Opinion
Case No. 3:04 CV 7522.
September 13, 2005
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. No. 21). Plaintiff has responded (Doc. No. 25), and Defendants have replied (Doc. No. 26). The Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. For the following reasons, Defendants' motion is granted.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff worked for Defendant Rexam, Inc. ("Rexam") until April 16, 1996, when he was terminated for failing to show up to work. Plaintiff claims he suffered a mental breakdown, requiring him to be psychiatrically hospitalized, four days before Rexam terminated him. On February 2, 2004, Plaintiff submitted a claim for permanent and total disability benefits under a pension plan he participated in while employed at Rexam ("the Plan"), alleging disability dating back to April 12, 1996. Defendants determined Plaintiff was not "disabled" as defined by the Plan, and denied Plaintiff's claim. Plaintiff claims he has exhausted his administrative remedies, and now sues for benefits under Section 502 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1132.
Defendants appended to their answer a copy of the Plan at issue and copies of two medical history documents from Zepf Community Mental Health Center that Plaintiff submitted to Rexam as part of his claim for benefits. Plaintiff referred to both the Plan and the claim in his Complaint.
In its "Definitions" section, the Plan declares that "[a] Participant shall be deemed to be totally and permanently disabled only . . . [i]f he has been totally disabled by bodily injury or disease so as to be prevented thereby from engaging in any occupation or employment for remuneration or profit. . . ." (Doc. No. 9, ex. B, § 1.1(t)(1)). In the section relating to disability benefits, the Plan provides, in pertinent part, under the sub-heading "Commencement":
Monthly retirement benefits by reason of a Participant's Permanent and Total Disability shall be payable on the first day of the month after eligibility for such benefit has been established, and such benefit shall continue to be made on the first day of each month thereafter during the life of such Participant, except as otherwise provided under subsections 3.5 and 5.2 hereof.Id. at § 5.1. Section 3.5 relates to surviving-spouse benefits and is not relevant here. Section 5.2 is captioned "Termination of Benefits," and reads, in pertinent part:
Monthly retirement benefits by reason of Permanent and Total Disability shall be terminated if, prior to his Normal Retirement Date . . . the Participant receiving such benefits undertakes any regular occupation or employment for wages or gain. . . .Id. at § 5.2.
The first medical history document Plaintiff submitted to Rexam is titled "Zepf Community Mental Health Center Comprehensive Assessment" and was completed sometime after August 31, 1998. (Doc. No. 9, ex. E, p. 1). Under "Employment History," the Diagnostician Clinical Supervisor who interviewed Plaintiff wrote that "Mr. Menifee reports that until recently, he was employed as a limousine driver for approximately 10 months." Id. at 1, 3. In the second document, titled "Zepf Community Mental Health Center Physician Psychiatric History and Evaluation," the doctor who interviewed Plaintiff wrote that Plaintiff reported that he had "quit his job in February or March of 1998," "feels bad because he is not currently working," and "had difficulty with his boss at the limousine company, which led to him leaving that job." (Doc. No. 9, ex. F, p. 1).
DISCUSSION
Defendant now moves for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), claiming the Complaint and the Answer with its exhibits show that Plaintiff is ineligible for disability benefits under the Plan because he was employed in 1997 and 1998 as a limousine driver, and that his claim is barred by the equitable doctrine of laches.
A. Judgment on the Pleadings
On a motion for judgment on the pleadings, all well-pleaded allegations of the non-moving party must be taken as true. United States v. Moriarty, 8 F.3d 329, 332 (6th Cir. 1993) (citing S. Ohio Bank v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner Smith, Inc., 479 F.2d 478, 480 (6th Cir. 1973)). In contrast, all allegations of the moving party which have been denied by the non-moving party must be taken as false. Judgment is granted only where there is no material issue of fact involved and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Paskavan v. City of Cleveland Civil Serv. Comm'n, 946 F.2d 1233, 1235 (6th Cir. 1991).
Rule 12(c) provides that, "[i]f, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56." FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c).
B. Plaintiff's Eligibility for Benefits
Plaintiff first argues that, in deciding whether to grant Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court cannot consider the medical reports Defendant attached to its answer. Plaintiff then argues that, even if the Court does consider the exhibits, they do not adequately demonstrate that Plaintiff was "employed" within the Plan's definition. Finally, Plaintiff argues that the Plan does not prohibit the payment of back-benefits. None of Plaintiff's arguments are well-taken.
1. Rule 12(c) Considerations
In deciding Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court may properly consider the exhibits to the answer without converting the motion into one for summary judgment. See FED. R. CIV. P. 7(a), 10(c); see also, e.g., Ackah v. Hershey Foods Corp., 236 F. Supp. 2d 440, 443 (M.D. Pa. 2002) (finding it appropriate, in deciding a Rule 12(c) motion filed by the defendant, to consider the plaintiff's complaints to the Pennsylvania Human Rights Committee and the EEOC, which the defendant had attached to its answer). Rule 10(c) provides that "[a] copy of any written instrument which is an exhibit to a pleading is a part thereof for all purposes," and, under Rule 7(a), an answer, like a complaint, is a pleading. FED. R. CIV. P. 7(a), 10(c). Plaintiff's citation to United States v. Moriarty, 8 F.3d 329 (6th Cir. 1993), for the proposition that the Court may rely only upon the allegations in the Complaint is erroneous: Moriarty holds only that the facts alleged in the Complaint must be accepted as true; it does not limit the scope of the Court's consideration to those facts alone. 8 F.3d at 332.
Here, Plaintiff referred to his application for benefits in his Complaint. (Doc. No. 1, ¶ 9). The medical evaluations referred to in and appended to the answer were part of that application. The Court may properly consider them in ruling on Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings. 2. Plaintiff's Employment
The medical reports establish that Plaintiff was employed as a limousine driver in 1997 and 1998. Plaintiff claims that discovery is needed to determine whether his employment amounted to "regular occupation or employment for wages or gain," or was instead sporadic and/or uncompensated. On the contrary, Plaintiff is well aware of whether his engagement with the limousine company, which medical personnel reported that Plaintiff described as "employment," "working," and a "job," was regular or sporadic; compensated or gratis. Plaintiff was free to submit evidence showing that his employment does not meet the Plan's definition, converting the Rule 12(c) motion into one for summary judgment, but has failed to do so. The Court finds Defendant's evidence, in the form of Plaintiff's own admission that he was employed in 1997 and 1998 as a limousine driver, sufficient to establish that Plaintiff was "employed" under the Plan's definition during that time.
3. Plaintiff's Eligibility
Under § 5.1 of the Plan, disability payments may only begin after a claimant establishes his eligibility. (Doc. No. 9, ex. B, § 5.1) (monthly disability benefits "shall be payable on the first day of the month after eligibility for such benefit has been established. . . ."). Because Plaintiff was employed as a limousine driver in 1997 and 1998, Plaintiff cannot establish that he is currently eligible to receive disability benefits, as he is not currently suffering from a "disability" incurred while he was employed by Rexam. Id. at § 1.1(t)(1) (a qualifying disability prevents one "from engaging in any occupation or employment for remuneration or profit").
Plaintiff nevertheless asserts that, if he establishes his past eligibility, he should receive payments at least for the number of months between the onset of his disability and the commencement of his employment as a limousine driver, arguing that § 5.1 "directs that if a claimant can establish that he was disabled on a certain date, for instance, as of April 12, 1996, that his benefits would start being payable for dates commencing at the start of the next month, e.g., May 1, 1996, and continue so long as eligibility is maintained," and that "even if Plaintiff's activities in 1997 and 1998 had terminated plaintiff's [sic] right to payments under the plan after that date, Plaintiff is still entitled to disability payments from the onset of his disability until such terminating event can be proven." (Doc. No. 25, pp. 4-5). On the contrary, Plaintiff's argument misconstrues the text of § 5.1, which is entitled "Commencement," and which provides that disability payments are "payable on the first day of the month after eligibility for such benefit has been established," not that such benefits are payable for dates commencing with the month following eligibility, as Plaintiff claims. Moreover, when read as a whole, the Plan does not support Plaintiff's construction.
Under the Plan, benefit payments, once commenced, extend for life, unless § 5.2 operates to terminate the monthly payments. (Doc. No. 9, ex. B, § 5.1). Section 5.2 only acts to terminate benefits when a person who is presently receiving them becomes employed. Id. at § 5.2 (monthly disability benefits terminate "if . . . the Participant receiving such benefits undertakes any regular occupation or employment for wages or gain . . ."). On its face, § 5.2 does not apply to a situation such as the one presented here, where the putative beneficiary undertook employment before establishing his eligibility. The text of that section therefore does not support Plaintiff's claim that Defendant should pay him, under the Plan, benefits for the number of months between his disability and his employment.
Because § 5.2 only terminates benefits when one who is currently receiving them becomes employed, it follows that if Plaintiff presently established his past eligibility and began receiving benefits, they would continue for life. However, because the parties agreed that benefits would terminate if a beneficiary became employed after establishing his eligibility, it would be absurd to conclude that they intended payments to those who commence employment and then establish past eligibility to continue for life, and the Court will not so find.
Viewed as a whole then, the Plan's terms authorize payments only upon the establishment of present, not past, eligibility. As explained above, the medical reports properly attached to Defendant's Answer, which this Court may consider in deciding Defendant's Rule 12(c) motion, establish that Plaintiff is not presently eligible for disability benefits, because, having worked in 1997 and 1998, he is not "disabled." Because it finds on the pleadings that Defendant's denial of Plaintiff's claim therefore proper, the Court need not address Defendant's laches argument.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. No. 21) is granted.
IT IS SO ORDERED.