Opinion
02-18-1868
METTERT'S adm'r v. HAGAN.
Johnson & Guigon, for the appellant. N. Howard and Roberts, for the appellee.
M, in his lifetime, conveyed by deed to H, M's interest in the estate of J deceased, upon the consideration, as expressed in the deed, of $1,000. After the death of M, H files his bill to recover the said interest; and M's administrator resists it, on the ground that M was incapable from drink of making a contract, and that the deed was obtained by the fraud of H, and that H gave no consideration for it. The evidence touching M's competency being contradictory, and there being some proof that M had confirmed the deed after its execution. HELD:
1. An issue should be directed to ascertain: 1st. Whether the deed had been procured by fraud; and, 2d. If procured by fraud, whether it had afterwards been confirmed by M, without coercion or restraint, when he was competent to act.
2. If it had not been procured by fraud, or if it had been confirmed by M without coercion and when he was competent, H is entitled to a decree for M's interest in the estate of J, without regard to the value of the consideration paid therefor.
3. Though according to the strict rules of pleading, a bill or cross-bill should have been filed to set aside the deed, yet the answer of M's administrator may, for that purpose, be treated as a cross-bill, so as to enable the court to do ample justice in the cause.
In August, 1866, John Hagan filed his bill in the Circuit Court of the city of Richmond against the administrator of George W. Mettert deceased, and others, in which he stated, that in July, 1859, George W. Mettert, by deed which was exhibited with the bill, conveyed to the plaintiff his interest in the estate of Dr. John H. Mettert deceased. That this estate had been sold and invested under the discretion of the court in two suits pending therein. And he asked that the share of said estate to which George W. Mettert was entitled as heir and distributee of Dr. Mettert might be decreed to him. The deed purports to convey the interest of G. W. Mettert in the estate of Dr. J. H. Mettert, in consideration of $1,000.
George W. Mettert's administrator answered the bill. He charged that the deed from his intestate to the plaintiff had been procured by the fraud of the plaintiff. That Mettert was at the time of making the deed, and had been for years previous, and continued up to the time of his death, from excessive intemperance, incapable of making a valid contract; that his intellect, naturally weak, had been so impaired by his excesses as that he was little better than a drivelling idiot. That Hagan had taken advantage of his condition; had induced him to stay at his house, and had there plied him with liquor until he obtained the said deed from him. That Hagan never gave any consideration for the deed, which conveyed an interest worth at the time near $6,000; and though it had been impaired by the war, was still worth upwards of $3,000. The defendant therefore asks, that the deed may be declared null and void, for the fraud in its procurement and the incapacity of the grantor to transact business; and that the interest of G. W. Mettert in the estate of J. H. Mettert may be decreed to the defendant.
A number of witnesses were examined, both by the plaintiff and the defendant, as to the condition of George W. Mettert about the time of the contract. Some of these witnesses stated he never was sober about that time, and for some time previous, and that he had not capacity to transact business. Others said that he was sometimes sober, and was able to contract. There was some proof of his staying at Hagan's house for a time in the year 1859.
The cause came on to be heard on the 3d of May, 1867, when the court expressed the opinion, that the defence set up in the answer was not sustained by the proofs, and decreed that the interest of George W. Mettert in the estate of John H. Mettert should be paid to Hagan. From this decree, George W. Mettert's administrator applied to this court for an appeal, which was allowed.
Johnson & Guigon, for the appellant.
N. Howard and Roberts, for the appellee.
OPINION
JOYNES, J.
The court is of opinion, that the said Circuit Court erred in rendering a decree in favor of the appellee Hagan, without first causing issues to be tried by a jury as hereinafter directed. Therefore it is decreed and ordered, that the said decree be reversed and annulled, and that the appellee Hagan pay to the appellant his costs by him expended in the prosecution of his appeal aforesaid here.
And this court proceeding to pronounce such decree as the said Circuit Court ought to have pronounced, it is further decreed and ordered, that a jury be empanelled at the bar of the said Circuit Court, on the chancery side thereof, to try the following issues:
1. Whether the deed in the proceedings mentioned from George W. Mettert to John Hagan was or was not obtained by fraud. 2. Whether, in case the said deed was so obtained by fraud, the same was subsequently confirmed by the said Mettert by his answer to the bill of Mrs. Kyle, or otherwise, the said Mettert intending thereby to ratify and give effect to the said deed, being fully aware of his right to avoid the same, and being competent to bind himself, and free from all coercion, restraint or undue influence. 3. In case the said deed was so obtained by fraud, and was not so subsequently confirmed, what was the value in money of the consideration, if any, paid or delivered by the said Hagan to the said Mettert for the interest of said Mettert conveyed by said deed. Upon the trial of which issues the said Hagan shall be entitled to open and conclude.
And the court is of opinion, that if it shall be ascertained that the said deed was not obtained by fraud; or, having been obtained by fraud, was subsequently confirmed as aforesaid, then the same should be held valid without regard to the value of the consideration paid or delivered therefor.
And the court is further of opinion, that though, according to the strict rules of pleading, the said deed could not be annulled and set aside without a bill or cross-bill filed for that purpose by said Mettert's administrator, the answer of said Mettert's administrator may, for that purpose, be treated as a cross-bill, so as to enable the court to do complete justice in this cause; and that if it shall be ascertained that the said deed was obtained by fraud, and was not subsequently confirmed as aforesaid, the same should be set aside and annulled, upon the payment to the said Hagan of the value of the consideration paid or delivered therefor by him, with interest thereon, for the re-payment whereof the said deed should be held as a security.
And the cause is remanded to the said Circuit Court for further proceedings to be had therein in conformity with the foregoing opinion and decree. Which is ordered to be certified, & c.
DECREE REVERSED.