Summary
In Miller, however, the taxpayer not only refused to execute the stipulation proposed by the Commissioner, but refused to follow the specific order of the court directing him to execute a meaningful stipulation or suffer dismissal.
Summary of this case from Kumpf v. C. I. ROpinion
No. 81-1067.
Submitted July 21, 1981.
Decided July 23, 1981.
Lyle F. Miller, pro se.
John F. Murray, Acting Asst. Atty. Gen., Michael L. Paup, Robert A. Bernstein, Gilbert S. Rothenberg, Attys., Tax Division, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., for appellee.
Appeal from the United States Tax Court.
Before HEANEY, HENLEY and McMILLIAN, Circuit Judges.
The taxpayer, Lyle F. Miller, listed $4,200 on his 1975 return as income "other than wages, dividends, and interest." The Commissioner accordingly determined that Miller was liable for self-employment taxes on this amount. The taxpayer petitioned in the tax court to contest this determination. After responding to the petition, the Commissioner learned facts which led him to question the validity of the taxpayer's $4,000 charitable deduction for a donation to the Life Science Church. The tax court allowed the Commissioner to file an amended response and challenge the deduction. In the amended response the Commissioner alleged that the Life Science Church was not a tax-exempt entity but instead was a sham organization and the $4,000 charitable "donation" was refunded in full to the taxpayer as a "subsistence allowance."
The Commissioner moved to compel production of documents relating to the taxpayer's association with the Life Science Church, and the tax court granted the motion. Based on the documents the taxpayer produced, the Commissioner proposed a stipulation of facts (see Appendix). The taxpayer refused to execute the stipulation and instead offered to stipulate only that he lived in Richfield, Minnesota, and had timely filed a tax return for 1975. The tax court directed the taxpayer to execute a meaningful stipulation or the case would be dismissed. The taxpayer made no further efforts to stipulate, and the tax court dismissed the case upon the motion of the Commissioner and determined that the taxpayer owed $1,279.35 in taxes for the year 1975 ($410.35 in self-employment taxes, $869 due to the disallowed charitable contribution to the Life Science Church). The taxpayer appeals pro se.
Tax Court Rule 91(a)(1) requires parties to stipulate "all matters not privileged which are relevant to the pending case. . . ." Rule 91 also provides that if a party refuses to stipulate, the party proposing a stipulation may move the court to compel stipulation, and if there is no adequate response, the matters in the proposal will be deemed stipulated. Based on this rule, the taxpayer urges that "the most" that the tax court could do after he refused to agree to the Commissioner's proposal was to deem the matters in the proposal stipulated.
We find this contention frivolous. Although the tax court could have simply deemed the matters stipulated, the tax court was not required to do so. The sanction provided by Rule 91 is not exclusive. We note that Tax Court Rule 123 provides in part: "For failure of a petitioner properly to prosecute or to comply with these Rules or any order of the Court . . ., the Court may dismiss a case at any time and enter a judgment against the petitioner."
In this case, the taxpayer failed to follow Tax Court Rule 91 and execute a meaningful stipulation. Further, the tax court instructed the taxpayer to stipulate, but he refused to do so and gave no justification for his inaction. Under these circumstances, the tax court properly dismissed the case under Tax Court Rule 123.
The taxpayer explained his refusal to stipulate on the grounds that "[t]he State of Minnesota confirmed that everything [relating to the Life Science Church] was sufficient and everything was proper and legal. And I see no reason to restipulate the facts that are concluded two years ago." Assuming that the Life Science Church is a church for state law purposes, it does not necessarily follow that it is a church for federal income tax purposes.
The taxpayer also contends that the tax court denied him due process of law. We disagree. The taxpayer was not arbitrarily denied a neutral forum in which he could present the merits of his claim. Instead, he lost his right to trial on the merits due to his own disregard of the tax court's instructions.
Accordingly, the decision of the tax court is affirmed.