Opinion
23-CV-2046 (LTS)
05-05-2023
MATTHEW L. MERCADO, Plaintiff, v. JUDGE WILLIAM DEPROSPO; DA DAVID HOOVLER; BILL RANSOM; HUDSON VALLEY POST; CHANNEL TWELVE NEWS, Defendants.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE TO REPLEAD
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff, who is currently incarcerated in the Elmira Correctional Facility,filed this action pro se action under the Court's federal question jurisdiction. By order dated March 10, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees.For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses the complaint, but grants Plaintiff leave to replead his claims in an amended complaint.
Plaintiff was detained in the Orange County Jail when he filed this complaint, but he was subsequently transferred to state custody.
Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee, even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court must dismiss a complaint, or portion thereof, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
BACKGROUND
The following facts are gleaned from the complaint, which names as Defendants Judge William Deprospo, Orange County District Attorney (“DA”) David Hoovler, retired Orange County Police Officer Bill Ransom, the Hudson Valley Post, and Channel Twelve News: On an unspecified date, Plaintiff was arrested in connection with the death “of a friend [of] a domestic nature,” who died from a drug overdose.(ECF 1 ¶ V.)
The Court quotes from the complaint and other documents verbatim. Unless otherwise indicated, all grammar, spelling, punctuation, and emphasis are as in the original.
On August 26, probably in 2022, a News 12 reporter named Blaise Gomez posted on Facebook that, “Prosecutors say [Plaintiff] caused Jessica Lopez's death by failing to help her during an overdose.” (Id. at 11.) In response, Bill Ransom, whom Plaintiff identifies as a retired police officer, posted:
I had dealings with Mercado back in the day, a real Douche Bag. Given his history of beating this victim to a pulp in the past, I am skeptical about his account of her death, but at least he is going away for a good stint.(Id.)
Plaintiff claims that he “did not kill [Lopez] & all the [Detectives] corroborated this to be true by their investigation” (id. at 8), and he entered into a “plea deal . . . confirming” that he “did not act in violence as well as not physically hurting” her. (Id. ¶ V.) At Plaintiff's sentencing hearing on February 22, 2023, however, Judge Deprospo “vulgarly & unlawfully called [him] a murderer, coward, f****** sociopathic killer, etc,” and DA Hoovler “called [him] a Domestic Violent, Demonic killer amongst other things, by which they both violated me.” (Id.) It appears that a portion of the courtroom proceeding was broadcast on television on March 1, 2023. (Id.)
Plaintiff claims that the comments of Judge Deprospo and DA Hoovler “le[]d to a snowball/domino effect of News Reports & Media Frenzy by both Named News Defendants calling me & making me a Murderer to the public to which they are liable as well for damages.” (Id.) The “Comments, Reports & Media Posts have destroyed [Plaintiff's] life, reputation & name to [his] whole family & any possibility of returning to free life without anything but an intensified struggle.” (Id.) According to Plaintiff, Defendants made false statements, and the “Libel, defamation & slander proves a malicious prosecution.” (Id. at 8-9. 12.) Plaintiff further claims that Defendants have caused Plaintiff “Mental Anguish & pain, Anxiety & fear of being falsely named & made to be a murder[er]/killer to the public and [his] family, for which Plaintiff seeks money damages. (Id. ¶ IV.)
DISCUSSION
A. Section 1983
The Court construes Plaintiff's complaint invoking the Court's federal question jurisdiction as asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988).
1. Malicious Prosecution
In his complaint, Plaintiff makes two brief references to having been maliciously prosecuted. (ECF 1 at 8-9, 12.) The tort of malicious prosecution “remedies detention accompanied, not by absence of legal process, but by wrongful institution of legal process.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 389-90 (2007). To state a claim for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must allege facts showing: (1) that the defendant initiated or continued a prosecution against the plaintiff; (2) that the defendant lacked probable cause to commence the proceeding or believe the proceeding could succeed; (3) that the defendant acted with malice; and (4) that the prosecution was terminated in the plaintiff's favor. See Fulton v. Robinson, 289 F.3d 188, 195 (2d Cir. 2002). Thus, because favorable termination is an element of a malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff who has been convicted and seeks to recover damages under Section 1983 for malicious prosecution must show that his conviction terminated in his favor by alleging that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, invalidated by a state tribunal authorized to make such determinations, or otherwise called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005) (holding that Section1983 actions are “barred (absent prior invalidation) if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration” (italics in original) (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994))).
There are no facts in the complaint suggesting that Plaintiff can, at this stage, state a malicious prosecution claim. First, there are no allegations that any defendant initiated or continued a prosecution against Plaintiff without probable cause. Second, Plaintiff was convicted of the criminal charges, and therefore he cannot show that the conviction terminated in his favor. Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim under Section 1983 without prejudice to Plaintiff's asserting the claim in a future civil action, if his conviction is invalidated or otherwise overturned.
B. Claims Against Immune State Actors
1. Judge Deprospo
The Court must dismiss Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims against Judge Deprospo. Judges are absolutely immune from suit for damages for any actions taken within the scope of their judicial responsibilities. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). Generally, “acts arising out of, or related to, individual cases before the judge are considered judicial in nature.” Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir. 2009). “Even allegations of bad faith or malice cannot overcome judicial immunity.” Id. (citations omitted). This is because, “[w]ithout insulation from liability, judges would be subject to harassment and intimidation ....” Young v. Selsky, 41 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1994).
Judicial immunity does not apply when the judge takes action “outside” his judicial capacity, or when the judge takes action that, although judicial in nature, is taken “in absence of jurisdiction.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 9-10; see also Bliven, 579 F.3d at 209-10 (describing actions that are judicial in nature). But “the scope of [a] judge's jurisdiction must be construed broadly where the issue is the immunity of the judge.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978).
Plaintiff fails to allege any facts showing that Judge Deprospo acted beyond the scope of his judicial responsibilities or outside his jurisdiction. See Mireles, 509 U.S. at 11-12. Because Plaintiff sues Judge Deprospo for “acts arising out of, or related to, individual cases before him,” Judge Deprospo is immune from suit for such claims. Bliven, 579 F.3d at 210. The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff's claims against Judge Deprospo because they seek monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii), and, consequently, as frivolous, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). See Mills v. Fischer, 645 F.3d 176, 177 (2d Cir. 2011) (“Any claim dismissed on the ground of absolute judicial immunity is ‘frivolous' for purposes of [the in forma pauperis statute].”).
2. District Attorney Hoovler
The Court must also dismiss Plaintiff's claims against DA David Hoovler. Prosecutors are immune from civil suits for damages for acts committed within the scope of their official duties where the challenged activities are not investigative in nature but, rather, are “‘intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.'” Giraldo v. Kessler, 694 F.3d 161, 165 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)); see also Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 269 (1993) (absolute immunity is analyzed under a “functional approach” that “looks to the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). In addition, prosecutors are absolutely immune from suit for acts that may be administrative obligations but are “directly connected with the conduct of a trial.” Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 344 (2009); see also Ogunkoya v. Monaghan, 913 F.3d 64, 70-72 (2d Cir. 2019) (holding that Assistant District Attorneys' (“ADA”)' direction as to where criminal defendant would be arraigned was in preparation for a court proceeding in which the prosecutors were acting as advocates, and ADAs were therefore shielded by absolute immunity (citing, inter alia, Van de Kamp).
Here, Plaintiff's claims against DA Hoovler are based on actions within the scope of his official duties and associated with the conduct of a court proceeding. Therefore, these claims are dismissed because they seek monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(iii), and, consequently, as frivolous, § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i); see also Collazo v. Pagano, 656 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding that claim against prosecutor is frivolous if it arises from conduct that is “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process”).
C. Claims Against Private Actors
SA claim for relief under Section 1983 must allege facts showing that each defendant acted under the color of a state “statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Private parties therefore generally are not liable under the statute. Sykes v. Bank of America, 723 F.3d 399, 406 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001)); see also Ciambriello v. Cnty. of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 323 (2d Cir. 2002) (“[T]he United States Constitution regulates only the Government, not private parties.”). As Defendants Hudson Valley Post Channel Twelve News and retired police officer Bill Ransom are private parties who are not alleged to work for any state or other government body, Plaintiff has not stated a claim against these defendants under section 1983. Plaintiff's claims under section 1983 against these actors are dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
Because Bill Ransom was a retired police officer when he posted the online comment, he was not acting under color of state law, nor can he be deemed a state actor. Llanes v. New York, No. 18-CV-3537, 2019 WL 4889258, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2019) (holding that a retired police officer does not act under color of state law).
D. State law claims
The facts alleged also suggest a state law defamation claim.A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Generally, “when the federal-law claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early stages and only state-law claims remain, the federal court should decline the exercise of jurisdiction.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988)). As the Court is granting Plaintiff leave to amend, the Court has not dismissed the federal claims of which the Court has original jurisdiction. Thus, the Court reserves its decision whether to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction of the state law claims Plaintiff is asserting. See Kolari v. New York-Presbyterian Hosp., 455 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Subsection (c) of § 1367 ‘confirms the discretionary nature of supplemental jurisdiction by enumerating the circumstances in which district courts can refuse its exercise.'”) (quoting City of Chicago v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997)).
The Court does not appear to have diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. Even if the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, the complaint suggests that all parties are citizens of New York. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
LEAVE TO AMEND
Plaintiff proceeds in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. District courts generally should grant a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects, unless amendment would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Indeed, the Second Circuit has cautioned that district courts “should not dismiss [a pro se complaint] without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)). In light of Plaintiff's pro se status, and in an abundance of caution, the Court grants him 60 days' leave to amend his complaint to detail his claims.
In the “Statement of Claim” section of the amended complaint form, Plaintiff must provide a short and plain statement of the relevant facts supporting each claim against each defendant. If Plaintiff has an address for any named defendant, Plaintiff must provide it. Plaintiff should include all of the information in the amended complaint that Plaintiff wants the Court to consider in deciding whether the amended complaint states a claim for relief. That information should include:
a) the names and titles of all relevant people;
b) a description of all relevant events, including what each defendant did or failed to do, the approximate date and time of each event, and the general location where each event occurred;
c) a description of the injuries Plaintiff suffered; and d) the relief Plaintiff seeks, such as money damages, injunctive relief, or declaratory relief.
Essentially, Plaintiff's amended complaint should tell the Court: who violated his federally protected rights; how, when, and where such violations occurred; and why Plaintiff is entitled to relief.
Because Plaintiff's amended complaint will completely replace, not supplement, the original complaint, any facts or claims that Plaintiff wants to include from the original complaint must be repeated in the amended complaint.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff's complaint, filed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), (iii).
Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint that complies with the standards set forth above. Plaintiff must submit the amended complaint to this Court's Pro Se Intake Unit within sixty days of the date of this order, caption the document as an “Amended Complaint,” and label the document with docket number 23-CV-2046 (LTS). An Amended Civil Rights Complaint form is attached to this order. No summons will issue at this time. If Plaintiff fails to comply within the time allowed, and he cannot show good cause to excuse such failure, the Court will enter judgment dismissing the complaint for failure to state a federal claim and declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state-law claims.
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. Cf. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962) (holding that an appellant demonstrates good faith when he seeks review of a nonfrivolous issue).
SO ORDERED.