Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:17-cv-2330
07-25-2019
DONNA MILBRAND, Plaintiff v. ANDREW SAUL, Defendant
(BRANN, D.J.) ()
REPORT & RECOMMENDATION
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Donna Milbrand, an adult individual who resides within the Middle District of Pennsylvania, seeks judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying her application for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §405(g).
This matter has been referred to me to prepare a Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. After reviewing the parties' briefs, the Commissioner's final decision, and the relevant portions of the certified administrative transcript, I find the Commissioner's final decision is not supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, I recommend that the Commissioner's final decision be VACATED. II. BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On November 24, 2014, Plaintiff protectively filed an application for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. (Admin. Tr. 122; Doc. 11-5, p. 3). In this application, Plaintiff alleged she became disabled as of February 17, 2014, when she was 59 years old, due to the following conditions: arthritis throughout the body, bilateral knee replacement, bilateral hip replacement, uterine cancer in remission, high blood pressure (controlled), high cholesterol, obesity, depression, right shoulder pain, and two back injuries with continuing pain. (Admin. Tr. 136; Doc. 11-6, p. 5). Plaintiff alleges that the combination of these conditions affects her ability to lift, squat, bend, stand, reach, walk, sit kneel, stair climb, and completing tasks. (Admin. Tr. 161; Doc. 11-6, p. 30). Plaintiff completed high school and obtained specialized training as an LPN. (Admin. Tr. 137; Doc. 11-6, p. 6). Before the onset of her impairments, Plaintiff worked as a Unit Clerk. (Admin. Tr. 17; Doc. 11-2, p. 18).
On March 18, 2015, Plaintiff's application was denied at the initial level of administrative review. (Admin. Tr. 63; Doc. 11-3, p. 11). On March 24, 2015, Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing. (Admin. Tr. 74; Doc. 11-4, p. 11).
On November 9, 2016, Plaintiff, assisted by her counsel, appeared and testified during a hearing before Administrative Law Judge Howard Kauffman (the "ALJ"). (Admin. Tr. 23; Doc. 11-2, p. 24). On March 15, 2017, the ALJ issued a decision denying Plaintiff's application for benefits. (Admin. Tr. 8; Doc. 11-2, p. 9). On April 6, 2017, Plaintiff requested review of the ALJ's decision by the Appeals Council of the Office of Disability Adjudication and Review ("Appeals Council"). (Admin. Tr. 118; Doc. 11-4, p. 55).
On October 16, 2017, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review. (Admin. Tr. 1; Doc. 11-2, p. 2).
On December 18, 2017, Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a Complaint. (Doc. 1). In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ's decision denying the application is not supported by substantial evidence, and improperly applies the relevant law and regulations. (Doc. 1). As relief, Plaintiff requests that the Court award benefits or in the alternative remand to Commissioner for new hearing. (Doc. 1).
On March 20, 2018, the Commissioner filed an Answer. (Doc. 10). In the Answer, the Commissioner maintains that the decision holding that Plaintiff is not entitled to disability insurance benefits was made in accordance with the law and regulations and is supported by substantial evidence. (Doc. 10). Along with her Answer, the Commissioner filed a certified transcript of the administrative record. (Doc. 11).
Plaintiff's Brief (Doc. 12), the Commissioner's Brief (Doc. 13), and Plaintiff's Reply (Doc. 14) have been filed. This matter is now ripe for decision. III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE REVIEW - THE ROLE OF THIS COURT
When reviewing the Commissioner's final decision denying a claimant's application for benefits, this Court's review is limited to the question of whether the findings of the final decision-maker are supported by substantial evidence in the record. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Johnson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 200 (3d Cir. 2008); Ficca v. Astrue, 901 F. Supp. 2d 533, 536 (M.D. Pa. 2012). Substantial evidence "does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, but rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance of the evidence but more than a mere scintilla. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). A single piece of evidence is not substantial evidence if the ALJ ignores countervailing evidence or fails to resolve a conflict created by the evidence. Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir. 1993). But in an adequately developed factual record, substantial evidence may be "something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent [the ALJ's decision] from being supported by substantial evidence." Consolo v. Fed. Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966).
"In determining if the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence the court must scrutinize the record as a whole." Leslie v. Barnhart, 304 F. Supp. 2d 623, 627 (M.D. Pa. 2003). The question before this Court, therefore, is not whether Plaintiff is disabled, but whether the Commissioner's finding that Plaintiff is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence and was reached based upon a correct application of the relevant law. See Arnold v. Colvin, No. 3:12-CV-02417, 2014 WL 940205, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2014) ("[I]t has been held that an ALJ's errors of law denote a lack of substantial evidence.") (alterations omitted); Burton v. Schweiker, 512 F. Supp. 913, 914 (W.D. Pa. 1981) ("The Secretary's determination as to the status of a claim requires the correct application of the law to the facts."); see also Wright v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 675, 678 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that the scope of review on legal matters is plenary); Ficca, 901 F. Supp. 2d at 536 ("[T]he court has plenary review of all legal issues . . . .").
B. STANDARDS GOVERNING THE ALJ'S APPLICATION OF THE FIVE-STEP SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS
To receive benefits under the Social Security Act by reason of disability, a claimant must demonstrate an inability to "engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a). To satisfy this requirement, a claimant must have a severe physical or mental impairment that makes it impossible to do his or her previous work or any other substantial gainful activity that exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a). To receive benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, a claimant must show that he or she contributed to the insurance program, is under retirement age, and became disabled prior to the date on which he or she was last insured. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a); 20 C.F.R. § 404.131(a).
Throughout this Report, I cite to the version of the administrative rulings and regulations that were in effect on the date the Commissioner's final decision was issued. In this case, the ALJ's decision, which serves as the final decision of the Commissioner, was issued on March 15, 2017.
In making this determination at the administrative level, the ALJ follows a five-step sequential evaluation process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). Under this process, the ALJ must sequentially determine: (1) whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) whether the claimant's impairment meets or equals a listed impairment; (4) whether the claimant is able to do his or her past relevant work; and (5) whether the claimant is able to do any other work, considering his or her age, education, work experience and residual functional capacity ("RFC"). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).
Between steps three and four, the ALJ must also assess a claimant's RFC. RFC is defined as "that which an individual is still able to do despite the limitations caused by his or her impairment(s)." Burnett v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 121 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). In making this assessment, the ALJ considers all the claimant's medically determinable impairments, including any non-severe impairments identified by the ALJ at step two of his or her analysis. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(2).
At steps one through four, the claimant bears the initial burden of demonstrating the existence of a medically determinable impairment that prevents him or her in engaging in any of his or her past relevant work. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512; Mason, 994 F.2d at 1064. Once this burden has been met by the claimant, it shifts to the Commissioner at step five to show that jobs exist in significant number in the national economy that the claimant could perform that are consistent with the claimant's age, education, work experience and RFC. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(f); Mason, 994 F.2d at 1064.
The ALJ's disability determination must also meet certain basic substantive requisites. Most significant among these legal benchmarks is a requirement that the ALJ adequately explain the legal and factual basis for this disability determination. Thus, to facilitate review of the decision under the substantial evidence standard, the ALJ's decision must be accompanied by "a clear and satisfactory explication of the basis on which it rests." Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704 (3d Cir. 1981). Conflicts in the evidence must be resolved and the ALJ must indicate which evidence was accepted, which evidence was rejected, and the reasons for rejecting certain evidence. Id. at 706-707. In addition, "[t]he ALJ must indicate in his decision which evidence he has rejected and which he is relying on as the basis for his finding." Schaudeck v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 181 F. 3d 429, 433 (3d Cir. 1999). IV. DISCUSSION
In her brief, Plaintiff raises the following arguments:
(1) The ALJ committed a reversible and harmful error of law by failing to account at step four for the impact of mild limitations with regard to concentration, persistence, or pace.(Doc. 12, p. 3).
(2) The ALJ committed reversible and harmful error of law by failing to properly assess the effects of Milbrand's obesity in combination with her other impairments as required by Social Security Ruling (SSR) 02-01p.
(3) The ALJ's RFC assessment is not supported by a medical opinion.
A. THE ALJ'S DECISION DENYING PLAINTIFF'S APPLICATION
In his March 2017 decision, the ALJ found that Plaintiff met the insured status requirement of Title II of the Social Security Act through September 30, 2019. (Admin. Tr. 13; Doc. 11-2, p. 12). Then, Plaintiff's application was evaluated at steps one through four of the sequential evaluation process.
At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not engage in substantial gainful activity at any point between February 17, 2015, (Plaintiff's alleged onset date) and March 15, 2017, (the date the ALJ decision was issued) ("the relevant period"). (Admin. Tr. 11; Doc. 11-2, p. 12). At step two, the ALJ found that, during the relevant period, Plaintiff had the following medically determinable severe impairment(s): degenerative joint disease of the bilateral hips and knees, degenerative disc disease, and obesity. (Admin. Tr. 13; Doc. 11-2, p. 14). At step three, the ALJ found that, during the relevant period, Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Admin. Tr. 14; Doc. 11-2, p. 15).
Between steps three and four, the ALJ assessed Plaintiff's RFC. The ALJ found that, during the relevant period, Plaintiff retained the RFC to engage in light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) subject to the following additional limitations:
the claimant can lift and/or carry up to 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; can stand and/or walk for a total of six hours, and sit for a total of six hours, in an eight-hour workday with normal breaks; can occasionally climb ramps/stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch or crawl; cannot use ladders, ropes or scaffolds; and is precluded from exposure to unprotected heights or wet surfaces(Admin. Tr. 14; Doc. 11-2, p. 15).
At step four, the ALJ found that, during the relevant period, Plaintiff could engage in her past relevant work. (Admin. Tr. 17; Doc. 11-2, p. 18). To support his conclusion, the ALJ relied on testimony given by a vocational expert during Plaintiff's administrative hearing and cited the claimant's age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity would be able to complete the job as a unit clerk.
Based on these findings, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled during the relevant period.
A. WHETHER THE ALJ ACCOUNTED FOR PLAINTIFF'S MILD DIFFICULTIES CONCENTRATING, PERSISTING OR MAINTAINING PACE IN THE RFC ASSESSMENT
The psychiatric review technique ("PRT"), described in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a guides the assessment of the severity of a claimant's mental impairments in categories identified in the "paragraph B" criteria of the adult mental disorders listings. SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184 at *4; see also 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 §12.00 et seq. The Paragraph B criteria include the following four broad categories: understanding, remembering or applying information; interacting with others; concentrating, persisting or maintaining pace; and adapting or managing oneself. 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 § 12.00E. These categories are used in conjunction with a five-point rating scale to assess the severity of the impairment at steps two and three of the sequential evaluation process. SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184 at *4. The degree of limitation in each area is assessed based on the following scale: no limitation (or none); mild limitation; moderate limitation; marked limitation; and extreme limitation. 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 § 12.00F.
At step two, the ALJ made the appropriate PRT findings and concluded that Plaintiff's mental impairment was medically determinable but non-severe. (Admin. Tr. 13; Doc. 11-2, p. 15). In doing so, the ALJ assessed that Plaintiff had "mild" limitations concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace. Id. A "mild" limitation is described as a "slight limitation" to the ability to function "independently, appropriately, effectively, and on a sustained basis." 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 § 12.00F2.
"Concentrate, persist or maintain pace" refers to "the abilities to focus attention on work activities and stay on task at a sustained rate. Examples include: Initiating and performing a task that you understand and know how to do; working at an appropriate and consistent pace; completing tasks in a timely manner; ignoring or avoiding distractions while working; changing activities or work settings without being disruptive; working close to or with others without interrupting or distracting them; sustaining an ordinary routine and regular attendance at work; and working a full day without needing more than the allotted number or length of rest periods during the day." 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P Appendix 1 § 12.00E3
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ "did not take into account the impact that mild limitations in maintaining CPP would have on the ability to perform the duties of her semiskilled PRW." (Doc. 12, p. 5). Semi-skilled work is "work which needs some skills but does not require doing the more complex work duties. Semi-skilled jobs may require alertness and close attention to watching machine processes; or inspecting, testing or otherwise looking for irregularities; or tending or guarding equipment, property, materials, or persons against loss, damage or injury; or other types of activities which are similarly less complex than skilled work, but more complex than unskilled work. A job may be classified as semi-skilled where coordination and dexterity are necessary, as when hands or feet must be moved quickly to do repetitive tasks." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1568(b).
The Commissioner argues that a "claimant's RFC is, thus, not reflective of mere diagnoses but, rather, the effect that those diagnoses specifically have on doing past work or other work." (Doc. 13, p. 16) (citing Garrett v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 274 F. App'x 159, 163 (3d Cir. Apr. 17, 2008) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e)(2), 404.1546, and Burnett v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 121 (3d Cir. 2000))). The Commissioner points out that the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had only a mild limitation in the CPP functional area and that her brief history of depression and anxiety were "nonsevere." (Doc. 13, p. 16). The Commissioner cites directly to the ALJ findings:
The limitations identified in the "paragraph B" criteria are not a residual functional capacity assessment but are used to rate the severity of mental impairments at steps 2 and 3 of the sequential evaluation process. The mental residual functional capacity assessment used at steps 4 and 5 of the sequential evaluation process requires a more detailed assessment by itemizing various functions contained in the broad categories found in paragraph B of the adult mental disorders listings in 12.00 of the Listing of Impairments (SSR 96-8p). Therefore, the following residual functional capacity assessment reflects the degree of limitation I have found in the "paragraph B" mental function analysis.Id. (quoting Admin. Tr. 14; Doc. 11-2, p. 15). Based on these findings, the Commissioner argues the ALJ's decision was reasonable and should be upheld.
I agree with the Commissioner and conclude that remand is not required for further consideration of Plaintiff's ability to concentrate, persist, or maintain pace. Plaintiff only appears to rely on her diagnosis, does not discuss any specific limitation (i.e., slow work pace, inability to maintain attention, inability to complete tasks) that would make it impossible for her to engage in semi-skilled work. Nonetheless, for the reasons discussed in the next section of this Report, I find that the ALJ's evaluation of Plaintiff's physical limitations is not supported by substantial evidence.
B. WHETHER THE ALJ'S ASSESSMENT OF PLAINTIFF'S PHYSICAL LIMITATIONS IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
One medical source, consultative examiner Roger Boatwright, M.D., provided an opinion about Plaintiff's physical limitations. Dr. Boatwright assessed:
It appears that this opinion is incorrectly attributed to "Dr. Long" in the ALJ's decision.
The claimant underwent internal medicine examination by Dr. Long on March 10, 2015 (Exhibit 7F, page 3). The claimant's chief complaints at that time included pain in her knees, hips, low back and right shoulder, which were exacerbated by prolonged standing or
walking, and mitigated by heat, rest and pain medication. Upon physical examination Dr. Long noted normal gait and maneuvering ability (with the exception of diminished squatting ability), with no joint abnormalities or neurologic deficiencies. The claimant's straight leg raises were limited to 60 degrees on the right and 30 degrees on the left. Medical imaging obtained by Dr. Long showed degenerative changes in the claimant's lumbar spine at L2-5. Based on his examination, Dr. Long concluded that the claimant would be capable of performing work activity involving lifting and/or carrying up to 10 pounds, sitting up to six hours and standing/walking up to two hours in an eight-hour workday, and a restricted range of postural and manipulative actions.(Admin. Tr. 16; Doc. 11-2, p. 17).
The ALJ gave "little" weight to this opinion. In support of his decision to discount Dr. Boatwright's opinion, the ALJ explained:
Dr. Long's opinion that the claimant would be limited to range of work at the sedentary exertional level is not consistent with Dr. Long's own documented clinical observations on the date of evaluation. Specifically, Dr. Long noted the claimant's normal gait with no assistance, no deficiency in postural maneuvering aside from reduced squatting ability, no spinal or joint abnormality or instability, no trigger points or sensory deficits, 5/5 strength in the upper extremities and 4/5 strength in the lower extremities, and unimpaired grip strength. Further, the claimant's primary care physical examinations, generally routine and conservative treatment (after the first few months following the alleged onset date) and reported symptoms over the course of the period at issue have not supported a conclusion that the claimant would be restricted to sedentary work activity. The undersigned finds that a limitation to work at the light level is supported by substantial evidence including the claimant's demonstrated clinical performance, treatment provider notes, and subjectively-alleged limitations (to the extent these allegations are not inconsistent with the objective evidence).(Admin. Tr. 17; Doc. 11-2, p. 18).
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ's RFC assessment is not supported by the medical opinion evidence of record, and indeed my review of the ALJ's opinion confirms that the ALJ gave little weight Dr. Boatright's medical opinion. In response, the Commissioner argues that the ALJ is permitted to reach RFC determinations without outside medical expert review of each fact incorporated into the decision. Plaintiff's argument falls within the growing number of cases that require the Court to compare the language offered in two Third Circuit opinions: Chandler v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. 667 F.3d 356 (3d Cir. 2012), and Doak v. Heckler, 790 F.2d 26 (3d Cir. 1986).
There is no dispute that it is the ALJ's duty to assess a claimant's RFC. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c). Further, the Commissioner's regulations and Third Circuit caselaw are clear that an ALJ must consider more than just medical opinions when evaluating a claimant's RFC. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3) ("We will assess your residual functional capacity based on all of the relevant medical and other evidence."); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(b) (explaining that "evidence" is "anything you or anyone else submits to us or that we obtain that relates to your claim."); Burnett v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. , 220 F.3d 112, 121 (3d Cir. 2000) ("In making a residual functional capacity determination, the ALJ must consider all evidence before him."). Although objective medical evidence and treatment records are relevant to an ALJ's RFC assessment and, if they include findings about a claimant's functional abilities may be enough to support specific findings in an RFC assessment on their own, as a practical matter such documents do not always contain this information. Thus, the reality in Social Security cases is that "[r]arely can a decision be made regarding a claimant's residual functional capacity without an assessment from a physician regarding the functional abilities of the claimant." McKean v. Colvin, 150 F. Supp.3d 406, 418 (M.D. Pa. 2015).
As two commentators have explained:
It can reasonably be asserted that the ALJ has the right to determine whether a claimant can engage in sedentary, light, medium, or heavy work. The ALJ should not assume that physicians know the Social Security Administration's definitions of those terms. Even though the RFC assessment draws from medical sources for support, it is ultimately an administrative determination based on those administrative definitions and is reserved to the Commissioner. However, the underlying determination is a medical determination, i.e., that the claimant can lift five, 20, 50, or 100 pounds, and can stand for 30 minutes, two hours, six hours, or eight hours. That determination must be made by a doctor. Once the doctor has determined how long the claimant can sit, stand or walk, and how much weight the claimant can lift and carry, then the ALJ, with the aid of a vocational expert if necessary, can translate that medical determination into a residual functional capacity determination. Of course, in such a situation a residual functional capacity determination is merely a mechanical determination, because the regulations clearly
and explicitly define the various types of work that can be performed by claimants, based upon their physical capacities.Carolyn A. Kubitschek & Jon C. Dubin, Social Security Disability Law and Procedure in Federal Courts, § 3:47 (2019) (emphasis added) (internal footnotes omitted) available on Westlaw at SSFEDCT § 3:47.
As this Court has explained:
It is well established that an ALJ "is not free to set his own expertise against that of a physician who presents competent evidence. Ferguson v. Schweiker, 765 F.2d 31, 37 (3d Cir. 1985). In cases where the ALJ does not give any significant or great weight to any medical opinion, the Court has found that the ALJ "seemingly interpreted the medical evidence of record, and substituted her own opinion for that of a medical one in arriving at [a] Plaintiff's RFC." McKay v. Colvin, No. 3:14-CV-2020, 2015 WL 5124119, *17 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 13, 2015). McKean is particularly on point in this matter, as there the Court found the ALJ's RFC not supported by substantial evidence where the ALJ dismissed the only medical opinion in the record rendered in regard to the claimant's physical limitations. See McKean, 150 F. Supp. 3d at 418.Decker v. Berryhill, No. 1:17-cv-00945, 2018 WL 4189662 at *6 (M.D. Pa. June 8, 2018) report and recommendation adopted 2018 WL 4184304 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2018).
"It is not error in and of itself to disagree with the opinion of a medical professional." Id. An RFC assessment, however, is not supported by substantial evidence where an ALJ assesses a lesser degree of limitation than found by any medical professional without citing to another type of evidence that supports his or her assessment. Id. (listing cases). The ALJ in this case fails to cite any evidence consistent with his ultimate conclusion that Plaintiff is able to: "lift and/or carry up to 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; can stand and/or walk for a total of six hours, and sit for a total of six hours, in an eight-hour workday with normal breaks; can occasionally climb ramps/stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch or crawl; cannot use ladders, ropes or scaffolds; and is precluded from exposure to unprotected heights or wet surfaces." (Doc. 11-2, pp. 15-16). Furthermore, the facts of this case are distinguishable from those in Chandler and Titterington. Unlike in this case, where the ALJ found that Plaintiff had a lesser degree of physical limitation than any medical source, the ALJs in Chandler and Titterington crafted RFC assessments that were more restrictive that those contemplated by the physician's findings. Chandler, 667 F.3d at 361-63; Titterington, 174 F. App'x at 11. "[W]hen an ALJ is saying that a claimant can do more than the medical source opinion states, courts exercise caution and suggest that only rarely can an ALJ unilaterally impose an RFC on a claimant that is less restrictive than the residual functional capacity found by the medical professional." Metzgar v. Colvin, No. 3:16-CV-1929, 2017 WL 1483328 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2017) (emphasis in original), report and recommendation adopted 2017 WL 1479426 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 2017).
In this case, the only medical opinion that addresses Plaintiff's ability to sit, stand, and lift contains more significant limitations than those assessed by the ALJ in his decision. As noted above, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could engage in "light" work. "Light" work is defined by the Commissioner's regulations as "lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b). The RFC assessment also includes that Plaintiff be limited to "occasional . . . stooping, crouching, . . . and kneeling." (Admin. Tr. 29; Doc. 9-2, p. 30).
In this context, "occasional" means occurring "up to 1/3 of the time." U.S. Department of Labor, Selected Characteristics of Occupations Defined in the Revised Dictionary of Occupational Titles, Appendix C available on Westlaw at SCODICOT App C. "Stooping" is defined as "[b]ending body downward and forward by bending spine at the waist, requiring full use of the lower extremities and back muscles." Id. (emphasis added). "Kneeling" is defined as "[b]ending legs at knees to come to rest on knee or knees." Id. (emphasis added). "Crouching" is defined as "[b]ending downward and forward by bending legs and spine." Id. (emphasis added).
Unlike the ALJ's RFC assessment, Dr. Boatwright assessed that Plaintiff would be capable of performing work activity involving lifting and/or carrying up to 10 pounds, sitting up to six hours and standing/walking up to two hours in an eight-hour workday.
Although an ALJ is required to consider the consistency of competing medical opinions with the objective evidence of record when deciding what opinions, or what portions of the opinions, to credit, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(4), an ALJ's lay reinterpretation of medical evidence by itself is not adequate to find a claimant not disabled. Wright v. Colvin, 1:14-cv-2350, 2016 WL 446876 at *1 (M.D. Pa. Ja. 14, 2016) ("even under the deferential standard of review, no reasonable person would find lay reinterpretation of medical evidence to be adequate to find a claimant was not disabled.") report and recommendation adopted 2016 WL 452142 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 4, 2016). Treatment notes showing that Plaintiff walked with a normal gait, had no significant weakness, normal reflexes, and mild abnormalities and degenerative changes in diagnostic imaging may be enough basis to discount a medical opinion that assesses significant physical limitations. However, this raw data is not, in my view, enough information for a lay individual, like an ALJ or other disability evaluator, to rely on to determine how much weight a person can lift, or whether the person can stoop, crouch, or kneel.
Accordingly, I find that the ALJ's RFC assessment is not supported by substantial evidence and therefore will recommend that the ALJ's decision be vacated and that this case be remanded to the Commissioner to conduct a new administrative hearing. Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985) (explaining when there is a lack of substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's decision "[t]he proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional investigation or explanation.").
C. PLAINTIFF'S REMAINING ARGUMENTS
Because I have found a clear basis for remand I need not address Plaintiff's remaining argument. To the extent any further error exists, it may be addressed during the new administrative hearing. V. RECOMMENDATION
IT IS RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's request for awarded benefits or in the alternative remand to Commissioner be GRANTED as follows:
(1) The final decision of the Commissioner should be VACATED.Date: July 25, 2019
(2) This case should be REMANDED to the Commissioner to conduct a new administrative hearing pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
(3) Final judgment should be issued in favor of Donna Milbrand.
(4) The clerk of court should CLOSE this case.
BY THE COURT
s/William I . Arbuckle
William I. Arbuckle
U.S. Magistrate Judge
NOTICE OF LOCAL RULE 72.3
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that any party may obtain a review of the Report and Recommendation pursuant to Local Rule 72.3, which provides:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.Date: July 25, 2019
BY THE COURT
s/William I . Arbuckle
William I. Arbuckle
U.S. Magistrate Judge