Opinion
2:21-CV-00870-CB-CRE
08-04-2022
JUSTIN M. MILLER, Plaintiff, v. LAURA WILLIAMS, CHIEF DEPUTY WARDEN OF MEDICAL SERVICES; SGT GILLESPIE, CORRECTIONS OFFICER WAGNER, MEGAN LEBAKKEN, MENTAL HEALTH SPECIALIST; Defendants,
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Cynthia Reed Eddy, Chief United States Magistrate Judge
I. Recommendation
This prisoner civil rights action was initiated in this court on July 12, 2021, by pro se Plaintiff Justin Miller. In his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), Plaintiff has set forth claims against Defendants Laura Williams, Chief Deputy Warden of Medical Services; Sergeant Gillespie; Corrections Officer Wagner; and Mental Health Specialist Megan Lebakken, asserting causes of action against them pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. FAC (ECF No. 33). This court has subject matter jurisdiction over the controversy pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Presently before the court is a motion by Defendants to dismiss the FAC pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (ECF No. 37). For the reasons that follow, it is respectfully recommended that Defendants' motion be granted in part and denied in part.
II. Report
A. Factual and Procedural History
This matter involves Plaintiff's incarceration and treatment in the Allegheny County Jail (“ACJ”) from December 12-18, 2020, which this Court summarized based upon the facts set forth in the FAC. FAC (ECF No. 33) at 7-11. According to Plaintiff, around 1:00 p.m. on December 12, 2020, he informed a corrections officer that he was suicidal. Id. at 7. Plaintiff asserts that he then informed Mental Health Specialist Michelle Kovalick and Defendant Gillespie that he was suicidal. Id. At that point, Gillespie then had Plaintiff change into a suicide gown, and his cell was cleared. Plaintiff inquired as to why he was not being taken to the mental health pod, and asserts that he was informed there was no room. Id. Kovalick informed Plaintiff he would be staying in solitary confinement under close observation, which, according to Plaintiff, was to include 15-minute observation rounds. Id. In addition, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Williams was “alerted due to her being in charge of all Mental Health Pods.” Id. Plaintiff claims he continued to plead to Defendants Williams and Gillespie for “help,” and he also informed them that the 15-minute observation rounds were not being done. Id.
The next morning, December 13, 2020, at 9:30 a.m., a “Psychiatrist PA Susan Mundy” spoke with Plaintiff. Id. at 8. Plaintiff informed her that he was “being mistreated” and that the 15-minute rounds were not being completed. Id. Nevertheless, Plaintiff asserts that rounds continued were still not being done at 15-minute intervals. Id. Specifically, Plaintiff states that “staff would do rounds upwards of 30 [minutes] between.” Id. On December 14, 2020, at 11:00 a.m., Plaintiff was seen by “Psychiatrist PA Thomas Patts,” and he was removed from suicide watch. Id. at 9.
In the meantime, on December 12, 2020, at 11:30 a.m., Plaintiff refused the first meal of what would become a hunger strike. Plaintiff refused his fifth consecutive meal on December 13, 2020, at 3:30 p.m. Id. Plaintiff was seen by “PA Elon Mwaura” at 7:54 p.m. that evening.
By way of example, a Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) policy provides that “an inmate is considered to be on hunger strike if he communicates to staff, or staff observe that the inmate has refrained from eating for a period of time, ordinar[il]y in excess of 72 hours.” Graham v. Connors, 2020 WL 4284122, at *5 (M.D. Pa. July 27, 2020).
Plaintiff refused his meal the following morning and was again seen by Mwaura the at 10:29 a.m. Plaintiff then refused lunch and dinner that day, as well as his ninth meal, breakfast following morning. Plaintiff asserts that he should have been moved out of solitary confinement and into medical observation at that time, but he was not. Id. at 10. On the afternoon of December 15, 2020, Plaintiff was seen by a doctor, and Plaintiff informed the doctor he felt terrible and expressed concern for his health. Id. According to Plaintiff, Defendant Williams was notified of the situation at that time, but still did not move Plaintiff to a different unit. Id.
Shortly thereafter, another inmate was moved into Plaintiff's cell, and according to Plaintiff, “within 5 minutes [his] water was shut off from the water closet door outside [his] cell.” Id. Plaintiff claims his “toilet was filled with diarrhea, vomit, and urine.” Id. It is Plaintiff's position that this was ordered by Williams.
Later that evening, Plaintiff was moved for observation due to the hunger strike. Although Plaintiff states that throughout the day, he “asked Psychiatrist Thomas Patt” for medical help, he claims he was told that Williams told personnel “they weren't allowed to speak with [him] due to [his] being on a hunger strike.” Id. Plaintiff asserts that on December 17, 2020, at 12:30 a.m. he “was throwing up” and felt “dizzy.” He requested help and claims that “administration told staff to not speak to” him. Id.
Plaintiff references medical records from “RN Vincent O'Reilly.” FAC (ECF No. 33) at 10.
On December 18, 2020, at 9:30 a.m., Plaintiff was moved to another observation bubble, where Defendants Wagner and Lebakken were responsible for Plaintiff. Id. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Wagner “denied” him water and denied him access to medical help. Id. Plaintiff alerted Lebakken that his “toilet and water were off,” and that he needed medical help. Id. Plaintiff states that “she ignored” him. Id. Plaintiff ended his hunger strike at 5:00 p.m. that day and was transferred back to solitary confinement. Id.
Plaintiff claims that during this timeframe, Defendants were in violation of their own policies related to treatment of prisoners on suicide watch and hunger strikes. After his grievances were denied, Plaintiff instituted the instant action.
Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss the FAC (ECF No. 37) along with a brief in support thereof (ECF No. 38), in which they argue the FAC should be dismissed in its entirety for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff filed a brief in opposition to the motion. (ECF No. 56). Defendants have not filed a reply. The matter is now ripe for consideration.
C. Standard of Review
To survive dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The reviewing court must “determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008). Dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is proper where the factual allegations of the complaint conceivably fail to raise, directly or inferentially, the material elements necessary to obtain relief under a legal theory of recovery. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561. Thus, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). The factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated, with the court accepting all well-pleaded facts as true and disregarding all legal conclusions. Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130-31 (3d Cir. 2010). Under this standard, civil complaints “must contain more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009). A court in making this determination must ask “not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claim.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 583 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhoads, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974) (internal quotations omitted)).
In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court may take into consideration “the allegations contained in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint and matters of public record” as well as “undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the document.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993).
Furthermore, a pro se pleading is held to a less stringent standard than more formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). As such, a pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must be construed liberally, Hunterson v. DiSabato, 308 F.3d 236, 243 (3d Cir. 2002), so “as to do substantial justice.” Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 234 (3d Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). In a section 1983 action, the court must “apply the applicable law, irrespective of whether the pro se litigant has mentioned it by name.” Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002). Notwithstanding this liberality, pro se litigants are not relieved of their obligation to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal claim. See, e.g., Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002); Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 2102 (10th Cir. 1996).
D. Discussion
Because Plaintiff was a pre-trial detainee during this period of time, this Court considers Plaintiff's claims mindful of the following. “Claims by pre-trial detainees challenging their conditions of confinement are analyzed under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Burgos v. City of Philadelphia, 270 F.Supp.3d 788, 794 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (footnotes omitted). “The inquiry courts must make is whether the conditions amount to punishment of the detainee.” Reyes v. Kelsey, 2020 WL 1689781, at *3 (D.N.J. Apr. 7, 2020) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “Absent a showing that the condition was imposed with intent to punish, the determination courts must make is whether the condition is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective and whether it is excessive to that purpose.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
“A pretrial detainee's protection from punishment under the Fourteenth Amendment has been distinguished from a convicted prisoner's protection from punishment that is ‘cruel and unusual' under the Eighth Amendment.” Hall-Wadley v. Maint. Dep't, 386 F.Supp.3d 512, 516 (E.D. Pa. 2019). “Although it remains somewhat unclear as to what level of protection is afforded to pretrial detainees under certain claims, the Third Circuit has broadly held in the context of nonmedical conditions of confinement claims that pretrial detainees ‘are entitled to greater constitutional protection than that provided by the Eighth Amendment.'” Id. “Thus, cases that have analyzed convicted prisoners' constitutional deprivations under the Eighth Amendment are helpful, but only to the extent that they address the minimum level of constitutional protection required for pretrial detainees.” Id. at 517.
i. Claims related to the Suicide Watch Policy
Plaintiff first claims that his treatment by Defendants Gillespie and Williams violated the ACJ's suicide watch policy, which is a violation of Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment rights. FAC (ECF No. 33) at 7-9. According to Plaintiff, the failure of Defendants Gillespie and Williams to ensure that the 15-minute intervals were being followed while Plaintiff was on suicide watch rendered them deliberately indifferent. In their motion to dismiss this claim, Defendants contend, inter alia, that Plaintiff has failed to plead a viable constitutional claim because “Plaintiff has not stated a cognizable injury.” Defs.' Br. (ECF No. 38) at 5.
“In order to state a valid claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: 1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law, and 2) that the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Finney v. Palakovich, 2010 WL 3718022, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 20, 2010). “The defendant's conduct must have a causal connection to plaintiff's injury in order for § 1983 liability to attach.” Id.
Here, even if all of the facts related to Plaintiff's treatment while on suicide watch were true, and Defendants were supposed to check on Plaintiff every 15 minutes, and they did not, Plaintiff has not pleaded that he was injured in any respect. Plaintiff did not commit suicide, and has also not alleged he injured himself in attempt to do so. See Coit v. Luther, 2020 WL 4260765, at *9 (M.D. Pa. July 24, 2020) (holding that Plaintiff set forth a plausible Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim where Plaintiff alleged that prison official failed “to take steps to prevent him from injuring himself in his attempts to commit suicide”). Therefore, this Court respectfully recommends that Defendants' motion to dismiss claims related to violations of the suicide watch policy be dismissed because Plaintiff has not suffered an injury. Furthermore, because Plaintiff could not cure this defect at this juncture, it is respectfully recommended that leave to amend be denied.
Plaintiff specifically asserts that “[o]n 12-12-20 at around 1:00 pm [he] informed a c/o that [he] was suicidal.” FAC (ECF No. 33) at 7. At no point in the FAC does Plaintiff allege he actually attempted suicide.
Even if Plaintiff were to be able to demonstrate a cognizable injury, this Court would still respectfully recommend that Plaintiff's claim be dismissed. In cases that involve a pre-trial detainee and attempted suicide, the Third Circuit has directed that a District Court
specifically consider the three elements that plaintiffs in prison suicide cases bear the burden of establishing: “(1) the detainee had a ‘particular vulnerability to suicide,' (2) the custodial officer or officers knew or should have known of that vulnerability, and (3) those officers ‘acted with reckless indifference' to the detainee's particular vulnerability.” Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 946 F.2d 1017, 1023 (3d Cir.1991) (quoting Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 838 F.2d 663, 669 (3d Cir.1988)).Hinton v. Mark, 544 Fed.Appx. 75, 77 (3d Cir. 2013).
In the instant matter, Defendants placed Plaintiff on a suicide watch as soon as Plaintiff informed Defendants he was suicidal. Thus, Plaintiff must allege facts to demonstrate that Defendants acted with “reckless indifference” by failing to follow its own policy of checking on Plaintiff every 15 minutes.
“Failure to follow written procedures does not constitute per se deliberate indifference.” Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 345 (3d Cir. 2014), reversed on other grounds, Taylor v. Barkes, 575 U.S. 822 (U.S. 2015). According to Plaintiff, “[t]he entire staff would do rounds upwards of 30 mins. between.” FAC (ECF No. 33) at 8. Even if it is true that rounds were being conducted at an interval greater than the 15-minute interval provided for in the policy, “a violation of prison policy is insufficient by itself to support an argument for deliberate indifference.” Bracey v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 571 Fed.Appx. 75, 79 (3d Cir. 2014). Accordingly, Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate that prison officials acted with reckless indifference, and this Court respectfully recommends that claims related to the suicide-watch policy be dismissed.
Moreover, with respect to Defendant Williams, Plaintiff has failed to allege adequate personal involvement in this matter. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Williams had to be alerted, or that Defendant Gillespie had actually alerted Defendant Williams, to Plaintiff's being on suicide watch because she “was in charge of all mental health pods.” FAC (ECF No. 33) at 7. Plaintiff also asserts that he saw Defendant Williams in the same pod responding to a different matter, and therefore she should have heard Plaintiff's yelling for help. Id. “A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs; liability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.” Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). However,
there are two general ways in which a supervisor can be held liable for his own actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. First, a supervisor can be held liable when with “deliberate indifference to the consequences,” he establishes or maintains “a policy, practice, or custom which directly cause[s] [a] constitutional harm.” Barkes [], 766 F.3d [at] 316 [] (citing A.M. v. Luzerne County Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572 (3d Cir. 2004)), overruled on other grounds by Barkes, 135 S.Ct. 2042 (2015). Second, a supervisor may be personally liable under § 1983 if he “participated in violating the plaintiff's rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in charge, has knowledge of and acquiesced in the subordinate's unconstitutional conduct.” Id. (citations omitted).Neals v. Stromberg, 2020 WL 5088226, at *16 (D.N.J. Aug. 28, 2020). Here, Plaintiff has not alleged the policy itself was inadequate; thus, Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Williams cannot succeed on that basis. Moreover, even if the 30-minute intervals the staff was purportedly utilizing were unconstitutional, there are no facts to demonstrate that Defendant Williams, beyond her capacity as a supervisor, knew or should have known that was occurring.
ii. Claims related to the Hunger Strike
Plaintiff next asserts claims related to his self-imposed hunger strike. FAC (ECF No. 33) at 9-11. First, it is his contention that after he had refused numerous meals, he was ill and requested medical help, which he did not receive. Id. at 11. In addition, Plaintiff asserts that the water and toilet in his cell were shut off for a periods of time in order to “break” him. Id. This Court will consider each allegation.
a. Denial of Medical Care
Plaintiff makes a general allegation that he was refused medical care during his hunger strike. Specifically, on December 17, 2020, which was day five of Plaintiff's hunger strike, Plaintiff claims he felt sick, asked for medical care, and the night officer “said he can't do anything because [] administration told staff not to speak to” Plaintiff. FAC (ECF No. 33) at 11. Similarly, on the following day, Plaintiff informed Defendant Lebakken that he needed medical care, and she refused. Id.
As discussed supra, Plaintiff himself cites to numerous medical records and conversations with doctors during the first several days of his hunger strike.
“Delay or denial of medical care violates the Eighth Amendment where defendants are deliberately indifferent to a prisoner's serious medical need. Under any standard applicable here, governmental actors' intent must be greater than mere negligence for their alleged misconduct to support a constitutional claim.” Montgomery v. Aparatis Dist. Co., 607 Fed.Appx. 184, 187 (3d Cir. 2015).
In this case, Plaintiff's medical needs arose from his refusing to eat the food he was regularly offered. By Plaintiff's own admission, he was evaluated by medical individuals numerous times. FAC (ECF No. 33) at 9-10. In fact, after Plaintiff refused his eleventh meal, he was moved to a medical unit for observation. Id. at 10. Despite being on a medical unit, and being offered meals regularly, Plaintiff continued to refuse to eat and continued to ask for medical care because he was not feeling well. Id. at 10-11. Based on these allegations, there are no facts to support Plaintiff's claim that any medical care was actually denied or delayed, let alone that officials acted with deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need. In fact, the opposite appears to be true. Plaintiff was in a medical observation unit and was regularly offered food that he continued to refuse, which led to the symptoms about which he was complaining.
Based on the foregoing, this Court respectfully recommends that Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claim related to denial of medical care be granted. In addition, this Court respectfully recommends that Plaintiff be granted leave to amend his complaint should he be able to assert facts that would demonstrate that he was denied medical care for medical needs unrelated to his hunger strike.
b. Conditions of Confinement
A fair reading of the FAC reveals that Plaintiff claims prison officials twice utilized placing him in a dry cell, or limiting his access to water, in order to encourage Plaintiff to cease his hunger strike. First, on December 15, 2020, at 4:30 p.m., the “water and toilet were shut off” in Plaintiff's cell, and at 9:00 p.m. that night, Plaintiff was moved to medical observation. FAC (ECF No. 33) at 10. Second, on December 18, 2020, at 9:30 a.m., which was day six of Plaintiff's hunger strike, Plaintiff was moved to an observation bubble next to Defendant Wagner's desk. Id. at 11. Plaintiff states that his “water and toilet were shut off.” Id. Plaintiff then ended his hunger strike at 5:00 p.m. that day, and was transferred back to solitary confinement. Thus, accepting the facts set forth in the FAC as true, Plaintiff's existence without access to water occurred on two separate occasions for a total of twelve hours.
Plaintiff asserts that his “water and toilet were shut off.” FAC (ECF No. 33) at 11. It is not clear if Plaintiff means he was denied access to water, placed in a dry cell, or both. Reading the FAC as liberally as possible, this Court will construe Plaintiff's claim, at this juncture, as him having no access to water of any sort during these periods.
Plaintiff also avers that he refused meal 19 at noon that day. FAC (ECF No. 33) at 11.
When a pre-trial detainee claims that the conditions of his confinement violate his due process rights, the proper inquiry is whether those conditions [at issue] amount to punishment of the detainee. [The United States Supreme Court] established a two-prong standard for determining whether conditions of
confinement violate Due Process: whether the questioned restrictions and practices (1) “are rationally related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental purpose[,] and (2) whether they appear excessive in relation to that purpose. The first prong of the [] analysis requires a two-part inquiry, analyzing first, whether any legitimate purposes are served by [the] conditions [of confinement], and second, whether these conditions are rationally related to these purposes.Carson v. Mulvihill, 488 Fed.Appx. 554, 559-60 (3d Cir. 2012).
This Court first considers “whether any legitimate purposes are served by” keeping Plaintiff removing access to water, and “whether these conditions are rationally related to these purposes.” Carson, 488 Fed.Appx. at 560. It is Plaintiff's position that he was being punished in this way in order to encourage him to end his hunger strike. This Court recognizes that “even though administrative confinement in a dry cell is unpleasant and often unsanitary, so long as the conditions of that confinement are not foul or inhuman, and are supported by some penological justification, they will not violate the Eighth Amendment.” Thomas v. Tice, 948 F.3d 133, 139 (3d Cir. 2020).
For example, a District Court concluded that a pre-trial detainee's constitutional rights were not violated when he was held in a dry cell for three days “after he purposely flooded his cell” because there was a “legitimate penological interest in preventing [p]laintiff from flooding his cell again.” Collins v. Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst., 2021 WL 5827696, at *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 8, 2021). See also Reeves v. Hemsley, 2019 WL 2560133, at *12 (D.N.J. June 21, 2019) (“Reeves' placement in a dry cell for a one-day period to confirm his complaints of constipation, standing alone, does not violate the Constitution.”).
It does appear that the use of a dry cell, or limiting access to water, can be a tool used by prisons to end hunger strikes. For example, the Bureau of Prisons has a policy stating that the use of a dry cell can be utilized for inmates on a hunger strike. See Collier v. Adams, 2014 WL 65755, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 8, 2014), aff'd, 602 Fed.Appx. 850 (3d Cir. 2015) (The BOP “policy states that the cell should have water shut-off capabilities;” however, “actually shutting off the water to the room is discouraged for most inmates on hunger strike status.”). However, at this juncture, there is no evidence as to what the policy is at the ACJ and whether that policy was followed in this instance.
Thus, this Court respectfully recommends that Plaintiff is entitled to discovery to determine whether placement in a dry cell or removing access to water appropriately served a nonpunitive penological interest. Furthermore, discovery can be obtained on whether Plaintiff was offered or had drinking water during these short periods of time. This Court recognizes that the periods of time about which Plaintiff complains are very short, and likely do not rise to a duration necessary for an Eighth Amendment violation. Calhoun v. Wagner, 1997 WL 400043, at *4 (E.D. Pa. July 14, 1997) (“In determining whether an inmate has been deprived of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities, the court may consider the duration of the deprivation experienced by the prisoner.”). However, Plaintiff, as a pre-trial detainee, is entitled to more protection than what the Eighth Amendment offers; thus, at this juncture, this Court respectfully recommends that Plaintiff be permitted to proceed with this claim.
Having recommended this claim should proceed, this Court now consider against which Defendants Plaintiff may proceed. Plaintiff claims that Defendant Williams “ordered” the water to be turned off to “break” Plaintiff. FAC (ECF No. 33) at 10. Plaintiff also claims that Defendant Wagner “denied” Plaintiff water. Id. at 11. With respect to Defendant Lebakken, Plaintiff asserts that she ignored his requests for help when he did not have access to water. Plaintiff claims that Defendant Lebakken “said they don't help inmates on hunger strikes.” Id. Thus, Plaintiff has asserted allegations of personal involvement as to all three of these Defendants. Accordingly, this Court respectfully recommends that Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's conditions-of-confinement hunger strike claim be denied, and that Plaintiff be permitted to proceed against Defendants Williams, Wagner, and Lebakken.
D. Conclusion
For all the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Defendants' motion to dismiss be granted in part and denied in part. Specifically, Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claims related to his suicide watch should be dismissed with prejudice as to all Defendants. Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claim related to the denial of medical care should be dismissed without prejudice as to Defendants Williams, Wagner, and Lebakken, and Plaintiff should be permitted to amend his complaint. Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim should proceed against Defendants Williams, Wagner, and Lebakken only. Defendant Gillespie should be dismissed with prejudice.
Pursuant to the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Civil Rules, the Plaintiff, because he is a non-electronically registered party, must file objections to this Report and Recommendation by August 22, 2022, and Defendants are allowed until August 18, 2022, to file objections. Failure to timely file objections will constitute a waiver of any appellate rights. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011). Any party opposing objections may file their objections and any response to the initial objections within fourteen (14) days thereafter in accordance with Local Civil Rule 72.