Miller v. Schwinn

1 Citing case

  1. Kayfirst Corp. v. Washington Terminal Co.

    813 F. Supp. 67 (D.D.C. 1993)   Cited 4 times

    In denying WMATA's Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court has determined that the footing is neither an easement nor a claim of easement that would bring it within General Exception 3. While an encumbrance has been defined as "every right to, or interest in the land granted, to the diminution of the value of the land, but consistent with the passing of the fee of it by the conveyance," Miller v. Schwinn, Inc., 113 F.2d 748, 751 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Sterling v. Blackwelder, 302 F. Supp. 1125, 1129 (E.D.Va. 1968), this definition is by no means all-inclusive. It has long been established that an encroachment may encumber title or render title unmarketable, particularly if the encroachment is substantial or interferes with the free development of the subject parcel. See Mid-State Homes, Inc. v. Brown, 47 Ala. App. 468, 256 So.2d 894, 897-99 (1972) (encroachment in the form of a fence rendered title unmarketable); Pasternack v. Alter, 123 A. 885, 885-86 (N.J.Ch. 1924) (encroachment of two inches of building on adjoining property rendered title unmarketable and "might well involve a suit in ejectment"); Glyn v. Title Guar. Trust Co., 132 A.D. 859, 117 N.Y.S. 424, 427-28 (1909) (encroachment of a stoop, pilaster, and door cap some nine inches onto plaintiff's property held to be an encumbrance within the coverage of plaintiff's title insurance policy); Kaplan v. Bergmann, 122 A.D. 876, 107 N.Y.S. 423, 424 (1907) (encroachment of u