Summary
finding a preliminary injunction should have been granted in the plaintiff's action claiming, inter alia, breach of contract, finding "a factual dispute as to whether the [college] conformed to the disciplinary guidelines as set forth in the student handbook" and that the plaintiff had "shown that without an injunction to preserve the status quo a suspension for two semesters will cause her irreparable injury for which monetary compensation is not adequate"
Summary of this case from Doe v. Rensselaer Polytechinic Inst.Opinion
July 6, 1993
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Levitt, J.).
Ordered that the order is modified, as a matter of discretion, by deleting the provision thereof which denied the appellant's motion for a preliminary injunction, and substituting therefore a provision granting the appellant's motion for a preliminary injunction pending the outcome of the proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (see, CPLR 7805); as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs to the appellant, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Nassau County, to fix the amount of the bond to be provided by the appellant as security for costs.
The appellant, a student at the respondent college, was accused of academic dishonesty in regard to an organic chemistry examination. A disciplinary hearing was held by the respondent's Subcouncil of the Standing of Students which resulted in a determination which gave the appellant a failing grade in organic chemistry and suspended her for two semesters of undergraduate classes. The appellant commenced an action, alleging, inter alia, breach of contract due to the respondent's failure to conform to the disciplinary guidelines set forth in the student handbook. The appellant also sought a preliminary injunction enjoining the respondent from enforcing the suspension pending the outcome of the matter. The respondent cross-moved for conversion of the action into a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 and for a change of the venue of the action to Schenectady County. In its decision, the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Levitt, J.), inter alia, granted the respondent's cross motion to convert the action to a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, transferred the venue of the matter to Schenectady County, and denied the appellant's motion for a preliminary injunction.
"CPLR article 78 relief is available to review the actions of [the respondent] university and to make inquiry to determine whether it abided by its own rules * * * and 'whether [it] has acted in good faith or its action was arbitrary or irrational'" (Grogan v. Saint Bonaventure Univ., 91 A.D.2d 855, citing Tedeschi v. Wagner Coll., 49 N.Y.2d 652, 658). Actions seeking annulment of an educational institution's disciplinary committee's determination are brought pursuant to CPLR article 78 (see, Silverman v. New York Univ. School of Law, 193 A.D.2d 410; Weidemann v. State Univ., 188 A.D.2d 974; Matter of Kalinsky v State Univ., 188 A.D.2d 810; Matter of Harris v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 62 N.Y.2d 956). Accordingly, we find that the Supreme Court properly converted the appellant's action to a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78. Moreover, the venue of the matter was properly transferred to Schenectady County (see, CPLR 7804 [b]; 506 [b]).
We agree with the appellant that the Supreme Court improperly denied her motion for a preliminary injunction. On a motion for a preliminary injunction, the movant must prove three things: (1) the likelihood of his ultimate success on the merits, (2) irreparable injury to the movant absent granting of a preliminary injunction, and (3) a balancing of the equities (see, Jurlique, Inc. v. Austral Biolab Pty., 187 A.D.2d 637; Merrill Lynch Realty Assocs. v. Burr, 140 A.D.2d 589, 592; Burmax Co. v. B S Indus., 135 A.D.2d 599, 600; Albini v. Solork Assocs., 37 A.D.2d 835). The respondent contends that the appellant has not established any of the aforementioned elements. We disagree.
To establish a likelihood of success on the merits, the movant must show its right to a preliminary injunction is plain on the facts of the case (see, Merrill Lynch Realty Assocs. v. Burr, supra, at 592-593). However, the existence of a factual dispute will not bar the imposition of a preliminary injunction if it is necessary to preserve the status quo and the party to be enjoined will suffer no great hardship as a result of its issuance (see, Mr. Natural, Inc. v. Unadulterated Food Prods., 152 A.D.2d 729, 730; US Ice Cream Corp. v. Carvel Corp., 136 A.D.2d 626, 628; Burmax Co. v. B S Indus., supra, at 600). Clearly, there is a factual dispute as to whether the respondent conformed to the disciplinary guidelines as set forth in the student handbook. Further, the appellant has adduced adequate evidence of irreparable injury and a balancing of the equities in her favor. The appellant has shown that without an injunction to preserve the status quo a suspension for two semesters will cause her irreparable injury for which monetary compensation is not adequate. Further, the respondent has not shown that it will suffer any harm as a result of the appellant continuing her studies during the pendency of this matter. Accordingly, under the circumstances herein, a preliminary injunction should have been granted (see, CPLR 7805).
We have considered the appellant's remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Bracken, J.P., Balletta, Lawrence and Copertino, JJ., concur.