A party to a contract does not repudiate its obligations under that contract by refusing to do that which the contract forbids it from doing. Cf. Miller v. Schwinn, 113 F.2d 748, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1940). And third, if it is determined that Standard Fire was bound to provide building coverage under the contract, it must be determined whether its refusal to perform that obligation was unequivocal and went to the "very essence of the contract."
Knowledge of the existence of an outstanding encumbrance may be the very reason for insisting on a covenant against it. Bossieux v. Shapiro, 154 Va. 255, 261, 153 S.E. 667, 668; Scott v. Albemarle Horse Show, 128 Va. 517, 537, 104 S.E. 842, 848; Olcott v. Southworth, 115 Vt. 421, 63 A.2d 189; Miller v. Schwinn, 113 F.2d 748; Thackston v. Farm Bureau Lbr. Corp., 212 Ark. 47, 204 S.W.2d 897; Browne v. Taylor, 115 Tenn. 1, 88 S.W. 933, 112 Am. St. Rep. 811, 4 L.R.A. (N.S.) 309, and Anno. at p. 310; Lavey v. Graessle, 245 Mich. 681, 224 N.W. 436, 64 A.L.R. 1477, and Anno. at p. 1479; 21 C.J.S., Covenants, sec. 39, p. 909; 14 Am. Jur., Covenants, etc., sec. 100, p. 547. Moreover, parol evidence was not admissible to prove that the deed, which on its face conveyed the timber, was not intended to convey it; or that this encumbrance was intended to be excepted from the general terms of the covenants in the deed.