Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. CV034125
Bamattre-Manoukian, ACTING P.J.
I. INTRODUCTION
This action arises from an assault on school premises. Plaintiff Rolando Mendoza was employed in an after-school program at respondent Grant Elementary School, which is part of respondent San Jose Unified School District (School District). On January 20, 2004, Mendoza was injured when he was attacked by two young men as he was leaving the school grounds. Mendoza filed a personal injury action against defendants School District, Grant Elementary School, and James Landa, an employee of Grant Elementary School. Defendants subsequently brought a summary judgment motion on the ground that they could have no liability as a matter of law because it was undisputed that the attack was unforeseeable. The trial court agreed and granted the summary judgment motion.
The parties also refer to respondent Grant Elementary School by the name Grant Academy.
On appeal, Mendoza contends that the summary judgment should be reversed because defendants had a duty to take reasonable steps to protect school staff from criminal activity. For reasons that we will explain, we conclude that defendants have no liability as a matter of law under the rules governing public entity liability for the criminal acts of third persons on public property and therefore we will affirm the judgment.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
At the time of the January 20, 2004 attack, Mendoza was employed by Campfire USA, which administered an after-school program at Grant Elementary School in San Jose. Mendoza worked afternoons at Grant Elementary School and was usually the last person to leave the school at around 5:30 p.m. Before he left, Mendoza would clean the cafeteria tables and take inventory of the remaining snacks.
On January 20, 2004, as Mendoza leaving the school at about 5:45 p.m., he saw two young men approaching him on school property. Mendoza observed that one man had dark shoulder-length curly hair, was wearing a white tee shirt and baggy pants, and appeared to be about 21 years old. The other man wore a blue or gray sweatshirt with blue jeans and had a goatee. They two young men blocked Mendoza’s path and asked him what time it was and whether he knew a teacher named Shelly. When Mendoza gave them the time and told them he did not know a teacher named Shelly, they again asked him for the time. As Mendoza tried to walk away the two young men attacked him. According to defendants, the assailants struck Mendoza on the head, knocked him down and then continued the assault, in which he sustained a broken arm, broken ribs, and a concussion.
There were no witnesses to the attack. However, on the afternoon of the attack two young men who matched the description of Mendoza’s assailants were seen by James Landa, who was employed as the on-site administrator of the Afternoon Allstars after-school program at Grant Elementary School. Landa saw the two young men sitting in the area of the school’s benches between approximately 5:00 p.m. and 5:30 p.m. Landa said hello to the young men and saw nothing about them that caused him to question their presence at the school. At that time, there were a number of people present who were awaiting the release of the children. In Landa’s words, “[i]t was not unusual to see young males in their late teens or early 20’s in this group as either parents or the older siblings of Grant students.” Consequently, Landa assumed that the two young men were waiting for a student.
Landa did not know of any on-campus incidents of violence during his nearly eight years of employment at Grant Elementary School other than the attack on Mendoza. He was aware of an incident in which an older child from another school encountered a Grant student in the bathroom and wrote something on his forehead with a lipstick. Landa also knew of a shooting that occurred approximately six blocks away from Grant Elementary School and caused all the schools in the area to go into a “ ‘lockdown’ ” mode for 30 minutes. However, he did not recall when the shooting occurred in relation to the attack on Mendoza.
Janis Hubbs was the principal of Grant Elementary School during the 2001 through 2005 period. She knew of no incidents of violence or gang activity occurring on school premises other than the incident involving Mendoza. However, from time to time Hubbs would receive a bulletin from the School District or the San Jose Police Department describing “a generalized escalation of gang activity in the [School District] as a whole.” After Hubbs received a bulletin, she would relay the information to school staff. None of the bulletins ever identified Grant Elementary School, its students, or its staff members as a potential target of gang activity.
Hubbs also recalled a shooting incident that took place on January 14, 2004, several blocks away from the Grant Elementary School. The students were housed in the cafeteria for part of the afternoon until the police gave the all-clear. Hubbs was never informed that the shooting incident had anything to do with a Grant Elementary School student or employee.
Hubbs also received a memo regarding a shooting that occurred at a Jack in the Box fast food restaurant, from either the police or the School District. A few weeks prior to the attack on Mendoza, she told staff there was heightened gang activity in San Jose, as reflected in a police report.
According to Mendoza, Hubbs came to the after-school program and told the staff a shooting had occurred at the Jack in the Box on Tully Road and there might be gang-related retaliation. After the incident in which the Grant Elementary School campus was locked down, the students were more closely supervised and the staff closely watched the perimeters of the school. Hubbs also told the after-school staff to “ ‘tell people who do not belong on the school campus to leave the premises, and/or if these unauthorized individuals resisted, to call the authorities in the office to report and remove them from the premises.’ ” Further, Mendoza recalls that Hubbs “further instructed us to ‘warn other staff and be mindful of unauthorized people on the campus and suspicious activities.’ ”
However, Mendoza did not have any personal knowledge of gang activity at Grant Elementary School prior to his assault, nor any information to suggest that either Grant Elementary School or Landa knew or should have known that the assault was going to occur.
B. Procedural Background
1. The Complaint
Mendoza filed a personal injury complaint against defendants School District, Grant Elementary School, and James Landa on January 19, 2005. According to the factual allegations in the complaint, Mendoza was attacked and severely beaten on school premises by two male assailants who had been previously seen on the premises by Landa, a school employee. Mendoza alleged that “Grant Elementary and employee [Landa] knew or should have known that criminal acts of third parties/gang-members were occurring or about to occur, on the premises, and failed to warn claimant or otherwise protect him from harm, resulting in claimant’s injuries and damages.” Based on these allegations, Mendoza asserted a first cause of action for premises liability.
Mendoza also stated a second cause of action for negligence, in which he alleged that defendants “negligently and carelessly supervised, coordinated an after school program at the Grant Elementary School site and in spite of actual and constructive knowledge failed to warn, or to take reasonable precautions to prevent harm to Plaintiff from gang violence on the school premises where Plaintiff was working.” Mendoza further alleged that “at all times herein mentioned, all Defendants knew that said dangerous condition existed on the school premises which created a foreseeable risk of harm to Plaintiff.”
2. The Motion for Summary Judgment
Defendants brought a motion for summary judgment on the ground that Mendoza’s personal injury action lacked merit as a matter of law, based on the rule established in Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center (1993) 6 Cal.4th 666 that a property owner generally cannot be held liable for a crime occurring on his or her premises unless the crime was reasonably foreseeable due to prior similar incidents. Defendants argued that because there was no evidence that criminal activity of any kind had occurred at Grant Elementary School, let alone prior incidents of outsiders coming onto school grounds and attacking a student or employee, the attack on Mendoza was not foreseeable and they could not be held liable.
The decision in Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center, supra, 6 Cal.4th 666 was superseded by statute on another point as stated in Saelzer v. Advanced Group (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 767-768.)
3. Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment
Mendoza argued that the motion for summary judgment should be denied because triable questions of fact existed as to whether the attack on him was foreseeable. He pointed to the “recent violent acts” that had occurred near the grounds of Grant Elementary School, including the shooting that had resulted in the school lockdown. Additionally, Mendoza asserted that the warnings of gang activity given by Janis Hubbs, the principal of Grant Elementary School, as well as her instructions to staff regarding how to deal with unauthorized individuals on campus, created a duty on defendants’ part to ensure the safety of after-school staff and students.
Alternatively, Mendoza contended that a lesser degree of foreseeability is required where, as here, there is a strong public policy reason to impose a duty on schools to protect students and staff from attacks on school premises, and such attacks can be prevented by the simple means of questioning and warning off unauthorized or suspicious individuals.
4. The Trial Court’s Order and Judgment
In its order of May 16, 2006, the trial court granted the summary judgment motion. The court reasoned as follows: “Defendants provide evidence that there were no prior, similar incidents of violence at Grant Academy, and there were no prior similar incidents of outsiders coming onto school grounds and attacking a Grant Academy student or employee. . . . The evidence establishes, at most, that there were two incidents of violence outside and away from Grant Academy, i.e. in the neighborhood . . . . Plaintiff fails to establish that these incidents that occurred off-site were similar to the incident involving him, or otherwise made it reasonably foreseeable to Defendants that Plaintiff would be attacked. Accordingly, Defendants did not owe a duty to warn or prevent the attack on Plaintiff.”
Judgment in defendants’ favor was entered on July 5, 2006.
III. DISCUSSION
A. The Standard of Review
The standard of review for an order granting a motion for summary judgment is de novo. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001)25 Cal.4th 826, 860 (Aguilar.) The trial court's stated reasons for granting summary judgment are not binding on the reviewing court, which reviews the trial court’s ruling, not its rationale. (Kids’ Universe v. In2Labs (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 870, 878.)
In performing our independent review, we are guided by the California Supreme Court’s decisions addressing summary judgment procedure. A defendant moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of showing that a cause of action lacks merit because one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established or there is a complete defense to that cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (o); Aguilar, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.) If the defendant fails to make this initial showing, it is unnecessary to examine the plaintiff’s opposing evidence and the motion must be denied. However, if the moving papers make a prima facie showing that justifies a judgment in the defendant’s favor, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact. (§ 437c, subd. (p)(2); Aguilar, 25 Cal.4th at p. 849; Kahn v. East Side Union High School Dist. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 990, 1002-1003.)
In determining whether the parties have met their respective burdens, the court must “ ‘consider all of the evidence’ and ‘all’ of the ‘inferences’ reasonably drawn therefrom [citation] and must view such evidence [citations] and such inferences [citations] in the light most favorable to the opposing party.” (Aguilar, 25 Cal.4th. at p. 843.) “There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” (Aguilar, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850, fn. omitted.) Thus, a party “cannot avoid summary judgment by asserting facts based on mere speculation and conjecture, but instead must produce admissible evidence raising a triable issue of fact. [Citation.]” (LaChapelle v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 977, 981.)
In the present case we will therefore independently determine whether defendants’ summary judgment motion should be granted on the ground that as a matter of law they cannot be held liable for the assault on Mendoza. Our analysis begins with a discussion of the rules governing the liability of a public entity and a public entity’s employee for the criminal acts of a third party on public property.
B. Liability for Third Party Criminal Activity
The California Supreme Court outlined the rules governing public entity liability for the criminal acts of a third party on public property in Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112 (Zelig). In that case, a mother was shot and killed by her former husband in a Los Angeles courthouse where she was attending a hearing regarding spousal and child support. (Id. at p. 1118-1119.) Her minor children filed an action against the County of Los Angeles and the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, alleging that the defendants had failed to provide adequate security against third party violence inside the courthouse. (Id. at p. 1118.) The trial court sustained the defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend and ordered dismissal. The California Supreme Court upheld the ruling on the ground that the plaintiffs had failed to state a cause of action against the public entity defendants.
In reaching the conclusion that the public entity defendants could not be held liable for the death of the plaintiffs’ mother, our Supreme Court in Zelig first observed that “it is well established that public entities generally are not liable for failing to protect individuals against crime.” (Zelig, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1126.) The court observed that under the California Tort Claims Act, Government Code section 810 et seq. (Tort Claims Act), a public entity may be held liable for the criminal acts of a third party under only two circumstances. First, public entities may be directly liable “based on their own conduct and legal obligations.” (Id. at p. 1127.) Second, public entities may be vicariously liable “based on respondeat superior principles, for the misconduct of their employees that occurred in the scope of their employment.” (Ibid.)
All further statutory references are to the Government Code unless otherwise indicated.
1. Direct Liability
In discussing direct liability, the Zelig court explained that “The Tort Claims Act draws a clear distinction between the liability of a public entity based on its own conduct, and the liability arising from the conduct of a public employee. Although the Act provides that a public employee generally is liable for an injury caused by his or her act or omission ‘to the same extent as a private person’ ([§] 820, subd. (a)) and that, when the act or omission of the public employee occurs in the scope of employment the public entity will be vicariously liable for the injury ([§] 815.2), the Act contains no provision similarly providing that a public entity generally is liable for its own conduct or omission to the same extent as a private person or entity. Rather, the Act provides that a public entity is not liable for an injury, ‘[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute . . . .’ ([§] 815.)” (Zelig, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1127.)
Section 835 sets forth the liability of public entities as property owners, and provides in pertinent part that “ ‘a public entity is liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition of its property if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and either: [¶] (a) A negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition; or [¶] (b) The public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition under Section 835.2 a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition.’ (Gov. Code, § 835.)” (Zelig, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1133.)
The Zelig court emphasized that liability for a dangerous condition of property “is imposed only where there is some defect in the property itself and a causal connection is established between the defect and the injury.” (Zelig, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1135.) “ ‘In other words, there is no liability for injuries caused solely by acts of third parties. [Citations.] Such liability can arise only when third party conduct is coupled with a defective condition of property.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 1137.) Thus, “public liability lies under section 835 only when a feature of the public property has ‘increased or intensified’ the danger to users from third party conduct. [Citation.]” (Bonanno v. Central Contra Costa Transit Authority (2003) 30 Cal.4th 139, 155.)
However, a public entity may be liable under section 835 where the public entity maintained its property “ ‘in such a way so as to increase the risk of criminal activity’ or in such a way as to ‘create[] a reasonably foreseeable risk of . . . criminal conduct.’ [Citation.]” (Zelig, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 1134-1135.) “Such a dangerous condition may exist, for example, when an entity with notice of criminal activity provides inadequate lighting in an airport parking lot, thereby forseeably increasing the risk that members of the public will be attacked. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 1135.)
Because the plaintiffs in Zelig did not allege the existence of a defect in the physical condition of the courthouse property, and also failed to allege a causal connection between the shooting and the physical condition of the property, the Zelig court concluded that the plaintiffs had not stated a cause of action based on the direct liability of the public entity defendants. (Zelig, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 1140-1141.)
2. Vicarious Liability
With respect to a public entity’s vicarious liability for its employee’s misconduct, the Zelig court noted that the Tort Claims Act provides that “ ‘[a] public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or omission would ... have given rise to a cause of action against that employee,’ unless ‘the employee is immune from liability.’ ([§] 815.2, subds. (a), (b).)” (Zelig, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1128.) The court also noted that “ ‘[u]nder general negligence principles . . . a person ordinarily is obligated to exercise due care in his or her own actions so as . . . not to create an unreasonable risk of injury to others . . . . [Citations.] It is well established . . . that one’s general duty to exercise due care includes the duty not to place another person in a situation in which the other person is exposed to an unreasonable risk of harm through the reasonably foreseeable conduct ... of a third person. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
However, the Zelig court emphasized that the duty to exercise due care so as not to create an unreasonable risk of injury to others generally does not encompass a “duty to come to the aid of another. A person who has not created a peril is not liable in tort merely for failure to take affirmative action to assist or protect another unless there is some relationship between them which gives rise to a duty to act.’ [Citation.]” (Zelig, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 1128-1129.) Thus, in general “ ‘one owes no duty to control the conduct of another, nor to warn those endangered by such conduct.’ [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 1129.)
The relationship that may give rise to a duty to control the conduct of a third person or to warn persons endangered by the third person’s conduct is termed a “ ‘special relationship.’ ” (Zelig, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1129.) The Zelig court instructed that a duty may arise from two types of special relationships. “Such a duty may arise if ‘ “(a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person’s conduct, or (b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other which gives the other a right to protection.” ’ [Citations.]” (Ibid.)
The California Supreme Court accordingly determined that there was no basis for imposing vicarious liability on the public entity defendants in Zelig because the complaint did not allege “that a public employee engaged in conduct within the scope of the employment that would render the employee liable to plaintiffs for their mother’s death, . . .” (Zelig, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1131.) In particular, no “peace officer or other nonpolicymaking employee of the county voluntarily undertook special duties to protect” the victim, or to control the conduct of the shooter. (Id. at p. 1130.) Further, there were “ ‘no allegations of the requisite factors to a finding of special relationship, namely detrimental reliance by the plaintiff on the officers’ conduct, [or] statements made by them which induced a false sense of security and thereby worsened her position.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
Having reviewed the rules governing public entity liability for the criminal acts of a third party as outlined by the California Supreme Court, we turn to our analysis of the motion for summary judgment in the present case.
C. Analysis
1. The Parties’ Contentions
In his opening brief, Mendoza argues that the motion for summary judgment should have been denied because defendants owed a duty to warn plaintiff of suspicious individuals, based on the special relationship created by the Grant Elementary School principal’s instructions to school staff to question unauthorized or suspicious individuals and to warn other staff members. Mendoza also asserts that defendant Landa is liable because he failed to warn him or to question the attackers, despite the “foreseeable nature” of the January 20, 2004 attack.
Additionally, Mendoza contends that a lesser degree of foreseeability is required to hold a defendant liable where the burden of preventing such attacks is “not great” because “simple measures” would have prevented the attack, such as Landa questioning the individuals who attacked Mendoza and warning Mendoza. Finally, Mendoza emphasizes that there are strong public policy reasons to impose liability on defendants, consisting of the protection of students and staff attending after-school programs.
In their respondents’ brief, defendants first note that Mendoza failed to provide an adequate record for appeal, since his appellant’s appendix includes only the memoranda of points and authorities that the parties filed in connection with the summary judgment motion, and lacks any of the supporting evidence, the parties’ separate statements of fact, and defendant’s reply papers.
Second, defendants argue that the trial court properly granted their summary judgment motion, because there is no evidence of prior similar attacks at Grant Elementary School and therefore the attack on Mendoza was not foreseeable. They assert that the decision in Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center, supra, 6 Cal.4th 666, supports their position that they owed no duty to control the criminal conduct of third persons in the absence of a high degree of foreseeability.
Third, defendants maintain that the evidence of other incidents of crime in the vicinity of Grant Elementary School does not create a duty on their part, because those incidents did not occur on school premises and were not similar to the attack on Mendoza.
Fourth, defendants reject Mendoza’s contention that that Principal Hubbs’s instructions to school staff to report suspicious persons or activities created a special relationship with Mendoza. They assert there is no evidence to suggest that the staff at Grant Elementary School had any reason to anticipate that the attack on Mendoza would occur.
Finally, defendants argue that imposing a duty on the part of schools to protect staff from random, violent attacks would place an unbearably heavy burden on financially-strapped schools to provide round-the-clock security, place impregnable barriers around the school, and search every parent and sibling who enters school grounds to pick up a child.
2. Supplemental Briefing
Because the parties did not address the liability of a public entity for the criminal acts of third parties, as set forth in Zelig, supra,27 Cal.4th 1112 and the relevant provisions of the Government Code, we asked the parties to submit supplemental briefing addressing the application of those authorities.
In his supplemental briefing, Mendoza argues that defendant Grant Elementary School had vicarious liability under Zelig and section 815 for the misconduct of its employee, James Landa, because Landa saw the attackers before they assaulted Mendoza but failed to inquire as to their purpose for being on campus. Mendoza asserts that “an ‘inquiry’ by Landa would have been a substantial factor in preventing the assault on Mendoza on campus.”
Mendoza also argues that Grant Elementary School has direct liability due to a dangerous condition of property, consisting of defendant’s failure to create a physical waiting area for persons waiting to pick up their children and failure to have a staff person in place to monitor the pick up area and to make sure that individuals were present for a legitimate purpose. Further, Mendoza asserts that there was a causal connection between his injuries and the dangerous condition of the school premises, because a warning system and a simple screening procedure to identify persons without a legitimate reason for being on campus would have prevented a criminal attack.
In their supplemental briefing, defendants contend that Mendoza cannot establish they are vicariously liable under Zelig because there are no facts to show that Mendoza had a special relationship with Landa, Principal Hubbs, or anyone else, since there is no evidence that anyone undertook to protect Mendoza or that he relied to his detriment on such a promise.
Defendants further contend that Mendoza cannot establish they are directly liable under Zelig because he failed to present any evidence to suggest that the risk of harm from third parties was increased or intensified by the physical condition of the Grant Elementary School premises. They maintain that the attackers could have assaulted Mendoza off school grounds.
3. Summary Judgment Was Properly Granted
Under Zelig, supra, 27 Cal.4th 1112 and the relevant provisions of the Government Code, we must first determine whether defendants have shown as a matter of law that they have no direct liability for the third party criminal attack on Mendoza.
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment was based upon the decisions in Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center, supra, 6 Cal.4th 666 and its progeny regarding the liability of private landowners for foreseeable third party criminal acts. Nevertheless, based on the parties’ supplemental briefing we may determine whether summary judgment was properly granted under the rules for public entity liability set forth in Zelig, supra, 27 Cal.4th 1112.
As we have discussed, the California Supreme Court in Zelig established that public entities are not directly liable for injuries caused solely by the criminal acts of third parties. (Zelig, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1137.) Because public entities are directly liable in their capacity as property owners only if the plaintiff’s injury was caused by a dangerous condition of property, pursuant to section 835, the plaintiff must show that a physical feature of the public property increased or intensified the danger to users from third party conduct. (Bonanno v. Central Contra Costa Transit Authority, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 155.)
In his supplemental briefing Mendoza does not describe any physical condition or defect in the Grant Elementary School property that increased or intensified the danger to after-school staff from third party criminal conduct, or suggest that further discovery would enable him to obtain such evidence. Moreover, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the attack on Mendoza was facilitated by a defect in the school property. It is undisputed that the attackers simply walked onto the school grounds and attacked Mendoza as he was leaving. Accordingly, Mendoza has not and cannot establish that defendants Grant Elementary School and School District are directly liable for the injuries caused by the criminal acts of his third party assailants.
We also find that Mendoza cannot establish that defendants are vicariously liable for the allegedly negligent acts of school employees Landa and Hubbs. We reiterate the general rule that there is no duty to control the conduct of a third person or to warn those endangered by the third person’s conduct in the absence of a special relationship. (Zelig, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1129.) Mindful of this rule, Mendoza focuses on the second type of special relationship articulated in Zelig, supra, 27 Cal.4th at page 1129, which gives one person a right to protection from the other.
Mendoza argues that this type of special relationship existed between him and defendants School District and Grant Elementary School, based on the evidence showing that Principal Hubbs instructed school staff, including Landa, “to advise persons who do not belong on the school campus to leave the premises and/or if these unauthorized individuals resisted, to call the authorities in the office to report and remove them from the premises.” Additionally, Mendoza asserts that “Hubbs further instructed them to warn other staff and to be mindful of unauthorized people on the campus and suspicious activities.” According to Mendoza, he “reasonably relied on [Grant Elementary School] employees to execute [Principal Hubbs’s] security program.”
We are not convinced by Mendoza’s argument that Principal Hubbs’s “security program” created a special relationship between defendants and Mendoza that gave him a right to protection. There is no evidence that would establish any of “the requisite factors to a finding of special relationship,” such as his detrimental reliance upon the conduct of Principal Hubbs or statements by her that induced a false sense of security and thereby worsened his position. (Zelig, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1130.) There is nothing in the record to indicate, for example, that at the time of the attack Mendoza was relying upon Principal Hubbs’s “security program” to protect him when he was the last person to leave the school grounds.
Similarly, Mendoza cannot establish that defendants are vicariously liable for the conduct of Landa. In his supplemental briefing, Mendoza argues only that Landa was negligent in failing, after he observed the attackers on school grounds before the attack on Mendoza, to inquire about their purpose for being on school grounds. Mendoza also contends that Landa negligently failed to warn him of the attackers’ presence prior to the attack. However, we emphasize again that in the absence of a special relationship there is no duty to control the conduct of others or to warn persons endangered by third party conduct. (Zelig, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1129.) Here, Mendoza offers no evidence that would support a finding that he had a special relationship with Landa that would obligate Landa to protect him. Absent the requisite special relationship, vicarious liability cannot be imposed on defendants for Landa’s alleged negligence, nor can Landa be held liable in his individual capacity.
For these reasons, defendants met their burden on summary judgment to establish that Mendoza’s causes of action for negligence and premises liability lack merit as a matter of law, and we conclude that the trial court did not err in granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are awarded their costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR: MIHARA, J., MCADAMS, J.