Opinion
No. CV09-5025243
March 15, 2011
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The plaintiff, Charles Miller, commenced this action in the nature of replevin and unjust enrichment against the defendant, Nicolette Chiaia. The plaintiff seeks the return of, or damages for, items of personal property which he claims to own but which are in the possession of the defendant. The most significant item is a diamond ring. Also, the defendant has filed a counterclaim involving other items which she claims to own but which are in the possession of the plaintiff.
The case was tried to the court. The court has considered all of the evidence presented, including the testimony of the witnesses and the exhibits fully admitted into evidence. Based upon the evidence, the court finds the following facts.
The plaintiff and the defendant met each other through work in 2007 and shortly thereafter began a relationship. In October 2008 the plaintiff moved into the defendant's home in Bethel, in which she resided with her minor children from a prior marriage. The plaintiff had also been married and he had recently divorced. The parties' living arrangement was predicated on a mutual belief that they would become engaged and would marry.
The parties went to Italy in early November 2008. While they were there the plaintiff proposed marriage to the defendant and he presented her with a diamond ring. The defendant accepted the proposal and the ring. That same day the defendant asked the plaintiff where he had purchased the ring. She became disappointed when he told her where he had bought it, and she gave it back to the plaintiff. When the parties returned from Italy, the plaintiff brought the ring back to the seller and received a full refund of the amount he had paid, $5,000. The defendant suggested the style of a different ring she would like. The plaintiff then purchased that ring from a jeweler for approximately $12,000. Toward the end of the month of November the plaintiff, in his own words, "reproposed" and presented the defendant with this second ring. It is this ring which became the subject of the litigation between the parties.
Over the next few months the plaintiff, who was at all times self-employed, had mounting business difficulties. This caused friction and problems between the parties. Their relationship soured. In late February 2009 the plaintiff moved out of the defendant's home. The parties never reconciled. The plaintiff asked for the ring back but the defendant refused. Each party also requested the return of certain other items which they claimed belonged to them. This action ensued in June 2009.
In count one of the complaint, the plaintiff has pled a cause of action for replevin. General Statute § 52-515 provides that ". . . [t]he action of replevin may be maintained to recover any goods or chattels in which the plaintiff has a general or special property interest with a right to immediate possession and which are wrongfully detained from him in any manner, together with the damages for such wrongful detention." In count two of the complaint, the plaintiff has stated a cause of action for unjust enrichment. The elements for unjust enrichment are that the defendant was benefited, that the defendant unjustly did not pay the plaintiff for the benefits, and that the failure of payment was to the plaintiff's detriment. Vertex, Inc. v. Waterbury, 278 Conn. 557, 573, 898 A.2d 178 (2006).
The threshold issue in this case is a determination of the nature of the transfer of the ring from the plaintiff to the defendant. The defendant claims that it was a completed gift and that, therefore, she owns the ring. "[A] gift is defined as ". . . a transfer of property without consideration. It requires two things: a delivery of the possession of the property to the donee, and an intent that the title thereto shall pass immediately to him." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Fox v. Shanley, 94 Conn. 350, 362, 109 A. 249 (1920). The plaintiff claims that the ring was a conditional gift which he gave to the defendant at the time of engagement and in contemplation of marriage. "[T]he majority rule appears to be that a gift made in contemplation of marriage is conditional upon a subsequent ceremonial marriage . . ." (Citation omitted.) Piccininni v. Hajus, 180 Conn. 369, 372, 429 A.2d 886 (1920). A ring so given is commonly known as an engagement ring. See Merrill Lynch Interfunding, Inc. v. Argenti, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. 169662 (July 20, 2001) ( 30 Conn. L. Rptr. 130).
The evidence offered by the parties in support of their respective claims was in substantial conflict. The plaintiff testified that when he and the defendant came back from Italy he returned the first ring to the seller for a refund, and then purchased the second one and presented it to the defendant in late November 2008. The defendant testified that the defendant gave her the second ring a few days before Christmas as a holiday gift. The court believes that the more credible evidence supports the plaintiff's claim. The court finds that the ring was clearly an engagement ring.
The plaintiff gave the ring to the defendant to commemorate their engagement and in contemplation of marriage. That the plaintiff did so subsequent to his original proposal does not change this conclusion, particularly given that the defendant had been unhappy with the first ring and had suggested a different one.
What remains, then, is the resolution of the ownership of the ring where, as here, the marriage does not occur. In a memorandum of decision in White v. Finch, 3 Conn. Cir.Ct. 138, 209 A.2d 199 (1964), the court stated that the then prevailing view was to examine the fault of the parties, and that ". . . where an engagement is broken due to the fault of the donor, he may not recover the ring . . ." (Citation omitted.) White v. Finch, supra, 141. However, there are more recent cases which are stated to comprise a modern trend and which, because of what they deem to be the "inherently conditional" nature of an engagement ring, have adopted a "no-fault" approach. This line of authority would resolve the issue of the ring's ownership in favor of the donor, regardless of who caused the engagement to be broken or who was at fault. See Meyer v. Mitnick, 244 Mich.App. 697, 702-03, 625 N.W.2d 136 (2001).
Further, the rule set forth in White is not necessarily binding precedent. Several Superior Court opinions have held that the Superior Court, as a constitutional court, is not bound by the precedent of the former statutory Circuit Court. Glazer v. The Dress Barn, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. 178375 (March 30, 2001) ( 29 Conn. L. Rptr. 596); Bodek v. Productivity, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. 339298 (July 2, 1998) ( 22 Conn. L. Rptr. 333); Yale New Haven Hospital v. Orlins, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. 010396 (May 12, 1992) ( 6 Conn. L. Rptr. 368).
At least one Connecticut Superior Court has adopted the "no-fault" approach. The opinion in Thorndike v. Demirs, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. 5000243 (July 26, 2007) ( 44 Conn. L. Rptr. 30), is instructive. As in the instant case, the parties in Thorndike had become engaged and the plaintiff had given the defendant an engagement ring. The parties subsequently broke-up, and the plaintiff brought an action in unjust enrichment to recover the ring. After thoroughly reviewing the law on this subject, the court aligned itself with the more modern view that, regardless of fault, the engagement ring should be returned to the donor. The court noted the likely difficulty in truly determining the basis for fault in many failed engagements. This court finds that the rationale stated by the court in Thorndike is persuasive and it should be followed here. Therefore, the plaintiff is the owner of the ring and he should recover it.
Each party claims to be the owner of additional items which the other retained possession of when they separated. The court has carefully considered all of the evidence in order to determine the rightful ownership of the disputed items. The court has stated its findings on Schedule "A" which is attached hereto and made a part hereof. To the extent that any item in dispute does not appear thereon, the court finds that the party now in possession of that item is the rightful owner. Finally, the cost of any third-party storage fees shall be the responsibility of the party presently in possession thereof.
Judgment shall enter for the plaintiff on counts one and two of the complaint for the return of those items set forth on Schedule "A." Judgment shall enter for the defendant on the counterclaim for the return of those items set forth on Schedule "A." The parties shall return each other's items on a mutually agreed date within thirty days. So ordered.
SCHEDULE "A"
A. The court finds that the plaintiff is the rightful owner of the following items currently in the possession of the defendant:
1. Diamond ring
2. Sectional couch and chaise
3. Floorstand lamps (2)
4. Leather high-back office chair
5. Mattress — king-size
B. The court finds that the defendant is the rightful owner of the following items currently in the possession of the plaintiff:
1. Rocking-type chair
2. Daybed
3. Mattresses — twin-size (2) and any frames
4. Plastic containers and contents (4)