Nos. 05-08-00516-CR, 05-08-00517-CR, 05-08-00518-CR, 05-08-00519-CR, 05-08-00520-CR
Opinion issued April 28, 2009. DO NOT PUBLISH Tex. R. App. P. 47.
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 4, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause Nos. F03-49397-UK, F03-54187-TK, F05-49578-VSK, F06-65938-K, F08-51585-UK.
Before Justices WRIGHT, BRIDGES, and FRANCIS.
Opinion By Justice BRIDGES.
Virginia Sue Miller a/k/a Dorothy Jean Ridley appeals from five convictions for prostitution. In thirteen points of error, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion (1) in revoking her community supervision, (2) by not specifying which allegations it found proved, and (3) by violating the objectives of the penal code in assessing prison sentences. In each case, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
In cause no. 05-08-00518-CR, appellant was indicted under the name Dorothy Jean Ridley. During the plea hearing, appellant testified her true name is Virginia Sue Miller. In all of the five cases, the written judgments reflect appellant's true name.
Background
In cause nos. 05-08-00516-CR through 05-08-00519-CR, appellant waived a jury and entered pleas of guilty or nolo contendere to offenses of prostitution with three or more prior prostitution convictions. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 43.02(a), (c) (Vernon 2003). In each case, the trial court assessed probated punishment. The State later moved to revoke appellant's community supervision in each case, alleging she violated the supervision terms by committing a new prostitution offense. Appellant pleaded true to the allegations in a hearing on the motions. The trial court found the allegations true, revoked appellant's community supervision, and assessed punishment at four years' imprisonment in three cases and two years' confinement in a state jail facility in one case. In cause no. 05-08-00520-CR, the new prostitution offense, appellant waived a jury and entered an open guilty plea to prostitution with three or more prior prostitution convictions. The trial court assessed punishment, enhanced by prior felony convictions, at four years' imprisonment. Applicable Law
Appellate review of an order revoking community supervision is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion. See Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006). In determining questions concerning sufficiency of the evidence in probation revocation cases, the burden of proof is by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. An order revoking probation must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence, meaning the greater weight of the credible evidence which would create a reasonable belief that the defendant has violated a condition of probation. Id. at 763-64. A finding of a single violation of community supervision is sufficient to support revocation. See Sanchez v. State, 603 S.W.2d 869, 871 (Tex.Crim.App. 1980); Leach v. State, 170 S.W.3d 669, 672 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2005, pet. ref'd.). Thus, in order to prevail, appellant must successfully challenge all the findings that support the revocation order. See Jones v. State, 571 S.W.2d 191, 193-94 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1978); Harris v. State, 160 S.W.3d 621, 626 (Tex.App.-Waco 2005, no pet.). Discussion
In points of error one, three, five, and seven, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion in revoking her community supervision. Appellant asserts she should have received continued probation rather than prison sentences. The State responds the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking appellant's community supervision. In its motions to revoke, the State alleged appellant violated the terms of her community supervision by committing the new prostitution offense. No other violations were recited in the motions. During the hearing on the motions, appellant pleaded true to committing a new prostitution offense. A plea of true, standing alone, supports revocation of community supervision. See Cole v. State, 578 S.W.2d 127, 128 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1979). Appellant's signed judicial confessions and stipulations of evidence were admitted into evidence. Moreover, appellant testified she was a "pure alcoholic" and was "trying to get something to drink" when she committed the offense. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the State's motions and revoking appellant's community supervision. See Rickels, 202 S.W.3d at 763-64. We overrule appellant's first, third, fifth, and seventh point of error. In points of error two, four, six, and eight, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion because it did not specify which conditions of community supervision had been violated. Appellant asserts the judgments failed to satisfy the minimum requirements of due process because they fail to specify the allegations the trial court found true. The State responds that appellant did not request that specific findings be included in the judgments, and the trial court is not required to make specific findings. In the absence of a request for specific findings, the trial court's failure to make specific findings in the order revoking community supervision is not error. See King v. State, 649 S.W.2d 42, 46 (Tex.Crim.App. 1983). Appellant did not request specific findings. Moreover, the motions to revoke are included in the record, and the judgments recite the trial court found the sole allegation in each motion had been proven. We overrule appellant's second, fourth, sixth, and eighth point of error. In points of error nine through thirteen, appellant contends the trial court violated the objectives of the Texas Penal Code by sentencing her to prison terms rather than continuing her community supervision because the sentences were not necessary to prevent the recurrence of the alleged offenses. Appellant asserts the evidence shows she suffers from an alcohol addiction and is a good candidate for continued probation. The State responds that appellant has failed to preserve her complaints for appellate review and, alternatively, the trial court properly exercised its discretion in assessing appellant's sentences. Appellant did not complain about the sentences either at the time they were imposed or in motions for new trial. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1); Castaneda v. State, 135 S.W.3d 719, 723 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.). Moreover, the trial court imposed punishment within the statutory ranges for the offenses. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. §§ 12.33, 12.35 (Vernon 2003); Kirk v. State, 949 S.W.2d 769, 772 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1997, pet. ref'd). We conclude the trial court did not err in assessing the sentences. See Jackson v. State, 680 S.W.2d 809, 814 (Tex.Crim.App. 1984). We overrule appellant's ninth through thirteenth points of error. In each case, we affirm the trial court's judgment.