Opinion
16-P-845
03-08-2017
James G. MILLER v. C. Thomas SEDDON& another.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
On cross motions for summary judgment, a Superior Court judge held that, based on the undisputed factual record, the plaintiff had established an easement by estoppel over land owned by the defendants. See Murphy v. Mart Realty of Brockton, Inc ., 348 Mass. 675, 677-678 (1965) ; Blue View Constr., Inc . v. Franklin , 70 Mass. App. Ct. 345, 355 (2007). See also G. L. c. 183, § 15, inserted by St. 1912, c. 502, § 1. We affirm.
"In a conveyance of real estate all rights, easements, privileges and appurtenances belonging to the granted estate shall be included in the conveyance, unless the contrary shall be stated in the deed, and it shall be unnecessary to enumerate or mention them either generally or specifically."
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On appeal, the defendants do not dispute the operative facts as recited in the motion judge's memorandum or otherwise claim there exists any material issue of genuinely disputed fact. We accordingly draw the facts from the judge's excellent memorandum. The three lots at issue were at one time held in common ownership by one Francis J. Quirico, as trustee (trustee). In 1951, the trustee conveyed what the parties refer to as Lot 1 to Raymond F. Nealon. The deed out of the trustee recites that Lot 1 was bounded to the east by parcel A, which the trustee retained, and to the north by a certain right of way. This way, shown on the deed's accompanying and incorporated plot map, runs eastward from Birch Grove Drive, acts as Lot 1's northern boundary, and continues through the whole of parcel A to that parcel's eastern-most property line. The motion judge held, and the Seddons do not argue otherwise, that this deed and map created an easement by estoppel over the way, granting access rights over the way's entire length to all those owning property along it. Thus, as of 1951, both Lot 1 and parcel A held easement rights over the way.
In 1956, the trustee conveyed his remaining land, including parcel A, to Donald A. Hall, as trustee for the benefit of James J. Quirico. In 1965, Hall conveyed that portion of parcel A containing and north of the right of way to Mario A. Allessio and Florence R. Allessio; the parties refer to this portion as Lot 2. In 1970, Hall conveyed that portion of former parcel A to the south of the way to James J. Quirico; the parties refer to this portion as Lot 3. The Seddons, through a series of conveyances, eventually came to own both Lots 1 and 2. Miller, through another series of conveyances, eventually came to own Lot 3 in 2004.
Since acquiring Lot 3, Miller has been using the way to access his driveway. More recently, the Seddons have been attempting to block Miller's use of the way. The motion judge held that when the common grantor, the trustee, deeded out Lot 1 in 1951, he created an access easement over the way benefitting those properties along the way, including Lots 2 and 3 (which originally made up parcel A). Although none of the deeds subsequent to the 1951 deed from the trustee to Nealon for Lot 1 mentioned the way or easements, those terms were, pursuant to G. L. c. 183, § 15, incorporated into those deeds. See note 2, supra . The judge therefore went on to hold, in essence, that because the Seddons' deeds incorporate, pursuant to § 15 and the authority noted above, the way and easement benefitting, relevant here, Miller's Lot 3, the Seddons are estopped from denying that easement.
To the extent we understand it, the Seddons argue that only "grantors" may be estopped from denying easements and that, therefore, neither they nor their title predecessors are estopped because they took title as "grantees." The Seddons cite to us no authority supporting this proposition which, among other things, ignores the simple reality that once Nealon and Hall in turn passed title they themselves became "grantors" and were, under the authorities cited above and in the absence of any "contrary" language in the deed, see G. L. c. 183, § 15, estopped to deny the way and easement rights. And so on down the title chain leading to the Seddons and Miller. More importantly, if accepted, the Seddons' proposition would, without logic or compelling reason, effectively abrogate § 15 and turn long-settled decisional law on its head. The motion judge did not err.
Judgment affirmed .