Opinion
C. A. 0:22-1207-JFA-SVH
06-30-2022
Kenneth Wayne Mikell, Plaintiff, v. State of South Carolina; York County; Clerk of York County General Sessions Court, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
SHIVA V. HODGES, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE,
Kenneth Wayne Mikell (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, filed this action alleging violations of his constitutional rights. He sues the State of South Carolina, York County, and the Clerk of the York County General Sessions Court (collectively “Defendants”). Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review such complaints for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the district judge.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff alleges the York County General Sessions court held a guilty plea hearing adjudicating him guilty of a charge of a lewd act with a minor on April 10, 1992. [ECF No. 10 at 10]. Plaintiff alleges he was not present at the hearing and attached a record indicating he was in the custody of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”) from April 10, 1992 until November 10, 1993. Id. He claims this violated his constitutional rights. Id. Plaintiff claims the allegedly-unconstitutional conviction was used by the state of Georgia to convict and sentence him to life without parole on January 2122, 2003. Id. Plaintiff seeks twenty million dollars and a representation to the state of Georgia that the April 10, 2022 conviction is invalid.
The undersigned notes that the fact that Plaintiff entered SCDC custody on the same day as he was convicted on the guilty plea does not prove that he was not at the hearing. Rather, it may mean he was taken into SCDC custody as a result of the conviction and sentence.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Plaintiff filed his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. To protect against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute allows a district court to dismiss a case upon a finding that the action fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted or is frivolous or malicious. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii). A finding of frivolity can be made where the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). A claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). In evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be true. Fine v. City of N.Y., 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1975). The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so. A federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts that set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990). Although the court must liberally construe a pro se complaint, the United States Supreme Court has made it clear a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements to state a claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face, and the reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint's factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.
B. Analysis
1. State of South Carolina
The Eleventh Amendment bars suits by citizens against non-consenting states brought either in state or federal court. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712-13 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996). Such immunity extends to arms of the state, see Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101-02 (1984), and also bars this court from granting injunctive relief against the state or its agencies. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978); Seminole Tribe of Florida, 517 U.S. at 58. While sovereign immunity does not bar suit where a state has given consent to be sued, or where Congress abrogates the sovereign immunity of a state, neither of those exceptions apply in the instant case. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends the state of South Carolina be summarily dismissed.
Congress has not abrogated the states' sovereign immunity under § 1983, see Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 343 (1979), and South Carolina has not consented to suit. S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-20(e).
2. York County
York County is not a person subject to suit under § 1983. It is well settled that only “persons” may act under color of state law; thus, a defendant in a § 1983 action must qualify as a “person.” See Harden v. Green, 27 Fed.Appx. 173, 178 (4th Cir. 2001); see also Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (holding that “neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons' under § 1983.”). Therefore, the undersigned recommends York County be summarily dismissed.
3. Clerk of Court
Plaintiff's claims against the Clerk of Court are related to the alleged unconstitutional conviction. [ECF No. 1 at 4]. It is well-settled that court support personnel have immunity from a claim for damages arising out of their judicial actions. Chu v. Griffith, 771 F.2d 79, 81 (4th Cir. 1985); see also Kincaid v. Vail, 969 F.2d 594, 601 (7th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (finding the doctrine of absolute quasi-judicial immunity has been adopted and made applicable to court support personnel because of “the danger that disappointed litigants, blocked by the doctrine of absolute immunity from suing the judge directly, will vent their wrath on clerks, court reporters, and other judicial adjuncts[.]”). Because Plaintiff's allegations concern the Clerk's actions or inactions taken in his capacity as a judicial officer, Clerk is protected by quasi-judicial immunity and is entitled to summary dismissal.
4. Statute of Limitations
Plaintiff's complaint is also barred by the statute of limitations. Although Plaintiff alleges he was unaware of the April 1992 conviction, he states that it caused an enhancement to his Georgia state sentence rendered in January 2003. Therefore, Plaintiff knew or should have known by January 2003 of the claims that form the basis of the complaint.
Such an obvious breach of the statute of limitations is an additional reason for summary dismissal. See Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Correction, 64 F.3d 951, 953-54 (4th Cir. 1995). As the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals clarified in 2006, a plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis may be subject to summary dismissal based on the statute of limitations:
In Nasim, we concluded that, in evaluating a complaint filed in forma pauperis pursuant to § 1915, a district court may consider a statute of limitations defense sua sponte when the face of the complaint plainly reveals the existence of such defense. See 64 F.3d at 953-54. In so ruling, we observed that, in eliminating the requirement for paying costs, § 1915 removed “any economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits,” and thus carried the potential to overburden the judicial system with patently meritless lawsuits. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, § 1915(e)(2), like Habeas Rule 4, imposes on the district courts a duty to screen initial filings. Specifically, it requires a district court to dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis “at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . is frivolous or malicious . . . [or] fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). In analyzing an earlier version of the statute, we observed in Nasim that § 1915 permits district courts to independently assess the merits of in forma pauperis complaints, and “to exclude suits that have no arguable basis in law or fact.” 64 F.3d at 954.12 We further
explained that this screening authority differentiates in forma pauperis suits from ordinary civil suits and justifies an exception to the general rule that a statute of limitations defense should not be raised and considered sua sponte. Id. at 953-94; see also Pino v Ryan, 49 F.3d 51, 53-54 (2d Cir.1995) (concluding that district court can raise statute of limitations defense sua sponte in evaluating complaint filed pursuant to § 1915).Eriline Co. S.A. v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 648, 656-58 (4th Cir. 2006). Therefore, Plaintiff's complaint is also subject to summary dismissal based on the statute of limitations.
III. Conclusion and Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends this matter be dismissed. As Plaintiff has had an opportunity to amend his complaint, the undersigned recommends the dismissal be with prejudice.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).