Opinion
EP-05-CA-0171-FM, EP-03-CR-2217-FM.
September 23, 2005
MEMORANDUM ORDER AND OPINION
Before the Court is Petitioner Lisa Mendez' ("Mendez") Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 ("Motion to Vacate") [Docket no. 63], filed on May 6, 2005. Therein, she raises two issues. First, she contends that the Bureau of Prisons' ("BOP") cancellation of its Boot Camp program violated her right to due process and invalidated the sentence imposed by this Court (Claims One and Three). Second, Mendez asserts that the Court imposed her sentence in a manner that violated the Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Booker, ___ U.S. ___ 125 S. Ct. 738 (Jan. 12, 2005) (" Booker") (Claim Two).
In an order entered on May 27, 2005, for the reasons stated therein and herein incorporated by reference, the Court summarily dismissed Claim Two with prejudice but directed the Government to answer the issue raised in Claims One and Three. The Government filed a Response to Mendez' Motion to Vacate ("Response") [Docket no. 67] on July 29, 2005. To date, Mendez has not filed a Reply.
After carefully considering the parties' pleadings, the record, and its own independent recollection of the proceedings in cause no. EP-03-CR-2217-FM, the Court concludes that to the extent Mendez' remaining issue is arguably cognizable in a § 2255 motion, it fails on the merits and should be dismissed with prejudice. However, the Court agrees with Respondent that inasmuch as Mendez is challenging the administration of her sentence, her remaining issue is not cognizable in an action pursuant to § 2255, but should rather be raised in a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Insofar as Mendez is raising her claims pursuant to § 2255, the Court will dismiss them with prejudice, but its order should not be interpreted to preclude Mendez from challenging the cancellation of the Boot Camp program in a § 2241 petition filed in the appropriate District and Division ( i.e., the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division).
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 3, 2003, the Grand Jury sitting in El Paso, Texas, returned a two-count Indictment against Mendez and a co-defendant, charging them with conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute 50 kilograms or more of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(C) (Count One); and possession of this same quantity of marijuana with the intent to distribute it, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(C) (Count Two).
Mendez chose to forego trial and instead pleaded guilty to the Indictment on July 7, 2004. The Court deferred Mendez' sentencing to allow for the preparation of a Presentence Report ("PSR"). The Court entered its judgment on October 7, 2004, sentencing Mendez to a 27-month term of imprisonment and a 3-year term of supervised release for each count, to run concurrently. The Court additionally ordered Mendez to pay a total special assessment of $200. Mendez did not appeal.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
The Court now considers whether it has jurisdiction to reach the merits of Mendez' claim that the Bureau of Prisons violated her right to due process and invalidated her sentence when it canceled its Boot Camp program. On one hand, section 2255 provides the primary means of collateral attack on a federal sentence, Tolliver v. Dobre, 211 F.3d 876, 877 (5th Cir. 2000), and represents the appropriate remedy for errors alleged to have occurred at or before sentencing. Cox v. Warden, Fed'l Detention Ctr., 911 F.2d 1111, 1113 (5th Cir. 1990). Errors of law or fact do not provide a basis for a collateral challenge under § 2255 unless the alleged error constituted a fundamental defect which inherently resulted in a complete miscarriage of justice. See United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 185 (1979). Such motions must be filed with the sentencing court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 ¶ 1 (stating that a prisoner "may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence.").
After a defendant has been convicted and exhausted or waived any right to appeal, a court is normally "entitled to presume that [he] stands fairly and finally convicted." Accordingly, "relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2255 is reserved for transgressions of constitutional rights and for a narrow range of injuries that could not have been raised on direct appeal and would, if condoned, result in a complete miscarriage of justice." United States v. Gaudet, 81 F.3d 585, 589 (5th Cir. 1996) (internal quotations and citations omitted). A criminal defendant seeking relief from his conviction or sentence in a Motion to Vacate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 must therefore establish one of the following: (1) his sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States; (2) the sentencing court lacked jurisdiction to impose the sentence; (3) the sentence imposed exceeded the maximum authorized by law; or (4) the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack. See United States v. Seyfert, 67 F.3d 544, 546 (5th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).
Title 28 U.S.C. § 2241, in contrast, constitutes the proper procedural vehicle for attacking the manner in which a sentence is administered. See Jeffers v. Chandler, 253 F.3d 827, 830 (5th Cir. 2001) (stating that 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is ordinarily used to challenge the method in which a sentence is being executed). A § 2241 petition on behalf of a sentenced prisoner must be filed in the same district where the prisoner is incarcerated. See Lee v. Wetzel, 244 F3d. 370, 372 (5th Cir. 2001) ("[T]he district of incarceration is the only district that has jurisdiction to entertain a defendant's § 2241 petition."). With these principles in mind, the Court turns to Mendez' claims.
III. DISCUSSION
The Court understands Mendez to argue that § 2255 is the appropriate vehicle with which to bring her claims relating to the BOP's cancellation of its shock-incarceration programs because, in arriving at her sentence, this Court fundamentally relied on a materially false assumption. That is, it mistakenly assumed that the Boot Camp program would remain available and specifically crafted her sentence so that she could participate in such a program. Mendez implicitly contends that the misinformation on which the Court purportedly relied is of constitutional magnitude.
Based on the record of the sentencing hearing and its own independent recollection of the proceedings, however, the Court finds that Mendez' argument fails on the most basic level. In arriving at her sentence, this Court did not fundamentally rely on the continuing availability of the Boot Camp program. Rather, at sentencing, Mendez' counsel asked the Court to recommend that she be allowed to apply for the Boot Camp program at her designated institution. The Court merely acceded to the request and stated "I will recommend to the Bureau of Prisons that you [Mendez] take part in the intensive confinement program, should you qualify for it." The Court finds that it would have assessed the same term of imprisonment even if it had known then that the BOP would subsequently terminate its shock-incarceration programs. Therefore, to the extent Mendez brings her Boot Camp claims pursuant to § 2255, the Court concludes that it should dismiss them with prejudice.
To the extent that Mendez complains of the way in which the BOP is administering her sentence, under the applicable legal standard it is clear that such claims are not cognizable in a § 2255 motion. Rather, they must be raised in a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, filed in the same District and Division where the prisoner is confined. Here, the record shows that Mendez is currently incarcerated in the Federal Prison Camp located in the City of Bryan, Brazos County, Texas. Brazos County, Texas is not located within the jurisdictional boundaries of the Western District of Texas. See 28 U.S.C. § 124(d). Rather, Brazos County falls within the jurisdiction of the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division. See 28 U.S.C. § 124(b)(2). Because Mendez is not incarcerated in the Western District of Texas, this Court has no jurisdiction to address her claims that are appropriately raised in a § 2241 petition or even to transfer this matter to the appropriate district. See Lee, 244 F.3d at 373-74. Thus, insofar as Mendez is challenging the administration of her sentence, the Court concludes that it should dismiss them without prejudice.
IV. CONCLUSION ORDER
For the reasons discussed above, the Court concludes that Petitioner Lisa Mendez is not entitled to relief regarding any of her claims to the extent they are properly raised in a Motion to Vacate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and they are accordingly dismissed with prejudice. To the extent that Claims One and Three are properly raised in a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, however, they are dismissed without prejudice so that Mendez may pursue relief in the appropriate District and Division. Accordingly, the Court enters the following orders:
1. Petitioner Lisa Mendez' Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 [Docket no. 63], filed on May 6, 2005, is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE except as specifically noted in this Memorandum Opinion and Order.
2. All pending motions in this cause, if any, are DENIED AS MOOT.
SO ORDERED.