Opinion
May 26, 1941.
1. — Paupers — Old Age Assistance — Construction. Language "Cash or negotiable" used in statute making owner of cash or negotiable security in sum of $500 or more ineligible for social security benefits construed to mean currency, whether in United States legal tender or negotiable paper, and the word "negotiable" as used therein has no broader significance than it has in other legislative enactments where word is used.
2. — Paupers. Though applicant might realize upon life insurance policy by surrender and cancellation of policy; by pledging policy as security for loan, or by proper assignment thereof not inconsistent with provisions of policy, held not to make such insurance policy "negotiable security" within terms of statute making ineligible for social security benefits owner of cash or negotiable security in sum of $500.00 or more.
3. — Paupers — Words and Phrases. To render any class of security negotiable, within provisions of social security benefit statute, there must be something in the general characteristics of such security as to bring same within the meaning of "negotiable" as defined as "capable of being negotiated, transferable in the ordinary course of business, transferable by delivery with or without endorsements; as negotiable instruments on paper."
4. — Paupers. Life policy, having cash surrender value of more than $500 held not "cash or negotiable security" within terms of statute making owner of "cash or negotiable security" in sum of $500 or more ineligible for social security benefits.
5. — Paupers. Insurance policy on life of applicant for benefits under social security law held "property" within terms thereof making owner or possessor of property of any kind in excess of $1500 ineligible for benefits.
6. — Paupers. In computing value of life policy issued to applicant for social security benefits as property within provision of social security statute, the value of policy is to be treated in the same manner as any kind or character of property.
Appeal from Circuit Court of Buchanan County. — Hon. Sam Wilcox, Judge.
AFFIRMED.
Roy McKittrick and B. Richards Creech counsel for appellant.
(1) The court erred in finding for this claimant for the reason that he owned and possessed a life insurance policy having a cash surrender value of over $500 viz., $683.53. Laws of Missouri, Sec. 11, Subdivision 2, State Social Security Act, p. 739; Wallace v. Woods 192 S.W.2d 91, 95; Nudelman v. Thimbles, 40 S.W.2d 475, 477; Websters Unabridged Dictionary; Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure; 2 Daniel on Negotiable Instruments (5 Ed.), p. 717; Baldwin v. Baldwin (N.J. Case), 151 A. 741, 742; Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 3rd Rev., Vol. 3; Farleigh v. Fidelity National Bank Trust Co., 335 Mo. 360, 368; Industrial Loan Investment Co. v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 222 Mo. App. 1228; Mead v. McLaughlin, et al., 42 Mo. 198; Couch, Vol. 6, Cyc. on Insurance Laws, p. 5188, Sec. 1458; Odell v. Frank Gray Co., 15 Mo. 337, 342; Miller v. State Social Security Commission, 138 S.W.2d 750, 761, par. 1 and 2; Narissa Belle Chapman v. The State Social Security Commission of Missouri, Case No. 19793 (Mo. App.); N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Wright, 88 S.W.2d 403, 408, Par. 3; In Re Greenspan, 8 Federal Suppl., 582, 583.
Melvin J. Duvall for respondent.
(1) The question in this case is whether or not the cash surrender value of a life insurance policy constitutes cash or negotiable security; under Section 11, Sub-section 2 under the State Social Security Act, page 739, Laws of 1939. It is necessary to determine the intention of the Legislature. Sec. 11, sub-division 2, p. 739, Laws of 1939, which is a part of the State Social Security Act, reads as follows. "Benefits shall not be payable to any person who: (1) . . . . . (2) Owns or possesses cash or negotiable security in the sum of $500.00 or more." If the Legislature intended for an insurance policy to be a bar for one who applies for old age assistance or pension; it would have been very easy for it to have said so. (3) Sec. 2630 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri, 1929, as to the requirements of negotiable instruments reads as follows. Insured cannot assign such a policy without the consent of the beneficiary. 29 Am. Jur., p. 403, sec. 493. An insurance policy payable to the heirs of the insured cannot be assigned. 29 Am. Jur., p. 403, sec. 493; Yore v. Booth, 110 Cal. 238, 42, p. 808, 52 Am. Rep. 81; Gosling v. Caldwell (Tenn.), 1 Lea 454, 27 Am. Rep. 774. Any assignment of a policy or certificate to a person having no insurable interest in the insured life shall render such assignments void and of no effect. Sec. 5751, Rev. St. 1929.
This is an appeal duly taken by the State Social Security Commission from the judgment of the Circuit Court of Buchanan County, Missouri, which reversed and remanded the action of the Commission in denial of relief to the respondent, William M. Miller.
The record clearly discloses that the applicant Miller was denied relief by act of the Commission on the sole ground that he had a life insurance policy with a cash surrender value of over $500.
The circuit court, on appeal from the act of the Commission, made finding, judgment and decree as follows:
"The finding of this court is that the cash surrender valuation of a life insurance policy does not constitute cash or negotiable security under Section 11, subsection 2 of the State Social Security Act, page 739, Laws of 1939.
"The court finds that the award of decision of the State Social Security Commission in denying this plaintiff benefits was arbitrary and unreasonable and remands this cause to the State Social Security Commission for a redetermination."
The appealing Commission urges that "the Court erred in finding for the Plaintiff for the reason that Plaintiff owned or possessed cash or negotiable security over the sum of $500 within the meaning of section 11, subsection 2 of the State Social Security Act, Laws of 1939, page 739, viz., the sum of $683.53 as represented by the cash surrender value of a life insurance policy."
There is no question but what the applicant in this case is entitled by reason of age and physical infirmity unless he be adjudged to come within a class excluded by the statutes. Section 9406, Chapter 52, Article 1, Revised Statutes Missouri 1939, sets forth as to both eligibility and non-eligibility of applicants.
As to non-eligibles, the statute states as follows:
"(1) Has made an assignment or transfer of property for the purpose of rendering himself eligible for benefits.
"(2) owns or possesses cash or negotiable security in the sum of $500.00 or more;
"(3) owns or possesses property of any kind or character in excess of $1,500.00, or who has an interest in property the value of which exceeds said amount;
"(4) is married and actually living with husband or wife, if the value of his or her property together with that of such husband or wife exceeds $2,000.00;
"(5) is an inmate of any public institution at the time of receiving benefits. An inimate of such an institution may, however, make application for such benefits, which if granted, shall not begin until after he or she ceases to be an inmate.
"(6) has earning capacity, income, or resources, whether such income or resources is received from some other person or persons, gifts of otherwise, sufficient to meet his needs for a reasonable subsistence compatible with decency and health."
In the hearing before the Commission, Gertrude Cope, employed by the Commission as Case Work Supervisor, testified that she had written to the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company of New York and asked as to the cash surrender value of the life policy the applicant had with that company. In reply that company sent an itemized cash value quotation. This document was introduced in evidence and showed a total balance payable of $683.53.
Upon the above showing, the appealing Commission contends that the applicant "owns and possesses cash or negotiable security in the sum of $500.00 or more," and is therefore ineligible under subdivision (2), supra.
In construing the language "cash or negotiable" we conclude it to mean, that if the claimant has either cash in a sum of $500 or more, or has negotiable paper of the value of $500 or more, or if applicant's cash and negotiable paper when added together amounts to $500 or more, then the applicant is ineligible. In other words, currency, whether in United States legal tender or negotiable paper suffices.
We conclude that the word "negotiable" as used in the legislative enactment has no broader significance in its context herein than it has in other legislative enactments where the word is used.
The appellant's brief contains language as follows:
"Webster's Unabridged Dictionary defines `negotiable' as follows:
"`Capable of being negotiated, transferable in the ordinary course of business, transferable by delivery, with or without endorsements; as negotiable instruments on paper.'"
The applicant's insurance policy according to the evidence can be cashed by surrender and cancellation of the policy. Ordinarily a life insurance policy may be put up and pledged as security. Usually one having a life insurance policy has a right to realize on same by a proper assignment not inconsistent with some provision of the contract. Such rights are common to property in general. However, such rights are no more potent in rendering an insurance policy "negotiable security" than it would other property.
To render any class of security negotiable, there must be something in the general characteristics of such security as to bring same within the meaning of negotiable, as defined, supra.
A policy issued under the assessment plan has statutory restrictions on assignment. [Sec. 5862, R.S. 1939.] The customary methods of cancellation for cash value and the customary method of transferring interest in life policies are contrary to the common and accepted meaning of the term "negotiable."
We conclude that life insurance policies are not included in the exclusion clause (2) supra. We further conclude that life insurance policies come within classification (3) supra. In other words, a life insurance policy is property and in computing under exclusion clause (3) supra, the value of the policy is to be treated in the same manner as any kind or character of property.
The evidence before us is conclusive to the effect that the value of the home owned by applicant, together with all other property, including the policy, is not in excess of $1500.
Judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. All concur.