Opinion
Case No. 8:20-cv-02333-SVW-KS
05-23-2022
MESA UNDERWRITERS SPECIALTY INSURANCE CO. v. ALLERGAN, INC.
Daniel Nicholas Katibah, James C. Nielsen, Nielsen Katibah LLP, San Rafael, CA, for Mesa Underwriters Specialty Insurance Co. James Edwin Gibbons, London Fischer LLP, Irvine, CA, David J. Shinder, John M. Hochhausler, Lucy Marie Bertino, Scott W. Davenport, Manning and Kass Ellrod Ramirez Trester LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Jeffrey M. Lenkov, Manning and Kass Ellrod Ramirez Trester LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Allergan, Inc.
Daniel Nicholas Katibah, James C. Nielsen, Nielsen Katibah LLP, San Rafael, CA, for Mesa Underwriters Specialty Insurance Co.
James Edwin Gibbons, London Fischer LLP, Irvine, CA, David J. Shinder, John M. Hochhausler, Lucy Marie Bertino, Scott W. Davenport, Manning and Kass Ellrod Ramirez Trester LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Jeffrey M. Lenkov, Manning and Kass Ellrod Ramirez Trester LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Allergan, Inc.
Proceedings: ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [53]
STEPHEN V. WILSON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Before the Court is Plaintiff Mesa Underwriters Specialty Insurance Company's motion for summary judgment against Defendant Allergan, Inc., ECF No. 53. For the reasons below, the motion is granted.
I. Background
a. Factual Background
This is an insurance coverage action arising out a suit in California state court styled as Kaufman v. Apeel Technology, Inc., et al. ("the Kaufman suit"). Def. Statement of Genuine Disputes of Material Fact ¶ 16, ECF No. 60 ("UF"); Pl. Resp. to UF ¶ 41 ("Supp. UF").
In 2017, Ryan Kaufman, the plaintiff in the underlying action, was severely burned when he unintentionally drilled into high voltage electrical equipment while installing security cameras at a building located at 71 Los Cameras Road in Goleta, California. Supp. UF ¶ 40. hi September 2019, Kaufman filed suit against several entities:
• Los Cameras Opportunity/Daketta Los Cameras ("Opportunity/Daketta"), which owned the property at the time of the suit;
• Los Cameras Business Park ("LCBP"), which had formerly owned the property;
• Meridian Group Real Estate, which managed the property;
• Allergan, Inc., which had leased the property from LCBP;
• Apeel Sciences, Inc., which had subleased the property from Allergan and was in possession of the property, operating a business there, and had contracted with Kaufman's employer for the installations of cameras;
• SoCal Edison, which provided electrical service to the property; and
• Beyond Heating and Air, which had done HVAC subcontracting work at the property.
Supp. UF ¶ 41.
Plaintiff Mesa had issued a general commercial liability insurance policy to Apeel that was in effect when Kaufman was injured. UF ¶ 1. While Apeel was the named insured, Allergan and LCBP were listed as additional insureds on the policy for liability connected to the property. UF ¶ 4. The policy included a $1 million per-occurrence liability limit and an exclusion for injuries to contractors ("the Contractor Injury Exclusion"). UF ¶¶ 2, 6.
After the Kaufman suit was initiated, Plaintiff agreed to defend all three insureds, Apeel, Allergan, and LCPB, under a reservation of rights. UF ¶¶ 17-18. Plaintiff offered to defend all three through independent counsel; Defendant Allergan selected Ed Riffle of Collins, Collins, Muir + Stewart LLP to defend it. UF ¶ 19.
In May 2019, after some discovery had taken place, Riffle gave his appraisal of the "value" of the case "as to Allergan" and opined that the "most frequent" "trial value" was "$750k-$1m," but that because of Kaufman's severe injuries, there was a 10-20% chance of much higher liability. UF ¶ 23. Thus, he concluded that the "settlement value" was $2 million. Id.
Around the same time, in June 2019, Mesa estimated that the total exposure of all Kaufman defendants was $10 million, with Allergan likely liable for $1.5-$2.5 million of that amount. Supp. UF ¶ 50. Mesa concluded that Apeel and Los Carneros likely faced a combined exposure of $5-$7.5 million. Id.
In September 2019, the Kaufman parties conducted an unsuccessful mediation, after which Riffle updated his estimated exposure, concluding that Kaufman's total damages were $20-25 million, of which Allergan would likely be liable for 15-25%, Apeel would likely be liable for 25-30%, and LCBP would likely be liable for 10-15%. Supp. UF ¶ 52. Given Allergan's likely exposure of $3-6.25 million, Riffle then revised his "settlement value" as to Allergan to $3.5 million. Id. Riffle stood by these estimates in another report a few months later. Supp. UF ¶ 56.
In June 2020, the Kaufman suit resolved in a global settlement of $10 million. Supp. UF ¶ 59. Plaintiff contributed its $ 1 million policy limit towards the settlement. Id. The rest of the settlement proceeds came from several sources:
• $1 million came from another insurance policy held by Apeel with National Union Fire Insurance Company;
• $1 million came from a general commercial liability policy held by Allergan with Ironshore Specialty Insurance Company;
• $6 million came from an excess umbrella coverage policy held by Allergan with North American Elite Insurance Company; and
• $1 million came from a general commercial liability policy held by Opportunity/Daketta with Travelers Insurance.
UF ¶¶ 7-15, 29-30; Supp. UF ¶¶ 43, 59.
Plaintiff then brought this action, alleging that the Kaufman suit fell within the Contractor Injury Exclusion and that it therefore had no duty to defend or indemnify Defendant. Compl. ¶¶ 17-24, ECF No. 1. Plaintiff sought reimbursement of the attorneys’ fees it paid on Defendant's behalf in the underlying suit, as well as the $1 million it contributed toward the settlement. Id.
b. Procedural Background
In response to the suit, Defendant brought a motion to dismiss, arguing that the Contractor Injury Exclusion did not apply to the Kaufman suit. See Mot. to Dismiss 1, ECF No. 20. The Court disagreed, concluding that that the Exclusion did apply and that as a matter of law, Plaintiff had no duty to defend or indemnify the suit. See Order 9, ECF No. 45. Further, given that conclusion, the Court ordered Defendant to show cause why summary judgment should not be entered in Plaintiff's favor. Id.
In response, Defendant noted that it disagreed with the Court's conclusion (and has persisted in that position so as to preserve the issue for appeal), but, in light of the Court's decision, acknowledged that there were no material disputes of fact on the issue of liability. See Resp. to OSC, ECF No. 48. However, Defendant contended that there were still disputes as to the amount of liability – how much it owed Plaintiff in reimbursement – that required further proceedings. See id.
Accordingly, the Court entered partial summary judgment in Plaintiff's favor as to liability and set a trial date to determine the amount of damages. Order, ECF No. 49.
Plaintiff now brings the instant motion for summary judgment, arguing that there are no genuine disputes of material fact as to the amount of damages, such that they may be determined without a trial. Mot. for Summ. J. 5, ECF No. 53 ("MSJ"). In the motion, Plaintiff contends that Defendant owes it $442,299.48 in reimbursement for defense expenses and $800,000 in reimbursement for the settlement payment, which represents the remaining balance since Plaintiff recovered $200,000 from the other insureds. Id. at 5-6.
After Plaintiff filed its motion, the parties reached a settlement as to the first issue – reimbursement of defense expenses – and filed a notice of partial settlement. See ECF No. 61. Accordingly, only the second issue – reimbursement of the indemnity payment – remains live.
II. Legal Standard
Summary judgment should be granted where "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party "bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of ... [the factual record that] demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once the moving party satisfies its initial burden, the non-moving party must demonstrate with admissible evidence that genuine issues of material fact exist. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 585-86, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Any inferences drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Id. 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (1986).
III. Analysis
To obtain reimbursement from an insured of an uncovered settlement payment, an insurer must prove: (a) that it made "a reasonable settlement payment," (b) that it issued "a timely and express reservation of rights," (c) that it gave "an express notification to [the insured] of [the insurer's] intent to accept a proposed settlement offer," and (d) that it extended "an express offer to [the insured] that [it could] assume [its] own defense" if it disagreed with that decision. Blue Ridge Ins. Co. v. Jacobsen , 25 Cal.4th 489, 502-503, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 535, 22 P.3d 313 (2001).
Here, there is little doubt that these four requirements are satisfied; Mesa issued a reservation rights, gave notice of its intent to accept the settlement, and offered to let Allergan assume its own defense. See UF ¶¶ 17, 27. And the $1 million payment is clearly "reasonable" to conclude the Kaufman suit, which presented a significant liability exposure for Defendant and the other insureds. Indeed, Defendant's opposition to the motion does not contests these points. See generally Opp. to MSJ, ECF No. 59.
Instead, the gravamen of the parties’ dispute is whether Defendant should be liable for the $800,000 remaining balance of the settlement payment or only part of it. Defendant argues that responsibility for reimbursing the $ 1 million should be equitably apportioned among the three insured. Id. at 11.
a. Applicable Caselaw
Two cases stake out the relevant legal boundaries. The first is LA Sound USA, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. , 156 Cal. App. 4th 1259, 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 917 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). In that case, the insurer, St. Paul, issued an insurance policy to LA Sound and its two principals, Hsu and Ji. Id. at 1263-64, 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 917. Hsu, Ji, and LA Sound were sued in a trademark infringement action, and all three tendered the defense of that action to St. Paul. Id. at 1263-65, 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 917. St. Paul negotiated a partial settlement and paid $1 million to settle the liability of LA Sound and Hsu and Ji in their capacity as principals of LA Sound, but that settlement did not resolve their liability for any conduct outside that capacity (i.e., in an individual capacity). Id. at 1265, 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 917.
Thereafter, St. Paul initiated a coverage action, seeking reimbursement for its defense and indemnity expenses and arguing that the insureds had had misrepresentations in obtaining coverage. Id. The California Court of Appeal concluded that the insureds had made misrepresentations, the policy was thus rescinded, and St. Paul was accordingly entitled to reimbursement of its defense and indemnity costs. Id. at 1271, 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 917.
However, it reversed the lower court's decision to hold all three insureds jointly and severally liable for the reimbursement amount, holding that "insurers seeking reimbursement must bear the [ ] burden of showing which costs can be allocated to the defense or indemnity of each particular insured." Id. at 1272-73, 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 917. This, it reasoned, was because reimbursement was equitable in nature – it is restitution of the "unjust enrichment" received by the insured – and it "would be inequitable to require a party insured under a rescinded policy to reimburse the insurer the policy benefits it received and also all policy benefits that every other insured party received." Id. at 1271, 1273, 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 917 (quoting Buss v. Superior Court , 16 Cal.4th 35, 51, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 366, 939 P.2d 766 (1997) ). Thus, an insured may be liable for reimbursement "only to the extent the [insured] actually benefits " under the policy. Id. at 1273, 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 917.
And in LA Sound , the court concluded that St. Paul had not met its burden to allocate the benefits of defense or indemnity among the three insureds. Id. With respect to the $1 million indemnity payment, joint and several liability was unwarranted because St. Paul had not shown that every dollar benefitted all three insureds equally. Id. It had not, for example, shown that all three "face[d] the same amount of liability" or that "their liability [was] settled on identical terms." Id.
The second relevant case is Axis Surplus Ins. Co. v. Reinoso , 208 Cal. App. 4th 181, 145 Cal.Rptr.3d 128 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012). There, a husband and wife, Edgar and Linda Reinoso, who owned an apartment building as community property were sued by the tenants for the dilapidated condition of the property. Id. at 184-85, 145 Cal.Rptr.3d 128. The two were also principals of the building's management company, Proud American, which was also named as a defendant in the tenants’ suit. Id. Axis Surplus Insurance insured Linda, Edgar, and Proud American under two general commercial liability policies. Id. at 185, 145 Cal.Rptr.3d 128.
After defending and ultimately settling the tenants’ suit, Axis brought a coverage action seeking reimbursement of its defense and indemnity payments on the basis that the claims were not covered by the policy. Id. 185, 188, 145 Cal.Rptr.3d 128. The trial court concluded that the claims were uncovered and held all three defendants jointly and severally liable for reimbursement of the settlement payment. Id. at 188, 145 Cal.Rptr.3d 128.
Linda Reinoso, who played a minor role in managing Proud American and the property, appealed, arguing that she should not be jointly and severally liable for the entirety of the settlement payment and citing LA Sound . Id. at 186, 188, 192, 145 Cal.Rptr.3d 128. The Court of Appeal affirmed Linda's joint and several liability. Id. at 195, 145 Cal.Rptr.3d 128. Despite her lesser role, the court reasoned that she was a co-owner of the property, still involved in Proud American and the property's management, and would thus have been jointly and severally liable under the causes of action in the tenant suit. Id. Accordingly, the court held that she received "a sufficient benefit from the settlement," such that it would amount to unjust enrichment to hold her responsible for less than the full amount. Id.
b. Application
Turning now to the instant case, to be entitled to the $800,000 Plaintiff seeks in reimbursement, Plaintiff has the burden of showing that Defendant received at least that much benefit from the settlement payment made by Plaintiff. See LA Sound , 156 Cal. App. 4th at 1273, 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 917 ; Axis Surplus , 208 Cal. App. 4th at 195, 145 Cal.Rptr.3d 128. Plaintiff argues that, like Linda Reinoso in Axis Surplus , Defendant should be held jointly and severally liable for reimbursement of the frill settlement payment. MSJ 15-16. Defendant counters that it would be inequitable for it to reimburse 80% of the settlement payment given that all three insureds received roughly equal benefit from the settlement. Opp. to MSJ 10-11.
Both LA Sound and Axis Surplus employed the same equitable doctrinal framework to analyze the issue of joint and several reimbursement liability, however, they reached different conclusions given then respective facts. Factually, this case lies somewhere in between LA Sound , where joint and several liability was rejected, and Axis Surplus , where it was affirmed. Here, there is a stronger case for joint and several liability than in LA Sound because in this case the liability of all three insureds was "settled on identical terms." See 156 Cal. App. 4th at 1273, 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 917. The Kaufman settlement was global, eliminating all potential liability for the three insureds arising out of Ryan Kaufman's injury. UF ¶ 29. Whereas the LA Sound settlement did not settle liability of the insureds in the same way: the corporation resolved all its possible liability, but the two individual insureds, Hsu and Ji only settled then liability for acts taken in then capacity as corporate directors – they still faced liability for acts done outside their corporate capacity. See 156 Cal. App. 4th at 1265, 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 917.
On the other hand, there is a weaker case for joint and several liability than in Axis Surplus. There, given that Linda Reinoso was (1) a co-owner of the building as community property, (2) a joint venturer in Proud American, and (3) participated in managing the building through her role with Proud American, thus, as a practical matter, it was virtually guaranteed that she would be jointly and severally liable for whatever liability stemmed from the tenants’ suit. See Axis Surplus , 208 Cal. App. 4th at 195-96, 145 Cal.Rptr.3d 128. Here, by contrast, the three insureds are all independent companies, not part of the same family operation. And while the three insured may have faced joint and several liability as to some of Kaufman's damages, it is unlikely that would have been the case for all of his damages.
For example, in personal injury cases, defendants are generally only severally liable, according to their fault, for the plaintiff's non-economic damages. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1431.2.
Thus, this case occupies something of a murky middle ground; however, in the Court's view, it is not necessary to determine, as a general matter, whether all three insureds under Plaintiff's policy should be deemed to be jointly and severally liable for reimbursement of the $1 million settlement payment. Rather, this case may be resolved on narrower grounds: whether Defendant received at least $800,000 in "benefit" from the settlement.
The answer to that question is clearly yes. On multiple occasions, Defendant's hand-picked independent counsel, Ed Riffle, estimated that Defendant faced a liability exposure of $1 million or more. Riffle first estimated that Defendant's likely liability at trial was "$750k-$1m," but there was a 10-20% chance of much greater liability, making the "settlement value" roughly $2 million. UF ¶ 23. Riffle later revised that estimate upwards, pegging Defendant's likely exposure between $3 million and $6.25 million, with a "settlement value" of $3.5 million. Supp. UF ¶ 52. These figures are corroborated by Plaintiff's estimates as to Defendant's liability at around $1.5-2.5 million. Supp. UF ¶ 50. Thus, Defendant received multi-million dollar "actual[ ] benefits" from the Kaufman settlement because the settlement completely extinguished its multi-million likely liability. See LA Sound , 156 Cal. App. 4th at 1273, 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 917.
Defendant points out that the two other insureds, Apeel and LCBP, were estimated to have roughly the same amount of fault and likely liability as Defendant. Opp. to MSJ 11; see Supp. UF ¶¶ 50, 52. Thus, Defendant protests, "despite this relatively equal liability between the three insureds, Mesa would have this Court make Allergan pay 80% of the indemnity costs." Opp. to MSJ 11. In Defendant's view, this is incompatible with the equitable underpinnings of reimbursement. See id. at 10-11.
However, in the Court's view, the equitable purposes underlying reimbursement do not mandate roughly equal apportionment among roughly equally liable insureds. Indeed, if that were so, then Axis Surplus would be untenable – Linda Reinoso could not have been held jointly liable for 100% of the reimbursement amount because she clearly was not the only party at fault (if anything, she was less culpable than her husband). See 208 Cal. App. 4th at 186-87, 195-96, 145 Cal.Rptr.3d 128.
Thus, this Court does not understand LA Sound to stand for the principle that apportionment of reimbursement liability for a settlement payment among multiple insureds must necessarily follow the comparative liability of the insureds. Rather, in a reimbursement action, the inquiry is whether it is equitable for a specific insured to reimburse the insurer in the amount sought, taking into account the extent to which that insured "actually benefit[ted]" from the settlement in terms of potential liability eliminated. See LA Sound , 156 Cal. App. 4th at 1273, 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 917 ; Axis Surplus , 208 Cal. App. 4th at 195, 145 Cal.Rptr.3d 128.
That is not to say that the comparative liability of the other insureds is wholly irrelevant. But the situation in which LA Sound is most applicable is one such as this: an insurer settles a case for $750,000 on behalf of two insureds, each of which faces an estimated liability of $500,000 ($1 million total), and then seeks reimbursement of the whole $750,000 from one insured. In that case, it would be inequitable for one insured to pay the entire $750,000 when it only received $500,000 of "benefit" from the settlement – it would inequitably subsidize the settlement for the other insured. See LA Sound , 156 Cal. App. 4th at 1273, 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 917.
However, this is not such a case. Here, where an insurer contributes $1 million to a settlement that extinguishes the multi-million-dollar liability faced by each of the three insureds, it is equitable to obtain reimbursement of the entire $ 1 million from any of the insureds – for each received a benefit from that settlement payment of far more than $1 million. Defendant is not forced to subsidize the settlement for Apeel and LCBP over and above its own benefit; it merely must return a portion of the benefit it received to which it was not entitled.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has met its burden of showing that Defendant received more than $800,000 in benefit from the settlement payment, such that it is equitable for Defendant to reimburse Plaintiff in that amount. See LA Sound , 156 Cal. App. 4th at 1273, 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 917 ; Axis Surplus , 208 Cal. App. 4th at 195, 145 Cal.Rptr.3d 128.
Thus, the Court giants Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on its indemnity reimbursement claim in the amount of $800,000.
c. Prejudgment Interest
The Court also grants Plaintiff's request for prejudgment interest on that amount. Under California law, prejudgment interest is available from the day on which the right to recover "damages certain, or capable of being made certain by calculation," vests in a party. Cal. Civ. Code § 3287(a). California courts have interpreted this provision to set up a dichotomy in which a "factual uncertainty" over the amount damages precludes prejudgment interest, but a "legal uncertainty" does not. See State of California v. Continental Ins. Co. , 15 Cal.App.5th 1017, 1037-39, 223 Cal.Rptr.3d 716 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017) (surveying caselaw). In other words, "[w]hat is critical is not whether the defendant actually knows how much it should pay; rather, it is whether the defendant could have calculated how much it should pay, if it had known how a court would ultimately rule on the legal issues. Id. at 1043.
Here, there were no disputed material facts between the parties; there was no "factual uncertainty" regarding the amount of damages Defendant may owe in reimbursement. See id. at 1039. Rather, there was only "legal uncertainty" about whether the Court would conclude that Plaintiff had met its burden under LA Sound. Had Defendant known how the Court would rule on that issue, it could have calculated its damages, so the damages were "capable of being made certain by calculation," and prejudgment interest is available. See id. at 1043 ; Cal. Civ. Code § 3287(a). Thus, as the Ninth Circuit held in a similar case, when an insurer is entitled to reimbursement of settlement costs because it never had a duty to indemnify the claim, it is also entitled to prejudgment interest from the date it made the settlement payment because on that date, the damages – the amount of the payment – were "certain, or capable of being made certain." Evanston Ins. Co. v. OEA, Inc. , 566 F.3d 915, 921 (9th Cir. 2009).
However, the Court does not agree with Plaintiff that the applicable prejudgment interest rate is ten percent. See MSJ 19. "In the absence of any legislative act to the contrary." the California Constitution affixes the default rate of prejudgment interest at seven percent per annum. See Cal. Const. Art. 15, § 1 ; Pacific-Southern Mort. Trust Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am. , 166 Cal. App. 3d 703, 716, 212 Cal.Rptr. 754 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) ; see also Westport Ins. Corp. v. Cal. Cas. Mgmt. Co. , 916 F.3d 769, 781 (9th Cir. 2019). Plaintiff points to California Civil Code § 3289 to argue that the interest rate applicable here is ten percent. MSJ 19.
Section 3289 provides that "[a]ny legal rate of interest stipulated by a contract remains chargeable after a breach thereof, as before, until the contract is superseded by a verdict or other new obligation" and if the contract "does not stipulate a legal rate of interest, the obligation shall bear interest at a rate of 10 percent per annum after a breach." Cal. Civ. Code § 3289. Plaintiff argues that because its reimbursement claim is "rooted in contract," the ten percent rate should apply. MSJ 19.
However, in the Court's view, the mere fact the parties are connected by an insurance contract does not convert Plaintiff's claim to a breach of contract claim. As discussed at length above, reimbursement is founded on equitable principles of unjust enrichment – not contract. See LA Sound , 156 Cal. App. 4th at 1271-72, 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 917 ; Axis Surplus , 208 Cal. App. 4th at 195, 145 Cal.Rptr.3d 128. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the ten percent rate of prejudgment interest is not the one that applies here; rather, the proper prejudgment interest rate is the default rate of seven percent. See Cal. Const. Art. 15, § 1 ; Pacific-Southern Mort. Trust Co. , 166 Cal. App. 3d at 716, 212 Cal.Rptr. 754.
Based on a principal of $800,000, at a rate of seven percent per annum, running from the date that Plaintiff issued the settlement check to the Kaufman plaintiffs until the date of this order, Plaintiff is thus entitled to $102,487.67 in prejudgment interest.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 53, is GRANTED. The Court shall enter final judgment in Plaintiff's favor in the amount of $902,487.67, consisting of $800,000 owed in reimbursement for Plaintiff's uncovered indemnity payment and $102,487.67 in prejudgment interest.
Since this order resolves all remaining issues in this case, the trial and all further proceedings are hereby vacated, final judgment shall be issued accordingly.