Opinion
C. A. 8:23-cv-3365-JD-JDA
08-29-2023
Brandon Lemar Miles, Plaintiff, v. John Vandermosten, Ronald Hollister, Scottie Bodiford, Marshall Stowers, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
JACQUELYN D. AUSTIN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Brandon Lemar Miles (“Plaintiff”), a pretrial detainee at the Greenville County Detention Center, brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Defendants violated his rights under the United States Constitution. [Doc. 1 at 2, 4.] Plaintiff is proceeding in this action pro se and in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B), D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review the Complaint for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. For the reasons explained below, this action is subject to summary dismissal.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff makes the following allegations in his Complaint. [Doc. 1.] Plaintiff contends that he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment because his “request for higher chain of command” was ignored, he was wrongfully charged with kidnapping, his character was defamed, and he has been denied the right to contact the outside world, his lawyer, and his family. [Id. at 4.] Plaintiff contends that the events giving rise to his claims occurred on December 22, 2022, in Dorm-O of Building 2 at the Greenville County Detention Center. [Id. at 5.]
According to Plaintiff he was ignored by Corporal Galloway, Sergeant Reed, and Officer Cooter, and denied the right to request a higher chain of command. [Id.] Plaintiff contends a camera in the Dorm-O should show what took place. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges that he politely asked Officer Cooter for a higher chain of command. [Id. at 6.] However, Officer Cooter called on the radio and stated that the Oscar Dorm would not let her leave. [Id.] She then walked past the inmates and left. [Id.] Plaintiff was then falsely charged and placed in segregated housing on high risk custody. [Id.]
For his injuries, Plaintiff alleges he suffers from mental health issues and “to be accused of such a [heinous] crime” caused him to suffer humiliation, embarrassment, and depression. [Id.] For his relief, Plaintiff asks that the kidnapping charge be dismissed and he seeks money damages in the amount of $1 million. [Id.]
The Court takes judicial notice that Plaintiff has been charged in the Greenville County Court of General Sessions with the following crimes: possession of marijuana at case number 2022A2330209927; trafficking in methamphetamine or cocaine base at case number 2022A2330209935; trafficking in heroin at case number 2022A2330209936; manufacture and distribution of cocaine base at case number 2022A2330209937; and kidnapping at case number 2022A2330210408. See Greenville County Thirteenth Judicial Circuit Public Index, available at https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Greenville/PublicIndex/ PISearch.aspx (search by case numbers listed above) (last visited Aug. 29, 2023). Those charges all remain pending against Plaintiff at this time. Significantly, the kidnapping charge at case number 2022A2330210408 arises from the incident alleged in the Complaint in this case.
See Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that courts “may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record”); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (“We note that ‘the most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the content of court records.'”).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute, which authorizes the district court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous or malicious,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, Plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition in 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and “seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, even if Plaintiff had prepaid the full filing fee, this Court would still be charged with screening Plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the Complaint if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, his pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, even under this less stringent standard, the pro se pleading remains subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the Court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which Plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct Plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411,417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or “conjure up questions never squarely presented” to the Court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Although the Court must liberally construe the pro se Complaint and Plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove his case as an evidentiary matter in his pleadings, the Complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a plaintiff may proceed into the litigation process only when his complaint is justified by both law and fact); cf. Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 530 (2011) (holding that plaintiff need not pin his claim for relief to precise legal theory). “A claim has ‘facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'” Owens v. Baltimore City State's Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014).
DISCUSSION
The Complaint is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
As noted, Plaintiff contends Defendants violated his civil rights. The allegations in the Complaint are cursory and the Court is unable to determine what precise causes of action Plaintiff intends to assert in this case. Although Plaintiff cites the Eighth Amendment, this case does not appear to challenge the conditions of Plaintiff's confinement. Instead, the crux of this action appears to be Plaintiff's challenge to the kidnapping charge against him and his ongoing detention at the Greenville County Detention Center. Despite Plaintiff's contentions, this action is subject to summary dismissal for the reasons below.
Defendants Entitled to Dismissal
First, the named Defendants are all entitled to summary dismissal because Plaintiff has failed to allege facts showing their personal involvement. It is well settled that only “persons” may act under color of state law, and, therefore, a defendant in a § 1983 action must qualify as a “person.” See Harden v. Green, 27 Fed.Appx. 173, 178 (4th Cir. 2001); Rutland v. Dorchester Cnty. Det. Ctr., No. 8:09-cv-274-SB, 2009 WL 1704331, at *2 (D.S.C. June 17, 2009) (“A defendant in a § 1983 action must qualify as a ‘person.'”). Further, “[i]n order for an individual to be liable under § 1983, it must be affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights.... Consequently, [defendants] must have had personal knowledge of and involvement in the alleged deprivation of [plaintiff]'s rights in order to be liable.” Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). While Plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove his case as an evidentiary matter in his Complaint, he must allege facts that support a claim for relief. Bass v. DuPont, 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003); White v. White, 886 F.2d 721, 723-74 (4th Cir.1989) (dismissing complaint dismissed because it “failed to contain any factual allegations tending to support his bare assertion”).
Here, Plaintiff does not allege facts showing Defendants' direct involvement in any alleged unconstitutional conduct. Instead, Plaintiff merely names Defendants in the caption of his Complaint and makes general, conclusory allegations about the alleged violations of his rights. “However, such general allegations, absent any specific facts of personal involvement in the events giving rise to this case, are insufficient to state a cognizable § 1983 claim.” Tracey v. Nelson, No. 1:12-cv-1614-JMC-SVH, 2012 WL 4583107, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 31, 2012), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2012 WL 4588205 (D.S.C. Oct. 1, 2012). Because Plaintiff makes no factual allegations in the Complaint of personal involvement against any Defendant, they are each entitled to summary dismissal. See Potter v. Clark, 497 F.2d 1206, 1207 (7th Cir. 1974) (“Where a complaint alleges no specific act or conduct on the part of the defendant and the complaint is silent as to the defendant except for his name appearing in the caption, the complaint is properly dismissed.”); Newkirk v. Circuit Court of City of Hampton, No. 3:14-cv-372-HEH, 2014 WL 4072212, at *2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 14, 2014) (finding the complaint was subject to summary dismissal where plaintiff made no factual allegations against the named defendants within the body of the pleading).
Further, to the extent Plaintiff names Defendants for any conduct alleged in the Complaint under a theory of respondeat superior, the undersigned recommends dismissal. “The doctrine of supervisory liability is generally inapplicable to § 1983 suits, such that an employer or supervisor is not liable for the acts of his employees, absent an official policy or custom that results in illegal action.” Dickerson v. South Carolina, No. 4:21-cv-00110-TLW-SVH, 2021 WL 537200, at *2 (D.S.C. Jan. 25, 2021), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2021 WL 535401 (D.S.C. Feb. 12, 2021); see also Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). “Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; see also Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 372-74 (4th Cir. 1984) (noting officials may be held liable for the acts of their subordinates, if the official is aware of a pervasive, unreasonable risk of harm from a specified source and fails to take corrective action as a result of deliberate indifference or tacit authorization). Here, Plaintiff has not alleged any such facts. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to summary dismissal.
Claims Subject to Dismissal
Next, to the extent that Plaintiff has asserted any claims that are not subject to dismissal for the reasons already stated, they are subject to dismissal for the reasons below.
Younger Abstention
First, the Court should abstain from hearing Plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief. As noted, Plaintiff appears to challenge a kidnapping charge pending against him in the Greenville County Court of General Sessions arising from an incident that took place at the Greenville County Detention Center. Although Plaintiff seeks money damages, he also requests that the Court dismiss his pending kidnapping charge.
To the extent Plaintiff is seeking release from custody, such relief is not available in this civil rights action. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994) (stating that “habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release, even though such a claim may come within the literal terms of § 1983”); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487-88 (1973) (explaining a challenge to the duration of confinement is within the core of habeas corpus). “Release from pretrial detention is simply not an available remedy in a § 1983 action.” El v. Fornandes, No. 2:19-cv-3045-RMG-MGB, 2019 WL 7900140, at *4 (D.S.C. Nov. 22, 2019) (explaining a plaintiff cannot use § 1983 to get out of jail), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2019 WL 6712057 (D.S.C. Dec. 10, 2019).
Further, to the extent Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief related to his pending state court criminal charge for kidnapping, including dismissal of that charge, such a claim is not properly before this Court based on the Younger abstention doctrine. Liberally construed, the Complaint appears to assert that the pending state court criminal proceedings against Plaintiff are improper and violate his constitutional rights. Plaintiff asks that the kidnapping charge against him be dismissed. Granting Plaintiff's requested relief, however, would require this Court to interfere with or enjoin the pending state court criminal proceedings against him. As discussed below, because a federal court may not award relief that would affect pending state proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances, this Court should abstain from interfering with it.
In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court held that a federal court should not equitably interfere with state criminal proceedings “except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances.” Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Younger Court noted that courts of equity should not act unless the moving party has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44; see also Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72-73 (2013) (explaining the circumstances when Younger abstention is appropriate).
From Younger and its progeny, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has culled the following test to determine when abstention is appropriate: “[1] there are ongoing state judicial proceedings; [2] the proceedings implicate important state interests; and [3] there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings.” Martin Marietta Corp. v. Md. Comm'n on Human Rels., 38 F.3d 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1994). Here, Plaintiff is involved in ongoing state court criminal proceedings, and Plaintiff asks this Court to award relief for alleged constitutional violations related to his pending criminal actions; thus, the first element is satisfied. The second element is satisfied for reasons the Supreme Court has explained: “[T]he States' interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable types of relief.” Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986). The third element is also satisfied, as the Supreme Court has noted “that ordinarily a pending state prosecution provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindication of federal constitutional rights.” Gilliam, 75 F.3d at 903 (internal quotation marks omitted).
A ruling in Plaintiff's favor in this case would call into question the validity of the state court criminal proceedings against him and would significantly interfere with those ongoing state proceedings. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-45; Cinema Blue of Charlotte, Inc. v. Gilchrist, 887 F.2d 49, 52 (4th Cir. 1989) (“[F]ederal courts should abstain from the decision of constitutional challenges to state action, however meritorious the complaint may be, ‘whenever [the] federal claims have been or could be presented in ongoing state judicial proceedings that concern important state interests.'”) (citation omitted); Washington v. Tilton, No. 2:10-cv-997-HFF-RSC, 2010 WL 2084383, at *1 (D.S.C. May 19, 2010). This Court finds that Plaintiff can adequately litigate his federal constitutional rights in the state court proceedings. Thus, this Court should abstain from adjudicating Plaintiff's claims as to his pending kidnapping charge.
Failure to State a Claim
Further, Plaintiff's Complaint is subject to dismissal because his allegations fail to state a claim for relief for money damages. In sum, other than vaguely mentioning that his Eighth Amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment was violated, Plaintiff does not allege any facts to support an Eighth Amendment claim. The Court is not required to accept “legal conclusions, elements of a cause of action, and bare assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Nemet Chevrolet Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 255 (4th Cir. 2009); see also Francis, 588 F.3d at 189. As a result, Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim, if any, fails. The Court will briefly address other claims that Plaintiff might be asserting in this case.
Fourth Amendment, Malicious Prosecution
First, to the extent Plaintiff is asserting a claim for malicious prosecution, his claim is without merit. Claims under § 1983 premised on false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution are analyzed as actions claiming unreasonable seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Brown v. Gilmore, 278 F.3d 362, 367-68 (4th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that a plaintiff alleging a § 1983 false arrest claim needs to show that the officer decided to arrest him without probable cause to establish an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment); Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279, 294 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating claims of false arrest and false imprisonment “are essentially claims alleging a seizure of the person in violation of the Fourth Amendment”). To state a malicious prosecution claim, “a plaintiff must allege that the defendant (1) caused (2) a seizure of the plaintiff pursuant to legal process unsupported by probable cause, and (3) criminal proceedings terminated in plaintiff's favor.” Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 647 (4th Cir. 2012); see also McDonough v. Smith, 139 S.Ct. 2149, 2160 (2019) (holding a cause of action for malicious prosecution does not accrue until the prosecution ends); Thompson v. Clark, 142 S.Ct. 1332, 1335 (2022) (holding a plaintiff need only show that the prosecution ended without a conviction).
Here, Plaintiff has failed to plead the minimum facts necessary to state a cognizable claim for a Fourth Amendment violation. This is so because Plaintiff has failed to allege facts showing that he was charged with kidnapping in the absence of probable cause or that the charge was terminated in his favor. Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff intends to assert a Fourth Amendment claim for malicious prosecution, any such claim fails.
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, Due Process
Likewise, to the extent that Plaintiff's allegations may be construed as asserting due process claims under the Fifth and/or Fourteenth Amendments, any such claims fail because Plaintiff has not alleged facts showing he was subjected to any deprivation of due process. To the extent Plaintiff is alleging a procedural due process violation with regard to the charges pending against him or his purportedly unlawful incarceration, he has failed to allege facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible. Additionally, such claims are subject to dismissal for the reasons already stated. Namely, the Court should abstain from deciding such claims under Younger.
Next, to the extent Plaintiff is alleging a substantive due process claim with regard to the conditions of his confinement, he has failed to allege facts to state a plausible claim. “To prevail on a substantive due process claim, a pretrial detainee must show unconstitutional punishment by proving that the challenged conditions were either (1) imposed with an expressed intent to punish or (2) not reasonably related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental objective, in which case an intent to punish may be inferred.” Williamson v. Stirling, 912 F.3d 154, 178 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal citation and quotation omitted). However, “Plaintiff's allegations do not rise to state a claim of a constitutional magnitude.” Brown v. Polk, No.4:21-cv-1229-TMC-TER, 2021 WL 3080966, at *2 (D.S.C. June 28, 2021) (discussing the requirements for a pretrial detainee to state a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2021 WL 3080157 (D.S.C. July 21, 2021). In sum, Plaintiff has made no allegations concerning the conditions of his confinement and has not identified any cognizable injury as to those conditions.
Eighth Amendment, Denial of Bond
Finally, Plaintiff may be asserting a claim under the Eighth Amendment for the denial of bond. [See Doc. 1 at 6 (alleging “false and wrongfully imprisoned (no bond)”).] However, Plaintiff's cursory allegations that he has been denied bond are without merit. The Eighth Amendment, made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive finds imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII; see also Grimes v. Pszczolkowski, No. 1:14-cv-13, 2015 WL 144619, at *22 (N.D. W.Va. Jan. 12, 2015). “However, the United States Constitution does not establish an absolute right to bail, nor does federal statutory law provide a right to bail in state criminal cases.” Odom v. Smalls, No. 3:09-cv-0629-PMD, 2009 WL 3805594, at *3 (D.S.C. Nov. 12, 2009). “The Eighth Amendment addresses pretrial release by providing merely that ‘[e]xcessive bail shall not be required.' This Clause, of course, says nothing about whether bail shall be available at all.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 752 (1987). Accordingly, “Plaintiff has no federal right to be released on bond,” and his claims against Defendants concerning the denial of his bond therefore must fail. Odom, 2009 WL 3805594, at *3 (emphasis omitted).
In sum, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to state any cognizable constitutional claim, and this action is therefore subject to summary dismissal on this basis in addition to the other reasons stated above.
RECOMMENDATION
Consequently, it is recommended that the District Court dismiss this action without issuance and service of process pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (as soon as possible after docketing, district courts should review prisoner cases to determine whether they are subject to summary dismissal).
The undersigned finds that Plaintiff cannot cure the defects in his Complaint by mere amendment and therefore recommends that the instant action be dismissed without affording Plaintiff an opportunity to amend because amendment would be futile. See Thomas v. Drive Auto. Indus. of Am., Inc., No. 6:18-cv-169-AMQ, 2018 WL 5258811, at *2 (D.S.C. July 25, 2018) (declining to automatically give plaintiff leave to amend because plaintiff could not cure the defects in his claims against defendant by mere amendment), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 5255183 (D.S.C. Oct. 22, 2018); Workman v. Kernell, No. 6:18-cv-00355-RBH-KFM, 2018 WL 4826535, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 2, 2018), aff'd, 766 Fed.Appx. 1 (4th Cir. 2019). Here, Plaintiff's state criminal charges remain pending at this time, and he can raise the issues complained of herein with the state court.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
250 East North Street, Suite 2300
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).