Mejia v. City of Dallas

Full title: JACINTO JESUS MEJIA, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF DALLAS, TERRELL BOLTON, MARK…

Court: United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division

Date published: Aug 11, 2004

Civil Action No. 3:03-CV-0352-K (N.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 2004)

Opinion

Civil Action No. 3:03-CV-0352-K.

August 11, 2004

ORDER

ED KINKEADE, District Judge

Before the Court are Defendants' Mark Delapaz ("Delapaz") and Eddie Herrera ("Herrera")'s Second 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, Motion for Rule 7(a) Reply, and Alternative 12(e) Motion for More Definite Statement, filed January 23, 2004. No responses to these motions were filed, but Delapaz and Herrera state in their certificate of conference that Plaintiff is opposed.

After consideration of the motions, pleadings and the applicable law, the Court denies in part, and grants in part Delapaz and Herrera's Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss. The Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently stated claims under section 1983, and for civil conspiracy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. Conversely, Plaintiff's pleading of his civil RICO and assault claims is insufficient and these claims shall be dismissed. Delapaz and Herrera's Motion for Rule 7(a) Reply is denied because they are not entitled to qualified immunity, and their Rule 12(e) Motion for More Definite Statement is also denied because they have failed to show that the information sought cannot be obtained by discovery.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff sued Defendants Delapaz and Herrera on February 18, 2003, alleging violations of his civil rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and bringing claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff also pleads claims against Delapaz and Herrera for civil conspiracy, assault, intentional infliction of emotional distress, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1962 ("civil RICO"). Plaintiff subsequently amended his pleadings, filing his First Amended Complaint ("Complaint") on January 13, 2004.

Plaintiff's lawsuit arises out of his arrest on May 22, 2001. According to the allegations in his Complaint, he was at Northern Carburetors, an auto repair shop, that morning. According to the Complaint, Delapaz and Herrera described the events leading to Plaintiff's arrest as follows:

Plaintiff met with an informant associated with the Dallas Police Department ("DPD") who had been engaged by Delapaz. Delapaz was working undercover in an effort to arrest both drug sellers and drug users. In the office of Northern Carburetors, Plaintiff gave the informant two large packages containing a white powdery substance. He also told the informant to "take these and bring me back the money for them, and I'll give you more." Plaintiff also told the informant he had more cocaine stored in a red pickup truck parked outside the building.

The Complaint further alleges that as he left the building, the informant saw a backpack in the pickup truck that contained several packages of cocaine. The informant then left and met Delapaz, delivering to him the two packages he had received from Plaintiff. The informant also told Delapaz about the other packages he had seen in the pickup truck. DPD officers were then summoned by Delapaz to go to Northern Carburetors and detain Plaintiff.

Delapaz and Herrera weighed the packages of cocaine that the informant had delivered to Delapaz. Herrera then field tested the contents of the two packages that the informant had received from Plaintiff, and reported that they were positive for cocaine. According to the Complaint, information regarding the alleged cocaine was related to a magistrate for the issuance of a search warrant for the search of Northern Carburetors and the red pickup truck. DPD officers Moses and Foster searched the pickup truck and found a duffel bag therein containing 14 packages of a white powdery substance. Moses tested the contents, which he said were positive for cocaine. Plaintiff contends that all of the above events as reported by Delapaz and Herrera are untrue.

Plaintiff was jailed that same day and two charges of unlawful possession of a controlled substance in an amount in excess of 400 grams were filed against him. He failed to post bond and thus remained jailed. On June 14, 2001, Plaintiff was indicted on two counts of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver. On October 9, 2001, Plaintiff's counsel was notified by the Dallas County District Attorney's office that the laboratory testing of the substance seized at Northern Carburetors revealed that the substance was not cocaine. The District Attorney's office then agreed to substantially reduce the amount of Plaintiff's bond. Plaintiff posted bond and was released from jail on October 10, 2001. Around that same time, the District Attorney's office sought two additional indictments against Plaintiff for unlawful possession of a controlled substance and unlawful delivery of a controlled substance. All of the charges against Plaintiff were dismissed by the District Attorney's office in January 2002.

Delapaz and Herrera filed their answer to Plaintiff's Complaint on January 22, 2004, and filed the instant motion to dismiss the next day. In their answer, Delapaz and Herrera also assert the defense of qualified immunity, which is central to their motion for Rule 7(a) Reply.

II. Pending Motions

Delapaz and Herrera contend that Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed for failure to state a claim as provided by Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Additionally, if Plaintiff's claims are not dismissed, Delapaz and Herrera ask the Court to order a Rule 7(a) reply because they believe that Plaintiff has not pleaded sufficient facts to overcome their affirmative defense of qualified immunity. Finally, Delapaz and Herrera move the Court to require Plaintiff to provide a more definite statement under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(e).

A. Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss

Upon consideration of a motion to dismiss, the Court must presume all well-pleaded facts in Plaintiff's complaint to be true, and resolve any ambiguities or doubts regarding the sufficiency of his claims in his favor. Kane Enterprises v. MacGregor (USA) Inc., 322 F.3d 371, 374 (5^th Cir. 2003); Campbell v. Wells Fargo Bank, 781 F.2d 440, 442 (5^th Cir. 1986). Further, the Court may not dismiss the complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). However, Plaintiff must plead specific facts, not mere conclusory allegations, to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim. Kane Enterprises, 322 F.3d at 374; Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5^th Cir. 2000). Dismissal is proper when "even the most sympathetic reading of [the] pleadings uncovers no theory and no facts that would subject the present defendants to liability." Jacquez v. Procunier, 801 F.2d 789, 791-92 (5^th Cir. 1986).

In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he was falsely arrested and jailed based upon the warrant obtained by Delapaz and Herrera. Plaintiff further pleads that Delapaz and Herrera knowingly provided false and misleading information to the magistrate judge who issued the warrant, and also conspired to enlist the aid of the confidential informant to provide false information about the presence of cocaine on his business premises. He further alleges that Delapaz and Herrera conspired to plant false evidence at his place of business, and knowingly misreported that the field test results of the material allegedly found at Plaintiff's business showed that material to be cocaine. The Court finds that when these allegations are taken as true, Plaintiff has sufficiently stated claims against Delapaz and Herrera for constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, civil conspiracy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. See Keko v. Hingle, 318 F.3d 639, 642 (5^th Cir. 2003) (malicious prosecution); Sanchez v. Swyden, 131 F.3d 1144, 1150 (5^th Cir. 1998) (illegal detention/false imprisonment) Simmons v. McElveen, 846 F.2d 337 (5^th Cir. 1988) (false imprisonment); Hand v. Gary, 838 F.2d 1420, 1424, 1427 (5^th Cir. 1988) (malicious prosecution and false arrest); Apani Southwest, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Enterprises, Inc., 300 F.3d 620, 635 (5^th Cir. 2002) (civil conspiracy); Hughes Training, Inc. v. Cook, 254 F.3d 588, 594 (5^th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1172 (2002) (intentional infliction of emotional distress). Therefore, as to these claims Delapaz and Herrera's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is denied.

The Court reaches a different conclusion with respect to Plaintiff's claims under 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (civil RICO) and for assault. Plaintiff has not sufficiently pleaded his civil RICO claim in that he has not identified the specific sub-sections of 18 U.S.C. § 1962 allegedly violated by Delapaz and Herrera, and also has not pleaded sufficient facts related to this claim. The Court also finds that Plaintiff has not pleaded sufficient facts to state a claim for common law assault. Accordingly, with respect to Plaintiff's civil RICO claims and his assault claim, Defendants Delapaz and Herrera's Rule 12(b)(6) motion is granted. These claims are dismissed without prejudice. If Plaintiff still wants to pursue these claims, he must obtain leave of court to amend his pleadings and re-plead them.

B. Motion for Rule 7(a) Reply

In addition to their Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, Delapaz and Herrera also move the Court to order Plaintiff to file a reply to their affirmative defense of qualified immunity, as contemplated by Fed.R.Civ.P. 7(a). Delapaz and Herrera contend that a Rule 7(a) reply is necessary because Plaintiff has not pleaded the facts related to his claims against them with sufficient particularity and specificity to overcome their claims of qualified immunity.

The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions from civil liability if their conduct violates no clearly established statutory or constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known. Evans v. Ball, 168 F.3d 856, 860 (5^th Cir. 1999); Sorenson v. Ferrie, 134 F.3d 325, 327 (5^th Cir. 1998). Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense not only to liability, it also provides government officials immunity from suit. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985); Matherne v. Wilson, 851 F.2d 752, 756 (5^th Cir. 1988). Whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity depends upon whether his or her actions were objectively reasonable in light of then clearly established law. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638-39 (1987); Bazan v. Hidalgo County, 246 F.3d 481, 488 (5^th Cir. 2001).

To evaluate a claim of qualified immunity, a court must first determine whether the plaintiff has alleged a violation of a clearly established constitutional right. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999); Bazan, 246 F.3d at 490; Kipps v. Caillier, 197 F.3d 765, 768 (5^th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 816 (2000). Next, the court must decide whether the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. Wilson, 526 U.S. at 609; Kipps, 197 F.3d at 768. For purposes of qualified immunity, a right is "clearly established" only when its contours are sufficiently clear that a reasonable public official would have realized or understood that what he was doing violates that right. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640. Finally, the court must determine whether the record shows that the violation occurred, or at least gives rise to a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendant actually engaged in the conduct that violated the clearly-established right. Kipps, 197 F.3d at 768, citing Morris v. Dearborne, 181 F.3d 657, 665 (5^th Cir. 1999). If it is determined that the official's conduct was unconstitutional, then the court must decide whether the conduct was nonetheless "objectively reasonable." Id., citing Eugene v. Alief Indep. School Dist., 65 F.3d 1299, 1305 (5^th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1191 (1996).

As the Court stated above, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to survive Delapaz and Herrera's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, and thus the Court finds that Plaintiff has satisfactorily pleaded a deprivation of his constitutional rights. Further, when the facts contained in Plaintiff's complaint are viewed in the light most favorable to him, the complaint also meets the next prong of the test for qualified immunity — that the rights allegedly violated were, at the time of the events in question, clearly established. Additionally, the record at least gives rise to a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Delapaz and Herrera actually engaged in the conduct that is alleged to have violated Plaintiff's clearly-established rights, and whether their conduct was objectively reasonable. Accordingly, the Court cannot grant qualified immunity to Delapaz and Herrera, and their Motion for Rule 7(a) Reply is denied.

C. Rule 12(e) Motion for More Definite Statement

Delapaz and Herrera have also, alternatively, moved for an order requiring a more definite statement from Plaintiff pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(e). The Court's local rules provide that unless the movant is complaining of failure to plead fraud with particularity under Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b), a motion for more definite statement may only be filed where the information sought cannot be obtained by discovery. L.R. 12.1. Delapaz and Herrera make only a passing reference to Rule 12(e), and have made no showing that the information the believe is missing from Plaintiff's Complaint cannot be obtained in the course of discovery. Therefore, Delapaz and Herrera's Rule 12(e) Motion for More Definite Statement is denied.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants Delapaz and Herrera's Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss is granted in part, and denied in part. Delapaz and Herrera's Motion for Rule 7(a) Reply and Rule 12(e) Motion for More Definite Statement are both denied.

SO ORDERED.