Brown v. Boulevard Village, Incorporated, Mo.App., 422 S.W.2d 389, 391(2); Meilves v. Morris, Mo., 422 S.W.2d 335, 339(5); Johnson v. Medlock, Mo.App., 420 S.W.2d 57, 59(3); Raef v. Stock-Hartis, Inc., Mo.App., 416 S.W.2d 201, 204(1). Daniels v. Krey Packing Company, Mo., 346 S.W.2d 78, 81(2); May v. Ozark Central Telephone Co., Mo.App., 272 S.W.2d 845, 848(2); Lupton v. Glenn's Oyster House, Mo.App., 266 S.W.2d 53, 55(1); McFarland v. St. Louis Car Co., Mo. App., 262 S.W.2d 344, 346(1); Sawtell v. Stern Bros. Co., 226 Mo.App. 485, 489(1), 44 S.W.2d 264, 267(1); Metting v. Lehr Const. Co., 225 Mo.App. 1152, 1154-1155(1), 32 S.W.2d 121, 123(1). Hazards encountered by employees while going to and from work are not, as a general rule, considered incidental to their employment, and injuries resulting from such hazards are not compensable because they do not arise out of and in the course of their employment.

In order for injury or death to be compensable it must (1) arise out of the employment and (2) arise in the course of the employment; in addition, where the injury or death was caused by the willful act of a third person such act must have been directed against the employee because of his employment. Mississippi Workmen's Compensation Act, Chap. 354 Laws 1948; Barry v. Sanders Co., (Miss.), 52 So.2d 493; 58 Am. Jur., Workmen's Compensation, Secs. 209, 210, 211, 212; Schneider's Workmen's Compensation, Vol. 6, Sec. 1560, p. 119; Metting v. Lehr Construction Co., 225 Mo. App. 1152, 32 S.W.2d 121; Rocky Mountain Fuel Co. v. Kruzie, 94 Col. 398, 30 P. 868; Farmer's Gin Co. v. Cooper, 147 Okla. 29, 294 P. 108; Larsen v. State Industrial Acc. Comm., 135 Or. 137, 295 P. 195; Whitley v. North Carolina State Highway Comm., 201 N.C. 539, 160 S.E. 827; Spiller v. Industrial Comm., 331 Ill. 401, 163 N.E. 406, 6 A.L.R. 1397; Associated Ind. Corp. v. Industrial Acc. Comm., 43 Cal.App.2d 292, 110 P.2d 676; Lebeda v. Pongracz, 230 App. Div. 606, 246 N.Y.S. 293; Westerdahl v. State Ins. Fund, 60 Utah 325, 208 P. 494. II.

48 C.J. 787; Dahlin v. Mo. Comm. for Blind, 262 S.W. 420; Hurley v. Sykes, 231 P. 748, 69 Cal.App. 310; In re Benson, 178 Okla. 299, 62 P.2d 962; Elliott v. Omaha, 109 Neb. 478, 191 N.W. 653; Hammel v. Town of Savgerties, 1 N.Y.S. 2d 208, 253 A.D. 84; In re Westphal, 259 N.Y.S. 303, 144 Misc. 729, affirmed 226 N.Y.S. 1015, 240 A.D. 85; Casserly v. Oakland, 12 P.2d 425. (2) The test to determine whether an officer is entitled to the "accidental injury" benefits under Section 8911, Revised Statutes 1929, is not whether the accident occurred during the exact hours of duty, but whether the accident was the proximate result of the performance of an act of duty, regardless of whether the accident occurred before or after or while the officer is technically "on duty." In re Benson, 178 Okla. 299, 62 P.2d 962; Buckley v. Roche, 290 P. 646; Gloeser v. Buffalo, 187 N.Y.S. 339; People ex rel. Donovan v. Retirement Board, 326 Ill. 579, 158 N.E. 220; Rhodes v. United States, 79 F. 740; Metting v. Lehr Const. Co., 32 S.W.2d 121; Howes v. Stark Bros. Nurseries Orchards Co., 22 S.W.2d 839, 223 Mo. App. 793. (a) The injury sustained by Officer Moore was the proximate result of the performance of an act of duty, which required him to walk across the street at the time and place where he slipped and fell.

(a) An assault to arise out of the employment must be connected with, pertaining to, or be incident to, the employment. Keithley v. Stone Webster Eng. Const. Co., 49 S.W.2d 296; Metting v. Lehr Const. Co., 32 S.W.2d 121; Sweeny v. Sweeny Tire Stores Co., 49 S.W.2d 205; Hagar v. Pulitzer Pub. Co., 17 S.W.2d 578; Blankenship v. Dept. of Labor, 39 P.2d 981; Davis v. Robinson, 179 N.E. 797; Scholtzhauer v. C. L. Lunch Co., 233 N.Y. 12; Harding v. Thomasville Furn. Co., 199 N.C. 733; Schloss-Sheffield Co. v. Harris, 218 Ala. 130; Phelps v. United Carbon Co., 8 La. App. 128; McDermott v. Cab Co., 288 Pa. 394; New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Collins, 289 S.W. 701. (b) An injury does not arise out of the employment unless there is a causal connection between the conditions under which the work is performed and the resulting injury. De Moss v. Evens Howard Fire Brick Co., 37 1110 S.W.2d 961; Price v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 42 S.W.2d 51; Griffith v. Anderson Motors, 59 S.W.2d 805; Crutcher v. Curtiss-Robertson Co., 331 Mo. 169; Wahlig v. Grocer Co., 29 S.W.2d 198; Cassidy v. Eternit, Inc., 32 S.W.2d 75. (3) An injury to be compensable must be received in the course of the employee's employment.

But, if the findings of fact be absent, and merely a conclusion involving a question of law be stated, the appellate court will look to the record to determine for itself whether there is sufficient competent evidence to support the conclusion and to warrant the making of the award. Metting v. Lehr Construction Co., [225 Mo.App. 1152], 32 S.W.2d 121."

The record shows the injuries of the claimant did not arise "out of" and "in the course of his employment," and there was not sufficient evidence to warrant the making of the award. Metting v. Lehr Construction Company, 32 S.W.2d l.c. 124, 225 Mo. App. 1152; Cassidy et al. v. Eternit, Inc., et al., 32 S.W.2d 75, 326 Mo. 342; Felden v. Horton Coleman, 135 S.W.2d l.c. 118, 234 Mo. App. 421; Smith v. Zukoski Mercantile Company, 14 S.W.2d 470, 223 Mo. App. 743; Reed v. Sensenbaugh, 86 S.W.2d 389, 229 Mo. App. 883; Barrentine v. Dierks Lumber Coal Company (Ark.), 181 S.W.2d 485; Jacqueminatal v. Turner Segmour Mfg. Co. (Conn.), 103 A. 115; Schmoll v. Weisbrod Herrs Brewery Co., 89 N.J. 150, 97 A. 723; Stone v. Blackmer Post Pipe Company, 27 S.W.2d 459, 224 Mo. App. 319. It is not necessary to cite authorities to establish the principle that the phrases "out of" and "in the course of" are not synonymous, but are independent of each other; that proof of one does not necessarily establish the other; and the inclusion of both elements in the act makes it obligatory upon the claimant in meeting his burden of proof to establish that the injury arose not only "in the course of" the employment, but also "out of" the employment as well.

(1) Where the facts are undisputed, the question whether the injury arose out of and in the course of employment is a matter of law for determination by the courts and the commission's award is not binding on the courts. Metting v. Lehr Const. Co., 225 Mo. App. 1152, 32 S.W.2d 121, 123; Carlton v. Henwood, 232 Mo. App. 165, 115 S.W.2d 172, 178; Horrell v. Chase Hotel, Inc., et al. (Mo. App.), 174 S.W.2d 881, 886; Palm v. Southwest Missouri Wholesale Liquor Co. (Mo. App.), 176 S.W.2d 528; Sawtell v. Stern Bros. Co., 226 Mo. App. 485, 44 S.W.2d 264.

The death of Reed is compensable because the accident arose out of his employment, the test being whether there is a causal connection between the injury and the employment itself, or the conditions under which it is to be performed. Metting v. Lehr Construction Co., 32 S.W.2d 121; Wahlig v. Krenning-Schlapp Grocer Co., 29 S.W.2d 128; Brooks v. Greenberg, 67 S.W.2d 823; Calvetti v. Gasbarri (Wis.), 230 N.W. 130; General Accident, Fire Life Assurance Corp. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 200 P. 419, 186 Cal. 653; State ex rel. Anseth v. District Court, 158 N.W. 713, 134 Minn. 16; Stevens v. Industrial Accident Commission, 178 P. 296, 179 Cal. 592; Wright Motor Company v. Steinhilber (Va.), 162 S.E. 192. The fact that others, if present, are also subject to injury does not prevent recovery, where the injury results from some hazard to which the employee must be subjected by reason of his employment, the risk being a condition of the employment resulting in injury to the employee.

George A. Hodgman and Albert E. Cunliff for appellants. (1) Under certain circumstances the question of whether or not an accident arises out of, and in the course of, the employment is a matter of law for the courts to decide; in this case the award of the Commission and the judgment of the circuit court do not have the legal sufficiency of competent evidence required by the Compensation Act: Teague v. Laclede Christy Clay Products Co., 52 S.W.2d 880; Barlow v. Shawnee, Inc., Co., 48 S.W. 35; Metting v. Lehr Const. Co., 32 S.W.2d 121. (2) If the Commission misapplies the law to the facts then its award is subject to judicial review and if the facts do not present any material conflict, then the application of the facts involves only a question of law calling for determination at the hands of the court: Thurman v. Fleming-Young Coal Co., 49 S.W.2d 288; Bricker v. Gille Mfg. Co., 35 S.W.2d 662; Sawtell v. Stern Bros., 44 S.W.2d 264; Seifert v. Heil Pkg. Co., 52 S.W.2d 579; Murphy v. Burlington Overall Co., 34 S.W.2d 1035; Keithley v. Stone Webster, 49 S.W.2d 296; Pruitt v. Harker, 43 S.W.2d 769. An accident does not arise "out of the employment" unless it arises because of a hazard reasonably incident to the performance of the work covered by the contract of employment; under the Compensation Act it is also a prerequisite that the accident must occur "in the course of" the employment.

His bodily movements, physical presence and exertion at any given time would be regulated by an intelligent conception of the proprieties, and characterized by the use of judgment and discretion. He was using his intellect in his employer's business in determining what course he should pursue until such a time as the prospective customer would likely arrive home and afford him an opportunity to resume the suspended conversation. Under the circumstances, there was no deviation from the work or the performance of any duty which he owed his employer, and if the visit could properly be designated a deviation it was merely incidental and claimant remained in the course of his employment. In the case of Metting v. Lehr Construction Company, 32 S.W.2d 121, 125, which involved a claim for death, this court observed in reference to the conduct of the employee as follows: "Under all of the circumstances it was an act that the defendant reasonably might have anticipated deceased would do and was not wholly beyond or disconnected with his employment.