Opinion
Case Number: 04-22176-CIV-MARTINEZ-BANDSTRA.
September 9, 2005
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (D.E. No. 4), filed on October 15, 2004. That motion was fully briefed by the parties, and a hearing was held on the record on April 15, 2005. The underlying lawsuit is based on a three-count complaint relating to a personal injury that allegedly occurred on a cruise ship on the high seas. (D.E. No. 1). Defendant argues that the Plaintiffs' suit should be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) because, inter alia, the suit is time barred due to contract provisions in the ticket-contract. For the reasons discussed below, this Court agrees and dismisses this lawsuit.
As Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (D.E. No. 26. at 2-3), explains this lawsuit was initially filed in Florida state court in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Miami-Dade County. That court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss on the basis of a forum-selection clause. Id. at Exh. B. Plaintiff then re-filed the lawsuit in the Southern District of Florida. As is discussed infra, this Court considered only the pleadings of the case in ruling on this motion to dismiss.
I. Relevant Factual and Procedural Background
This lawsuit involves an injury that allegedly occurred while Plaintiffs Barbara Middleton and her husband James Middleton were passengers on Defendant Carnival Corporation's cruise ship. Plaintiffs' four-page complaint alleges the following three counts: Count I, Negligence; Count II, Breach of Contract; and Count III, Loss of Consortium. The Complaint also attaches, as Exhibit A, the passenger ticket packet that contains contract provisions governing the ticket.
Plaintiffs' Complaint (D.E. No. 1) initially explains: The incident which forms the basis of this lawsuit occurred aboard the vessel MN VICTORY while located upon the high seas, and thus, is subject to and governed by the general maritime law pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1333." (D.E. No. I at ¶ 1). It notes that Plaintiffs "were and are residents of Pinellas County, Florida, id. at 3, and that Defendant "was authorized and actively doing business in the State of Florida and maintained offices or agents for the transaction of its customary business in Dade County, Florida." Id. at ¶ 4.
Count I of the Complaint alleges that Defendant Carnival Corporation's negligence caused injuries to the Plaintiff Barbara Middleton. Id. at ¶ 6. More specifically, it alleges that on or about January 13, 2003 Ms. Middleton "was caused to trip and fall while exiting the Caribbean Lounge, due to a step or stair that protruded into the normal walkway of the exit area in said Lounge." Id. at ¶ 6.
Count II alleges a breach of contract action. The Complaint explains that "Defendant undertook and agreed, as a common carrier, to well and safely transport the Plaintiff aboard the MN Victory from the Port of Miami to various Caribbean islands and returned [sic], in consideration of a stipulated fare which Plaintiff duly paid." Id. at ¶ 9. Plaintiffs allege that "Defendant failed and neglected to so well and safely transport the Plaintiff as agreed." Id. at 10. Plaintiffs also allege that "the Plaintiff was caused to fall and injure herself aboard the M/V Victory as a result of unreasonably dangerous conditions aboard the subject vessel which were either created by or known to the Defendant." Id. at ¶ 10. Additionally, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant "had the Plaintiff removed from or put off the M/V Victory in San Juan, Puerto Rico, thereby failing to return the Plaintiff to her original port of embarkation in Miami, Florida." Id. at ¶ 11.
Count III of the Complaint alleges loss of consortium on the behalf of Plaintiff James Middleton. More specifically, it alleges that Plaintiff James Middleton "has been required in the past and will be required in the future to expend sums of money for the care and treatment of his wife's injuries; the Plaintiff, JAMES MIDDLETON, has lost the services of his wife in the past and will continue to lose her services in the future." Id. at ¶ 13.
II. Legal Standard
Defendant's motion to dismiss cites generally, "Rule 12(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." (D.E. No. 4 at 1). This Court determines that, more specifically, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) applies. For purposes of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept the allegations of the complaint as true. United States v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 195 F.3d 1234, 1236 (11th Cir. 1999). Moreover, the complaint must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff St. Joseph's Hosp., Inc. v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 795 F.2d 948, 953 (11th Cir. 1986). To warrant a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it must be "clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations." Blackston v. State of Ala., 30 F.3d 117, 120 (11th Cir. 1994) (quoting Hishon v. King Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984)).
Nonetheless, to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must do more than merely label his or her claims. Blumel v. Mylander, 919 F.Supp. 423, 425 (M.D. Fla. 1996). Thus, dismissal of a complaint or a portion thereof is appropriate when, on the basis of a dispositive issue of law, no construction of the factual allegations will support the cause of action. Marshall County Bd. of Educ. v. Marshall County Gas Dist., 992 F.2d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 1993). In deciding a motion to dismiss, a court may only examine the "four corners" of the complaint and any matters incorporated therein, and not matters outside the complaint, without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. See Crowell v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Servs., Co., Inc., 87 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1290 (S.D. Fla. 2000). But see Ware v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 614 F.2d 413, 414-15 (5th Cir. 1980) (the court has complete discretion to determine whether or not to accept any material beyond the pleadings that is offered in conjunction with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion).
In Bonner v. Pritchard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to October 1, 1981.
III. Analysis
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1333, federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction with state courts over in personam admiralty matters. Diesel "Repower," Inc. v. Islander Investments Ltd., 271 F.3d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 2001). When determining whether there is admiralty jurisdiction over tort claims, the federal judiciary traditionally looks to: 1) the locality of the wrong, which requires that the incident occur on, in, or over navigable waters, Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 205 (1971), and 2) a significant relationship between the incident and traditional maritime activity. Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 268 (1972). With admiralty jurisdiction comes the application of substantive maritime law. E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 864 (1986).Furthermore, courts have found admiralty law applies in personal injury and contract disputes between passengers injured on cruise ships and the cruise ship companies. See e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 589 (1991) (holding that a forum-selection clause was enforceable in a suit between injured passengers and the cruise line); Keefe v. Bahama Cruise Line, 867 F.2d 1318, 1320-21 (11th Cir. 1989) ("[a]s a preliminary matter, we note that the substantive law applicable to this action, which involves an alleged tort committed aboard a ship sailing in navigable waters, is the general maritime law, the rules of which are developed by the federal courts"); Kornberg v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 741 F.2d 1332, 1334 (11th Cir. 1984) (noting that "admiralty jurisdiction is also present and maritime law governs the outcome of the suit."), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1004 (1985). Therefore, this Court finds that on the basis of the facts alleged in the complaint, it has jurisdiction on the basis of admiralty and that maritime law governs.
As a general rule, conditions or limitations in a contract for passage are valid if the ticket provides adequate notice and reasonably communicates the limitations contained therein. See Carpenter v. Klosters Rederi A/S, 604 F.2d 11, 13 (11th Cir. 1987); Marek v. Marpan Two, Inc., 817 F.2d 242, 245-46. Title 46 U.S.C.A. App. § 183b(a) permits cruise lines to place a one-year contractual time limit on their passenger's right to file personal injury suits. Courts will enforce such a limitation if the cruise ticket provided the passenger with reasonably adequate notice that the limit existed and formed part of the passenger contract. Nash v. Kloster Cruise A/S, 901 F.2d 1565, 1566-67 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that passenger who slipped and fell was time-barred from filing suit under contractual limitation set forth in a multi-page cruise ticket packet); Kornberg, 741 at 1335. Whether the notice to passengers was reasonably adequate is a question of law to be determined by the court. Nash, 901 F.2d at 1567. Specifically, the language must be such as to "reasonably communicate to [passengers] the existence [within the ticket] of important terms and conditions which affect legal rights." Id. (quoting Shankles v. Costa Armatori, S.P.A., 722 F.2d 861, 867 (1st Cir. 1983)).
Title 46 U.S.C.A. App. § 183b(a) states in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for the manager, agent, master, or owner of any sea-going vessel . . . transporting passengers or merchandise or property from or between ports of the United States and foreign ports to provide by . . . contract . . . a shorter period for giving notice of, or filing claims for loss of life or bodily injury, than six months, and for the institution of suits on such claims, than one year, such period for institution of suits to be computed from the day when the death or injury occurred.Id.
Furthermore, in additions to limitations on time for commencing suit, federal courts have upheld forum-selection clauses in the context of cruise passenger tickets, Shute, 499 U.S. at 589, and in admiralty contexts generally. See generally M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972). A forum-selection clause in a cruise line's contract of passage is valid if it is reasonable and the passenger has notice. See generally Shute, 499 U.S. 585.
In the instant case, the Plaintiffs' Complaint attached a copy of the cruise ticket packet, Exhibit A, the first page of which describes the document as the "guest ticket contract." This attachment may properly be considered part of the pleadings for the purposes of ruling on the motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Vernon v. Medical Management Associates of Margate, Inc., 912 F. Supp. 1549, 1553 (S.D. Fla. 1996) ("the analysis of a 12(b)(6) motion is limited primarily to the face of the complaint and attachments thereto"). The Court now turns to the contract language contained in the cruise ticket packet. As is discussed infra, relevant language of the ticket contract is dispositive in this case.
Initially, it should be noted that the first page of the cruise ticket packet states in a bold font:
IMPORTANT NOTICE TO GUESTS THE GUEST TICKET CONTRACT IN THIS BOOKLET CONTAINS CONDITIONS ON NUMBERED PAGES 1 THROUGH 11 IN THE REAR PORTION OF THIS BOOKLET. YOUR ATTENTION IS DIRECTED TO THESE CONDITIONS, CERTAIN OF WHICH CONTAIN IMPORTANT LIMITATIONS ON RIGHTS OF GUESTS TO ASSERT CLAIMS AGAINST THE CRUISE LINE, VESSEL, OR THEIR AGENTS OR EMPLOYEES. PLEASE READ THE CONTRACT AND THESE TERMS AND RETAIN THE CONTRACT FOR FUTURE REFERENCE.
(D.E. No. 1, Exh. A at 10).
The Court finds that the above language provides adequate notice and reasonably communicates that the contract limitations contained in the ticket packet affect important legal rights. Carpenter v. Klosters Rederi A/S, 604 F.2d at 13; Marek, 817 F.2d at 245-46. The face of the passenger contract ticket contains a conspicuous notice directing the passenger's attention to the contractual terms contained on the inside. Strauss v. Norwegian Carribean Lines, 613 F. Supp. 5, 8 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (finding that the ticket contract requiring passengers to file suit within one year was valid and that negligence and contract actions against a cruise ship company were time-barred).
Under such circumstances, "courts have uniformly held the passenger bound by the contractual terms contained in the contract," even in the event that the passenger may not have read the contract. Id.; Rogers v. Furness Withy Co., 103 F. Supp. 314, 316 (noting that "[p]rovisions that appear on the ticket as part of the contract of passage embodied in the ticket are binding regardless of whether they were read by the passenger, provided they are not unlawful in content.").
Paragraph 14(a) of the passenger ticket contract states:
Carnival shall not be liable for any claims whatsoever for personal injury, illness or death of the guest, unless full particulars in writing are given to Carnival within 185 days after the date of injury, event, illness or death giving rise to the claim. Suit to recover on any such claim shall not be maintainable unless filed within one year after the date of the injury, event, illness or death, and unless served on Carnival within 120 days after filing. Guest expressly waives all other potentially applicable state or federal limitations periods.
(D.E. No. 1, Exh. A at 10) (emphasis added).
Additionally, Paragraph 14(b) of the passenger ticket contract states:
Carnival shall not be liable for any claims whatsoever, other than for personal injury, illness or death of the guest unless full particulars in writing are given to Carnival within 30 days after the guest is landed from the Vessel or in the case the Vessel is abandoned, within 30 days thereafter. Suit to recover on any claim whatsoever, other than for personal injury, illness or death, shall not be maintainable unless filed with six months after the date Guest is landed from the Vessel or in the case the Vessel is abandoned, within six months thereafter, and unless served upon Carnival within 120 days after filing. Guest expressly waives all other potentially applicable state or federal limitation periods for claims which, include but are not limited to, allegations concerning any and all civil rights, the ADA, trade practices and/or advertising.
(D.E. No. 1, Exh. A at 10)
In addition, Paragraph 15 of the passenger ticket contract states:
It is agreed by and between the Guest and Carnival that all disputes and matters whatsoever arising under, in connection with or incident to this Contract or the Guest's cruise, including travel to and from the vessel, shall be litigated, if at all, before the United States District Court of the Southern District of Florida in Miami, or as to those lawsuits which the Federal Courts of the United States lack subject matter jurisdiction, before a court located in Miami-Dade County, Florida, U.S.A., to the exclusion of the Courts of any other county, state, or country.
(D.E. No. 1, Exh. A at 11).
In response to Paragraph 15 of the guest ticket contract, Plaintiffs argue: "Inasmuch as there are no admiralty and maritime lawsuits to which the federal courts of the United States lack subject matter jurisdiction, this attempt to restrict such claims is a nullity, it lacks adequate consideration for the contract and represents an unlawful attempt to divest state concurrent jurisdiction over admiralty claims." (D.E. No. 26 at 4). This Court disagrees. Notwithstanding the fact that state courts may have concurrent jurisdiction in some instances under 18 U.S.C. § 1333, the contract language clearly states that suit should be brought in the Southern District of Florida. The court finds that this language is unambiguous, and that in this case it is clear that this Court has jurisdiction over the admiralty claim at issue. Furthermore, this Court disagrees that there is not proper consideration for the contract provision contained in a cruise ship ticket. See generally Shute, 499 U.S. 585. In addition, this court finds that the forum-selection clause in Paragraph 15 is reasonable and that Plaintiffs had sufficient notice of the clause. Id.
When the contract provisions discussed above are read together, the plain language of the contract clearly states that in order to properly file suit against the cruise line for a personal injury claim, the suit must be brought within the Southern District of Florida within one year. Furthermore, the plain language of the contract makes clear that in order to properly file suit against the cruise line for a non-personal injury claim, i.e. in the instant case a contract claim or a suit for loss of consortium, suit must be brought within the Southern District of Florida within six months. Plaintiffs agreed to the terms of these contract provisions. See generally Shute, 499 U.S. 585.
Plaintiff did not file suit in the Southern District of Florida until August 27, 2004, more than a year after the alleged injury and the facts giving rise to the associated claims arose. Thus, no construction of the factual allegations alleged in the Plaintiffs' Complaint will support the causes of action, and therefore dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is appropriate. Marshall County Bd. of Educ., 992 F.2d at 1174.
While this Court reaches this decision solely on the basis of the pleadings, Plaintiffs note in their Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Motion to Dismiss (D.E. No. 26) that a nearly identical suit was filed in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Miami-Dade County before the one year period had expired. That suit in state court was dismissed in an order, dated August 19, 2004, in which the Circuit Court judge explained that the suit was being dismissed "on the basis of a forum selection clause in Plaintiffs [sic] passenger ticket contract." (D.E. No. 26, Exh. B). Plaintiffs argue that this fact entitles them to now file suit in the Southern District of Florida, notwithstanding the contractual language in the ticket. (D.E. No. 26 at 2-3). However, federal courts have specifically rejected the argument that filing suit within an improper forum tolls the contractually established filing period. See generally Bailey v. Carnival Cruise Line, 774 F.2d 1577 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that the filing of an admiralty action under the Death on the High Seas Act in state court does not suffice to toll the running of a contractual time bar to an action subsequently brought to federal court after the state court dismissed the action); Levick v. Steiner Transocean Ltd., 377 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1258-59 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (finding that equitable tolling was not warranted in a case where injured passenger on cruise ship filed a claim in a California state court within a contractually based one-year period to file suit and did not file suit in federal court until after one year had expired).
Therefore, it is hereby:
ORDERED and ADJUDGED that
1. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (D.E. No. 4) is GRANTED with prejudice with respect to Count I, Count II, and Count III.
2. This case is CLOSED.
3. All pending motions are DENIED as moot.
DONE AND ORDERED.