Miller v. Eichleay Engineers, Inc.

27 Citing cases

  1. In re New Valley Corporation

    89 F.3d 143 (3d Cir. 1996)   Cited 153 times
    Holding that top hat plans are unilateral contracts

    The SEB and Girardin Plans are clearly ERISA plans. See 29 U.S.C. §(s) 1002(3) (defining "employee benefit plan"); Miller v. Eichleay Engineers, Inc., 886 F.2d 30, 33 n.7 (3d Cir. 1989). Barrowclough's holding on the arbitrability of statutory ERISA claims was overruled in Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 1110 (3d Cir. 1993).

  2. Bruno v. Hershey Foods Corp.

    964 F. Supp. 159 (D.N.J. 1997)   Cited 4 times
    Applying Section 514 of ERISA to preempt state law claims related to top-hat plan

    (1) a plan which is unfunded and is maintained by an employer primarily for the purpose of providing deferred compensation for a select group of management or highly compensated employees[.]See also Miller v. Eichleay Engineers, Inc., 886 F.2d 30, 34 n. 8 (3d Cir. 1989). These unfunded plans, commonly referred to as "top hat funds", must satisfy two prerequisites in order to be exempt from the fiduciary obligations set forth in Part 4: they must be (1) unfunded and (2) for the purpose of providing deferred income for select employees.

  3. Bigda v. Fischbach Corp.

    898 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)   Cited 71 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, "[w]hen a party materially breaches a contract, the nonbreaching party must choose between two remedies — he can elect to terminate the contract and recover liquidated damages or he can continue the contract and recover damages solely for the breach" (citing ARP Films, Inc. v. Marvel Entertainment Group, Inc., 952 F.2d 643, 649 (2d Cir. 1991))

    For example, the provision providing a federal cause of action for violations of the terms of a plan applies to top hat plans. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a); Miller v. Eichleay Eng'rs, Inc., 886 F.2d 30, 37 (3d Cir. 1989); Rockney v. Blohorn, 877 F.2d 637, 639-40 (8th Cir. 1989); Fasco Indus., Inc., 843 F. Supp. at 1255; Carr v. First Nationwide Bank, 816 F. Supp. 1476, 1487-88 (N.D.Cal. 1993). It would be illogical for top hat plans to be subject to some of the administration and enforcement provisions of ERISA and not to others.

  4. Kemmerer v. ICI Americas, Inc.

    842 F. Supp. 138 (E.D. Pa. 1994)   Cited 10 times

    The DEC plan at issue in this case is an executive deferred compensation plan that is generally referred to as a Top Hat plan. Miller v. Eichleay Engineers, Inc., 886 F.2d 30, 34 n. 8 (3d Cir. 1989). Top Hat plans are "employee benefit plans" within the meaning of ERISA.

  5. Carr v. First Nationwide Bank

    816 F. Supp. 1476 (N.D. Cal. 1993)   Cited 45 times
    Finding "at any time or from time to time" language to be insufficient

    Jt. Stmt. ¶ 8. Such plans are commonly referred to as "Top Hat" plans. See, e.g., Miller v. Eichleay Engineers, Inc., 886 F.2d 30, 34 n. 8 (3d Cir. 1989); Wolcott v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 884 F.2d 245, 250 n. 2 (6th Cir. 1989); U.S. Dep't of Labor ERISA Advisory Ops. 90-14A (May 8, 1990) 89-24A (September 25, 1989). The identical language is contained in 29 U.S.C. § 1051(2) and 1081(a)(3).

  6. DDRA Capital, Inc. v. KPMG, LLP

    No. 14-3139 (3d Cir. Sep. 6, 2017)   Cited 3 times

    We exercise plenary review over the entry of summary judgment. E.g., Miller v. Eichleay Eng'rs, 886 F.2d 30, 35 (3d Cir. 1989). Summary judgment is proper if a moving defendant "shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and [it] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law," Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)—that is, if "there exists no genuine issue of material fact that would permit a reasonable jury to find for" plaintiffs, Miller v. Indiana Hosp., 843 F.2d 139, 143 (3d Cir. 1988).

  7. Campbell v. Sussex Cnty. Fed. Credit Union

    602 F. App'x 71 (3d Cir. 2015)   Cited 7 times
    Holding that the claimant was not required to exhaust administrative remedies where the administrator failed to notify the claimant of, among other things, "the time limits for requesting a review"

    "A top hat plan is a 'plan which is unfunded and is maintained by an employer primarily for the purpose of providing deferred compensation for a select group of management or highly trained employees.'" Miller v. Eichleay Eng'rs, Inc., 886 F.2d 30, 34 (3d Cir. 1989) (quoting 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051(2), 1081(a), 1101(a)(1)). I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

  8. Taggart v. GMAC Mortgage, LLC

    600 F. App'x 859 (3d Cir. 2015)   Cited 3 times

    Our review of the District Court's grant of summary judgment is plenary. Miller v. Eichelay Eng'rs, 886 F.2d 30, 35 (3d Cir. 1989). Our review of the District Court's dismissal of the claims for damages is also plenary.

  9. Greer v. Mondelez Global, Inc.

    590 F. App'x 170 (3d Cir. 2014)   Cited 96 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's discrimination claim because the discrimination was neither severe or pervasive enough to establish a hostile work environment and plaintiff had no adverse employment action

    We exercise plenary review over an order granting a defendant's motion for summary judgment. Miller v. Eichelay Eng'rs, 886 F.2d 30, 35 (3d Cir. 1989). A court may grant summary judgment where the moving party shows that "there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law."

  10. Zebrowski v. Evonik Degussa Corp.

    578 F. App'x 89 (3d Cir. 2014)   Cited 4 times

    But top hat plans are exempt from ERISA's substantive vesting rules, including the anti-cutback provision. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051(2), 1101(a)(1); Miller v. Eichleay Eng'rs, Inc., 886 F.2d 30, 34 n.8 (3d Cir. 1989). Appellees nevertheless rely on Battoni and contend that the ordinary fiduciary duty and anti-cutback rules apply because the plans at issue in this case are so interconnected that the Committee's interpretation of the Supplemental Plan was an amendment that effectively reduced benefits under the Pension Plan.