Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for extraordinary writ review Super. Ct. No. 95150-3. Jamileh Schwartzbart, Judge.
Melissa G., in pro per., for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Dennis A. Marshall, County Counsel and William G. Smith, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.
Before Vartabedian, Acting P.J., Harris, J., and Levy, J.
OPINION
Petitioner in propria persona seeks an extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452) to vacate the orders of the juvenile court issued at a contested dispositional hearing denying her reunification services and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing as to her daughter T. We will deny the petition.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
In July 2007, newborn T. was detained at the hospital by the department of social services (department) after she and petitioner tested positive for marijuana and methamphetamine. Petitioner, who has a long history of drug use, admitted using both drugs throughout her pregnancy with T. She identified Jaime G., then an inmate in state prison, as T.’s alleged father.
As it turned out, T.’s detention was not the first time the department had to intervene on behalf of petitioner’s children. Eight years previously, in July 1999, petitioner’s then three-year-old son L. and his half-brother, two-month-old N., were removed from the custody of petitioner and N.’s father, Jaime G., after doctors, while evaluating N. for a urinary tract infection, discovered he had four fractured ribs as well as bruising on his back and a cut lip. The juvenile court sustained allegations Jaime physically abused N. and that petitioner failed to protect him and exercised dependency jurisdiction over both children.
In July 2000, the juvenile court denied reunification services to petitioner, Jaime G., and L.’s father, whose whereabouts were unknown, and set a section 366.26 hearing (setting hearing) to implement a permanent plan. However, three months later, the court vacated the setting hearing and, at a subsequent hearing, ordered the case assessed for reunification because petitioner had regularly visited the children and completed services, including intensive outpatient drug treatment.
The juvenile court ordered a plan of reunification for petitioner but she continued to use methamphetamine. Consequently, in June 2002, the court terminated her services and terminated her parental rights as to L. and ordered N. into long-term foster care with a relative.
In light of petitioner’s ongoing drug use, the department filed a dependency petition on T.’s behalf, alleging petitioner’s drug use caused her failure to reunify with L. and N. and to expose T. to drugs in utero. (§ 300, subds. (b) & (j).) The juvenile court ordered T. detained pursuant to the petition and ordered the department to refer petitioner for parenting classes, a mental health evaluation, a substance abuse assessment, and random drug testing.
In August 2007, petitioner waived her right to a contested hearing on the allegations. Consequently, the court adjudged T. a dependent child and set the matter for disposition later in the month.
By the time set for disposition, petitioner was midway through a 90-day residential drug treatment program, which she was expected to complete by mid-October 2007. As part of the program, petitioner was participating in parenting classes, domestic violence counseling, and random drug testing. She tested negative for drugs and initially participated in her classes. However, in early August 2007, she was discharged from the program for fighting. She also completed a mental health assessment in late July 2007 as a result of which she was recommended for individual therapy after she attained 30 days of sobriety.
In its dispositional report, the department recommended the court deny petitioner reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) and (b)(11) because petitioner’s drug use in part contributed to her failure to reunify with L. and N. and to the severance of her parental rights as to L. and because she did not subsequently make reasonable efforts to resolve her drug problem. Further, the department concluded, it would not be in T.’s best interest to provide petitioner reunification services because of petitioner’s poor prognosis for successful reunification and the lack of parent/child bond. The department reported that T. appeared to be bonding with her care providers but that the care providers were not willing to provide her a permanent home. Instead, the department was assessing T.’s maternal grandmother for placement.
Section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) and (b)(11) provide, in pertinent part:
Petitioner challenged the department’s recommendation and the court conducted a contested dispositional hearing in November 2007. Petitioner’s position was that her participation in services and regular visitation both evidenced that she resolved the problems requiring L. and N.’s removal and that reunification efforts would serve T.’s best interest.
Petitioner testified she entered a six-month residential drug treatment program in mid-October 2007, which accommodates mothers with children. She expected to graduate in April 2008. She was also participating in a parenting class, which she expected to complete in November 2007, and in a 26-week domestic violence/anger management class of which she had completed 8 sessions. In addition, she began individual therapy two weeks prior to the hearing.
On cross-examination by county counsel, petitioner admitted that her mother tried to get her into drug treatment when she was pregnant with T. but that petitioner refused. She also admitted under questioning by minor’s counsel that she continued a relationship with Jaime G., albeit purely sexual, even after Jaime physically abused N.
Petitioner also called a cultural broker she worked with to testify. The cultural broker explained her role as one who mediates cultural issues on behalf of a client involved in dependency proceedings. The cultural broker also explained that while petitioner did not identify with her Mexican culture, she was raised on the streets without much parental supervision. Petitioner’s upbringing rather than her race associated her with a culture which presented unique needs. Based on her observations and interaction with petitioner, the cultural broker considered petitioner to be a loving and nurturing parent. She had also observed T.’s excitement in seeing petitioner. She also believed petitioner stood a chance of successfully reunifying with T. because she was participating in residential drug treatment, which afforded her more support than was available through outpatient drug treatment.
Following testimony and argument, the court found by clear and convincing evidence a factual basis for denying petitioner services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) and (b)(11). The court also found petitioner failed to meet her burden of showing that services would nevertheless be in T.’s best interest. The court based its decision on petitioner’s longstanding and severe substance abuse problem, the fact that she was only in the initial stages of recovery and the absence of a strong parent/child bond. The court denied petitioner reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing. This petition ensued.
DISCUSSION
Apparently missing the import of the juvenile court’s denial order, petitioner argues she was not given enough time to reunify. Such an argument would be germane in a case where the court ordered reunification services at the dispositional hearing but subsequently terminated them rather than in a case, such as this one, where the court did not order reunification services. Nevertheless, petitioner invites our attention to the progress she made in the services ordered at the detention hearing. To that end, she included with her petition certificates of achievement and recognition and letters from the drug treatment program. Some of the certificates and letters are included in the appellate record, some are not. In addition, petitioner included two self-authored letters, one detailing her progress in recovery and the other describing the struggles of her upbringing and her poor judgment as a youth. The first letter is part of the appellate record. The second letter is not. In the second letter, petitioner also claims sobriety and her commitment to be a good mother to T.
Preliminarily, we will not review any of the evidence included with the petition that is not part of the appellate record. As a reviewing court, we review the correctness of the juvenile court’s judgment at the time of its rendition and upon the record that was before the juvenile court for consideration. (In re Zeth Z. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 405.) Additionally, it is not our role to reweigh the evidence that was before the juvenile court. (In re Walter E. (1992) 13 Cal.App.4th 125, 139-140.) Rather, we determine whether substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings and orders based on the evidence before it. (Ibid.) In this case, we conclude that it does.
The juvenile court properly found petitioner’s circumstances squared with the provisions of section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) and (b)(11). Petitioner failed to reunify with her sons, one of whom was placed for adoption and she continued to use methamphetamine. Further, where, as here, the court makes an affirmative finding under any of certain enumerations of subdivision (b), including (10) and (11), the juvenile court cannot order reunification services unless it finds by clear and convincing evidence that reunification is in the best interest of the child. (§ 361.5, subd. (c).) In this case, the evidence as cited by the court and set forth in the statement of the facts supports the court’s conclusion services would not serve T.’s best interest. Accordingly, we find no error and will deny the petition.
DISPOSITION
The petition for extraordinary writ is denied. This opinion is final forthwith as to this court.
“(b) Reunification services need not be provided to a parent … described in this subdivision when the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, [¶] … [¶] (10) [t]hat the court ordered termination of reunification services for any siblings … of the child because the parent … failed to reunify with the sibling … after the sibling … had been removed from that parent … and that parent … is the same parent … described in subdivision (a) and that, according to the findings of the court, this parent … has not subsequently made a reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to removal of the sibling … of that child from that parent .…” [¶] (11) [t]hat the parental rights of a parent over any sibling … of the child had been permanently severed, and this parent is the same parent described in subdivision (a), and that, according to the findings of the court, this parent has not subsequently made a reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to removal of the sibling … of that child from the parent.”