Opinion
C. A. 6:23-cv-05150-DCC-KFM
01-16-2024
Quinteris Z. Miller, Plaintiff, v. Bryan Stirling, Dominic Boccabello, A.W. Werts, Pamela Hough, D. Anderson, Cleve Awtry, A. Hester, Defendants.
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
KEVIN F. MCDONALD, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and submit findings and recommendations to the district court.
The plaintiff's complaint was entered on the docket on October 16, 2023 (doc. 1). By order filed December 11, 2023, the plaintiff was informed that his complaint was subject to summary dismissal because it failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and that he could attempt to cure the defects identified in his complaint by filing an amended complaint within 14 days (doc. 13). The plaintiff was informed that if he failed to file an amended complaint or otherwise cure the deficiencies outlined in the order, the undersigned would recommend that his case be dismissed (id. at 6). On December 27, 2023, the plaintiff's amended complaint was entered on the docket (doc. 16). However, upon review of the plaintiff's amended complaint, the undersigned recommends that this matter be summarily dismissed.
ALLEGATIONS
The plaintiff, a state prisoner currently in the custody of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”) and located at Perry Correctional Institution (“Perry”), filed this action seeking damages from the defendants (doc. 16). The plaintiff alleges that his rights have been violated by the defendants (id.). The plaintiff alleges that he wishes to grow his hair long as part of his religion and gender identity (id. at 2). He further contends that the grooming policy violates his equal protection rights because as a heterosexual inmate he is not allowed to grow his hair long, but homosexual and transgender inmates are allowed to have their hair at whatever length they desire (id. at 1-2). The plaintiff contends that Dir. Stirling is responsible for the discriminatory grooming policy because he spoke with Dir. Stirling about it (id.).
The plaintiff also alleges that his rights have been violated because he has been labeled as a Security Threat Group (“STG”) gang member by defendants A/W Werts, Sgt. Boccabello, Off. Anderson, Sgt. Awtry, Sgt. Hester, and Ms. Hough (id.). The plaintiff contends that being labeled as an STG gang member means that he has restricted visitation privileges, and cannot be on a level one or two prison yard (id.). For relief, the plaintiff seeks money damages (id.).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous or malicious,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, the plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and “seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, even if the plaintiff had prepaid the full filing fee, this Court is charged with screening the plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the complaint if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
As a pro se litigant, the plaintiff's pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
This complaint is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
DISCUSSION
As noted above, the plaintiff filed the instant action pursuant to § 1983, seeking damages and injunctive relief from the defendants. However, the plaintiff's amended complaint is subject to summary dismissal.
Custody Status Claim
The plaintiff alleges violations of his rights because he has been labeled as an STG inmate, which limits his access to visitation and the “level two or one prison yard.” (doc. 16 at 2). However, even as amended, this claim is subject to dismissal because prisoners generally do not have a constitutionally recognized liberty interest in a particular security classification or prison placement. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983) (finding no constitutional right under the due process clause to a particular security classification or prison placement), overruled in part on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). Indeed, as noted by the Supreme Court, a change in a prisoner's conditions of confinement only gives rise to a federally-protected liberty interest if it “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483, 485 (finding no liberty interest when inmate placed in segregated confinement). Here, the plaintiff's only alleged hardships are that he has limited access to visitation and that he cannot be on a “level two or one yard” (doc. 16 at 2). However, these conditions fall far short of the level of an atypical or significant hardship. Indeed, the plaintiff is not constitutionally entitled to visitation privileges. See Ky. Dep't ov Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 461 (1989) (finding no constitutionally protected right to unlimited visitation); Conn v. Stolle, et al., C/A No. 1:11-cv-00758-CMH-TCB, 2011 WL 3321136, at *3 (E.D. Va. July 29, 2011) (finding no constitutional right to watch television and recognizing that prisoners do not have a direct constitutional right to visitation). Further, the Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, and only deprivations denying the “minimal civilized measure of life's necessities are sufficiently grave to provide the basis” of a § 1983 claim. Shakka v. Smith, 71 F.3d 162, 166 (4th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing and partially quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991). As such, the plaintiff's claim that his rights were violated when he was labeled as an STG inmate are subject to summary dismissal.
Grooming Policy Claim
The plaintiff also asserts that he is subject to a discriminatory grooming policy based on his religion and gender identity (doc. 16 at 1-2). However, as set forth below, these claims are subject to summary dismissal based on res judicata and for failure to state a claim.
The plaintiff's grooming policy claims are barred by res judicata
In the instant matter, the plaintiff seeks to re-litigate grooming policy claims that have already been adjudicated and decided adversely to him by this Court. Under the doctrine of claim preclusion-or res judicata-a final judgment on the merits of an action bars the parties from re-litigating the issues that were or could have been raised in the prior action. See Pueschel v. United States, 369 F.3d 345, 354 (4th Cir. 2004). In order for res judicata to apply, there must have been (1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit; (2) the identity of the cause of action in both suits; and (3) the same parties or their privies in the two suits. Id. at 354-55 (citing Nash Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Biltmore Co., 640 F.2d 484, 486 (4th Cir. 1981)); see Orca Yachts L.L.C. v. Mollicam, Inc., 287 F.3d 316, 318 (4th Cir. 2002) (noting that claim preclusion applies when there has been a valid and final judgment-even if the matter was not actually litigated (quoting In re Varat Enters., Inc., 81 F.3d 1310, 1315 (4th Cir. 1996)). In evaluating whether the same cause of action is brought in both suits, the court ascertains whether the claim in the new litigation “arises out of the same transaction or series of transactions as the claim resolved by the prior judgment.” Pittston Co. v. United States, 199 F.3d 694, 704 (4th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Harnett v. Billman, 800 F.2d 1308, 1313 (4th Cir. 1986)). Here, the plaintiff again alleges that the defendants have violated his rights by enforcing an allegedly discriminatory grooming policy against him (doc. 16). The plaintiff has already brought claims regarding the alleged discriminatory grooming policy - based both upon his religion and his gender identity - and those claims were dismissed with prejudice. See Miller v. Labador, et al., C/A No. 6:23-cv-01289-DCC-KFM, 2024 WL 63665 (D.S.C. Jan. 5, 2024). Accordingly, the plaintiff's claims in this case regarding the alleged discriminatory grooming policy are barred by res judicata.
First Amendment Claim
The plaintiff alleges that the defendants have violated his First Amendment rights because he would like to keep his hair long as part of his unspecified religion (doc. 16). The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise” of religion. U.S. Const. amend. I. Known as the free exercise clause, this provision guarantees citizens the right to freely exercise their religious beliefs without government interference. To state a free exercise claim under the First Amendment, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to show that he held a sincere religious belief and that the official action or regulation substantially burdened his exercise of that belief. Hernandez v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989). Here, the plaintiff has not identified a specific religion and only vaguely alleges that he would like to grow his hair long because of his religion (doc. 16 at 1-2). Additionally, although the plaintiff alleges that he spoke with Dir. Stirling about wanting to keep his hair long (id.), he does not allege that he requested to be excused from the grooming policy based on his religion, and has failed to allege that such a request was denied. Nevertheless, prison policies that substantially burden an inmate's ability to practice his religion can withstand a First Amendment challenge when the policy is “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” OLone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Courts have held that grooming policies, such as the one in question, are reasonably related to legitimate penological interests in security, staff safety, inmate identification, and inmate health. See Ragland v. Angelone, 420 F.Supp.2d 507, 515-17 (W.D. Va. 2006). As such, in addition to res judicata, the plaintiff's First Amendment claim is also subject to summary dismissal for failure to state a claim.
Fourteenth Amendment Claim
The plaintiff also alleges that his equal protection rights are being violated because homosexual and transgender inmates are allowed to have their hair whatever length they desire and he has to keep his hair short as a heterosexual male inmate (doc. 16 at 1-2). The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourth Circuit has held that
[t]o succeed on an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must first demonstrate that he has been treated differently from others with whom he is similarly situated and that the unequal treatment was the result of intentional or purposeful discrimination. Once this showing is made, the court proceeds to determine whether the disparity in treatment can be justified under the requisite level of scrutiny.Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 2001) (internal citations omitted). Here, even as amended, the plaintiff has not alleged that he is similarly situated to homosexual or transgender inmates who are allowed to keep their hair long for purposes of his equal protection claim. For example, the plaintiff - an STG inmate currently housed at Perry -has not alleged that there are other STG inmates at Perry who identify as homosexual or transgender that are allowed to have their hair at whatever length they desire. Further, the plaintiff is not similarly situated to homosexual or transgender inmates who are in general population because of his status as an STG inmate. See Green v. Sterling, C/A No. 0:22-cv-01634-SAL, 2023 WL 6357991, at *3-4 (D.S.C. Sept. 29, 2023) (noting that an inmate housed in restricted housing is not similarly situated to inmates housed in general population for purposes of an equal protection claim). As such, in addition to res judicata, the plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claim is also subject to summary dismissal for failure to state a claim.
RECOMMENDATION
By order issued December 11, 2023, the undersigned gave the plaintiff an opportunity to correct the defects identified in his complaint and further warned the plaintiff that if he failed to file an amended complaint or failed to cure the identified deficiencies, the undersigned would recommend to the district court that the action be dismissed with prejudice and without leave for further amendment. Despite filing an amended complaint, the plaintiff has not cured the deficiencies identified in the order dated December 11,2023 (doc. 13). Therefore, the undersigned recommends that the district court dismiss this action with prejudice, without further leave to amend, and without issuance and service of process. See Britt v. DeJoy, 45 F.4th 790, 791 (4th Cir. 2022) (published) (noting that “when a district court dismisses a complaint or all claims without providing leave to amend . . . the order dismissing the complaint is final and appealable”). The attention of the parties is directed to the important notice on the following page.
The plaintiff is warned that if the United States District Judge assigned to this matter adopts this report and recommendation, the dismissal of this action for failure to state a claim could later be deemed a strike under the three-strikes rule. See Pitts v. South Carolina, 65 F.4th 141 (4th Cir. 2023).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committees note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
250 East North Street, Room 2300
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).