Opinion
TTDFA176012126S
06-11-2018
Mary MICHAELS v. Peter D. MICHAELS
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
Murphy, J.
The plaintiff, MARY MICHAELS, commenced this dissolution of marriage action against the defendant, PETER MICHAELS, by summons and complaint dated March 23, 2017, returnable to this court on March 28, 2017. The case was tried before the Court on March 27 and 29, 2018. The plaintiff was represented by Attorney Keith Yagaloff and the defendant was represented by Attorney Douglas Manion.
The court heard testimony from both parties. The plaintiff submitted a financial affidavit dated March 27, 2018. The defendant submitted a financial affidavit on March 27, 2018. He also filed a financial affidavit on April 12, 2018. The Court will make findings based upon and refer to the most recent financial affidavits filed by both parties. The Court considered all exhibits which were admitted into evidence as full exhibits.
There are two main disputes in this case. The defendant recognizes his obligation to provide some alimony support to the plaintiff but the parties disagree regarding the amount of that compensation. The parties also disagree on property distribution of the money which was remaining from a 2005 personal injury settlement which was in the parties’ possession as of December 2016. The defendant agrees to evenly split his retirement assets. The plaintiff is requesting a larger percentage of those assets. Since the parties’ two children are both adults there is no issue regarding custody or support of the children.
Upon careful consideration of the facts agreed to by the parties, of the evidence presented and the pertinent statutory law, in particular General Statutes § 46b-66 (agreements), § 46b-82 (alimony) and § 46b-81 (assignment of the marital estate), and the relevant case law, and having observed the demeanor and assessed the credibility of the witnesses at trial. The court finds and orders as follows.
I. Jurisdiction
The plaintiff and the defendant were married on November 14, 1992 in Vernon, Ct. The plaintiff and defendant have continuously lived in the State of Connecticut for at least one year before this action was filed. All statutory stays have expired. The court has jurisdiction over this matter. Neither party received monetary State assistance during the course of their marriage. The Court finds that the parties’ marriage has irretrievably broken down with no hope of reconciliation.
II. Discussion and Findings of Fact
The parties met early 1991 when the defendant was approximately 23 years old and the plaintiff was approximately 26 years old. They dated for approximately eleven to twelve months and became engaged in December 1991. They were married the following November 1992. They have been married for over twenty-five years. The parties have two children; the oldest child, Sean Michaels (born in the first year of the parties marriage/ approximately 1993 to 1994- no evidence regarding his exact age) and Nicole E. Michaels, D.O.B. April 7, 1997. Both children are doing very well. Sean Michaels, is currently in the United States Air Force and has been for over four years. The youngest, Nicole, is in college at Central Connecticut State University. There is no issue regarding custody, support or post-secondary educational orders.
Over the years since their marriage the parties have purchased two properties. Ms. Michaels contributed the down payment on the first property out of inheritance that she received when her father died. She received that inheritance before the marriage. Both parties contributed to the cost of the marriage ceremony costs. It is difficult to put an exact number on the amount or percentage of each party’s contribution to their early marriage costs. The first property ultimately was sold at a loss and the parties essentially lost the down payment contributed by Ms. Michaels. The second property, and ultimately the current marital property 32A Morrison Street, Vernon, Ct. was purchased on September 20, 1995. Mr. Michaels’ father gifted a sum of money to both parties in order for them to afford the down payment. Over the years a cycle developed where the mortgage has been paid down, home equity loans obtained, and the mortgage increased to cover the new debt. All the while the property increased in value by a typical appreciation resulting in the current debt equity ratio. The Court finds that these transactions were not unusual. In addition the Court finds that both Mr. and Ms. Michaels participated fully in the decisions relating to debt and refinancing of the house. The Court finds that both Mr. and Ms. Michaels were financially sophisticated. There was no wrongdoing on the part of either party.
The plaintiff attempted to portray the marriage as one of interpersonal conflict over the years since 1997 when some marriage counselling occurred. The Court finds that the plaintiff has not shown that to be the case. The Court watched both parties while they testified. Watching their manner while testifying and examining whether their testimony was supported by other credible evidence, the Court finds that both parties were credible in most areas. Utilizing the analysis that I have described the Court finds that Mr. Michaels was credible throughout his testimony in all areas, and in particular in describing the cause of the divorce. The Court finds that Ms. Michaels testimony did not deviate significantly from Mr. Michaels. She was not credible in her explanation of the cause of the dissolution. Plaintiff attempted to claim that she was not familiar with some of the financial activity of the parties. This was not credible. The evidence indicated that Ms. Michaels was as sophisticated in handling finances as Mr. Michaels (if not more).
The relationship was relatively stable until early 2016 when Ms. Michaels perceived that Mr. Michaels was overly involved with his friends at work and more specifically one person, Ben Campbell. Her dissatisfaction with her relationship with her husband reached its peak when Ms. Michaels intentionally burned herself with a cigarette in September 2016. She was acting out of character for the months following that incident. Shortly after that, in December 2016 she converted all jointly held assets which were the result of her 2005 personal injury settlement into bank accounts solely in her name. Using some of these recently converted funds she retained an attorney and filed for divorce March 7, 2017. There is a dispute as to whether, around the same time as Ms. Michaels’ activity described above, Mr. Michaels had been preparing for divorce by consulting with an attorney and by looking into getting his own apartment. The Court finds that Mr. Michaels was not making these type of preparations and that he was totally surprised by Ms. Michaels filing for divorce.
Ms. Michaels attributes the breakdown of the marriage to what she describes is her husband paying more attention to her husband’s male friend from work in mid-2016 leading up to a disagreement in September 2016 as to whether that friend should be invited to a party honoring the parties’ son who was returning to his military station. The defendant/husband indicates that it was not his decision to get divorced and that he did not know the cause of the divorce. There was no significant history of domestic violence in the relationship. The Court finds that the cause of the breakup was likely the result of Ms. Michaels dissatisfaction with Mr. Michaels starting in early 2016. Other than a change in Ms. Michaels’ attitude toward Mr. Michaels the Court cannot attribute the breakup to any other cause.
Ms. Michaels is 53 years of age. She appears to be of good health in court but she has a history of a significant automobile accident from 2000 which resulted in a significant injury to her shoulder area which appeared to be resolved satisfactorily and a jaw injury which was still causing her problems in 2008. She indicated that she currently suffers from pain in the jaw from that 2000 injury. Medical records were submitted which reflect pain in her jaw until 2008. No medical records were submitted which reflected her condition after 2008. At the time of the parties’ marriage she was employed as a manager in a restaurant. She also acted as manager and bookkeeper of another restaurant at one time. She also worked at the Friendly’s Restaurant in Vernon, Ct. Early in the marriage the parties oldest son was born and sometime after Ms. Michaels stayed home with her children while Mr. Michaels worked outside the home. She worked part-time following the birth of the parties’ second child until the motor-vehicle accident in 1999. Ms. Michaels went back to work in 2013 after she had recovered sufficiently from the car accident. She has been working full-time for over two years.
The defendant, Mr. Michaels was 49 years of age when he testified in March 2018. He appeared to be in good health when he was in court. It is not clear what level of education he has. He has a history of working as a maintenance tech around the time of the parties’ marriage. He continued to work in a similar capacity throughout the marriage and is currently employed by Fedex in that capacity. There is no history of any health-related issues.
INCOME AND EXPENSES
The plaintiff indicates that she has a gross weekly income from Northeastern Credit Services, 117 Hartford Turnpike, Tolland, Ct. of $720.00, less mandatory deductions of $140 for a net weekly income of $580.00. She also lists her weekly expenses at $725. The Court finds that the listed expenses of TV/Internet of $117, Groceries of $140 and Pet Expenses of $38 are slightly high. The Court will reduce the TV/Internet to $75 per week, Groceries to $80.00 per week and Pet Expenses to $30.00 per week. In addition, the Court believes that she has underestimated her health insurance premium of $38 per week. She can obtain health insurance through COBRA and her ex-husband’s health plan at a cost of $466.50 a month (Defendant’s Exhibit EEE), so a fair approximation of her weekly health insurance premium is $120. Additionally, the parties have allocated a certain amount to cover rent/mortgage. The Court’s orders will result in the sale of the current marital property and therefore the current allowance regarding mortgage rent may not be accurate. In order to treat both parties equally the Court will allocate the same amount for rent/mortgage to both parties ($200 weekly). This results in an additional $116 expense above her weekly estimate of $84. Accordingly with the upward and downward adjustments the Court will find that a reasonable estimate of plaintiff’s weekly expenses is $781.00. The result is that with no other adjustments in income or expenses Ms. Michaels would be operating with a deficit of $201 per week.
The defendant lists his gross weekly income from Fed Ex Ground, 350 Ruby Road, Willington, Ct. including a weekly allowance for his holiday related overtime at $1,350.36, less mandatory deductions of $368.20 for a net weekly income of $982.16. He allocates a weekly contribution to his 401k plan and other pretax deductions of $82.36. He lists his total weekly expenses as $1,006.07 including a payment of household expense amount of $184.61. For purposes of these calculations this household expense amount will be removed. In addition, the defendant lists weekly expenses to cover the debt on the house as a total of $403.77. As indicated above since the marital property will be liquidated and servicing of these debts will no longer be an issue, the Court will allocate the same amount for housing to both parties of $200.00 per week. The Court will also reduce the weekly allowance for groceries from $75 to $55. Taking into account these adjustments the Court finds that prior to the payment of any alimony to Ms. Michaels, Mr. Michaels weekly expenses would be approximately $680.05 which leaves him with an operating surplus per week of $302.11.
One area of dispute by the plaintiff is whether the defendant’s stated income should be used by the court or whether the Court should add a substantial amount of yearly overtime in light of the large amount of overtime that the defendant received in 2017. Mr. Michaels testified that this was an extremely unusual occurrence because of "one-time" shortage of staff at FedEx. Mr. Michaels’ manager provided a letter confirming this information. (Defendant’s Exhibit FF.) The Court finds that Mr. Michaels was credible in his explanation and is supported by significant evidence including the previous years income tax returns for the defendant. (He was employed in the same position.) The Court will rely on Mr. Michaels’ description of his expected future income which includes a small amount for future holiday-related overtime, but not the large amount of overtime which Mr. Michaels experienced in 2017. Accordingly, the Court has not estimated a larger amount requested by the plaintiff and has included the defendant’s figure of $18.36 overtime per week in the above calculations.
DEBTS AND LIABILITIES
The plaintiff lists her joint liabilities as two credit cards, one from Discover Card and one by Citibank with a combined balance of $1,533. The defendant lists his joint liabilities as two credit cards, both from Discover Card with a combined balance of $809.67. The plaintiff also lists a Meineke car repair bill of an uncertain amount without indicating whether it was joint or sole debt. Plaintiff lists her sole debt including her health care debt as $930. The defendant also lists as sole debt a 401k loan (Vanguard) in the amount of $10,628.26. The Court will accept these designations and find that the Discover Card and Citibank balance total of $1,533 is a joint marital debt, the Meineke car repair is a joint marital debt and the Discover card balance of $809.67 is a joint marital debt. The Court will find that the other listed debts are the responsibility of the party in whose name the debt appears including the plaintiff’s health care debt of $930 and the defendant’s Vanguard 401k debt of $10,628.26.
ASSETS
The disputed marital assets have been organized by the Court into four categories: (a) The 2005 Personal Injury Settlement; (b) The equity in the marital residence; (c) Mr. Michaels Retirement assets; and (d) other assets.
2005 Personal Injury Settlement for Ms. Michaels
Mrs. Michaels was involved in an automobile accident on June 13, 2000. As a result of that accident she eventually reached a settlement with the other party where, after payment of attorneys fees and some outstanding medical related expenses, she received $133,324.89. This money was kept separate from other marital assets but was administered by both husband and wife over the course of the next 13 years. Most of these assets were placed in the names of both parties. From 2005 through 2013, when Ms. Michaels returned to work, the assets were used for household expenses such as paying bills.
Plaintiff indicates that she has control over seven bank accounts, A Capital One Checking account, a Capital One Savings account, three Discover CDs and two United Bank accounts which she identifies as "joint." (Plaintiff Exhibit 11.) The CDs and Capital One accounts with the total value of $70,340.71 appear to be the result of liquidating what had been accounts set up to hold the proceeds of Ms. Michaels 2005 personal injury settlement. There were a number of Defense exhibits which, with the exception of one document which is addressed to Mary Michaels alone and one bank statement in the amount of $21,414.18 (Defendant’s Exhibit J), show that the funds were previously held in the name of both parties. Defendant indicates that prior to Ms. Michaels December 2016 withdrawals the remaining funds saved from the 2005 personal injury settlement totaled $83,557.29. He indicates that she ultimately opened up accounts in December 2016 in the amount of $72,694.89. (Defendant’s Exhibit ZZ and related exhibits.) The Court cannot determine when the $83,557.29 was spent down to the $70,000 area, the Court will find that this marital asset was worth $72,694.89 when Ms. Michaels converted it to solely her name in December 2016.
Between December 6, 2016 and December 14, 2016 Ms. Michaels withdrew all of the assets from CD and other accounts, sometimes with an early withdrawal penalty, and placed them solely in her name. (See e.g. Defendant’s Exhibit Q.) She did not consult with Mr. Michaels in advance of making these withdrawals or tell him about them immediately following the withdrawals.
Quoting from Lopiano v. Lopiano, 247 Conn. 356 (1998) "[c]haracterization of the right of action as personal, or characterization of what the recovery was intended to address as personal, does not affect the divisibility of the settlement or award in dissolution proceedings because the trial court retains the authority to distribute both jointly held and individually held property." Id. Actual source or ownership of property are just, two factors to be considered in reaching an equitable division in dissolution proceedings.
There really are not many factual disputes in regard to this asset. The dispute is how to interpret these facts. There is no question that this asset would not exist were it not for the injury to Ms. Michaels, her subsequent personal injury claim and her later personal injury settlement. Following the personal injury accident and prior to the settlement the parties used their joint assets to pay for daily expenses, children’s expenses and medical bills. The main source of income paying for all of the parties’ expenses for the first few years and really until Ms. Michaels worked full-time was Mr. Michaels’ income. Mr. Michaels testified that he attended each of Ms. Michaels’ doctors’ appointments and assisted Ms. Michaels through her recuperation. Ms. Michaels did not contradict this testimony.
Ultimately in 2005, Ms. Michaels received the check for $133,324.89. The money was deposited in various CDs and other bank accounts. For the most part all of the funds were in both parties’ names. They were treated as joint assets for over eleven years until Ms. Michaels decided to separate from Mr. Michaels. The settlement statement does not separate the funds into designations of "pain and suffering," "lost wages," "future expenses" or "medical bills." There is no way to tell now which if any portion that is left can be attributed to any of these categories. In addition, both parties spent, saved and treated these assets as joint marital property until December 2016. The best evidence of the nature of these assets is the manner the parties treated them. Accordingly, the Court finds that what remained from Ms. Michaels’ 2005 personal injury settlement is joint marital property to be distributed in accordance with Connecticut General Statutes.
The Marital Residence
One area of dispute is the value of the marital home. The plaintiff and defendant purchased 32A Morrison Street, Vernon, CT on September 20, 1995 utilizing in part a mortgage in the amount of $60,000. (Defendant’s Exhibit W.) Mrs. Michaels provides a Town of Vernon revaluation assessment which lists their property at 32A Morrison Street, Vernon, Ct with a fair market value of $126,860. (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 2.) The defendant has presented an appraisal report from O’Malley, O’Rourke and Bezz Appraisal Associates showing that using comparative property sales the house is worth $165,000. (Defendant’s Exhibit YY.) The Court finds that the comparative market analysis based upon recent comparable sales is the best estimate of the value of the house. The court finds that the value of the house is approximately $165,000. The value of the house is really not of strong importance here since neither party wishes to live in the home and both parties are in favor of selling the house. With that in mind the court finds that the house is a marital asset, purchased by both parties during the course of their marriage. There has been some testimony that the plaintiff obtained a down payment from her deceased father’s estate for their first house which ultimately was sold at a loss. The defendant indicates that the parties obtained the down payment for the current house as the result of a gift of Mr. Michaels’ father to both parties. The plaintiff also questioned the defendant’s practices of refinancing the home a number of times. After a number of financial transactions the property is currently encumbered by a mortgage taken out for $130,000 on November 29, 2010. The Court did not find any impropriety in the parties’ efforts to obtain home equity loans and refinance the mortgage during the course of their marriage. There was nothing in that evidence that would cause the Court to penalize either party for these practices. Any equity in the home is joint marital property. The Court finds that any money after paying the debts secured by the house upon the sale of the house, when it occurs, is to be split equally between the parties. If there is a deficit, which the plaintiff claims is likely, the debt will be the responsibility of both parties and the parties are to share equally the debt and the cost of selling the house.
Retirement Assets
Ms. Michaels does not list any assets in this category. Mr. Michaels lists the following assets on his financial affidavit: a 401K Vanguard account in the amount of $117,367.41; monthly pension with Fedex with a cash balance as of 9/1/17 of $97,899.00; and a "Portable Pension" with Fedex Corp. with a cash value of $61,756.15. (It is not clear if these last two pension accounts are defined benefit accounts but the Court is proceeding as if they are.) The defendant indicates that his retirement assets were all acquired during the course of the parties’ marriage. The Court considers all of these accounts as marital property. The Court does not believe that it would be equitable after consideration of the statutory factors to provide an unequal distribution of these assets. After weighing all of the assets the Court finds that these Retirement assets should be split equally.
Other Assets
Ms. Michaels lists a number of bank accounts with a combined total balance of $73,424.00. The bulk of these accounts represents the proceeds from her 2004 personal injury settlement. She does not list a vehicle or any other personal property. Mr. Michaels lists three vehicles with a combined value of $3,520 after payment of the debt associated with two of the vehicles. He also lists four bank accounts in addition to the bank accounts liquidated by Ms. Michaels in December 2016; United Bank 0895 with a balance of $1,178.82 which he lists as a sole account; Key Bank 1775 with a balance of $4,158.29 which he lists as a sole account in his name and which he further identifies as "inheritance," United Bank 8505 with a balance of $2,203.63 which he lists as a joint account and which he claims a total of $1,101.81, and United Bank 0432 with a balance of $2,640.58 which he lists as joint and which he claims a total of $1,320.29.
Mr. Michaels also lists $11,060 in Children’s assets. The Court will consider these assets as the children’s assets and should be distributed accordingly.
ALIMONY
There is no absolute right to alimony. General Statutes § 46b-82 provides that the court "may" award alimony and the decision whether to do so rests within the discretion of the court. Weinstein v. Weinstein, 18 Conn.App. 622, 637, 561 A.2d 443 (1989). The purpose of alimony is to fulfill a continuing duty to support, which arises out of the obligation the spouses assume toward each other as a result of the marriage. Smith v. Smith, 249 Conn. 265, 275, 752 A.2d 1023 (1999). The court’s view in this case, considering all the applicable factors, is that the circumstances do not favor an award of alimony to the defendant.
When considering an award of alimony, the court must consider "the evidence presented by each party and shall consider the length of the marriage, the causes for the annulment, dissolution of the marriage or legal separation, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, earning capacity, vocational skills, education, employability, estate and needs of each of the parties and the award, if any, which the court may make pursuant to section 46b-81" concerning property distribution. Provided the court considers all the statutory criteria, it has wide discretion in awarding alimony. Costa v. Costa, 57 Conn.App. 165, 174, 752 A.2d 1106 (2000). The court may place varying degrees of importance on each statutory criterion according to the factual circumstances of the case. Cimino v. Cimino, 155 Conn.App. 298, 304, 109 A.3d 546 (2015). "[T]he specified criteria are not exhaustive, and the court properly may consider other equitable factors when crafting its property distribution and alimony orders." Keller v. Keller, 167 Conn.App. 138, 155, 142 A.3d 1197 (2016), quoting Loughlin v. Loughlin, 93 Conn.App. 618, 625, 889 A.2d 902, aff’d, 280 Conn. 632, 910 A.2d 963 (2006).
The court has considered all of the statutory factors in determining whether to award alimony to the defendant. There is a disparity of income between the parties. Both parties are relatively young and both parties have similar level of vocational skills. It is recognized that now Mr. Michaels, due to being in his current position, has higher income now and his employability is more stable in light of the number of years that he has been employed by Fedex. Ms. Michaels has the potential to increase her income from its current level, given her age and her intelligence. The Court finds that Ms. Michaels’ health is not at the same level as Mr. Michaels in light of her motor vehicle injuries. Having found that, the Court cannot find that there is a severe health issue. Ms. Michaels testified that she has ongoing health issues. Mr. Michaels testified that he was not aware of current health issues that affect her ability to work or function. The most recent objective evidence from health care providers is dated; Doctors communications from 2008. The plaintiff claims that there is a current need for surgery, but there is no documentary evidence to support this claim. As required by statute, the Court will take this health issue into account in the Court’s decision awarding alimony and in distributing the marital assets. There is an allowance in the property distribution to cover a possible future surgery. The Court has also considered the other statutory factors.
As a result of the weighing of these factors, the Court will award Alimony to the plaintiff in the amount of $260.00 per week for a period of twelve years.
The amount and duration of this periodic Alimony shall not be modified unless the plaintiff cohabitates with another person, plaintiff dies or the defendant provides sufficient proof of a substantial change of circumstances. Within 2 months following the date of this judgment Husband shall obtain a term life insurance policy in the amount of $150,000 for a period of twelve years.
The result of this Alimony payment is that Mr. Michaels’ reasonable weekly expenses (including alimony) is estimated to be $940.05 compared to his net weekly income of $982.16 resulting in a net weekly surplus of approximately $42.11. Ms. Michaels’ reasonable weekly expenses is estimated at $781.00 (see above) compared to her weekly income of $840 (including alimony) resulting in a net weekly surplus of approximately $59.00. The Court recognizes that there may be some tax implications of plaintiff receiving Alimony payments from the defendant. Neither party has provided information in this regard but the Court has taken into account that there may be some tax implications in making this award.
ASSIGNMENT OF THE MARITAL ESTATE
At the time a court enters a judgment of dissolution, it "may assign to either spouse all or part of the estate of the other spouse." General Statutes § 46b-81. "The purpose of a property division pursuant to a dissolution proceeding is to unscramble existing marital property in order to give each spouse his or her equitable share at the time of dissolution." Smith v. Smith, 249 Conn. 265, 275, 752 A.2d 1023 (1999). "In fixing the nature and value of the property, if any, to be assigned, the court ... shall consider the length of the marriage, the causes for the ... dissolution of the marriage ... the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, earning capacity, vocational skills, education, employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties and the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income. The court shall also consider the contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of their respective estates." General Statutes § 46b-81(c). Provided the court considers all relevant statutory criteria, it may exercise broad discretion in dividing property. Coleman v. Coleman, 151 Conn.App. 613, 617, 95 A.3d 569 (2014). The court may place varying degrees of importance on each criterion according to the factual circumstances of each case. Keller v. Keller, 167 Conn.App. 138, 155, 142 A.3d 1197 (2016). "[T]he specified criteria are not exhaustive, and the court properly may consider other equitable factors when crafting its property distribution and alimony orders." Id., quoting Loughlin v. Loughlin, 93 Conn.App. 618, 625, 889 A.2d 902, aff’d, 280 Conn. 632, 910 A.2d 963 (2006).
The allocation of liabilities and debts is a part of the court’s broad authority in the assignment of property in marital dissolution proceedings. McKenna v. Delente, 123 Conn.App. 146, 2 A.3d 38 (2010).
There is substantial overlap between the statutory criteria applicable to alimony and those applicable to property distribution. The principal difference when it comes to property distribution is that the court is to consider the "contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of their respective estates." § 46b-81; see Pasquariello v. Pasquariello, 168 Conn. 579, 362 A.2d 835 (1975). Such contributions are not limited to monetary contributions. One party’s nonmonetary contributions that make it possible for the other party to acquire or retain property, or have the effect of preserving or appreciating the value of property, should be considered. O’Neill v. O’Neill, 13 Conn.App. 300, 311-12, 536 A.2d 978 (1988). Homemaking and primary caretaking responsibilities may constitute such a nonmonetary contribution, provided there is a connection between those efforts and the property in question. Picton v. Picton, 111 Conn.App. 143, 153, 958 A.2d 763 (2008).
In regard to the assets, with the exception of those assets which the Court designated as sole assets the Court finds that all of the assets listed on both parties’ financial affidavits are assets acquired during the course of the marriage and attributable to both parties equally. It was Ms. Michaels’ personal injury and the settlement that related to that injury that caused the $133,000 cash asset to exist. Over the years a significant portion of that asset was preserved. It is clear that Mr. Michaels was the primary source of income for the family over that eleven year period of time. Certainly he contributed to the preservation of those assets. As indicated above, at this time it is impossible for the Court to attribute an identifiable portion of these assets to Ms. Michaels’ pain and suffering or other specific category.
The Court will order the distribution of all of the assets in accordance with the 46c-81 Statutory factors.
The Marital Home is to be sold and the proceeds or deficit from the sale of the house is to distributed equally to or borne equally by both parties.
The defendant’s retirement assets are to be divided and split equally by the parties. Any monthly benefit asset will be equalized as of the date of dissolution via QDRO (cost to be divided equally.) If the retirement asset does not have a defined benefit, the asset is to be split equally and distributed to both parties.
The 2005 Personal Injury Settlement. The value of this asset at the end of December 2016 was $72,694.89. As indicated above, the Court has found this amount was a joint marital resource. Utilizing the statutory factors above this asset is distributed with $46,694.89 to the plaintiff/wife and $26,000.00 to the defendant/husband.
Neither party lists any furniture or other personal items except for vehicles listed on Mr. Michaels’ affidavit. There is no evidence as to the source of Mr. Michaels’ bank accounts or regarding the vehicles Mr. Michaels lists on his affidavit.
ORDERS
A. The marriage is dissolved on the grounds of irretrievable breakdown. There is no hope of reconciliation. The parties are declared single and unmarried.
B. Alimony- Defendant is to pay periodic alimony to the plaintiff in the amount of $260 weekly for twelve years from the date of judgment. Termination or modification will be governed by the Court’s findings above.
C. The parties are to sell the marital home at 32A Morrison Street, Vernon, Ct. It shall be listed as soon as possible. If no one is living in the residence until the residence is sold both parties are to contribute equally to the maintenance of the residence including all mortgage, tax and utility payments. If one of the parties resides in the home that party shall contribute $200 a week toward maintenance of the residence and the balance is to be split between the two parties.
D. Upon the sale of the house the proceeds or deficit from the sale of the house, after payment of costs to make the house ready for sale, realtor fees and attorneys fees, is to distributed equally to or borne equally by both parties.
E. The parties are to file all future and any remaining pending tax returns separately.
F. The defendant’s retirement assets are to be divided and split equally by the parties. Any monthly benefit asset will be equalized as of the date of dissolution via QDRO (cost to be divided equally.) If the retirement asset does not have a defined benefit, the asset is to be split equally and distributed to both parties.
G. The plaintiff is in possession of $72,694.89 which the Court has found is what remains of a marital asset relating to the 2004 personal injury settlement. Over time amounts have been transferred and designated as sole assets. Plaintiff is ordered to transfer from her listed Bank Accounts the amount of $26,000 to the defendant within 3 weeks following the dissolution date.
H. The assets listed on the defendant’s financial affidavit as Children’s Assets are to be transferred to the two children within 60 days following dissolution. If the funds have been previously designated in the name of the child, the funds are to be transferred to the child in whose name the funds are listed. If there is no specific child designated on the account or if both children are designated on the account the parties are to distributed to each child by a percentage agreed to by both parties. If the parties cannot agree on a percentage distribution, the asset shall be distributed with 50% going to each child.
I. The four bank accounts listed on Mr. Michaels’ affidavit are distributed as follows: United Bank with account ending in 0895 to be kept by Mr. Michaels; Key Bank with account ending in 1775 to be kept by Mr. Michaels; United Bank with account ending with 8505 to be split equally between the parties; and United Bank with account ending with 0432 to be split equally between the parties.
J. All other personal items whether listed or not, and vehicles listed on the parties’ respective financial affidavits will remain with the party is designated on the financial affidavit or to be distributed by agreement of the parties. Both parties are to cooperate in completing any applicable paperwork to place those assets solely in the name of the party who is to have legal possession of that property.
K. The debts and liabilities which the Court has found are joint or marital debts are to be split equally and paid by both parties. All other debts have been found to be sole debts and the responsibility of the party in whose name the debt appears. Those debts are to be paid by that party.
L. Mr. Michaels is to cooperate with Ms. Michaels’ efforts to obtain health care coverage if she chooses to obtain health insurance through Mr. Michaels’ employer using COBRA.
M. The parties are responsible for paying their attorney for their respective legal fees.