Opinion
2:22-CV-00926-SPB
05-26-2023
DARREN L. MILLER, Plaintiff v. ERIC ARMEL, SUPERINTENDENT, INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY; MR. BRIGHT, CHCA, INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY; AND C/O 1 SHEETZ, INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY, Defendants
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS IN RE: ECF NO. 24
RICHARD A. LANZILLO CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint has been referred to the undersigned for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Local Rules 72.1.3 and 72.1.4. It is respectfully recommended that the Defendants' motion be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
I. Introduction
Plaintiff Darren L. Miller (“Miller”) is an inmate at the State Correctional Institution at Fayette (“SCI-Fayette”). He brings this pro se civil rights action against three Department of Corrections employees at SCI-Fayette: Superintendent Eric Armel, Corrections Health Care Administrator (“CHCA”) James Bright, and Corrections Officer Sheetz (“Defendants”). Miller alleges that the Defendants assaulted him, retaliated against him in violation of the First Amendment, and were deliberately indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See ECF No. 14, pp. 2-4.
The Defendants have moved to dismiss certain claims. ECF No. 24. Specifically, they contend that the claims against them in their official capacities should be dismissed and that all claims against Armel and Bright should be dismissed because Miller fails to allege facts to support their personal involvement in actionable conduct. Id. Miller has filed a brief in opposition to the Defendants' motion. ECF No. 30. The motion is ripe for decision.
II. Standard of Decision
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). In deciding a motion to dismiss, the court is not opining on whether the plaintiff is likely to prevail on the merits; rather, the plaintiff must only present factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-36 (3d ed. 2004)). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). A complaint should only be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12 (b)(6) if it fails to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (rejecting the traditional Rule 12 (b)(6) standard established in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). In making this determination, the court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint and views them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. U.S. Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002).
While a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must provide more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Moreover, a court need not accept inferences drawn by a plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts as set forth in the complaint. See California Pub. Employee Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must the Court accept legal conclusions disguised as factual allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. See also McTernan v. City of York, Pennsylvania, 577 F.3d 521, 531 (3d Cir. 2009) (“The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”).
Expounding on the Twombly/Iqbal line of cases, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has articulated the following three-step approach: “First, the court must ‘tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.' Second, the court should identify allegations that, ‘because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.' Finally, ‘where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.'” Burtch v. MilbergFactors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010)). This determination is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Moreover, when considering pro se pleadings, a court must employ less stringent standards than when judging the work product of an attorney. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). This means when presented with a pro se complaint, the court should construe the complaint liberally and draw fair inferences from what is not alleged as well as from what is alleged. Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003). In a § 1983 action, the court must “apply the applicable law, irrespective of whether the pro se litigant has mentioned it by name.” Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Holley v. Dep't of Veteran Affairs, 165 F.3d 244, 247-48 (3d Cir. 1999)). See also Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996) (“Since this is a § 1983 action, the [pro se] plaintiffs are entitled to relief if their complaint sufficiently alleges deprivation of any right secured by the Constitution.”).
Notwithstanding this liberality, pro se litigants are not relieved of their obligation to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal claim. See, e.g., Cromwell v. Fichter, 2022 WL 16973785, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 26, 2022) (citing Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002); Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir. 1996)). Finally, when dismissing a claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) in a civil rights case, the Court must sua sponte permit a curative amendment unless it would be inequitable or futile. Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 245 (3d Cir. 2008).
III. Discussion and Analysis
A. Factual Allegations and Legal Claims
The following allegations of Miller's complaint are accepted as true for purposes of Defendants' motion. See Hensley v. McCaulley, 2023 WL 2167805, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 25, 2023). While incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Albion in July of 2019, Miller tore his Achilles tendon. ECF No. 14, Section III, ¶ 2. In September of 2019, Miller “suffered an injury which left him paralyzed in his lower extremities.” Id., ¶ 3. In February of 2020, Miller was transferred to FCI-Fayette. Id., ¶ 4. Soon after his arrival, “medical providers” ordered that he receive “off-side indepth physical therapy.” Id., ¶ 5. Then, between March 2020, and October 2020, Miller was examined in-house by physical therapists who “determined that SCI-Fayette is not equipped to provide the indepth physical therapy that is required for [his] conditions of paralysis.” Id., ¶ 7. Between August 2020, and August 2021, Miller was seen by a “neuro doctor Dr. Small.” Id., ¶ 8. Small and other “SCI-Fayette medical providers” agreed that Miller needed “off-side indepth physical therapy.” Id. According to Miller, Bright, the CHCA, overruled the medical recommendations for off-site therapy without medical justification and for non-medical reasons. Id., ¶ 9. Miller alleges that Bright's “real reason” for denying the recommended physical therapy was “my lawsuit.” Id.
Miller's Complaint asserts three counts, divided into subparts and containing overlapping allegations. Count I alleges an Eight Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Bright based on his denial of off-site physical therapy. Id., p. 2. This count also includes assault and battery and retaliation claims against Sheetz. Id., p. 3. Miller alleges that he filed two grievances in November of 2021 concerning the deprivation of his physical therapy and another concerning the denial of services such as the law library. Id., p. 3. He alleges that after filing these grievances (and after the filing of another lawsuit against Armel), a “campaign of retaliatory harassment” began. Id. On December 12, 2021, while Miller was “naked using the toilet,” Sheetz entered his cell, “grabbed him by the throat,” warned him to “keep Armel's name out of your lawsuit, or things will get worse for you, pushed Plaintiff s wheelchair” (apparently while he was seated in the wheelchair) and caused him to “bang against the doorway.” Id. Sheetz then issued what Miller characterizes as a “false misconduct report.” Id. Miller realleges in Count II an assault and battery claim against Sheetz based on Sheetz “grabbing [him] by the throat,” and “violently pushing me in my wheelchair.” Id., p. 4. He also asserts a retaliation claim against Sheetz based on the issuance of the alleged false misconduct. Id.
Count II also includes claims that Sheetz and another corrections officer (Mayer) retaliated against Miller by confiscating his legal papers to prevent him from complying with certain court-ordered deadlines. Id., p. 5. His legal property was returned to him in March of 2022, although some documents were missing, including an amended complaint for another action he had been working on. Id. He also alleges that his draft of the complaint in this case was missing. Id. Miller also alleges that Armel “directly/and or indirectly provided the information that Plaintiff had involved Armel's name in Plaintiff's motion to the courts in case no. 20-234.” Id., p. 6.
Plaintiff expressed an intention to “amend his complaint adding C/Ol Mayer as a defendant,” but, to date, he has not done so. Thus, Mayer remains a nonparty.
Count III asserts retaliation claims against Sheetz relating to the confiscation of his legal materials, as well as an allegation that Armel “caused Plaintiff to be subjected to the foregoing campaign of retaliatory harassment.” Id., p. 6. He also brings this claim against Sheetz, as Armel's “subordinate” for engaging in a “campaign of retaliatory harassment against Plaintiff because the Plaintiff exercised his rights to petition the court and file grievances.” Id.
Although Miller's allegations are often repetitive, the Court can distill from his Complaint the following claims: (1) an Eighth Amendment claim that Bright was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs; (2) a retaliation claim against Sheetz and Armel; and (3) an assault and battery claim against Sheetz. Miller has sued the Defendants in both their individual and official capacities. Id.,p. 1.
All three Defendants have moved to dismiss the “official capacity” claims against them based on the immunity afforded to the states by the Eleventh Amendment. ECF No. 24, ¶ 5. Defendants Armel and Bright also seek dismissal of all claims against them based on Miller's failure to allege facts to support their personal involvement in actionable conduct. Id. As to Sheetz, the motion seeks dismissal of only Miller's official capacity claims.
B. Miller's “official capacity” claims for money damages should be dismissed with prejudice.
Under the Eleventh Amendment, “[t]he judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another state, or be Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const, amend XI. Thus, the Eleventh Amendment protects states, as well as their agencies and departments, from suit in federal court. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). This protection additionally extends to state employees acting in their official capacities. See Will v. Michigan Dept, of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (“[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office.”).
Here, the Department of Corrections (“DOC”) is an agency of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, which has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity for lawsuits filed in federal court. Therefore it, its departments and their officials sued in their official capacities are immune from suits filed in federal court. See, e.g., Talbert v. Dep't Corrs., 2022 WL 171774790 at *4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 23, 2022). As officials of the DOC, the Defendants are entitled to sovereign immunity and the claims for money damages against them in their official capacities should be dismissed with prejudice. Downey v. Pa. Dep't of Corrs., 968 F.3d 299, 310-11 (3d Cir. 2020).
The Eleventh Amendment, however, does not provide immunity for claims seeking injunctive or declaratory relief. “In an injunctive or declaratory action grounded on federal law, the State's immunity can be overcome by naming state officials as defendants.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 n.18 (1985) (citing Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)). Miller's Complaint includes requests for injunctive relief, including an order directing Bright to permit him access to off-site physical therapy services and directing Armel to provide him with access to his legal papers. ECF No. 14, p. 7. The Complaint also seeks unspecified declaratory relief. Id. Eleventh Amendment immunity does not provide a basis to dismiss Miller's official capacity claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. These claims should proceed.
C. The claims against Armel and Bright
Miller identifies Superintendent Armel as “in charge of the overall operations of SCI-Fayette,” and CHCA Bright as “in charge of the medical department.” ECF No. 14, p. 1. Armel and Bright argue that Miller's allegations do not support their personal involvement in the deprivation of any constitutional right. ECF No. 24, ¶ 5. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a defendant's liability cannot be based solely on a theory of respondeat superior. Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). Instead, a defendant is liable for a violation of a plaintiff s civil rights only if the defendant was personally involved in the violation. Jutrowski v. Twp. of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 289 (3d Cir. 2018); Derk v. Zaken, 2022 WL 17832532 at *7 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 32, 2022 (“[A]n inmate must allege sufficient facts that the prison official participated in the alleged constitutional deprivation.”).
1. Retaliation claim against Armel
To support the liability of a supervisor such as Armel for the actions of a subordinate, Miller must allege facts to support that he personally participated or directed the violation or had actual knowledge of and acquiescence in the violation. Id. Miller's Complaint does not allege facts to support a plausible inference that Armel personally participated in or directed any alleged violation of Miller's civil rights. Although Miller alleges that “on information and belief, Defendant Armel directly/and/or (sic) indirectly provided the information that Plaintiff had involved Armel's name in Plaintiff's motion to the courts in case no. 20-234,” ECF No. 14, p. 6, this is not an allegation that Armel took any adverse action against Miller. At best, it reflects Armel's acknowledgement that Miller had filed a grievance against him. In and of itself, this accurate statement of fact cannot be considered an adverse or retaliatory action. Miller also alleges that Armel “caused his subordinates” to retaliate against him due to Miller's filing of grievances against Armel. Id. This conclusory allegation is unsupported by any allegations of fact and, as such, does not support Armel's personal involvement in any alleged acts of retaliation. Miller does not identify the “subordinates” who Armel allegedly caused to retaliate against him, how he allegedly caused them to retaliate, when Armel engaged in the unspecified conduct that caused the subordinates to retaliate, or the acts or timing of the retaliation committed by the unidentified subordinates. Miller does not allege that Armel himself did anything to retaliate against Miller. Instead, he offers only the type of conclusory allegations that have consistently been determined to be insufficient to demonstrate personal involvement. See, e.g, Betts v. Varner, 2022 WL 987888 at *5 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2022) (finding allegation that defendant was acting “in concert with” others to cause them to file false misconduct charges was conclusory and thus insufficient to state a retaliation claim); Ivy v. Wetzel, 2021 WL 5240227, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 10, 2021). The retaliation claim against Armel should be dismissed.
2. The Eighth Amendment claim against Bright
Miller's Complaint alleges facts sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Bright. The Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment requires that prison officials provide inmates with adequate medical care. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-05 (1976). To state a cognizable claim, an inmate must allege (1) a serious medical need and (2) acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate deliberate indifference to that need. Id. at 104; Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999). A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he knows that a prisoner faces a substantial risk of serious harm and fails to take reasonable steps to avoid the harm. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). A prison official may manifest deliberate indifference by “intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05.
However, “a prisoner has no right to choose a specific form of medical treatment,” so long as the treatment provided is reasonable. Harrison v. Barkley, 219 F.3d 132, 138-40 (2d Cir. 2000). An inmate's claim is not viable under § 1983 where the inmate receives continuing care, but believes that more should be done by way of diagnosis and treatment and maintains that options available to medical personnel were not pursued on the inmate's behalf. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107. Moreover, allegations of medical malpractice are not sufficient to establish a Constitutional violation. White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 108-09 (3d Cir. 1990) (citations omitted); see also Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332-34 (1986) (negligence is not compensable as a Constitutional violation). Finally, “mere disagreement as to the proper medical treatment” is insufficient to state a constitutional violation. See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235 (3d Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
Miller's complaint acknowledges Bright's position as the CHCA and alleges that unnamed medical providers “told him that Bright denied the medical orders of off-side indepth (sic) physical therapy without any medical justifications.” ECF No. 14, p. 2. Miller claims the non-medical justification was his filing of lawsuits. Id. Bright responds that Miller cannot establish his personal involvement regarding the alleged inadequate care because he is a nonmedical prison official. See, e.g., Simmons v. Wetzel, 2018 WL 10230019, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 10, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 10229914 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 11, 2018).
Prison health care administrators such as Bright are “undisputedly administrators, not doctors ....” Thomas v. Dragovich, 142 Fed.Appx. 33, 39 (3d Cir. 2005). As such, they are “not charged with prescribing medication or providing [an inmate] medical care” and “lack[ ] any medical authority to dictate the course of [an inmate's] treatment.” Ascenzi v. Diaz, 2007 WL 1031516, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2007). Such administrators cannot be considered deliberately indifferent simply because they fail to respond directly to the medical complaints of a prisoner who was already being treated by a prison doctor. Durmer v. O 'Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir. 1993). That is, “a non-medical prison official will not be chargeable with deliberate indifference ‘absent a reason to believe or actual knowledge' that prison doctors or their assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner.” Layton v. Smyth, 2022 WL 17832548, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 2022) (quoting Pearson v. Prison Health Servs., 850 F.3d 526, 535 (3d Cir. 2017) (citation omitted).
Miller's claim against Bright, however, is not based on any failure by him to respond to his medical complaints. Instead, Miller alleges that Bright overruled the medical judgment of physical therapists and a “neuro doctor” who determined that his condition required physical therapy services unavailable within the prison. Miller further alleges that Bright denied him the recommended outside physical therapy services based on nonmedical considerations, specifically because he had filed his “lawsuits.” A CHCA is not shielded from potential liability where a reasonable jury could find that he was “responsible for the resolution of an inmate's health care grievances and to oversee the delivery of health care of each inmate and, despite awareness of [the inmate's] ongoing [health care needs,] did nothing.” Jefferson v. Overton, 2017 WL 3922909, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 7, 2017). It follows that a CHCA is not shielded from liability where, for nonmedical reasons, he interferes in or prevents an inmate's receipt of care that medical personnel have determined to be necessary. Here, Miller's allegations against Bright, although somewhat thin, are minimally sufficient to state such a claim. Accordingly, Defendants' motion to dismiss should be denied as to Miller's Eighth Amendment claim against Bright.
The Complaint refers to a “Declaration” in connection to this allegation. See ECF No. 14, p. 2. However, the docket does not contain a declaration from Miller, save for one filed early in the case at ECF No. 3, which pertains only to Miller's filing of a motion to proceed in forma pauperis.
Where an inmate's Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim is based on a corrections healthcare administrator's alleged failure to provide necessary healthcare, the plaintiff “must show that [the CHCA] ‘possessed actual knowledge or a reason to believe that prison doctors or their assistants [were] mistreating (or not treating) him.'” Trainor v. Wellpath, 2021 WL 3913970, at *10 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 1, 2021) (citing Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004)) (internal citations omitted). See also Begandy v. Wellpath, 2022 WL 18282896, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 27, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 185206 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 13, 2023); see also Fantone v. Herbik, 528 Fed.Appx. 123, 128 (3d Cir. 2013); Rivera v. Rendell, 2013 WL 1339273, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 1, 2013). Here, Miller does not claim that his physicians were mistreating him. Instead, he alleges that Bright actively interfered in his physician's treatment decisions for nonmedical reasons and thereby denied him necessary care. If proven, such conduct also would meet the high standard necessary to support an inference of deliberate indifference.
IV. Miller should be granted leave to file an amended complaint as to his claim against Armel.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has instructed that if a civil rights complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the Court should permit a curative amendment unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). This instruction is equally applicable to pro se litigants and those represented by counsel. Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004). In this case, Miller's official capacity claims against the Defendants fail as a matter of law and should be dismissed with prejudice.
However, it is plausible that Miller might be able to proffer additional factual allegations to support his purported claims against Armel. Because further amendment may not be futile as to this claim, it is recommended that Miller be given an opportunity to file an amended complaint.
V. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Defendants' motion to dismiss [ECF No. 24] be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows:
• The motion should be GRANTED as to Plaintiffs official capacity claims for money damages against all Defendants, and these claims should be dismissed with prejudice;
• The motion should be DENIED as to Plaintiffs official capacity claims for injunctive or declaratory relief against all Defendants;
• The motion should be GRANTED as to Plaintiffs retaliation claim against Defendant Armel, but this claim should be dismissed without prejudice and with leave to file an amended complaint; and
• The motion should be DENIED as to Plaintiffs Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Bright.
VI. Objections
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), Fed.R.Civ.P. 72((b)(2), and Local Rule 72(D)(2), the parties are permitted to file written objections in accordance with the schedule established in the docket entry reflecting the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Failure to timely file objections will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011). Any party opposing objections may file their response to the objections within fourteen (14) days thereafter in accordance with Local Civil Rule 72(D)(2).