Miller v. Schwinn

2 Citing cases

  1. Studio Frames Ltd. v. Standard Fire Ins. Co.

    369 F.3d 376 (4th Cir. 2004)   Cited 31 times
    Holding that failure to submit a proof of loss within 60 days generally bars recovery except when the insurer repudiates SFIP coverage prior to the end of the 60-day limit

    A party to a contract does not repudiate its obligations under that contract by refusing to do that which the contract forbids it from doing. Cf. Miller v. Schwinn, 113 F.2d 748, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1940). And third, if it is determined that Standard Fire was bound to provide building coverage under the contract, it must be determined whether its refusal to perform that obligation was unequivocal and went to the "very essence of the contract."

  2. Adams v. Seymour

    191 Va. 372 (Va. 1950)   Cited 11 times
    Explaining that plaintiff's actual or constructive knowledge of an outstanding claim to the title of the plaintiff's property was "not a sufficient defense" to a suit for breach of covenants in a deed

    Knowledge of the existence of an outstanding encumbrance may be the very reason for insisting on a covenant against it. Bossieux v. Shapiro, 154 Va. 255, 261, 153 S.E. 667, 668; Scott v. Albemarle Horse Show, 128 Va. 517, 537, 104 S.E. 842, 848; Olcott v. Southworth, 115 Vt. 421, 63 A.2d 189; Miller v. Schwinn, 113 F.2d 748; Thackston v. Farm Bureau Lbr. Corp., 212 Ark. 47, 204 S.W.2d 897; Browne v. Taylor, 115 Tenn. 1, 88 S.W. 933, 112 Am. St. Rep. 811, 4 L.R.A. (N.S.) 309, and Anno. at p. 310; Lavey v. Graessle, 245 Mich. 681, 224 N.W. 436, 64 A.L.R. 1477, and Anno. at p. 1479; 21 C.J.S., Covenants, sec. 39, p. 909; 14 Am. Jur., Covenants, etc., sec. 100, p. 547. Moreover, parol evidence was not admissible to prove that the deed, which on its face conveyed the timber, was not intended to convey it; or that this encumbrance was intended to be excepted from the general terms of the covenants in the deed.