Mich. State Podiatry v. B.C.B.S.

8 Citing cases

  1. Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. Tool Works, Inc.

    910 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1990)   Cited 2,277 times
    Holding that trial court is free to reconsider and reverse its decision on an interlocutory order "for any reason it deems sufficient, even in the absence of new evidence or an intervening change in or clarification of the substantive law"

    See Mas Marques, 637 F.2d at 29-30; Couch, 551 F.2d at 959-60.See Hooks v. Hooks, 771 F.2d 935, 946 (6th Cir. 1985); Anderson v. Montgomery Ward Co., 704 F. Supp. 162, 163 (N.D.Ill. 1989); Michigan State Podiatry Ass'n v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 681 F. Supp. 1239, 1241 (E.D.Mich. 1987).See Good Luck Nursing Home, Inc. v. Harris, 636 F.2d 572, 577 (D.C. Cir. 1980).

  2. Herbst v. Lincoln County Board of County Commissioners

    No. CIV 02-0202 LCS/KBM (D.N.M. Dec. 11, 2002)

    See Rill v. Trautman, 950 F. Supp. 268, 269 (E.D.Mo. 1996). Although such deficiencies are subject to waiver, see Michigan State Podiatry Ass'n v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, 681 F. Supp. 1239, 1243 (E.D.Mich. 1987), Plaintiffs have timely objected to Defendants' Exhibits 5, 6 and 7. Because the documents do not comply with the requirements of Rule 56, and Plaintiffs have raised timely objections, Defendants' Exhibits 5, 6, and 7 will not be considered by the Court in the instant summary judgment motion.

  3. Ortiz v. Wingard

    173 F. Supp. 2d 1155 (D.N.M. 2001)   Cited 9 times
    Noting that "the interests of the Housing Authority of Las Cruces are not so similar as the City's that for the purpose of obtaining voluntary conciliation and compliance it would be unnecessary to include the City in the EEOC proceedings."

    Although such deficiencies are subject to waiver, the City has timely objected to these exhibits. See Michigan State Podiatry Ass n v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, 681 F. Supp. 1239, 1243 (E.D.Mich. 1987) Because they do not comply with the requirements of Rule 56, and the opposing party have raised timely objections, Plaintiffs Exhibits A, B and C will not be considered by the Court in the summary judgment determination. However, the Court notes that even if these exhibits were considered, Plaintiff still failed to satisfy the relatively lenient single employer test.

  4. Tindall v. Wayne County Friend of Court

    Case No. 98-CV-73896-DT (E.D. Mich. Sep. 28, 2001)

    If the affidavit is untimely and the party does not alert the Court to any previously unconsidered issues of material fact, the affidavit should not be considered. Michigan State Podiatry Ass'n v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Michigan, 681 F. Supp. 1239, 1241 (E.D. Mich. 1987). Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) imposes a burden on the nonmoving party to produce evidence to rebut a properly supported motion for summary judgment.

  5. Whitley v. New Mexico Children, Youth Families Department

    No. CIV 00-1101 LCS (D.N.M. Jul. 26, 2001)

    Although such deficiencies are subject to waiver, Defendants have timely objected to Plaintiffs Exs. 1, 5-8, 9-11, and 13-16. See Michigan State Podiatry Ass n v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, 681 F. Supp. 1239, 1243 (E.D.Mich. 1987). Because they do not comply with the requirements of Rule 56, and opposing parties have raised timely objections, Plaintiffs Exhibits 1, 5-8, 9-11, and 13-16 as submitted should not be considered by the Court in the summary judgment determination.

  6. Salazar v. Marquez

    No. CIV 99-0807 LCS (D.N.M. Nov. 7, 2000)

    Although such deficiencies are subject to waiver, both Plaintiffs and Defendants have timely objected to these exhibits. See Michigan State Podiatry Ass n v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, 681 F. Supp. 1239, 1243 (E.D.Mich. 1987). Because they do not comply with the requirements of Rule 56, and the opposing parties have raised timely objections, Defendants Exhibits A- 1, F, H and I, and Plaintiffs Exhibit 5 will not be considered by the Court in the summary judgment determination.

  7. Lupo v. Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories

    4 F. Supp. 2d 642 (E.D. Tex. 1997)   Cited 15 times
    Providing that post-judgment motions should not be used to raise arguments that could, and should, have been made before the entry of judgment . . . [or] to re-urge matters that have already been advanced by a party"

    This challenge comes too late. See Kjorlie v. Lundin, Civ.A. No. 91-4040-DES, 1993 WL 142689, at *2 (D.Kan. Apr.26, 1993); Michigan State Podiatry Ass'n v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Mich., 681 F. Supp. 1239, 1243 (E.D.Mich. 1987); cf. McCloud River R.R. v. Sabine River Forest Prods., Inc., 735 F.2d 879, 882 (5th Cir. 1984). It, moreover, merits no consideration as it represents nothing more than an argument Lupo could, and should, have made earlier.

  8. Kaken Pharmaceutical Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co.

    737 F. Supp. 510 (S.D. Ind. 1989)   Cited 9 times
    Dismissing claims of tortious interference with contractual relationship and tortious interference with prospective business relations as barred by two-year statute of limitations for injuries to personal property

    The affidavits submitted by Kaken are untimely, and will not be considered because Kaken has failed to make any showing why the facts therein were not brought forth earlier. Michigan State Podiatry Ass'n v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Michigan, 681 F. Supp. 1239 (E.D.Mich. 1987); Mas Marques v. Digital Equipment Corp., 637 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1980) (holding an affidavit filed 10 days after summary judgment was entered was insufficient to allow judgment to be set aside where no explanation was given for failure to present the affidavit or its contents earlier and no claim was made that further facts became known to the plaintiff only after judgment had been entered). The Seventh Circuit has followed this reasoning in discussing the limited role of a motion for reconsideration.