Opinion
No. 49A05-1101-JT-23
09-22-2011
IN MATTER OF TERMINATION OF THE PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP OF: M.G., M.G., E.G. (Minor Children) and M.G. (Father), Appellant, v. THE INDIANA DEPARTMENT FOR CHILD SERVICES, Appellee, and CHILD ADVOCATES, INC., Co-Appellee.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: KIMBERLY A. JACKSON Indianapolis, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: PATRICK M. RHODES Indiana Department of Child Services Indianapolis, Indiana ROBERT J. HENKE DCS Central Administration Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
KIMBERLY A. JACKSON
Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
PATRICK M. RHODES
Indiana Department of Child Services
Indianapolis, Indiana
ROBERT J. HENKE
DCS Central Administration
Indianapolis, Indiana
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT, JUVENILE DIVISION
The Honorable Gary Chavers, Judge Pro Tem
The Honorable Roseanne Ang, Magistrate
Cause Nos. 49D09-0908-JT-036197, 49D09-0908-JT-036198 and 49D09-0908-JT-036199
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MATHIAS , Judge
Mi.G. ("Father") appeals the involuntary termination of his parental rights to his children, M.G., Me.G, and E.G., claiming there is insufficient evidence supporting the trial court's judgment. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
Father is the biological father of M.G., born in June 1998, Me.G., born in July 2001, and E.G., born in August 2005. Father was never married to the children's biological mother, C.F. ("Mother"), but the family lived together on-and-off for many years. In 2007, the children began living with Father at the paternal grandmother's home when Father and Mother ended their relationship. The children were returned to Mother's care in March or April of 2008, however, when Father was arrested and incarcerated on drug-related charges.
In August 2008, the Marion County office of the Indiana Department of Child Services ("MCDCS") initiated an investigation concerning a report that Father had sexually abused at least one of the children while they were in his care at the grandmother's home. Shortly thereafter, Mother contacted MCDCS and requested that the children be placed in foster care because she had lost her job and was being evicted from her residence. Although Mother was offered referrals for shelter facilities and other community resources so that she could maintain custody of the children, Mother refused all offers and delivered the children to MCDCS. MCDCS thereafter filed petitions, under separate cause numbers, alleging M.G., Me.G., and E.G. were all children in need of services ("CHINS") based on Mother's inability to provide housing and support for the children. A hearing was held the same day. Mother admitted to the allegations of the CHINS petition, the court adjudicated the children as such, and the matter proceeded to disposition. Following the dispositional hearing, the children were made wards of MCDCS and were placed in foster care.
Mother never participated in reunification services and eventually signed voluntary consent for adoption forms pertaining to all three children during the involuntary termination hearing. Mother does not participate in this appeal. Consequently, we limit our recitation of the facts herein to those pertinent solely to Father's appeal.
Eventually, in November 2009, all three children were placed in relative therapeutic foster care with their maternal grandparents. The children remained in the care of their maternal grandparents until the time of the termination hearing.
Separate CHINS petitions pertaining to Father alleged the children were in need of services based on Father's unavailability to parent the children due to his incarceration, as well as the facts MCDCS had substantiated the allegations of sexual abuse involving Father and M.G., and a criminal investigation of the same sexual abuse allegations was pending. Counsel for Father submitted stipulations to the CHINS petition in December 2008, and a dispositional hearing as to Father was held in January 2009. Later the same month, the juvenile court entered an order reaffirming its CHINS determination and incorporating a Participation Decree directing Father to successfully complete a variety of services designed to facilitate reunification with the children, including, among other things, a parenting assessment, a drug and alcohol assessment and any resulting treatment recommendation, random drug screens, a sexual offender assessment and program, domestic violence classes, and home-based counseling services. Although encouraged by MCDCS case manager Lisa Cooper ("Cooper") to participate in several services available to him while incarcerated, Father informed Cooper that he did not wish to participate in any services until he was released from incarceration. Approximately seven months later, MCDCS filed petitions seeking the involuntary termination of Father's parental rights to all three children.
We note that although Father does not dispute the fact he stipulated to the allegations of the CHINS petitions, the specific details of Father's stipulations are not known because they were not made part of the record on appeal.
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In November 2009, Father was acquitted of the sexual abuse charges relating to M.G. and was released from jail. Although MCDCS agreed to delay the involuntary termination proceedings and made the necessary referrals so that Father could participate in and accomplish all of the juvenile court's dispositional orders, Father only completed the parenting assessment and substance abuse treatment. Father also tested positive for cocaine during a random drug screen after his release from incarceration and later refused to submit to any requests for drug screens after he completed the substance abuse program. In addition, although court-ordered to obtain stable housing and employment sufficient to support him and all three children, Father neither provided MCDCS case workers with employment verification nor allowed case workers to enter and view the home where he was living again with his own mother. As for the remaining dispositional goals, Father refused to participate in a sex offender program, claiming his acquittal proved he is not a sex offender. Father also failed to complete the domestic violence program, claiming it was a waste of his time.
A two-day consolidated evidentiary hearing eventually commenced on October 15 and concluded on October 25, 2010. During the termination hearing, M.G. testified regarding the "bad things" that occurred to her when she was eight years old and living with her Father and paternal grandmother. Tr. p. 16. M.G. described multiple occasions during which Father woke her in the middle of the night and "hurt" her in her "front butt." Id. at 22. M.G. also described an incident that occurred in the bathroom where Father instructed her to "suck on his penis like a popsicle," but she refused. Id. at 25. On another occasion, M.G. was instructed by Father to get on her knees and "suck on his penis." Id. at 26. M.G. further explained that afterwards, Father made her "spit what was in my mouth, out, onto his shirt, and then he went and got me some cookies and turned on the [T.V.]." Id. at 26. M.G. described yet another incident when she awoke in the middle of the night after feeling a "sharp pain in my vagina and I think it was one of [Father's] finger nails." Id. at 27. When asked how often bad things like these happened, M.G. answered, "I'm not sure[,] but it was a lot." Id. at 27. M.G. also reported that when Father went to jail, the bad things stopped happening. In addition to M.G.'s testimony, MCDCS also presented evidenced establishing Father had a significant criminal history dating back to 1999, repeatedly exposed all the children to incidents of domestic violence against Mother, refused to cooperate with case workers and service providers during the underlying proceedings, and failed to complete a majority of the trial court's dispositional goals.
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court took the matter under advisement. In December 2010, the court entered its judgment terminating Father's parental rights to all three children. Father now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
We begin our review by acknowledging that this court has long had a highly deferential standard of review in cases concerning the termination of parental rights. In re K.S., 750 N.E.2d 832, 836 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). When reviewing a termination of parental rights, we will not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. Instead, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that are most favorable to the judgment. Id. Moreover, in deference to the juvenile court's unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside the court's judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied.
Here, in terminating Father's parental rights, the juvenile court entered specific factual findings and conclusions of law. When a juvenile court's judgment contains specific findings of fact and conclusions thereon, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. "Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference." Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ind. 1996). If the evidence and inferences support the juvenile court's decision, we must affirm. L.S., 717 N.E.2d at 208.
"The traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution." In re M.B., 666 N.E.2d 73, 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied. A juvenile court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child, however, when evaluating the circumstances surrounding a termination. K.S., 750 N.E.2d at 837. In addition, termination of a parent-child relationship is proper where a child's emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. Although the right to raise one's own child should not be terminated solely because there is a better home available for the child, parental rights may be terminated when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet his or her parental responsibilities. Id. at 836.
Before an involuntary termination of parental rights may occur in Indiana, the State is required to allege and prove, among other things:
(B) that one (1) of the following is true:Ind. Code Ann. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). The State's burden of proof for establishing these allegations in termination cases "is one of 'clear and convincing evidence.'" In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260-61 (Ind. 2009) (quoting Ind. Code § 31-37-14-2). If the juvenile court finds that the allegations in a petition described in section 4 of this chapter are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8.
(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.
(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the child.
(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been adjudicated a child in need of services; [and](C) that termination is in the best interests of the child . . . .
Father challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the juvenile court's findings as to subsections (b)(2)(B) and (C) of the termination statute cited above. See Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). Initially, we observe that Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive. Thus, MCDCS needed to establish only one of the three requirements of subsection (b)(2)(B) by clear and convincing evidence before the juvenile court could terminate parental rights. See In re L.V.N., 799 N.E.2d 63, 69 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). Here, the court found MCDCS presented sufficient evidence to satisfy the first two subsections of (b)(2)(B) of the termination statute. See I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B)(i) & (ii). Because we find it dispositive under the facts of this particular case, however, we shall consider only whether clear and convincing evidence supports the juvenile court's findings regarding subsection (b)(2)(B)(i), namely, whether there is a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in the children's removal or continued placement outside Father's care will not be remedied. See I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B)(i).
I. Conditions Remedied
In determining whether there is a reasonable probability that conditions resulting in a child's removal or continued placement outside a parent's care will be remedied, a juvenile court must judge the parent's fitness to care for his or her child at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions. In re J.T., 742 N.E.2d 509. 512 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. The court must also evaluate the parent's habitual patterns of conduct to determine the probability of future neglect or deprivation of the child. Id. Pursuant to this rule, courts have properly considered evidence of a parent's prior criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support, and lack of adequate housing and employment. A.F. v. Marion Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 762 N.E.2d 1244, 1251 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. The juvenile court may also consider the services offered to the parent by a county office of the Indiana Department of Child Services and the parent's response to those services, as evidence of whether conditions will be remedied. Id. Moreover, MCDCS is not required to provide evidence ruling out all possibilities of change; rather, it need establish that there is a reasonable probability the parent's behavior will not change. In re Kay L., 867 N.E.2d 242 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
In the instant case, Father asserts that the circumstances resulting in the children's removal from his care "have been cured because Father no longer is incarcerated, he has proven that the allegations of sexual abuse were false, and he can provide a proper home to the children." Appellant's Br. at 8. He further argues that his "failure to complete all [court-ordered reunification] services was understandable because [MCDCS], either explicitly or implicitly, made clear that completing those services would not change its view that he was a sex offender who should not have any contact with or custody of the children." Id. at 9. Father therefore contends he is entitled to reversal.
In terminating Father's parental rights to all three children, the juvenile court's judgment contained detailed findings regarding Father's extensive criminal history, which includes convictions for possession of marijuana/hashish, public intoxication, possession of cocaine, criminal conversion, as well as domestic battery after he "attempt[ed] to strangle [Mother] with a telephone cord." Appellant's App. p. 52. The court also found Father had a history of domestic violence throughout his ten-year relationship with Mother, and that M.G. and Me.G. observed Father argue with Mother "once or twice per week" with these incidents oftentimes "escalating to physical altercations." Id. The court took particular note of one specific incident of domestic violence during which M.G. observed Father "punching [Mother] repeatedly in the head and throwing items at [Mother]." Id.
Although the juvenile court specifically acknowledged that Father had been "found not guilty of the criminal charges which stemmed from [M.G.'s] disclosures of sexual abuse," it nevertheless found that while living with the children at the paternal grandmother's home, Father "sexually abused [M.G.] on at least four occasions." Id. at 52. The court further found that the mental health assessments conducted on M.G. and Me.G. "yielded a diagnosis of sexual abuse of child" and "neglect of child." Id. at 49, 51. In addition, the court noted that the children's therapeutic foster care worker observed both M.G. and Me.G. "to display symptoms of sexual abuse," including "anger, anxiety, inability to sleep, and nightmares," and that both children had indicated they were "afraid" when in the neighborhood where they knew Father to reside. Id. at 51-52.
Based on these and other findings, the juvenile court determined that there was a "reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the removal of [the children] will not be remedied. [Father] has not completed sex offender treatment to address his sexual abuse of [M.G.] or domestic violence treatment to address his violent behavior which has been witnessed by the children." Id. at 53. A thorough review of the record leaves us satisfied that clear and convincing evidence supports the juvenile court's findings, which in turn support the court's ultimate decision to terminate Father's parental rights to M.G., Me.G., and E.G.
During the termination hearing, MCDCS case manager Cooper, therapists Jennifer Braunecker ("Braunecker") and Michele Marsh ("Marsh"), as well as guardian ad litem Brian Robinson ("Robinson") all confirmed that Father had made little or no progress in his overall ability to care for the children. Specifically, case workers confirmed that Father had failed to provide any employment verification following his release from incarceration, although he claimed to be working part-time at a local fast food restaurant, and refused to participate in the recommended parenting classes, domestic violence program, psychosexual evaluation, and sexual offender treatment program. Although the evidence reveals Father completed a substance abuse program, case manager Cooper informed the juvenile court that Father's discharge summary gave Father "grades of average participation and engagement" and further indicated Father's "[p]rognosis [is] poor, based on his lack of engagement." Tr. p. 134. Cooper also confirmed that Father had refused all requests for random drug screens following his completion of the program in January 2010. As for housing, Father failed to secure independent housing and was living with his mother in the same two-bedroom residence where he was living with the children before his incarceration.
There was also extensive testimony admitted into evidence pertaining to the sexual abuse allegations in this case. In addition to M.G.'s disturbingly detailed testimony concerning the sexual abuse she suffered at Father's hands, the record is replete with testimony from case workers and services providers confirming that not only had M.G. and Me.G. independently reported they had been sexually abused by Father while in his care, but that the girls' reports appeared honest and credible. Therapist Braunecker testified that M.G. had been "open and honest" during counseling sessions and that she had exhibited typical signs and symptoms of a child that had been sexually abused, including "anxiety" and "fear." Id. at 42. When asked whether she ever saw "any characteristics in [M.G.] that made [Braunecker] think [M.G.] had created a false memory about her abuse" or if Braunecker thought M.G. was "easily suggestible," Braunecker answered, "No." Id. at 60. Similarly, when therapist Marsh was questioned as to whether she believed M.G.'s and Me.G.'s respective statements about being sexually abused "to be credible," Marsh answered, "Yes." Id. at 71.
The children's therapeutic foster care therapist, Peggy Burdsall ("Burdsall") of Children's Bureau, also testified during the termination hearing. Burdsall confirmed that both M.G. and Me.G. had disclosed they had been sexually abused, and that M.G. had been evaluated by the Children's Bureau's consulting psychologist. Burdsall went on to state that M.G. had been diagnosed with "ADHD [attention deficit hyperactivity disorder] with a rule out, which means there's evidence of the possibility of PTSD [post-traumatic stress disorder] and oppositional defiant disorder." Id. at 75. When asked to describe any "signs or symptoms that would lead [Burdsall] to believe that . . . both [M.G.] and [Me.G.] have been sexually abused," Burdsall testified that one "very strong" sign was that the girls "don't have a very wide range of expressing emotion, except for anger[,] and there's a lot of anger." Id. at 76. Burdsall also stated that both girls exhibited signs of "[d]epression, withdrawing, [and] not wanting to talk about what happened to them," which is also "very common for a child or an adult who's been sexually abused." Id. In addition, Burdsall reported that M.G. and Me.G. had "very obvious[]" signs of PTSD, such as "anxiety," "anger," "[n]ot being able to sleep, having nightmares, [and] depressive symptoms," and that both girls had "repeatedly been afraid when in the vicinity of a neighborhood that they said was their father's" to the point that they "ducked in the car," which Burdsall further explained is "very possibly evidence" of a post traumatic stress. Id.
Father's own testimony lends further support to the juvenile court's findings. Father admitted during the termination hearing that he knew he was supposed to complete all of the court-ordered services, including a sex offender treatment program, a domestic violence course, and random drug screens, in order to achieve reunification with the children. When asked why he refused to participate in these services, Father explained that the domestic violence program was just "wasting my time." Id. at 103. Father further testified that he refused to submit to random drug screen requests because he was "not on probation," and he did not participate in a sexual offender program because he is "not a sex offender." Id. at 103-104.
As noted earlier, a juvenile court must judge a parent's fitness to care for his or her child at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration the parent's habitual patterns of conduct to determine the probability of future neglect or deprivation of the child. D.D., 804 N.E.2d at 266. Moreover, "[a] pattern of unwillingness to deal with parenting problems and to cooperate with those providing services, in conjunction with unchanged conditions, supports a finding that there exists no reasonable probability that the conditions will change." Lang, 861 N.E.2d at 372. After reviewing the record, we conclude that MCDCS presented clear and convincing evidence to support the juvenile court's findings and ultimate determination that there is a reasonable probability the conditions leading to the children's removal or continued placement outside of Father's care will not be remedied. Moreover, contrary to Father's assertions on appeal, the fact that he was acquitted of the sexual abuse charges in a separate, criminal action is not at all dispositive as to his fitness to parent, especially under the facts and circumstances of this case. See, e.g., Sigo v. Prudential Prop. and Cas. Ins. Co., 946 N.E.2d 1248, 1252-53 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (stating that because the burden of proof on the moving party to establish the crucial facts is heavier in a criminal case than in a civil case, and there is a dissimilarity in parties, it has generally been held that an acquittal in a criminal case is not admissible in a civil action as evidence of the innocence of the accused).
Considering all the evidence admitted during the termination hearing, including the testimony and demeanor of all the witnesses, we do not believe that the juvenile court was unjustified in determining that M.G. and Me.G had likely been sexually abused by Father. Moreover, even if we were to disregard the court's findings concerning Father's sexual abuse as unsupported by the evidence, there remain abundant findings regarding Father's significant history of criminal activity and substance abuse, repeated refusals to submit to random drug screen requests, failure to complete parenting and domestic violence classes, and ongoing refusal to cooperate with case workers and service providers all support the juvenile court's determination that there is a reasonable probability the conditions resulting in the children's removal and/or continued placement outside of Father's care will not be remedied.
The juvenile court was responsible for judging Father's credibility and for weighing his testimony against MCDCS's evidence demonstrating Father remained incapable of providing the children with a safe, stable, and nurturing home environment. It is clear from the language of the judgment that the trial court considered Father's testimony but gave more weight to the evidence provided by MCDCS, which it was entitled to do. See Bergman v. Knox Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 750 N.E.2d 809, 812 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (concluding that trial court was permitted to and in fact gave more weight to abundant evidence of mother's pattern of conduct in neglecting her children during several years prior to termination hearing than to mother's testimony that she had changed her life to better accommodate children's needs). Father's arguments on appeal amount to an invitation to reweigh the evidence, and this we may not do. D.D., 804 N.E.2d at 265; see also In re L.V.N., 799 N.E.2d 63, 68-71 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (concluding that mother's argument that conditions had changed and that she was now drug-free constituted an impermissible invitation to reweigh the evidence).
II. Best Interests
We next consider Father's assertion that MCDCS failed to prove termination of his parental rights is in all three children's best interests. In determining what is in the best interests of a child, the juvenile court is required to look beyond the factors identified by the Indiana Department of Child Services and look to the totality of the evidence. McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 798 N.E.2d 185 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). In so doing, the court must subordinate the interests of the parent to those of the child. Id. The court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id. Moreover, we have previously held that the recommendations of the case manager and child advocate to terminate parental rights, in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests. In re M.M., 733 N.E.2d 6.
Beyond the findings previously discussed, the juvenile court made several additional pertinent findings in determining that termination of Father's parental rights is in the children's best interests. Specifically, the court noted that as part of the mental health assessment of M.G., therapist Marsh "recommended that [M.G.] have a safe and secure environment, [and] participate in significant, ongoing counseling[.]" Appellant's Appendix p. 51. Marsh's recommendations for Me.G. likewise included "a secure environment and counseling." Id. The court further acknowledged that case manager Cooper "believes that adoption is in the best interests of the children as [Father] refuses to observe the safety risks by minimizing the past incidents of domestic violence, his history of drug abuse and the sexual abuse of the children." Id. at 52-53. In addition, the court found:
43.Id. at 53-54. These findings, too, are supported by the evidence.
* * *
The children have not seen [Father] since before the filing of the CHINS action. [M.G.] and [Me.G] have shown signs of fear of their father and have expressed that they do not wish to have contact with him. [Father] has been violent towards [Mother] in the past and did not engage in the domestic violence program to address this behavior. Additionally, [Father] has not completed any sex offender treatment to ensure the children will be safe in his care.
44. The children's guardian ad litem, Brian Robinson, has observed the children in the home of their maternal grandparents. . . and has found the home to be safe, stable[,] and appropriate. [Robinson] has observed the children to be comfortable in this home and recommends that they remain there. The current relative caregivers of the children wish to adopt the children and the children wish to be adopted by them.
45. . . . The current relatives have been in the children's lives since prior to the filing of the CHINS action, they are currently able to meet [the children's] needs[,] and the children go to them for support and comfort.
During the termination hearing, therapist Burdsall testified that she would "[a]bsolutely not" recommend the children be allowed to visit with Father. Tr. p. 77. She went on to explain:
The two girls have very clearly and consistently, and over the time I've worked with them, said they want no contact with [Father]. In addition, they show signs of fear. When sexual abuse has been alleged, contact with a perpetrator, is, is not at all positive for the victim and needs to be prepared for, not forced. . . .Id. at 77-78. Burdsall also informed the juvenile court that the children "need to be secure, safe, [and] settled," and that she believed "adoption by the grandparents who they are living with would be the best possible permanency for [the children]." Id. at 79.
Similarly, in recommending termination of Father's parental rights, case manager Cooper stated that, in her opinion, Father "refuses to observe the . . . safety risks that are present by minimizing [his] domestic violence history, drug use history, and allegations of sex abuse, as well as the ongoing distress . . . [o]f his children about being reunified with him" which he has "consistently" been made aware of. Id. at 137. Cooper further stated that she "could not confirm adequate housing," "could not confirm adequate income or . . . ability to provide support," and given the length of time Father had been released from incarceration and refused to complete services, she believed "the safety risks will not be alleviated and that termination of the parent relationship with these children is in their best interests." Id.
Guardian ad litem Robinson's testimony echoed that of Burdsall and Cooper. Robinson confirmed that the children were "doing very well" in their current placement, that their "needs are being met," and that the children are "comfortable" in a "safe, stable[,] and appropriate environment." Id. at 223. Robinson went on to say that to disrupt the children's lives now would "just be extremely damaging to them." Id. at 229.
Based on the totality of the evidence, including Father's history of criminal activity and substance abuse, untreated domestic violence issues, and current inability to demonstrate he is capable of providing the children with a safe and stable home environment, coupled with the testimony from Burdsall, Cooper, and Robinson recommending termination of the parent-child relationships, we conclude that clear and convincing evidence supports the juvenile court's determination that termination of Father's parental rights to M.G., Me.G., and E.G. is in the children's best interests.
This Court will reverse a termination of parental rights "only upon a showing of 'clear error'- that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." In re A.N.J. 690 N.E.2d 716, 722 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (quoting Egly v. Blackford Cnty. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 592 N.E.2d 1232, 1235 (Ind. 1992)). We find no such error here.
Judgment affirmed. BAILEY, J. and CRONE, J., conur.