Opinion
ACTION NO. 4:22-CV-823-Y
2023-02-07
Linzee MELTON v. BELL TEXTRON, INC., et al.
Jason C.N. Smith, Law Offices of Jason Smith, Fort Worth, TX, for Linzee Melton. Jay K. Rutherford, Jackson Walker LLP, Fort Worth, TX, Sara Harris, Jackson Walker LLP, Dallas, TX, for Bell Textron, Inc., et al.
Jason C.N. Smith, Law Offices of Jason Smith, Fort Worth, TX, for Linzee Melton. Jay K. Rutherford, Jackson Walker LLP, Fort Worth, TX, Sara Harris, Jackson Walker LLP, Dallas, TX, for Bell Textron, Inc., et al.
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO REMAND
TERRY R. MEANS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Pending before the Court is the Motion to Remand (doc. 5) filed by plaintiff Linzee Melton. After review of the motion, the related briefs, and the applicable law, the Court concludes that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Melton's claims, and thus the motion to remand is GRANTED.
I. Factual Background
Melton's original petition alleges that she commenced employment with defendant Bell Textron, Inc. ("Bell") on March 15, 2020, as a "Composite Bonder." (Orig. Pet. (doc. 1-5) 6.) She alleges that she was pregnant at the time she was hired and informed her manager of that fact during her interview. Her manager indicated that her pregnancy would not be a problem.
Melton alleges she took maternity leave from April 15 through June 1, 2020. She returned to work on June 1. On June 12, however, she was terminated, allegedly because Bell "could not judge her performance during the 90[-]day probationary period because she had taken pregnancy leave." (Id.)
As a result, Melton filed her original complaint in the 352nd Judicial District Court, Tarrant County, Texas, alleging that she was terminated and discriminated against on the basis of her sex in violation of section 21.051 of the Texas Labor Code. Alternatively, Melton seeks declaratory relief under section 21.125 of the Texas Labor Code that her sex was a motivating factor in her termination. Bell removed Melton's claims to this Court, contending that the exercise of federal-question subject-matter jurisdiction is proper because Melton's claims are preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). Melton now seeks remand.
II. Applicable Law
A. Removal and the Well-Pleaded Complaint
A party may remove to federal court any civil action brought in state court over which the federal court has original jurisdiction, "[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress." 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The statute allows a defendant to "remove a state court action to federal court only if the action could have originally been filed in federal court." Anderson v. Am. Airlines, 2 F.3d 590, 593 (5th Cir. 1993). The party seeking to invoke federal removal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing the existence of federal jurisdiction. See Willy v. Coastal Corp., 855 F.2d 1160, 1164 (5th Cir. 1988). Because removal "raises significant federalism concerns," however, removal jurisdiction must be strictly construed. Id.
"The well-pleaded complaint rule governs whether a defendant can remove a case based on the existence of a federal question." Terrebonne Homecare, Inc. v. SMA Health Plan, Inc., 271 F.3d 186, 188 (5th Cir. 2001). "Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, 'federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint.' " Id. (quoting Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987)). In general, removal jurisdiction is not satisfied by raising a federal defense. Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393, 107 S.Ct. 2425.
"The artful pleading doctrine is a narrow exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule, and it prevents a plaintiff from defeating removal by failing to plead necessary federal questions." Terrebonne, 271 F.3d at 188. The artful-pleading doctrine only applies, however, when federal law completely preempts the field. Id. B. LMRA Section 301 Preemption
Although a federal court's jurisdiction normally is determined by the well-pleaded-complaint rule, when "an area of state law has been completely pre-empted, any claim purportedly based on that preempted state law is considered, from its inception, a federal claim, and therefore arises under federal law." Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393, 107 S.Ct. 2425. Section 301 of the LMRA provides for federal jurisdiction over claims asserting violations of a collective-bargaining agreement ("CBA"):
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce . . . may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties."29 U.S.C. § 185(a). Section 301 "[p]reemption occurs when a decision on the state claim is inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor contract or when the application of state law to a dispute requires interpretation of the CBA." Lingle v. Norge Div., Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 406-07, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988); see also Caterpillar, 482 U.S. 386, 394, 107 S.Ct. 2425 (the LMRA completely preempts "claims founded directly on rights created by collective-bargaining agreements, and also claims 'substantially dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining agreement' ") (quoting Elec. Workers v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851, 859, n.3, 107 S.Ct. 2161, 95 L.Ed.2d 791 (1987)).
Conversely, however, "when the meaning of contract terms is not in dispute, the bare fact that a collective-bargaining agreement will be consulted in the course of state-law litigation plainly does not require the claim to be extinguished." Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 124, 114 S.Ct. 2068, 129 L.Ed.2d 93 (1994). Congress did not intend that section 301 preempt "state rules that proscribe conduct, or establish rights and obligations, independent of a labor contract." Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 219, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985). Rather, preemption under section 301 occurs only when a dispute's resolution is " 'substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms' of the [CBA]." Wells v. Gen. Motors Corp., 881 F.2d 166, 173 (5th Cir. 1989) (quoting Lueck, 471 U.S. at 220, 105 S.Ct. 1904). "A substantially dependent claim under the LMRA is one that 'require[s] the interpretation of some specific provision of' a collective bargaining agreement, . . . including any documents incorporated by reference." Boldt v. N. States Power Co., 904 F.3d 586, 593 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Meyer v. Schnucks Mkts., Inc., 163 F.3d 1048, 1051 (8th Cir. 1998)). "A plaintiff's state[-]law claims will not be preempted, even when they are 'intertwined' with a CBA, so long as they are not 'inextricably intertwined' with it." Jones v. Roadway Exp., Inc., 931 F.2d 1086, 1089 (5th Cir. 1991). "Indeed, either party may use the CBA to support the credibility of its claims." Id. Thus, although an employer "may defend against [a plaintiff's] claim by arguing that its actions were justified by the CBA and its rules . . . , such reliance does not necessarily transform [the] claim into a claim that requires an interpretation of the CBA." Anderson, 2 F.3d at 596-97.
III. Analysis
The starting point in determining whether Melton's claim is preempted is to look at the elements of the claim itself. See Dancy v. Fina Oil & Chem. Co., 921 F. Supp. 1532, 1535 (E.D. Tex. 1996) (citing Lingle, 486 U.S. at 406-07, 108 S.Ct. 1877). "If the elements of the claim require an interpretation of the CBA, the claim is inextricably intertwined and the case is removable." Id.
Melton has asserted a claim of sex discrimination under section Texas Labor Code section 21.051. Under that section, "[a]n employer commits an unlawful employment practice if because of . . . sex . . . the employer . . . discharges an individual." TEX. LABOR CODE ANN. § 21.051(1) (West 2015). "Discrimination on the basis of sex includes pregnancy." Jespersen v. Sweetwater Ranch Apartments, 390 S.W.3d 644, 653 (Tex. App.--Dallas 2012, no pet.) (citing id. § 21.106(a)).
"In the absence of direct evidence of discrimination, the employee must make out a prima face case of discrimination under the McDonnell-Douglas burden shifting analysis." Id. at 654. "To establish a prima-facie case of discrimination, the employee must show she (1) is a member of a protected class; (2) was qualified for her position; (3) suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) was replaced by someone outside of her protected class or others similarly situated were treated more favorably." Id. Once an employee establishes his case, prima facie, "the burden of production shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action." Id. If the employer presents such a reason, the burden of persuasion then lies with the employee to demonstrate that "the stated reason was a pretext for discrimination." Id.
On its face, Melton's sex-discrimination claim does not appear to be preempted by section 301 of the LMRA. Her claim is not founded upon a right created in the CBA, nor does her claim appear to be substantially dependent on analysis of any CBA provision. See Robinson v. Rainbow Beach QOC, LLC, 2022 WL 1803376, *4 (N.D. Ill. June 2, 2022) ("Numerous courts in other districts around the country have concluded that [discrimination] claims under various state [laws] are not preempted by Section 301"; citing cases); Knox v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 899 F. Supp. 1529, 1534-35 (N.D. W. Va. 1995) (concluding that terms of the applicable CBA were irrelevant to employee's sex-discrimination claim, as "the elements of [the state-law] discrimination claim . . . pertain to the conduct and motivation of the employer under statutory standards, rather than the standards of the CBA").
Bell cites to several provisions of its CBA with Melton's union, however, that it contends are inextricably intertwined with Melton's claim. First, Bell notes that Melton, as a "Material Bonder B, is an employee under the CBA." (Bell's Resp. to Mot. to Remand (doc. 8) at 3.) Bell also points to the CBA's provision regarding probationary employees:
All new employees shall be regarded as probationary employees during the first ninety (90) calendar days of their employment by the Company. A probationary employee shall have no seniority rights and his retention as an employee is entirely within the discretion of the Company, . . . . The Union agrees that it shall not bear any responsibility for the probationary employees if they are laid off during their probationary period of ninety (90) days.
The probationary period shall be automatically extended for any vacation
shutdown or Christmas-New Year holiday period that occurs during an employee's probationary period, provided the employee does not work during these periods.(Id.) Bell also refers to a "Union Covered Job Performance Evaluation Policy" that provides as follows:
The probationary period will be extended for any vacation shutdown or Christmas-New Year holiday period that occurs during an employee's probationary period provided the employee does not work during these periods. The probationary period is not automatically extended for any leave period. Bargained employees automatically gain standing as a seniority employee upon the completion of this probationary period. Consequently, the Labor Relations office must be advised prior to the completion of the probationary period of the supervisor's intent to retain or dismiss the probationary employee.(Id. at 4.) Finally, Bell points to the CBA's leave policy, which provides as follows:
. . . .
The supervisor has the right to expect employees on trial or probation to demonstrate reasonable levels of performance.
C. Family Leave--Family leave(s) of absence without pay for the birth or to adopt a child . . . may be granted by the Director of Employee Relations to an employee for up to twelve (12) weeks in any twelve (12)[-] month period if they have more than one year of seniority and worked at least 1250 hours the preceding twelve (12) months. Such leave must be applied for in advance when feasible, and documentation satisfactory to the Company detailing the necessity for the leave is required . . . .(Id. at 5-6.)
Bell contends that "Melton's claims cannot be litigated without substantive interpretation of the CBA given her allegations regarding her probationary status, her use of leave, and her discharge during her probationary period." (Id. at 9.) But the only thing Bell cites in support of that particular statement in its brief is Melton's petition; it does not point to a particular provision of the CBA that must be interpreted to resolve Melton's claim. Later in its brief, Bell posits that "Melton's pregnancy[-]discrimination claim plainly requires more than mere reference to the CBA--it turns on questions involving (1) probationary status, (2) eligibility under the CBA for the 'approved' 'maternity leave' Melton alleges she took . . . , (3) whether, given the CBA and Union Covered Job Performance Evaluation Policy provisions governing probationary employees, Melton's 90-day probationary period could have been extended due to her leave; and (4) the rights and obligations of Bell, Melton, and the Union with respect to the discharge of employees, including probationary employees." (Id. at 11-12.) But again Bell fails to specifically demonstrate that analysis of Melton's state-law claim will require interpretation of any of these provisions of the CBA between Bell and the union.
Bell suggests that Melton's proof as to the second prima-facie element of her discrimination claim--her qualifications--will "require interpretation of the Material Bonder B job classification and job duties." (Bell's Resp. (doc. 8) at 12). Bell wholly fails, however, to specifically point to any provision in the CBA that sets out those classifications and duties, much less show that the Court will have to interpret them--as opposed to merely refer to them--in assessing Melton's claim. Bell also posits that Melton's proof that she is qualified will require interpretation of "the rights, obligations and standards set out in the Union Covered Job Performance Evaluation Policy." (Id.) Initially, the Court notes that Bell has wholly failed to demonstrate that this policy is part of any agreement between it and the union or was incorporated by reference into the CBA. Cf. Boldt, 904 F.3d at 591-92 ("To evaluate whether complete preemption exists, we start with whether the collective-bargaining agreement incorporates NSP's fitness-for-duty policy.") Secondly, Bell's brief again fails to specifically point to any specific provision of that policy that must be interpreted to assess Melton's sex-discrimination claim.
Johns Sams, Bell's assistant secretary, merely avers that "[A]s a probationary employee and Local 218 member, Ms. Melton was also subject to the Union Covered Job Performance Evaluation Policy." (Notice of Removal (doc. 1-12), Sams Aff. at 2, ¶ 4.)
Bell cites Reece v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 79 F.3d 485 (5th Cir. 1996), suggesting that its legitimate non-discriminatory reason for Melton's discharge will require interpretation of the CBA and that, as a result, preemption applies. (Bell's Resp. (doc. 8) at 7.) Bell notes that " 'under Reece, if Plaintiff's claims or the defenses to be raised would necessitate interpretation under the CBA, the Court must retain jurisdiction notwithstanding the fact that the Complaint itself does not reference the CBA.' " (Bell's Resp. (doc. 8) 7 (quoting Moreno v. STP Nuclear Operating Co., 172 F. Supp. 2d 857, 859, 860 (S.D. Tex. 2001)).) Even assuming the correctness of Bell's contention that its defense can provide a basis for preemption and thus removal, Bell notably fails to mention a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason provided by the CBA that justifies Melton's termination. Nor is it apparent looking at the CBA provisions Bell cites that any legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason it may have for refusing to accommodate Melton's pregnancy and extend her probationary status accordingly will emanate from, or require interpretation of, the CBA. Thus, even assuming that Bell's defenses can be considered in determining preemption and the propriety of removal, it is impossible for the Court to discern here that such defenses will require interpretation of the portions of the CBA to which Bell points.
There appears to be a circuit conflict on this issue. See Vines v. Sloss Indus. Corp., 1996 WL 806682, *5 n.2 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 25, 1996) (noting "that the Fifth Circuit has taken the view that a plaintiff's claim is preempted whenever the employer invokes the CBA as its legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating the employee, [but that b]y contrast, the Eighth and Tenth Circuits have rejected this 'defense preemption' ") (citing Reece, 79 F. 3d at 487; Humphrey v. Sequentia, Inc., 58 F.3d 1238, 1244 (8th Cir. 1995); Jarvis v. Nobel/Sysco Food Servs. Co., 985 F.2d 1419, 1427 (10th Cir. 1993)). The Court notes, however, that Reece's claims "turn[ed] on questions of promotion, seniority, and assignment to training programs, all of which [were] provided for in the CBA." Reece, 79 F. 3d at 487. Here, Melton's claim turns on whether her pregnancy was a factor in Bell's refusal to extend her probationary period and terminate her employment, and not on any rights granted or governed by the CBA.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that Bell has failed to carry its burden of proving that analysis of Melton's claim will require interpretation of the CBA between Bell and its union. Consequently, Melton's sex-discrimination claim under the Texas Labor Code is not preempted by the section 301 of the LMRA, and the Court lacks jurisdiction over that claim and must remand the action to the state court from which it was removed.
The Court further concludes, however, that Melton's request for attorney's fees under the removal statute should be DENIED. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). The Court finds that Bell had an objectively reasonable, albeit ultimately unavailing, basis for removal.