Opinion
Opinion filed June 7, 1932.
1. — Property — Ownership — Divesting Title. No man can be divested of his property without his consent.
2. — Sales — Honest Purchaser — Vendor Without Title — True Owner's Rights. An honest purchaser cannot hold property against the true owner.
3. — Pledges — Finder of Lost Property — Owner's Right to Reclaim. If the owner loses his property, or it is pledged without his consent by one who has only a temporary right to use it, or a qualified possession of it, the owner can follow and reclaim it in possession of any person, however innocent.
4. — Carriers — Rights of — Receiving Goods from Wrongdoer. A carrier is not bound to receive goods from a wrongdoer.
5. — Same — Same — Freight Charges — Prepayment. A carrier is not bound to receive goods unless the freight or pay for the carriage is first paid to him, and such carrier may, if he so desires, secure the payment of the carriage in advance.
6. — Chattel Mortgages — Recorded — Liens — Freight Charges — Priority — Replevin. In an action in replevin to recover possession of an automobile, mortgagee's prior recorded purchase-money chattel mortgage lien on an automobile, held, superior to the carrier's lien on such automobile for freight charges when taken by the mortgagor to another State and shipped back to mortgagee, where the carrier did nothing to ascertain whether the shipper was the owner or to require payment of the freight in advance, even though the mortgage provided that the mortgagor might remove the car from his place for temporary purposes, such provision did not authorize mortgagor to drive it out of the State and ship it as he did back to mortgagee.
7. — Same — Same — Same — Mortgage Lien on Personalty Removed to Another State — Effective — Comity. A chattel mortgage lien is given effect in the State to which the property is removed by virtue of the doctrine of comity, but such doctrine does not obtain as a matter of right, but is more in the nature of a voluntary or courtesy act on the part of the State recognizing or granting it.
8. — Same — Same — Same — Same — Law of Forum. The law of the forum held applicable in determining whether chattel mortgagee's lien or carrier's lien on mortgaged automobile taken into another State by mortgagor and shipped back to mortgagee was superior.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis. — Hon. Granville Hogan, Judge.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
H.F. Russell for appellant.
(1) The trial court erred in overruling plaintiff's motion for new trial. (See citations and authorities under 2.) (2) The trial court erred in rendering judgment for defendant. Section 3097, Revised Statutes 1929, contains the following language: "When the same (chattel mortgage), or copy thereof, shall have been filed, as above provided, shall thenceforth be notice of the contents thereof to all the world." "After condition of payment in a chattel mortgage is broken, the mortgage may take possession and replevin the mortgaged property, wherever he finds it, the property being his." Leavel v. Johnston, 232 S.W. 1064; Exch. Nat. Bank v. Daley, 237 S.W. 846; Lange v. Midwest Securities Co., 231 S.W. 272; Edmonston v. Jones, 69 S.W. 741; Meyer Bros. Drug v. Self, 77 Mo. App. 284; Brunk v. Salinger, 8 S.W.2d 88. In the absence of statutory provisions to the contrary, priority of liens arising out of private contracts depends on priority in time, and the first in order of time is prima facie superior to those of a later date. Jaicks v. Oppenheimer, 168 S.W. 216, 175 S.W. 972; Taylor v. Smith, 47 Mo. App. 141; Woolner v. Levy, 48 Mo. App. 469; Stone v. Kelly, 59 Mo. App. 214; Baskin v. Wayne, 62 Mo. App. 515. A mortgagor in possession has no power to create by contract a lien that shall have priority of a duly recorded chattel mortgage. Hampton v. Seible, 58 Mo. App. 181; Sec. 472, Jones on Chat. Mort. (5 Ed.). If a chattel mortgage is recorded (filed), the mortgagee's title is not affected by the retention of the possession of the property by the mortgagor, nor by his removal of it, and if the mortgage is good here it will be good in every State to which the property may be removed. Shapard v. Hynes, 104 F. 449, 45 C.C.A. 271, 52 L.R.A. 675; Flora v. Julesburg Motor Co., 193 P. 545, 69 Colo. 238; First National Bank v. Wesson, 109 Okla. 226, 235 P. 595; Smith v. Hutchings, 30 Mo. 385; McDaniel v. Bard, 27 Mo. App. 545; United Iron v. Sleepy Hollow Mining Co., 198 S.W. 443; Jones on Chattel Mortgages, secs. 260-260A. The law of the place of contract, when this is also the place where the property is, governs as to the nature, validity, construction and effect of a mortgage. McNichols v. Fry, 62 Mo. App. 13; Lafayette Co. Bank v. Wilson, 29 Mo. App. 384; Jones on Chattel Mortgages, secs. 299 and 300. So, where delivery is regarded as essential to the completion of the contract, it is regarded as made at the place of delivery. 13 C.J., p. 581. The comity between states does not require courts of one State to enforce rights accruing under contracts valid by the laws of another State, if to do so would violate the public policy of the State of the forum as declared by statute, or if its citizens would be injured or prejudiced by giving legal effect to it. Atwater v. A.G. Edwards Brokerage Co., 147 Mo. App. 436, 126 S.W. 823; J.J. Case v. Tomlin, 174 Mo. App. 512; St. Louis S.W. Ry. Co. v. McIntyre, 82 S.W. 346, 36 Tex. Civ. App. 399; Lake Shore Ry. Co. v. Teeters, 77 N.E. 599, 166 Ind. 335; Show Co. v. Randall, 75 Ind. App. 417; Bartlett v. Collins, 85 N.W. 703, 109 Wis. 477. "The lien of the carrier for transportation charges on property received from the mortgagor in possession, with the right to move from place to place, is inferior to that of a mortgage on which the carrier had both constructive and actual knowledge." Owen v. Burlington R.R. Co., 11 S.D. 153, 76 N.W. 302, 74 Am. S.R. 786; 11 C.J., page 652. A common carrier who innocently receives goods from a wrongdoer, without the consent of the owner, express or implied, has no lien upon them for their charges against such owner. A common carrier is bound to receive and carry goods only when offered for carriage by their owner or his authorized agent, and then only upon payment for the carriage in advance, if required. Replevin or trover remedies. Fitch v. Newberry, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 1; Robinson v. Baker, 5 Bush. 137; Van Buskirk v. Purinton, 2 Hall (N.Y.) 561; Collman v. Collins, 2 Hall (N.Y.) 569; 10 C.J., p. 459. Neither can he assert a lien for his services as such carrier. Kinsey v. Leggett, 71 N.Y. 387; Wills on Replevin, section 315, 1907 edition.
Thompson, Mitchell, Thompson Young and R. Forder Buckley for respondent.
(1) A common carrier receiving goods from one rightfully in possession is entitled to a lien upon the property carried by it for the reasonable value of its services. R.S. 1929, sec. 14233; 10 C.J. 456; Robbins v. C. A. Ry. Co., 132 Mo. App. 306, 111 S.W. 1179; Sutton v. St. L. S.F.R. Co., 159 Mo. App. 685, 140 S.W. 76; Hutchinson on Carriers (3 Ed.), sec. 864. 1. This lien covers charges which a connecting carrier has advanced to a preceding carrier. Wells v. Thomas, 27 Mo. 17; Shewalter v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 84 Mo. App. 589; Evans v. C. A.R. Co., 76 Mo. App. 472; Armstrong v. Chicago etc. R. Co., 62 Mo. App. 639; Moore Son v. Henry et al., 18 Mo. App. 35; 10 C.J. 457; Hutchinson on Carriers, sec. 867. 2. Where goods are not delivered by the carrier, but the owner takes them from the carrier without the carrier's consent, whether by legal process or otherwise the carrier's lien is not lost. Darlington v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 99 Mo. App. 1, 72 S.W. 122; 10 C.J. 461. (2) A common carrier is bound to accept goods tendered for carriage under penalty of liability for refusal and, like an innkeeper being bound to accept he is entitled to a right of lien coextensive with his duty; and this is true even though the goods be received from a wrongdoer. 1. A common carrier is bound to accept goods for carriage. 10 C.J. 65; Knight v. Quincy R. Co., 120 Mo. App. 311, 96 S.W. 716. 2. An innkeeper, being bound to receive under penalty, is entitled to a lien even though the goods be in the hands of a wrongdoer. Fox v. McGregor, 11 Bark. 41; Manning v. Hollenbeck, 27 Wis. 202; King v. Richards, 6 Whart. 418; York v. Grenaugh, 2 Ld. Ray. 866; Hutchinson on Carriers, secs. 882, 883 and 884; Brodwood v. Granara, 10 Exch. 417; Snead v. Watkins, 1 Com. B. (N.S.) 267; Butler v. Wolcott, 2 Bos. P.N.R. 64; Proctor v. Nicholson, 7 C. P. 67. 3. The lien of an innkeeper is superior to that of a chattel mortgagee, even though the mortgage was due when the chattel was brought to the hotel. 11 C.J. 656; Matthews v. Victor Hotel Co., 74 Misc. 426, 132 N.Y.S. 375; Weil Bros., Inc., v. Stern, 136 Misc. 265, 240 N.Y.S. 639. 4. A common carrier is likewise entitled to its lien although the goods be received from a wrongdoer. Case of The Exeter Carrier, referred to in York v. Grenaugh, 2 Ld. Ray. 866; Hutchinson on Carriers, sections 882, 883; Vaughan v. Railroad, 13 R.I. 578. (3) A chattel mortgagee may by his conduct waive his prior lien. 1. Consent by the mortgagee that the mortgaged chattel may be taken from its situs is a waiver of the mortgage against every person except the mortgagor. 11 C.J. 425; Jones on Chattel Mortgages, sec. 260 (a); Hutchinson on Carriers, sec. 885; Adamson v. Fogelstrom, 300 S.W. 841; Hollipeter, Shonyo Co. v. Maxwell, 224 S.W. 113; Geiser Mfg. Co. v. Todd, 204 S.W. 287. 2. Where the mortgagee permits a mortgaged chattel to remain for an unreasonable period of time in the possession of the mortgagor after condition broken, the lien of a third party then accruing is paramount to the lien of a chattel mortgagee. Jones on Chattel Mortgages, sec. 371; Kirtley v. Morris, 43 Mo. App. 144; Zahner Mfg. Co. v. Harnish, 24 S.W.2d 641. 3. Where the mortgagee knows of or consents to some work being done or service performed to the mortgaged chattel, the lien acquired by such service is paramount to the lien of the chattel mortgagee; this consent may be express or implied. 11 C.J. 651; Miller v. Crabbe, 66 Mo. App. 660; Pickett v. McCord, 62 Mo. App. 467; Kirtley v. Morris, 43 Mo. App. 144; Zahner Mfg. Co. v. Harnish, 24 S.W.2d 641; Robinson-Hoover Cattle Loan Co. v. Sifferman, 37 S.W.2d 974. (4) Even though an initial carrier may not be entitled to a lien, nevertheless, the final carrier is justified in paying the charges of the preceding carrier, which appear regular, and in holding the property for its lien. Berry Coal Coke Co. v. Chicago, Peoria St. Louis Ry. Co., 116 Mo. App. 214. (5) A contract for shipment from one State to another State, made in one State and party performed in that State, is governed by the lex loci contractus in determining the validity of the same and the rights and liabilities arising out of it. 4 Elliott on Contracts, sec. 3225, p. 450, and vol. 2, sec. 1192, p. 432; Thompson v. Traders Insurance Co. of Chicago, 169 Mo. 12; The Otis Company v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 112 Mo. 622; Carey v. Schmeltz, 221 Mo. 132, 119 S.W. 946; Herf Frerichs Chemical Co. v. Lackawana Line, 100 Mo. App. 164, 73 S.W. 346; Hurst v. St. L. S.F.R. Co., 117 Mo. App. 25, 94 S.W. 794; McKinstrey v. Chicago, Rock Island Pacific Ry. Co., 153 Mo. App. 546, 134 S.W. 1061; Hartmann v. Louisville Nashville R.R. Co., 39 Mo. App. 88; James S. Sample v. Verner-Kelley Live Stock Co., 193 Mo. App. 670; Nenno v. St. L. S.F.R. Co., 105 Mo. App. 540, 80 S.W. 24; Townsend Wyatt Dry Goods Co. v. U.S. Express Co., 133 Mo. App. 683, 113 S.W. 1061; Lord Bushnell v. Texas N.O.R. Co., 155 Mo. App. 175, 134 S.W. 111; 13 C.J. 248 and 257.
This is an action in replevin to recover possession of an Essex automobile. The statement alleges the value of the automobile to be $200, and it is sought to recover the same from the possession of the defendant; the defendant seeks to retain possession on account of certain freight and storage charges.
There was a judgment in favor of defendant and against plaintiff for the sum of $96.72, the amount of the freight and storage charges.
The case was submitted upon the following agreed statement of facts:
"On July 17, 1926, plaintiff sold an Essex automobile, motor No. 155905, to Edward T. Rayment for the sum of three hundred fifty ($350) dollars; that a note in the amount of two hundred fifty ($250) dollars secured by a chattel mortgage was executed by the said Rayment as part purchase price, said note being payable in weekly installments of six ($6) dollars until the note was paid in full; that the chattel mortgage was filed for record in the Recorder's office of St. Louis, Missouri, at 1:45 P.M., July 26, 1926; that the automobile in question was delivered to Mr. Rayment, and that Mr. Rayment paid nothing on the car after delivery.
"It is further agreed that some time thereafter the said Mr. Rayment drove the car out of the State of Missouri without the actual knowledge or consent of the plaintiff herein, and that on or about October 22, 1926, the said Edward T. Rayment delivered in Philadelphia to the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company the said Essex coach consigned to the plaintiff herein at its address in St. Louis, Missouri; that plaintiff was not a party to said contract with said railroad company, and had no knowledge or information of its terms, nor has it since agreed to be bound by the terms of said contract, and that at the time the said car was delivered to the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company for delivery to the plaintiff herein in St. Louis, the said Edward T. Rayment received a bill of lading for the same, which said bill of lading is attached hereto and made a part hereof, which he thereafter, by a letter dated October 27, 1926, from Philadelphia, forwarded to the plaintiff herein, which said letter is attached hereto and made a part hereof; that the Essex coach in the due course of its transportation was delivered by the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company to its East St. Louis terminus and there delivered to the Columbia Terminals Company as a connecting carrier for carriage to St. Louis, the final destination; that the Columbia Terminal Company, in accordance with the custom of carriers, paid the previous carrier, the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, its reasonable and regular charge of ninety-six ($96) dollars, whereupon the said freight bill in the amount of ninety-six ($96) dollars was marked `paid' by the agent for the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, the said freight bill being attached hereto and made a part hereof; that the said Essex coach was kept by the defendant Columbia Terminals Company until the charge of seventy-two cents for storage, the same being the usual, just and reasonable charge for such storage, had accrued; that the note, chattel mortgage and bill of sale executed by the said Mr. Rayment are attached hereto and made a part hereof; that in said letter above referred to the said Rayment enclosed the said bill of lading, which the plaintiff presented to the defendant, requesting the delivery of the automobile to him, and that defendant refused to deliver the said automobile unless the plaintiff paid the sum of ninety-six dollars and seventy-two cents ($96.72) as freight and storage charges; that the plaintiff refused to pay said freight and storage charges and instituted the present suit in replevin for possession in the Justice of the Peace Court of Elmer L. Moone; from a judgment in said court awarding the defendant Columbia Terminals Company a judgment for ninety-six dollars and seventy-two cents ($96.72) as its special interest in and to the said Essex coach, the plaintiff has appealed.
"It is further agreed that the said Essex coach has been sold by the plaintiff, under the terms of the chattel mortgage, for less than the mortgage debt.
"It is further agreed that under the law and decisions of the State of Pennsylvania a chattel mortgage recorded in a State other than Pennsylvania does not import notice to anyone in Pennsylvania whether the mortgaged article has been removed to the State of Pennsylvania with or without the consent of the mortgagee of the same, and that the rights of any party accruing in the State of Pennsylvania constitute a lien superior to that of a mortgagee under chattel mortgage recorded in the other State. Plaintiff does not concede that the laws of Pennsylvania have any application to the facts of the case. The replevin suit instituted by plaintiff is upon a Missouri mortgage."
The sole question for our decision in this case is whether or not the defendant carrier's lien is superior to the rights of the plaintiff, who was the mortgagee of the property in question. It is conceded by counsel here that this precise question has not been passed upon in any jurisdiction.
The chattel mortgage referred to in the agreed statement of facts was in ordinary form. It stated that Rayment lived at 3217 Kossuth, in the City of St. Louis, and that he sold and conveyed the automobile to Metzger, the plaintiff, on condition that he would pay six dollars a week, beginning July 24th, following, for forty-two consecutive weeks. The mortgage provided that Rayment should not remove or attempt to remove the property from his residence except for temporary use.
While this precise question, with all its complications, has not been definitely decided in any decision which has been called to our attention, yet the principle involved has been passed upon in many cases. We are of the opinion that this judgment of the lower court is erroneous, and ought not to be permitted to stand.
It is a universal principle of law that no man can be divested of his property without his consent, and that even an honest purchaser cannot hold against the true owner. If an owner loses his property, or it is pledged without his consent by one who has only a temporary right to use it, or a qualified possession of it, the owner can follow and reclaim it in possession of any person, however innocent. These are merely general and abstract principles of law.
It has been held that the rule of caveat emptor should apply to common carriers. One of the reasons urged by respondent as to why this judgment should be upheld is that the carrier is compelled to receive the goods and carry them, and therefore his lien should be superior to that of the mortgagee. But the carrier is not bound to receive goods from a wrongdoer. Nor is a carrier bound to receive goods unless the freight or pay for the carriage is first paid to him, and such carrier may, if he so desires, secure the payment of the carriage in advance.
In Fitch v. Newberry (Mich.), 1 Doug. 1, it is said that a person can neither acquire a lien by his own wrongful act, nor can he retain one when he obtains possession of the goods without the consent of the owner, express or implied.
The case of Owen v. Burlington, etc. Ry. Co., 11 S.D. 153, was a case involving the priority of a lien of a common carrier as against a mortgagee. It was held that the mortgagee's lien was superior and prior to that of the carrier. It was there stated that the carrier by waiving its statutory right to demand and receive its charges in advance of shipment exposed itself to the risk there encountered, and its lien could not be regarded superior to the mortgage without violating the fundamental principle that no man can be divested of his personal property without his consent, express or implied. It is further stated in that opinion: "If the rule were as contended for by appellant, a chattel mortgage would afford but scanty security, and the common carrier would be, without an obvious distinction upon principle, relieved from a hazard to which other persons in business are constantly subjected." It is true in that case that the carrier had knowledge of the existence of the mortgage, and it involved the question of moving the property from one place to another in the same State.
A well considered and well reasoned case is that of Wright v. Sherman, 3 S.D. 290. That case involved the question of the priority of an agister's lien over a mortgage. The court held that the lien of the chattel mortgage was prior unless the mortgagee had given his consent, and that the mere fact that the mortgagor had retained possession of the property was not proof of such consent. After a thorough discussion of the question of the priority of liens, the court stated: "The principle of those cases which hold that the chattel mortgage remains the precedent lien seems right to us; while to hold that the mortgagee, who has exactly and in good faith met every requirement of the statute, which undertakes to secure and establish his lien upon and interest in the property covered by his mortgage, may be supplanted and undermined without any fault or negligence upon his part, seems an encroachment upon the fundamental rights of property."
Another somewhat similar case is the case of Corinth Engine Boiler Works v. Mississippi Central R. Co., 95 Miss. 817. In that case the boiler company sold some machinery to one E.O. Kirby, and shipped the same to Kirby in the State of Mississippi, or from one point in the State to another. At the time of the sale the boiler company took a contract from E.O. Kirby, retaining title and ownership of the property until paid for by Kirby. Later one J.N. Kirby delivered the machinery to a railroad company in Mississippi for shipment to a different point in Mississippi, and consigned the shipment to himself. This shipment was made before the notes were paid. J.N. Kirby failed to call for the machinery, and the railroad company undertook to hold the machinery for freight and demurrage as against the boiler works who had reserved title by their contract of sale. The court in that case held, after reviewing the authorities, that the boiler company, who had sold the machinery in the first instance, could not be compelled to pay freight as a condition precedent to its recovery from a common carrier, although the common carrier received the property from and transported it at the instance of a third person, who bought it from a conditional buyer, and neither the third person nor the carrier had notice of the owner's right.
In Robinson v. Baker (Mass.), 5 Cush. 137, it is held that a common carrier, who innocently receives goods from a wrongdoer, without the consent of the owner, express or implied, has no lien upon them for their carriage against such person.
In the instant case it is conceded that plaintiff did everything which could reasonably be required of him in order to protect his rights and establish the priority of his claim, because it is agreed in the statement of facts that Rayment drove the car out of the State of Missouri without the actual knowledge or consent of the plaintiff herein. The fact that the mortgage provided that Rayment may remove the car from his place of residence for temporary purposes could not be construed as authorizing or permitting him to drive it to Philadelphia, and contract with a carrier to ship the car back to its owner in Missouri, and then such carrier claim its freight charges as a prior lien against the mortgagee when it did nothing to ascertain whether or not the shipper was the owner or to require payment of freight charges in advance.
We are of the opinion, therefore, that the judgment cannot be permitted to stand upon the theory that the defendant's lien was prior to that of the mortgagee, unless it be upon the theory that under the law and the decisions of the State of Pennsylvania, the chattel mortgage recorded in a State other than Pennsylvania does not import notice to any one in Pennsylvania whether the mortgaged article has been removed to that State with or without the consent of the mortgagee. We shall next dispose of this question.
Respondent insists that where a mortgagee consents that a mortgaged chattel may be taken from its situs, he waives the priority of the mortgage against every person except the mortgagor. The agreed statement of fact says the mortgagee did not consent to this. It is insisted under the law of comity between States that inasmuch as Pennsylvania does not under its laws recognize the Missouri rule, we must interpret the contract according to the laws of the State of Pennsylvania, where the shipment started, and for that reason the judgment ought to be affirmed.
In 5 Ruling Case Law, page 399, it is said: "The general consensus of judicial opinion seems to be that when personal property, which at the time is situated in a given State, is there mortgaged by the owner, and the mortgage is duly executed and recorded in the mode required by the local law, so as to create a valid lien, the lien remains good and effectual although the property is removed to another State." This mortgage lien is given effect in the State to which the property is removed by virtue of the doctrine of comity. The doctrine of comity between States with respect to conditional sales has been discussed in this State in the case of Parker-Harris Co. v. Stephens, 205 Mo. App. 373, 224 S.W. 1036, and Associates Investment Co. v. Froelich (Mo. App.), 34 S.W.2d 987. We have upheld in these cases contracts entered into in other States where the law of the other State has been complied with and where the property was removed to Missouri. Now, in this case we do not have a contest between a citizen of Pennsylvania and a citizen of Missouri. We have a contest wherein the carrier made his contract in Pennsylvania to deliver the property in Missouri, and chose his forum to enforce his lien. It made no request for the payment of charges in advance, taking its chance on enforcing its lien in the State of Missouri, which was the destination of the goods shipped. There were but two places where respondent could enforce his right to collect charges for this shipment. One was at the place where it received the goods, Pennsylvania, and the other at their destination at St. Louis. It did not seek to enforce its right by collecting in advance in the State of Pennsylvania, relying upon the laws of that State, but sought rather to accept the goods, ship them to Missouri, and take a chance on enforcing its lien in this State. The rule of comity does not obtain as a matter of right but is more in the nature of a voluntary or courtesy act on the part of the State recognizing or granting it. The facts of this case in our opinion do not justify us in overruling the positive law of the forum, and there are no authorities which justify or require us to recognize or enforce a foreign law where to do so would prejudice the rights of the citizens of our own State and contravene the positive policy of the law of the forum. Our policy is, and should be, to protect the right of ownership, and it would be to the contravention of the general policy as recognized by the majority of the different states to give effect to the contention of respondent here. Respondent argues that whether the mortgagor was permitted to remove the chattel from the jurisdiction for temporary use only or for permanent use is of no matter so far as the right of the respondent is concerned, which right accrued while the automobile was out of the jurisdiction. Respondent's rights may have accrued when it accepted the property for shipment, but by refusing to demand payment for carriage in advance, it sought to select another forum for the enforcement of these rights, and such rights ought to be enforced according to the law of the forum chosen by the respondent to enforce them.
We do not refer to all the authorities cited by either plaintiff or defendant. We have examined them. The case has been well briefed on both sides, and we have arrived at the conclusion that the lien of the mortgagee is superior to that of the carrier, and that the law of comity does not require, nor would we be justified in holding that the carrier has a superior lien because under the laws of Pennsylvania a chattel mortgage recorded in another State does not import notice to a citizen of Pennsylvania.
Therefore, the judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause remanded. Haid, P.J., and Becker, J., concur.