Opinion
2:21-cv-08546-MRA (MAR)
07-30-2024
WANDA J. OLDEN MEYERS, Plaintiff, v. FRANK KENDALL, Defendant.
ORDER ACCEPTING FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
MONICA RAMIREZ ALMADANI UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, the Court has reviewed the Complaint, the records on file, and the Report and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge (“Report”). Further, the Court has engaged in a de novo review of those portions of the Report to which objections have been made.
The Report recommends the grant of Defendant's motion for summary judgment and dismissal of Plaintiff's claims of employment discrimination. (ECF No. 55.) As explained below, Plaintiff's objections to the Report (ECF No. 56) do not warrant a change to the Report's findings or recommendation.
Plaintiff objects to the Report's remark that her allegations are “somewhat unclear,” and points out that she used the Court's Civil Cover Sheet to specify her claims. (ECF No. 56 at 7-8.) The Cover Sheet, however, is not a Complaint. See Balaoing v. Nissan North America, Inc., 2023 WL 4234664, at *2 n.3 (E.D. Cal. June 28, 2023) (“To be clear, the civil cover sheet, a form that may be required by local, state or other rule, is generally used administratively by clerks of the courts to categorize a case, but is not an initial pleading within the meaning of the law.”) (collecting cases). Still, the Report liberally construed Plaintiff's Complaint and carefully analyzed Plaintiff's claims. And although Plaintiff suggests that she had an additional due process claim based on a protected property interest (ECF No. 56 at 8, 33), such a claim fails because she failed to show she had a property interest in continued federal employment. See Bollow v. Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 650 F.2d 1093, 1099 (9th Cir. 1981) (former federal employee had no property interest in continued employment protected by the Due Process Clause); see also The Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577-78 (1972) (rejecting due process claim by state employee who was not rehired because he had no entitlement to continued employment).
Plaintiff objects that she raised a genuine dispute of material fact in support of her disability discrimination claim. (ECF No. 56 at 8-16, 32.) This objection does not point to any evidence that overcomes the Report's finding that “Plaintiff disclosed her disability and requested an accommodation after the alleged adverse actions began; in any case, Plaintiff's accommodation was granted, and there is no evidence that any of her negative performance reviews or the ultimate decision to terminate Plaintiff were in any way related to her disability, whatsoever.” (ECF No. 55 at 23.) Indeed, to oppose summary judgment, Plaintiff must cite to “particular parts of materials in the record” demonstrating a material fact is “genuinely disputed.” Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(1); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). Plaintiff “must direct [the court's] attention to specific, triable facts, and the reviewing court is not required to comb through the record to find some reason to deny a motion for summary judgment.” Gordon v. Virtumondo, Inc., 575 F.3d 1040, 1058 (9th Cir. 2009) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff, by failing to cite to “particular parts of materials in the record” that demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact, has not met this evidentiary burden. Relatedly, to the extent that Plaintiff now alleges that her telework accommodation was improperly removed (ECF No. 56 at 11), this vague and unsupported allegation does not raise a genuine dispute of material fact.
Plaintiff objects that she raised a genuine dispute of material fact for her hostile work environment claim. (ECF No. 56 at 10, 13, 16.) This objection does not point to evidence that overcomes the Report's finding that none of the alleged incidents of abuse “involve[d] explicitly race-related remarks, and Plaintiff has produced no evidence that would raise a genuine dispute as to whether any of these events were motivated by Plaintiff's race.” (ECF No. 55 at 31.) Moreover, as the Report explained, a hostile-work-environment claim generally requires proof of abuse that is “severe” or “relentless.” (Id.) Plaintiff's allegations of a few isolated workplace incidents, which either were not directed at her or were not race-based, do not raise a genuine dispute of material fact.
Plaintiff objects that she raised a genuine dispute of material fact for her retaliation claim. (ECF No. 56 at 15, 19.) This objection does not point to evidence that overcomes the Report's finding that, based on Plaintiff's documented performance issues, Defendant articulated nondiscriminatory reasons for reassigning Plaintiff's duties, placing her on a performance improvement plan, and recommending that she be terminated. (ECF No. 55 at 24-25.)
Plaintiff objects that she stated a prima facie case of disparate treatment. (ECF No. 56 at 28-30.) This objection does not point to evidence that overcomes the Report's finding that Plaintiff failed to identify a comparator, or an employee with a similar job or duties, who was treated more favorably. (ECF No. 55 at 17.) Although Plaintiff now points to two other employees who allegedly were treated more favorably (ECF No. 56 at 28-29), this suggestion does not point to evidence sufficient to overcome the Report's finding that Plaintiff has not shown she was subjected to an adverse employment action due to her membership in a protected class (ECF No. 55 at 14-15). And as Defendant's Response to the objections points out, Plaintiff has not pointed to evidence showing that these two employees were similarly situated to her. (ECF No. 58 at 4-5.)
Plaintiff objects that her documented performance issues were pretextual. (ECF No. 56 at 30-31.) This objection does not point to evidence that overcomes the Report's finding that Plaintiff “has not met her burden to produce sufficient evidence to raise a genuine dispute as to whether Defendant's nondiscriminatory explanations [for the adverse actions] were pretextual.” (ECF No. 55 at 26.) Plaintiff did not offer evidence of discriminatory or retaliatory motive for the reallocation of her duties, her placement on a performance improvement plan, or the recommendation of termination. (Id. at 26-29.)
In sum, Plaintiff's objections are overruled.
IT IS ORDERED that (1) the Report and Recommendation is accepted; (2) Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted (ECF No. 34); and (3) Judgment shall be entered dismissing this action with prejudice.