Opinion
C.A. No. 98C-11-155-JOH
Submitted: December 6, 2000
Decided: February 15, 2001
Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial and for Judgment of as a Matter of Law — DENIED.
Robert K. Beste, Jr., Esq., Biggs Battaglia
Edward F. Kafader, Esq., McCullough, McKenty Kafader, P.A.
On November 21, 2000, after a two-day trial, the jury found defendant Joseph Sowiak was not negligent. Plaintiffs Paul and Ruth Meuser have now moved for a new trial and for judgment as a matter of law. Their claim is that the Court erred in giving an instruction on unavoidable accident and in denying their earlier motion to declare Sowiak negligent, as a matter of law. They now ask the Court to declare Sowiak negligent, as a matter of law, and order that there be a new trial confined to damages.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On November 18, 1996, plaintiff Paul Meuser was driving toward Wilmington on Maryland Avenue. It had been raining to some extent. He stopped for a red light at the intersection with Stroud Street. A vehicle driven by Patricia Andrews pulled up and stopped behind him. While the two were stopped there, Sowiak came up behind them. He had come from the Boxwood Road area outside Wilmington.
Sowiak had driven on Maryland Avenue before. On this occasion, he was aware it had been raining and that the road surface was wet. He saw the red light at Stroud Street, which is either on a hill or just at the bottom of it. Approximately five car lengths behind Andrews' vehicle, Sowiak said he began to brake. He had been going less than 25 m.p.h. For the first several lengths, he said, he slowed without incident but then, unexpectedly, the car slid causing him to strike Andrews' car. Her car was knocked forward into Meuser's car. He testified that his head hit the steering wheel. Andrews recalls Sowiak apologizing.
The exact configuration was not made a matter of record.
Sgt. Bruno Battaglia of the Wilmington Police Department investigated the accident. He noted that Meuser's car was damaged. He testified that it had been raining and that the road surface was wet. While at the scene, he saw other vehicles skidding while trying to stop.
Since plaintiffs' motions relate to the issue of negligence and since the jury never reached the damages issue, the evidence about damages and injuries will not be reviewed. At the end of all of the evidence, plaintiffs moved for judgment as a matter of law asking the Court to declare: (1) Sowiak negligent as a matter of law, and (2) that this event could not have been an unavoidable accident. This Court denied plaintiffs' motion on both matters. Their current motions repeat these requests.
The case was then submitted to the jury. It was given a number of claims of negligence: common law failure to keep and maintain a proper lookout and failure to have the car under control, and statutory claims of careless driving, failure to control, exceeding a reasonable speed, following too closely and failure to maintain a proper speed when approaching an intersection. The jury was instructed that plaintiffs need prove only one of these claims to make Sowiak negligent. The Court also instructed the jury on unavoidable accident in this manner:
The mere fact that an accident occurred does not mean that someone was negligent. There may be an unavoidable accident for which no party is responsible. Such an accident is one which could not have been avoided through the exercise of proper care. If Mr. Sowiak was not negligent in a manner proximately causing the accident, in truth, the accident was unavoidable and defendant Mr. Sowiak cannot be held liable.
Jury Instructions at 13.
Plaintiffs objected to this instruction, arguing this case could not be such an accident.
The jury deliberated for approximately an hour and twenty minutes before it returned its verdict that Sowiak had not been negligent.
Plaintiffs criticize the jury for not taking long enough to deliberate and returning its verdict just before it would have left for the day. It would have resumed deliberations the next day. Plaintiffs, however, do not seek a new trial on the basis of the length of the jury's deliberations. Nor, in this case, would the Court award one. The negligence issues were uncomplicated. The testimony about the circumstances of the accident was not long. The Court finds no undue haste, or any haste, in the length of the jury's deliberations. Estate of Tribbitt v. Alexander, Del.Super., C.A. No. 95C-02-138, Herlihy, J. (January 17, 1997).
APPLICABLE STANDARD
When a motion for a Rule 50(b) judgment as a matter of law is presented, such as here, the Court does not weigh the evidence. The Court views the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. When considering such a motion, the Court must determine if the jury could reach but one conclusion.DISCUSSION
Two drivers, Paul Meuser and Andrews, said they were able to stop without sliding on the wet surface of Maryland Avenue. Sowiak said when he first braked, he did not slide, but started to do so after several car lengths ultimately causing him to strike Andrews' car. Prior to that, on the rest of Maryland Avenue, he had not slid. The Court, of course, cannot weigh that evidence or determine witness credibility.Added to this evidence is that of the investigating officer, Sgt. Battaglia. He saw cars sliding on the wet surface of Maryland Avenue. There is nothing to indicate any of the drivers of the vehicles were negligent. What that means, coupled with the evidence of the other three named drivers, is that there were portions of the road surface which caused some drivers to slide. That happened apparently even though those drivers exercised due care. Or, the jury could reasonably infer that they did and, therefore, Sowiak had, too. These facts fit within the definition of an unavoidable accident.
The jury, of course, was empowered to reject Sowiak's sliding as occurring despite the exercise of due care on his part. Various claims of negligence were put before the jury. Only one had to be proven. But, there was evidence that despite the exercise of due care, sliding was unavoidable and not the result of any negligent conduct on his part.
On this basis, this Court cannot say the jury could reach but one conclusion, i.e., that he was negligent. There was evidence that Sowiak was not negligent and that the accident was unavoidable. Since the jury could reach that alternate conclusion, Sowiak cannot be negligent as a matter of law.
O'Hara v. Petrillo Bros., Del.Supr., 216 A.2d 672, 674 (1966).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, therefore, plaintiffs' motion for a new trial and judgment, as a matter of law, is DENIED.IT IS SO ORDERED.
Sincerely,
JOH/bsr Original to Prothonotary