Opinion
2013-12-27
John F. MIKULSKI, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Russell M. BATTAGLIA, Defendant–Appellant.
Diane M. Ciurczak, Buffalo, for Defendant–Appellant. Amigone, Sanchez & Mattrey, LLP, Buffalo (Richard S. Juda, Jr., of Counsel), for Plaintiff–Respondent.
Diane M. Ciurczak, Buffalo, for Defendant–Appellant. Amigone, Sanchez & Mattrey, LLP, Buffalo (Richard S. Juda, Jr., of Counsel), for Plaintiff–Respondent.
PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., SMITH, PERADOTTO, LINDLEY AND SCONIERS, JJ.
MEMORANDUM:
Plaintiff commenced this action seeking damages for fraudulent inducement and fraudulent misrepresentation, arising from his purchase of a home from defendant. Defendant appeals from an order that, inter alia, denied his cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint. We note at the outset that defendant's contention that he was entitled to dismissal of the amended complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(11) was raised for the first time in his reply papers in Supreme Court. “The function of reply papers is to address arguments made in opposition to the position taken by the movant and not to permit the movant to introduce new arguments in support of, or new grounds for the motion” (Dannasch v. Bifulco, 184 A.D.2d 415, 417, 585 N.Y.S.2d 360). Thus, defendant's contention was not properly before the court ( see Zolfaghari v. Hughes Network Sys., LLC, 99 A.D.3d 1234, 1235, 952 N.Y.S.2d 367, lv. denied20 N.Y.3d 861, 2013 WL 599760).
Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant met his initial burden on that part of the cross motion with respect to the fraudulent concealment cause of action by submitting evidence that he did not knowingly fail to disclose any defects in the property ( see generally Sample v. Yokel, 94 A.D.3d 1413, 1415, 943 N.Y.S.2d 694), we conclude that plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact in opposition ( see generally Jablonski v. Rapalje, 14 A.D.3d 484, 485–486, 788 N.Y.S.2d 158).
We reject defendant's contention that the court erred in denying that part of the cross motion with respect to the fraud cause of action on the ground that it fails to meet the requirements of CPLR 3016(b). The statute “requires only that the misconduct complained of be set forth in sufficient detail to clearly inform a defendant with respect to the incidents complained of” (Lanzi v. Brooks, 43 N.Y.2d 778, 780, 402 N.Y.S.2d 384, 373 N.E.2d 278, mot. to amend remittitur granted43 N.Y.2d 947, 403 N.Y.S.2d 896, 374 N.E.2d 1247, rearg. denied44 N.Y.2d 733, 405 N.Y.S.2d 1030, 376 N.E.2d 946; see Mandarin Trading Ltd. v. Wildenstein, 16 N.Y.3d 173, 178, 919 N.Y.S.2d 465, 944 N.E.2d 1104), and that standard was met here. Furthermore, we agree with plaintiff that the court otherwise properly denied that part of defendant's cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the fraud cause of action on the merits. It is well settled that, “[t]o establish a cause of action for fraud, plaintiff must demonstrate that defendant [ ] knowingly misrepresented a material fact upon which plaintiff justifiably relied and which caused plaintiff to sustain damages” (Klafehn v. Morrison, 75 A.D.3d 808, 810, 906 N.Y.S.2d 347). False representation in a property condition disclosure statement mandated by Real Property Law § 462(2) “may constitute active concealment in the context of fraudulent nondisclosure ..., [but] to maintain such a cause of action, ‘the buyer must show, in effect, that the seller thwarted the buyer's efforts to fulfill the buyer's responsibilities fixed by the doctrine of caveat emptor’ ” (Klafehn, 75 A.D.3d at 810, 906 N.Y.S.2d 347). Here, although defendant met his initial burden on that part of the cross motion with respect to the fraud cause of action by submitting evidence that he did not knowingly fail to disclose any defects in the property ( see generally Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 557, 562, 427 N.Y.S.2d 595, 404 N.E.2d 718), plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact ( see generally id.).
It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.