In order to provide relief on the ground of newly discovered evidence, the asserted facts must have been: (1) unknown by the trial court, by the party, or by counsel at the time of trial, and it must appear that the defendant or defense counsel could not have known them by the use of diligence; and (2) the newly discovered evidence must be of such a nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial. See Melendez v. State, 718 So. 2d 746, 747 (Fla. 1998); Blanco v. State, 702 So. 2d 1250, 1251 (Fla. 1997); Jones v. State, 591 So. 2d 911, 915 (Fla. 1991). In reviewing the trial court's application of the newly discovered evidence rule, this Court applies the following standard of review:
Steinhorst, 695 So.2d at 1248. Also applicable is our statement inMelendez v. State, 718 So.2d 746 (Fla. 1998): First, to qualify as newly discovered evidence, "the asserted facts must have been unknown by the trial court, by the party, or by counsel at the time of trial, and it must appear thatdefendant or his counsel could not have known them by the use of diligence."
When the trial court rules on a newly discovered evidence claim after an evidentiary hearing, we accept the trial court's findings on questions of fact, the credibility of witnesses, and the weight of the evidence if based upon competent, substantial evidence. Melendez v. State, 718 So.2d 746, 747-48 (Fla. 1998); Blanco v. State, 702 So.2d 1250, 1252 (Fla. 1997). As with rulings on other postconviction claims, we review de novo the trial court's application of the law to the facts.
Larzelere's claim is without merit because each of her arguments is either without merit or procedurally barred. See Melendez v. State, 718 So.2d 746, 749 (Fla. 1998) (holding that where claims were either meritless or procedurally barred, there was no cumulative effect to consider). This Court found on direct appeal that the trial judge "met the burden of assuring that appellant's [pretrial] waiver was made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently," and that he properly denied Larzelere's post-trial motions to discharge counsel because she failed to show how she would be prejudiced by counsel's continued dual representation of Larzelere and Jason.
Larzelere's claim is without merit because each of her arguments is either without merit or procedurally barred. See Melendez v. State, 718 So. 2d 746, 749 (Fla. 1998) (holding that where claims were either meritless or procedurally barred, there was no cumulative effect to consider). This Court found on direct appeal that the trial judge "met the burden of assuring that appellant's [pretrial] waiver was made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently," and that he properly denied Larzelere's post-trial motions to discharge counsel because she failed to show how she would be prejudiced by counsel's continued dual representation of Larzelere and Jason.
When the trial court rules on a newly discovered evidence claim after an evidentiary hearing, we review the trial court's findings on questions of fact, the credibility of witnesses, and the weight of the evidence for competent, substantial evidence. Melendez v. State, 718 So.2d 746, 747-48 (Fla. 1998); Blanco v. State, 702 So.2d 1250, 1251 (Fla. 1997). As with rulings on other postconviction claims, we review the trial court's application of the law to the facts de novo.
When the trial court rules on a newly discovered evidence claim after an evidentiary hearing, we review the trial court's findings on questions of fact, the credibility of witnesses, and the weight of the evidence for competent, substantial evidence. Melendez v. State, 718 So.2d 746, 747-48 (Fla. 1998); Blanco v. State, 702 So.2d 1250, 1251 (Fla. 1997). As with rulings on other postconviction claims, we review the trial court's application of the law to the facts de novo.
When the trial court rules on a newly discovered evidence claim after an evidentiary hearing, we review the trial court's findings on questions of fact, the credibility of witnesses, and the weight of the evidence for competent, substantial evidence. Melendez v. State, 718 So. 2d 746, 747-48 (Fla. 1998); Blanco v. State, 702 So. 2d 1250, 1251 (Fla. 1997). As with rulings on other postconviction claims, we review the trial court's application of the law to the facts de novo.
When the trial court rules on a newly discovered evidence claim after an evidentiary hearing, we review the trial court's findings on questions of fact, the credibility of witnesses, and the weight of the evidence for competent, substantial evidence. Melendez v. State, 718 So. 2d 746, 747-48 (Fla. 1998); Blanco v. State, 702 So. 2d 1250, 1251 (Fla. 1997). As with rulings on other postconviction claims, we review the trial court's application of the law to the facts de novo.
The trial court initially concluded that a jury would not have found these newly found witnesses credible since Melton himself testified that he was the shooter. Furthermore, the trial court, citing to Melendez v. State, 718 So.2d 746 (Fla. 1998), questioned the overall credibility of these witnesses and noted that their versions of events were not even consistent with one another. In Melendez, this Court supported a trial court's dismissal of a newly discovered evidence claim based on the new testimony of five individuals.