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Miller v. Primo

United States District Court, N.D. New York
Sep 29, 2023
5:23-CV-1051 (BKS/ML) (N.D.N.Y. Sep. 29, 2023)

Opinion

5:23-CV-1051 (BKS/ML)

09-29-2023

DAISHAWN LAVON MILLER, doing business as Daishawn Lavon Miller Living Express Trust Plaintiff, v. DAVID PRIMO, Onondaga Family Court; SARAH G MERRICK, Title IV-D Agency; PATRICIA DeRUE, Onondaga Family Court; JEFFREY ALAN DOMACHOWSKI, Onondaga Family Court; and KELLY MURPHY, Director of Human Resources, Defendants.

DAISHAWN LAVON MILLER Plaintiff, Pro Se


DAISHAWN LAVON MILLER Plaintiff, Pro Se

ORDER AND REPORT-RECOMMENDATION

MIROSLAV LOVRIC U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

The Clerk has sent this pro se Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) together with an application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) (Dkt. No. 2), an Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 6), and an amended IFP application (Dkt. No. 7) filed by Daishawn Lavon Miller (“Plaintiff”) to the Court for review. For the reasons discussed below, I (1) deny Plaintiff's IFP application (Dkt. No. 2) as moot, (2) grant Plaintiff's amended IFP application (Dkt. No. 7), and (3) recommend that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 6) be dismissed in its entirety without prejudice (a) in part with leave to amend, and (b) in part without leave to amend.

I. BACKGROUND

On August 24, 2023, Plaintiff commenced this action by the filing of a pro se Complaint against Defendants David Primo, Sarah G Merrick, Patrick DeRue, and Jeffrey Alan Domachowski. (Dkt. No. 1.) On September 25, 2023, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint, as of right, which supersedes his original Complaint. (Dkt. No. 6); Int'l Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 556 F.2d 665, 668 (2d Cir. 1977) (“It is well established that an amended complaint ordinarily supersedes the original, and renders it of no legal effect.”). Thus, presently before the undersigned for review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, is Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. (Dkt. No. 6.)

Liberally construed, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint-which is on a form complaint alleging violations of civil rights-asserts that his rights were violated by Defendants David Primo, Sarah G Merrick, Patrick DeRue, Jeffrey Alan Domachowski, and Kelly Murphy (collectively “Defendants”), who were all involved in Plaintiff's state court family proceeding. (See generally Dkt. No. 6.)

The court must interpret pro se complaints to raise the strongest arguments they suggest. Soto v. Walker, 44 F.3d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994)).

The Amended Complaint is difficult to decipher and fails to provide sufficient factual information for the Court to review or for Defendants to have notice of the claims against them. (See generally Dkt. No. 6.) From what the undersigned can glean, Plaintiff appears to allege that Defendants refuse to terminate Plaintiff's child support obligation. (Id.) As relief, Plaintiff requests that this court terminate the child support order, reimburse him for all amounts paid, and award him damages in the amount of three times what has been garnished from his wages. (Dkt. No. 6 at 7.)

Plaintiff also filed an application to proceed IFP and an amended IFP application. (Dkt. Nos. 2, 7.)

II. PLAINTIFF'S APPLICATIONS TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

“When a civil action is commenced in a federal district court, the statutory filing fee, currently set at $402, must ordinarily be paid. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). A court is authorized, however, to permit a litigant to proceed IFP status if a party “is unable to pay” the standard fee for commencing an action. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). After reviewing Plaintiff's amended IFP application (Dkt. No. 7), the Court finds that Plaintiff meets this standard. Therefore, Plaintiff's amended application to proceed IFP is granted. In addition, Plaintiff's original application to proceed IFP is denied as moot. (Dkt. No. 2.)

The language of that section is ambiguous because it suggests an intent to limit availability of IFP status to prison inmates. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) (authorizing the commencement of an action without prepayment of fees “by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such prisoner possesses”). The courts have construed that section, however, as making IFP status available to any litigant who can meet the governing financial criteria. Hayes v. United States, 71 Fed.Cl. 366, 367 (Fed. Cl. 2006); Fridman v. City of N.Y., 195 F.Supp.2d 534, 536 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).

The Court notes that Section 1915(a)(1) does not set financial guideposts as standards for determining IFP eligibility. Although Plaintiff's income appears to be above the federal poverty guidelines (Dkt. No. 7 at ¶ 2), based on his monthly expenses (id. at ¶ 6) and support contributions for his minor children (id. at ¶ 7), I find that he has established-albeit barely- that he is “unable” to pay the filing fee, or that paying the filing fee would pose a “serious hardship.”

Plaintiff is reminded that, although his amended IFP application has been granted, he is still required to pay fees that he may incur in this action, including copying and/or witness fees.

III. LEGAL STANDARD FOR INITIAL REVIEW OF COMPLAINT

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

In determining whether an action is frivolous, the court must consider whether the complaint lacks an arguable basis in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Dismissal of frivolous actions is appropriate to prevent abuses of court process as well as to discourage the waste of judicial resources. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327; Harkins v. Eldridge, 505 F.2d 802, 804 (8th Cir. 1974); see Fitzgerald v. First East Seventh Street Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 364 (2d Cir. 2000) (a district court “may dismiss a frivolous complaint sua sponte even when the plaintiff has paid the required filing fee[.]”); see also Pflaum v. Town of Stuyvesant, Columbia Cnty., N.Y., 11-CV-0335, 2016 WL 865296, at *1, n.2 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2016) (Suddaby, C.J.) (finding that the Court had the power to address and dismiss additional theories of the plaintiff's retaliation claim sua sponte because those theories were so lacking in arguable merit as to be frivolous).

In order to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a complaint must contain, inter alia, “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). The requirement that a plaintiff “show” that he or she is entitled to relief means that a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (emphasis added) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 [2007]). “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . . requires the . . . court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense....[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not shown-that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (internal citation and punctuation omitted).

“In reviewing a complaint . . . the court must accept the material facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Hernandez v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). However, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Courts are “obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally.” Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009); see also Nance v. Kelly, 912 F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (reading the plaintiff's pro se complaint “broadly, as we must” and holding that the complaint sufficiently raised a cognizable claim). “[E]xtreme caution should be exercised in ordering sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint before the adverse party has been served and [the] parties . . . have had an opportunity to respond.” Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir. 1983).

IV. ANALYSIS

In addressing the sufficiency of a plaintiff's complaint, the court must construe his pleadings liberally. Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008). Having reviewed Plaintiff's Amended Complaint with this principle in mind, I recommend that all causes of action be dismissed.

Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Section 1983, which establishes a cause of action for “‘the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” German v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 885 F.Supp. 537, 573 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (citing Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983)) (footnote omitted). “Section 1983 itself creates no substantive rights, [but] . . . only a procedure for redress for the deprivation of rights established elsewhere.” Sykes v. James, 13 F.3d 515, 519 (2d Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). To establish liability under the statute, a plaintiff must plead that each government official defendant violated the Constitution through that official's own individual actions. Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609, 618 (2d Cir. 2020).

Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is largely incomprehensible and must be dismissed for three reasons.

A. Frivolous

First, Rule 8 of the Fed.R.Civ.P. requires a “short and plain statement” of a claim, showing that “the pleader is entitled to relief.” Whitfield v. Johnson, 763 Fed.Appx. 106, 107 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)). Each statement must be “simple, concise, and direct,' and must give ‘fair notice of the claims asserted.” Whitfield, 763 Fed.Appx. at 107 (quoting Simmons v. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 86 (2d Cir. 1995)). A pleading must also contain “a demand for the relief sought[.]” Id. “A complaint may be dismissed under Rule 8 if it is ‘so confused, ambiguous, or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.'” Id. Moreover, Rule 10 of the Fed.R.Civ.P. provides that “[a] party must state its claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances[.]” Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(b). Rule 10's purpose is to “provide an easy mode of identification for referring to a particular paragraph in a prior pleading[.]” Clervrain v. Robbins, 22-CV-1248, 2022 WL 17517312, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2022) (Stewart, M.J.) (citation omitted), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 3170384 (N.D.N.Y. May 1, 2023) (D'Agostino, J.). A complaint that does not comply with these Rules “presents far too heavy a burden in terms of defendants' duty to shape a comprehensive defense and provides no meaningful basis for the Court to assess the sufficiency of [the plaintiff's] claims,” and may properly be dismissed by the court. Gonzales v. Wing, 167 F.R.D. 352, 355 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (McAvoy, C.J.).

As it currently stands, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint wholly fails to provide fair notice of the claims he attempts to assert. Given its lack of clarity, the Court recommends dismissal of the Amended Complaint because it is not acceptable under Rules 8 and 10 of the Fed.R.Civ.P. and because Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims against Defendants are entirely unclear.

B. Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief May be Granted

Second, and in the alternative, I recommend that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint be dismissed because it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Due to the nature of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, it is difficult to precisely determine exactly which doctrine applies, but his claims are also likely barred. “[I]n the event the underlying state court proceedings are concluded, such claims are likely barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.” Walker v. O'Connor, 22-CV-0581, 2022 WL 2341420, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. June 29, 2022) (Dancks, M.J.) (citing Phifer v. City of New York, 289 F.3d 49, 57 (2d Cir. 2002) (“There is no question that Rooker-Feldman bars Phifer's challenges to the family court's decisions regarding custody, neglect, and visitation.”); Fernandez v. Turetsky, 12-CV-4092, 2014 WL 5823116, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2014) (collecting cases) (“Courts have repeatedly invoked the [Rooker-Feldman] doctrine in cases, like the one currently before the Court, in which plaintiffs challenge family court decrees setting child support arrears.”), aff'd, 645 Fed.Appx. 103 (2d Cir. 2016)), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 2805462 (N.D.N.Y. July 18, 2022) (Hurd, J.). “Under the domestic relations exception to the jurisdiction of federal courts, cases involving divorce, alimony, and child custody remain outside federal court jurisdiction.” Amato v. McGinty, 21-CV-0860, 2022 WL 226798, at *10 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2022) (Dancks, M.J.) (citing Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 308 (2006)). In the event that Plaintiff's underlying state family court proceeding remains pending, his request for this Court's involvement may also implicate the Younger abstention doctrine. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Under the Younger doctrine, “federal courts [must] abstain from taking jurisdiction over federal constitutional claims that involve or call into question ongoing state proceedings.” Diamond “D” Constr. Corp. v. McGowan, 282 F.3d 191, 198 (2d Cir. 2002).

“To state a valid claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege that the challenged conduct (1) was attributable to a person acting under color of state law, and (2) deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Whalen v. Cnty. of Fulton, 126 F.3d 400, 405 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing Eagleston v. Guido, 41 F.3d 865, 875-76 (2d Cir. 1994)).

Here, the Amended Complaint includes the following allegations related to actions taken by Defendants, in full:

David Primo, Jeffrey Alan Domachowski, Sarah Merrick, and Patricia DeRue are all in breach of trust for refusing appointment by me to settle the account and terminate the unconditional bill of attainer they are refusing due to the cooperative arrangement they have in order to provide Title IV-D services. The form is child support and the substance is securities because child support is not in the best interest of the child or mother it's in the states best interest
(Dkt. No. 6 at 4.)

These allegations fail to allege the personal involvement of any of Defendants in a violation of Plaintiff's rights.

The Court notes that the Amended Complaint includes two pages with each Defendant listed as a heading and a bullet point list under each heading. (Dkt. No. 6 at 5-6.) These pages do not contain factual allegations and instead appear to include legalese phrases that largely do not make sense. By way of example, under the heading naming Defendant Primo, Plaintiff alleges:

• Breach of Agreement
• Securities fraud
• Trespass of my estate
• Neglect/failed to prevent
• Violation of the hierarchy of law
(Dkt. No. 6 at 5.) The list also includes a heading for Defendant Murphy. (Dkt. No. 6 at 6.) However, the Amended Complaint fails to allege factual allegations plausibly suggesting any action taken by Defendant Murphy and therefore fails to allege her personal involvement in any violations.

C. Immunity

Third and in the alternative, I recommend that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint be dismissed to the extent that it asserts claims against Defendants Primo, Merrick, Domachowski, and DeRue, because it seeks relief from individuals who are immune from suit.

1. Defendant Primo

Absolute immunity extends to nonjudicial officers who perform acts that “are integrally related to an ongoing judicial proceeding.” Mitchell v. Fishbein, 377 F.3d 157, 172-73 (2d Cir. 2004). Plaintiff's Amended Complaint identifies Defendant Primo as “Chief Clerk of Onondaga County Family Court.” (Dkt. No. 6 at 2.) Quasi-judicial immunity protects court clerks and sheriffs from suit “for performance of tasks which are judicial in nature and an integral part of the judicial process.” Garcia v. Hebert, 08-CV-0095, 2013 WL 1294412, at *12 (D. Conn. Mar. 28, 2013) (quoting Rodriguez v. Weprin, 116 F.3d 62, 66 (2d Cir. 1997)), aff'd, 594 Fed.Appx. 26 (2d Cir. 2015) (summary order), cert. denied, No. 14-9720 (Oct. 5, 2015).

As a result, I recommend that Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Primo in his individual capacity be dismissed, because he is immune from suit. See Leftridge v. Judicial Branch, 22-CV-0411, 2023 WL 4304792, at *9 (D. Conn. June 30, 2023) (dismissing the plaintiff's claims against the state court clerks of court based on the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity where “their alleged actions arose out of or related to [plaintiff]'s child support and child custody proceedings.”); Braithwaite v. Tropea, 23-CV-1431, 2023 WL 4207907, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. June 27, 2023) (citing Jackson v. Pfau, 523 Fed.Appx. 736, 737-38 (2d Cir. 2013) (affirming dismissal pursuant to Section 1915(e)(2)(B) of pro se plaintiff's Section 1983 claims against the Chief Clerks of several state courts based on the doctrine of judicial immunity)) (dismissing as frivolous the plaintiff's claims against the clerk of the court because he was entitled to absolute immunity); Mendez v. Johnson, 22-CV-6811, 2022 WL 3587600, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2022) (citing inter alia, Chmura v. Norton, Hammersley, Lopez & Skokos Inverso PA, 17-CV-2164, 2018 WL 2138631, at *2 (D. Conn. May 9, 2018) (extending judicial immunity to a clerk of court); Manko v. Ruchelsman, 12-CV-4100, 2012 WL 4034038, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2012) (same)) (noting that courts have routinely granted judicial immunity to “government officials, including clerks of court and other court employees, for their acts that assist a judge in the performance of his or her judicial duties.”).

Moreover, I recommend that Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Primo in his official capacity as Chief Clerk of Onondaga Family Court be dismissed because the Onondaga County Family Court is an arm of the New York state court system and New York State is immune from suit pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment. Braithwaite, 2023 WL 4207907, at *4 (collecting cases) (holding that the plaintiff's claims against the Chief Clerk of the Suffolk County Court in his official capacity are barred by the Eleventh Amendment).

2. Defendant Merrick

Defendant Merrick, as the Commissioner of Social Services-Economic Security, is “not entitled to judicial immunity because her responsibilities are not closely associated with the judicial process nor is her agency a quasi-judicial body. However, she [is] entitled to qualified immunity.” Parent v. New York, 786 F.Supp.2d 516, 537 (N.D.N.Y. 2011) (Hurd, J.), aff'd, 485 Fed.Appx. 500 (2d Cir. 2012); but see Ramos v. Putnam Family Court, 15-CV-1443, 2017 WL 3083727, at *3 (D. Conn. July 18, 2017) (quoting Lomtevas v. Cardozo, 05-CV-2779, 2006 WL 229908, at *5 (D. Conn. Jan. 31, 2006)) (finding that “[o]fficials involved with . . . the enforcement of [a] child support order are entitled to ‘absolute quasi-judicial immunity.'”). Defendant Merrick's conduct in “enforcing the petition [ordering Plaintiff to pay child support] did not violate any clearly established right. There is no right to refuse to pay child support. Moreover, even if there was such a right and it was clearly established, it was objectively reasonable for [Defendant Merrick] to believe that carrying out her duties and enforcing the petition did not violate [P]laintiff's rights.” Parent, 786 F.Supp.2d at 537. As a result, I recommend that all claims against Defendant Merrick in her individual capacity be dismissed based on the doctrine of qualified immunity. See also Chris H. v. New York, 16-CV-6807, 2017 WL 2880848, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. July 5, 2017) (finding that the plaintiff's claims against the New York City Human Resources Administration/Department of Social Services Commissioner were subject to dismissal pursuant to the doctrine of qualified immunity).

However, the undersigned notes that Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Merrick in her official capacity are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Meyers v. Becker, 23-CV-0173, 2023 WL 3079611, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2023) (Hummel, M.J.), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 3073495 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2023) (Hurd, J.). Notwithstanding that conclusion, I recommend that any claims against Defendant Merrick in her official capacity be dismissed because-in addition to the reasons set forth above-the Complaint fails to allege facts plausibly suggesting that Defendant Merrick's actions were pursuant to any policy or custom of Onondaga County. Official capacity suits are merely an alternative way to plead a claim against an entity of which an officer is an employee. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985). “[A] governmental entity is liable under § 1983 only when the entity itself is a ‘moving force' behind the deprivation.” Graham, 473 U.S. at 166 (quoting Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981)). In an official capacity suit against a municipal employee, a plaintiff must show that the acts were performed pursuant to a policy or custom. Patterson v. Cnty. of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 226 (2d Cir. 2004).

3. Defendants DeRue and Domachoski

Plaintiff's claims under § 1983 against Defendants DeRue and Domachowski, who acted as the support magistrate judges, are barred under the doctrine of judicial immunity. Under this doctrine, judges are absolutely immune from suit for claims for damages for any actions taken within the scope of their judicial responsibilities. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991). Generally, “acts arising out of, or related to, individual cases before [a] judge are considered judicial in nature.” Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir. 2009). “[E]ven allegations of bad faith or malice cannot overcome judicial immunity.” Bliven, 579 F.3d at 209.

Judicial immunity does not apply when a judge takes action outside his or her judicial capacity, or when a judge takes action that, although judicial in nature, is taken “in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Mireles 502 U.S. at 11-12; see also Bliven, 579 F.3d at 209-10 (describing actions that are judicial in nature). However, “the scope of [a] judge's jurisdiction must be construed broadly where the issue is the immunity of the judge.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978). “District courts within this Circuit have applied this immunity doctrine to New York Family Court Support Magistrates,” like Defendants DeRue and Domachowski. Roger of the Family Forest v. 45 C.F.R. § 75.2 IV-D Contractor Steve Banks, 18-CV-10866, 2019 WL 4194332, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2019) (collecting cases).

Plaintiff asserts claims that appear to arise from the efforts of Defendants DeRue and Domachowski, in their capacities as a New York Family Court Support Magistrates, to assess and collect child support that Plaintiff owes pursuant to Family Court orders and judgments. Defendants DeRue and Domachowski are therefore immune from suit under the doctrine of judicial immunity. As a result, I recommend that Plaintiff's claims against Defendants DeRue and Domachowski in their individual capacities be dismissed based on the doctrine of judicial immunity.

Moreover, I recommend that Plaintiff's claims against Defendants DeRue and Domachowski in their official capacities be dismissed pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment. See Sundwall v. Leuba, 28 Fed.Appx. 11, 12 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing K & A Radiologic Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Comm'r of the Dep't of Health, 189 F.3d 273, 278 (2d Cir. 1999)) (holding that “state officers, if sued in their official capacities, are immunized from suit by private citizens under the Eleventh Amendment.”); King v. New York State, 23-CV-3421, 2023 WL 5625440, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2023) (citing Thomas v. Martin-Gibbons, 857 Fed.Appx. 36, 37 (2d Cir. 2021) (affirming dismissal of pro se Section 1983 claims against the State of New York and a state court judge in his official capacity based on Eleventh Amendment immunity)) (“Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to state officials acting in their official capacities, including state court judges.”); Aron v. Becker, 48 F.Supp.3d 347, 366-67 (N.D.N.Y. 2014) (McAvoy, J.) (dismissing the plaintiff's claims against a state court judge in his official capacity based on the doctrine of Eleventh Amendment immunity).

V. OPPORTUNITY TO AMEND

Generally, a court should not dismiss claims contained in a complaint filed by a pro se litigant without granting leave to amend at least once “when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 704-05 (2d Cir. 1991); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2) (“The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.”). An opportunity to amend is not required, however, where “the problem with [the plaintiff's] causes of action is substantive” such that “better pleading will not cure it.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Cortec Indus. Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Of course, where a plaintiff is unable to allege any fact sufficient to support its claim, a complaint should be dismissed with prejudice.”). Stated differently, “[w]here it appears that granting leave to amend is unlikely to be productive, . . . it is not an abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend.” Ruffolo v. Oppenheimer & Co., 987 F.2d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1993); accord, Brown v. Peters, 95-CV-1641, 1997 WL 599355, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1997) (Pooler, J.).

See also Carris v. First Student, Inc., 132 F.Supp.3d 321, 340-41 n.1 (N.D.N.Y. 2015) (Suddaby, C.J.) (explaining that the standard set forth in Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 796 (2d Cir. 1999)-that the Court should grant leave to amend “unless the court can rule out any possibility, however unlikely it might be, that an amended complaint would be successful in stating a claim”-is likely not an accurate recitation of the governing law after Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)), rev'd on other grounds, 682 Fed.Appx. 30.

Here, better pleading could not cure the Court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the immunities described above, which appear to apply to all claims against Defendants Primo, DeRue, and Domachowski.

Although I have serious doubts about whether Plaintiff can further amend the Amended Complaint to assert an actionable claim against Defendants Merrick and Murphy, given Plaintiff's pro se status and that Plaintiff has not had the benefit of the Court's analysis prior to amending, out of an abundance of caution, I recommend that Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Merrick and Murphy be dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend.

If Plaintiff chooses to file a second amended complaint, he should note that the law in this circuit clearly provides that “‘complaints relying on the civil rights statutes are insufficient unless they contain some specific allegations of fact indicating a deprivation of rights, instead of a litany of general conclusions that shock but have no meaning.'” Hunt v. Budd, 895 F.Supp. 35, 38 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (McAvoy, J.) (quoting Barr v. Abrams, 810 F.2d 358, 363 (2d Cir. 1987)); accord Pourzancvakil v. Humphry, 94-CV-1594, 1995 WL 316935, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. May 22, 1995) (Pooler, J.). Therefore, in any second amended complaint, Plaintiff must clearly set forth facts that give rise to the claims, including the dates, times, and places of the alleged underlying acts, and each individual who committed each alleged wrongful act. In addition, the revised pleading should allege facts demonstrating the specific involvement of any named defendant in the constitutional deprivations alleged in sufficient detail to establish that it was tangibly connected to those deprivations. Bass v. Jackson, 790 F.2d 260, 263 (2d Cir. 1986). Finally, Plaintiff is informed that any such second amended complaint will replace the existing Amended Complaint and must be a wholly integrated and complete pleading that does not rely upon or incorporate by reference any pleading or document previously filed with the Court. See Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994) (“It is well established that an amended complaint ordinarily supersedes the original and renders it of no legal effect.”).

ACCORDINGLY, it is

ORDERED that Plaintiff's IFP application (Dkt. No. 2) is Denied as moot; and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff's amended IFP application (Dkt. No. 7) is Granted; and it is further respectfully

RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 6) be sua sponte dismissed in its entirety pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e); and it is further respectfully

RECOMMENDED that the Court Dismiss without prejudice and with leave to amend Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 6) against Defendants Merrick and Murphy in their individual and official capacities, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); and it is further respectfully

RECOMMENDED that the Court Dismiss without prejudice and without leave to amend Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 6) against Defendants Primo, DeRue, and Domachowski in their individual and official capacities, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); and it is further

ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall file a copy of this Order and Report Recommendation on Plaintiff, along with copies of the unpublished decisions cited herein in accordance with the Second Circuit's decision in Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).

NOTICE: Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (Supp. 2013); Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), 6(d), 72; Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)).

If you are proceeding pro se and served with this report, recommendation, and order by mail, three additional days will be added to the fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date that the report, recommendation, and order was mailed to you to serve and file objections. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a)(1)(C).


Summaries of

Miller v. Primo

United States District Court, N.D. New York
Sep 29, 2023
5:23-CV-1051 (BKS/ML) (N.D.N.Y. Sep. 29, 2023)
Case details for

Miller v. Primo

Case Details

Full title:DAISHAWN LAVON MILLER, doing business as Daishawn Lavon Miller Living…

Court:United States District Court, N.D. New York

Date published: Sep 29, 2023

Citations

5:23-CV-1051 (BKS/ML) (N.D.N.Y. Sep. 29, 2023)

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