Opinion
Nos. 3D99-227, 3D99-105.
Opinion filed March 15, 2000.
Appeals from the Circuit Court for Dade County, Roberto Pineiro and Gil S. Freeman, Judges, L.T. Nos. 93-38848 98-105.
Robert A. Ginsburg, County Attorney, and Jason Bloch, Assistant County Attorney, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Richard L. Polin, Assistant Attorney General, for appellees.
Before JORGENSON, COPE, and FLETCHER, JJ.
In a consolidated action, Miami-Dade County appeals from two orders determining that it is responsible for paying the costs associated with prosecutions brought by the Statewide Prosecutor for the State of Florida. For the following reasons, we reverse. The Statewide Prosecutor for the State of Florida drafted criminal informations from her office in Broward County. The informations charged various defendants with Medicaid fraud offenses that were alleged to have occurred in the Fifth, Sixth, Eleventh, Thirteenth, Fifteenth, Eighteenth, and Nineteenth Judicial Circuits. The offenses allegedly were part of related transactions in a criminal conspiracy that occurred in, or affected, two or more judicial circuits. Every count alleged that the offense occurred in Dade County and the Eleventh Circuit. The Statewide Prosecutor brought the charges solely in the Eleventh Circuit in Dade County.
In April 1998, the Statewide Prosecutor filed a "Motion for Order Approving Payment of Prosecution Costs by Dade County" in one proceeding; she filed a similar motion in December 1998 in the second proceeding. The motions sought payment by Dade County for witness and travel expenses of the prosecution's witnesses. Neither motion cited any authority for charging those expenses to Dade County. At the hearings on the motions, the Statewide Prosecutor argued that there was no statutory or constitutional authority that would allow her office to pay for the witnesses, and suggested that payment come from the County's fine and forfeiture fund. The claimed costs amounted to $357.15. The trial courts granted the motions; the County appeals.
There is no dispositive authority on this issue. No statute or constitutional provision directly controls; no other district has addressed this specific quandary.
The office of the Statewide Prosecutor has its origins in the Florida Constitution.
There is created in the office of the attorney general the position of statewide prosecutor. The statewide prosecutor shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the state attorneys to prosecute violations of criminal laws occurring or having occurred, in two or more judicial circuits as part of a related transaction, or when any such offense is affecting or has affected two or more judicial circuits as provided by general law. The statewide prosecutor shall be appointed by the attorney general from not less than three persons nominated by the judicial nominating commission for the supreme court, or as otherwise provided by general law.
Art. IV, § 4(c).
When the Florida Legislature implemented the constitutional provision, it tracked the language of Article IV. See § 16.56, Fla. Stat. (1997). The Statewide Prosecutor only has jurisdiction over crimes that "involve two or more judicial circuits and are either part of a related transaction or part of an organized criminal conspiracy." Zanger v. State, 548 So.2d 746, 747 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). In Zanger, the fourth district noted that "[t]he statewide grand jury is a creature similar to the statewide prosecutor also born of the Florida Statutes" and that "the subject matter jurisdiction of the statewide grand jury parallels that of the statewide prosecutor's with regard to crimes which can be indicted or prosecuted." Id. at 747. Section 905.40, Florida Statutes (1997), provides that the "costs and expenses incurred by the statewide grand jury in the performance of its functions and duties shall be paid by the state out of funds appropriated to the circuit courts." (emphasis added). It has long been recognized that a prosecutor sits as a "one-man grand jury" for the purpose of investigating and filing informations. See Imparato v. Spicola, 238 So.2d 503, 506 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970). The Statewide Prosecutor fulfills that same role, although her jurisdiction is obviously statewide, and its limits are detailed in the constitution and by statute. Therefore, in the absence of any statutory or constitutional provision that directly authorizes either the state or the county to pay these particular costs, or specifically prohibits either the State or County from paying these costs of the Statewide Prosecutor, we hold that the State, and not the county in which the action was filed, bears the costs of the actions brought by the Statewide Prosecutor. Our conclusion is buttressed by the Commentary to the 1998 constitutional revisions: "The effect of this revision was to clearly and substantially shift the burden of the of [sic] funding the state courts system from the counties to the state." William A. Buzzett Deborah K. Kearney, Commentary to the 1997-1998 Constitution Revision Commission Revision 7, Art. V § 14, Fla. Const. (1998) (emphasis added).
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
FLETCHER, J., concurs.
The trial court orders are correct and should be affirmed. Miami-Dade County is responsible for paying the costs associated with prosecutions brought by the Statewide Prosecutor. This follows both from existing law and from what has apparently been the uniform practice until now.
Prior to the creation of the office of Statewide Prosecutor in 1986, it was the responsibility of individual state attorneys to prosecute crimes occurring in more than one circuit. It is undisputed that where a state attorney brings such a prosecution, the County is responsible for paying the costs, such as the witness expenses at issue in the present case.
In 1986, the office of Statewide Prosecutor was created by constitutional amendment. See Fla. Const. art. IV, § 4(c) (amended 1986); 26 Fla. Stat. Ann. Supp. 2000, at 5-6. The amendment granted the Statewide Prosecutor " concurrent jurisdiction with the state attorneys to prosecute violations of criminal laws occurring . . . in two or more judicial circuits. . . ." Fla. Const. art. IV, § 4(c) (Emphasis added). Thus, any particular multi-circuit crime can in theory be prosecuted either by the Statewide Prosecutor, or by the state attorney in the circuit where any part of the criminal activity occurred.
As I understand it, it has been the custom since 1986 that costs associated with prosecutions by the Statewide Prosecutor have been paid by the counties and that the legislature has never made an appropriation for this purpose. To me that is a powerful indication that, at the time of the creation of the Statewide Prosecutor, there was no intention to shift the costs of prosecution to the State. Instead, the intent of the amendment and the enabling statute, see § 16.56, Fla. Stat., was that costs of prosecution would continue to be paid, as they had in the past, by the counties.
The Florida Supreme Court has said:
In general, counties are responsible for all costs necessary to operate the circuit and county courts not paid by the State. § 43.28, Fla. Stat. (1995). Under section 43.28, "counties shall provide appropriate courtrooms, facilities, equipment, and, unless provided by the state, personnel necessary to operate the circuit and county courts." This includes attorney's fees and costs of required counsel.
Hoffman v. Haddock, 695 So.2d 682, 684 (Fla. 1997) (some emphasis added, some emphasis in original, citations omitted). The costs at issue here are, of course, witness expenses. The State also points out that the County collects fines and forfeitures pursuant to section 142.01, Florida Statutes, which are intended to be used for just this type of expense.
The majority opinion says that the State must pay on account of section 905.40, Florida Statutes, which requires the State to pay the expenses of the Statewide Grand Jury. That statute is irrelevant here. These are not expenses for the Statewide Grand Jury. They are expenses incurred in two prosecutions filed in the circuit court in Miami-Dade County.
The majority opinion says that the State must pay on account of the 1998 amendment to Article V, Section 14, of the Florida Constitution. While it is true that the 1998 amendment requires the State to fund the court system, the amendment has a delayed effective date and does not become fully effective until July 1, 2004. The amendment does not have a bearing on the question now before us.
For the reasons stated, at the present time Miami-Dade County is responsible for these costs of prosecution. The trial court correctly so ruled. The orders under review should be affirmed.