Opinion
Case No. 1:14-cv-318-JVB-SLC
10-30-2015
TABITHA LEE MEINEN, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security Administration, Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Tabitha Lee Meinen seeks judicial review of the Social Security Administration's decision to deny her disability insurance and Social Security Income benefits. She asks this Court to remand the case to the agency for reconsideration.
On August 14, 2013, Administrative Law Judge Patricia Melvin denied Plaintiff's application for disability benefits. Although the ALJ agrees that Plaintiff's Crohn's disease is a severe impairment, she found that it does not meet or equal any listing found in the federal regulations. Furthermore, the ALJ found that Plaintiff's residual functional capacity allows her to vie for numerous jobs in the economy. The ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner when the Social Security Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request to review it.
For the reasons discussed in this opinion, the Commissioner's decision is AFFIRMED.
A. Facts
Plaintiff claims that she became disabled on January 22, 2012, at the age of 32, after being diagnosed with Crohn's disease. She submits that she cannot maintain employment because of a number of mental and physical health conditions, including Crohn's disease flare-ups, a urinary tract infection, mild depression, cibophobia, insomnia, weight loss, and pain and swelling. To treat her conditions, Plaintiff consulted physicians, used various medications, underwent CT scans and colonoscopies, and received emergency medical treatment and hospitalization. In addition, Plaintiff's husband occasionally takes time off work to care for her.
As Plaintiff correctly points out in her brief, the onset date was amended to September 23, 2011. Nevertheless, for reasons discussed later in this opinion the Court uses the original onset date submitted by Plaintiff.
The Court addresses other relevant facts in its analysis below.
B. Standard of Review
The Social Security Act authorizes judicial review of final decisions made by the Commissioner. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). In addition, the Act requires that the Commissioner's findings be sustained if supported by substantial evidence. Id; Lopez v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 535, 539 (7th Cir. 2003). Therefore, the Commissioner's findings will be reversed only if they are not supported by substantial evidence or if the Commissioner applied an erroneous legal standard. See Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351 (7th Cir. 2005). "Substantial evidence means 'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)).
In issuing an opinion, the ALJ must, at a minimum, state an analysis of the evidence so that a reviewing court can make an accurate decision. Scott v. Barnhart, 297 F.3d 589, 595 (7th Cir. 2002). Although we review the entire administrative record, we do not reweigh the evidence, resolve conflicts, decide questions of credibility, or substitute our own judgment for that of the Commissioner. Powers v. Apfel, 207 F.3d 431, 434-35 (7th Cir.2000). This does not mean, however, that we will simply rubber-stamp the Commissioner's decision without a critical review of the evidence. Ehrhart v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 969 F.2d 534, 538 (7th Cir.1992).
C. Disability Standard
To qualify for disability and Social Security Income benefits a claimant under the age of 55 must establish that she suffers from a disability that prevents her from "engag[ing] in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The Social Security Administration provides a five-step sequential process for evaluating whether a claimant is disabled. A successful claimant must show that: (1) she is not presently employed; (2) her impairment is medically severe; (3) her impairment is listed or equal to a listing in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1; (4) she is not able to perform her past relevant work; and (5) she is unable to perform any other work within the national and local economy. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920.
An affirmative answer leads either to the next step or, at steps three and five, to a finding that the claimant is disabled. See Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 2001). A negative answer at any point, other than at step three, stops the inquiry and leads to a finding that the claimant is not disabled. Id. The claimant bears the burden of proof at every step, but the fifth, where it shifts to the Commissioner. Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 2000).
D. Discussion
Plaintiff makes four arguments: (1) the ALJ failed to address Plaintiff's use of Humira; (2) the ALJ used the wrong disability onset date; (3) the ALJ applied an erroneous legal standard; and (4) the ALJ failed to give proper weight to Plaintiff's strong work history. (1) ALJ's failure to address Plaintiff's past use of Humira is harmless error
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ's failure to address her past use of Humira is cause for remand.
An ALJ must "minimally articulate" the reasons for her decision to deny a claimant disability benefits by "building an accurate and logical bridge" from the evidence to her conclusions so that an appellate court can assess the validity of her finding and provide a meaningful review. Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001). In doing so, the ALJ need not address every piece of evidence, but she cannot subjectively limit her discussion of the evidence to that which favors her conclusions. See Herron v. Shalala, 19 F.3d 329, 333 (7th Cir. 1994).
In the instant case, the evidence of record does not show that Plaintiff used Humira at the time the ALJ made her assessment for disability benefits. (R. 40-42, 199). Plaintiff does not present any evidence to the contrary. Her sole contention is that Dr. Saiffundin prescribed her Humira. (Pl. Br. at 20.) But, according to Plaintiff's own testimony, Dr. Saiffundin merely contemplated reinstating her Humira treatment and she has not used Humira since May 2013. (R. at 40-42, 199, 432-33.) Therefore, the ALJ did not need to address Plaintiff's past use of Humira and its reported side-effects. (2) ALJ's use of original onset date is harmless error
Plaintiff claims that the ALJ's use of the original onset date in her disability benefits determination is cause for remand.
In addition to determining disability, the ALJ must also establish the onset date of disability. See SSR 83-20. To this end, the ALJ considers the applicant's: (1) allegations; (2) work history; (3) medical evidence; and (4) other relevant evidence. Id.; see also Briscoe, 425 F.3d at 352. "In many claims, the onset date is critical; it may affect the period for which the individual can be paid and may even be determinative of whether the individual is entitled to or eligible for any benefits." SSR 83-20.
Here, the ALJ established the onset date of disability to be January 22, 2012. (R. at 13.) However, Plaintiff amended the onset date to September 23, 2011. (R. at 29.) Despite this change, the ALJ used the original onset date in her disability benefits determination and found Plaintiff to be not disabled. (R. at 11.) Plaintiff contends that this mistake is cause for remand. The Court disagrees. In the four month period not considered by the ALJ, Plaintiff received a CT scan of her pelvis, underwent a biopsy, and consulted her physician. (R. at 229, 246, 279.) Although the ALJ did not address this evidence, it would not alter her findings. To the contrary, Plaintiff's 2011 CT scan, biopsy, and consultation report support the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff suffers from Crohn's disease, a severe impairment. (R. at 13.) Accordingly, the ALJ's use of the original onset date is harmless error. (3) ALJ did not apply an erroneous legal standard in assessing Plaintiff's credibility
At Plaintiff's 2011 consultation, her physician expressed concern over the effectiveness of Entocort, a steroid medicine used to treat Crohn's disease. (R. at 279.) The ALJ, in her opinion, accounted for Plaintiff's use of steroids, stating that Plaintiff "reported that she takes steroids, but suffers from the bad side effects." (R. at 15.) Also, the ALJ accounted for Plaintiff's subsequent CT scans of her pelvis, which ultimately "confirmed the diagnosis of Crohn's disease." (R. at 15-16.) --------
Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ applied an erroneous legal standard in assessing her credibility.
In determining an applicant's credibility an ALJ must consider several factors, including the claimant's daily activities, her level of pain or symptoms, aggravating factors, medication, treatment, and limitations. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c); S.S.R. 96-7p. Since an ALJ is in the best position to determine the claimant's credibility, courts "will not overturn an ALJ's credibility determination unless it is 'patenlty wrong.'" Sharbek v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 500, 505 (7th Cir. 2004).
In this case, the ALJ recognized Plaintiff's symptoms and aggravating factors. (R. at 15.) Then, the ALJ considered Plaintiff's daily living activities. (R. at 15.) Next, the ALJ weighed Plaintiff's reported symptoms with the treatment sought and received. (R. at 15-16.) Here, the ALJ accounted for Plaintiff's CT scans, consultation reports, medication, and emergency medical treatment and hospitalization. (R. at 15-16.) However, the ALJ found Plaintiff's statements concerning the intensity, persistency and limiting effects of her symptoms to be not credible. (R. at 15.) The principle reason behind the ALJ's finding is the lack of consistency between Plaintiff's claims and the objective medical evidence. (R. at 17.) Irrespective of the ALJ's findings, this analytical framework is consistent with federal regulations. See § 404.1529(c); S.S.R. 96-7p. Thus, the ALJ did not apply an erroneous legal standard in assessing Plaintiff's credibility. (4) ALJ is not required to give substantial weight to Plaintiff's strong work history
Plaintiff contends that she is "entitled to substantial credibility" because of her "excellent work history and her demonstrated desire to work." (Pl. Br. at 24.) In support of this contention, Plaintiff cites Porter v. Chater, 921 F. Supp. 89 (D. Conn. 1996), Rivera v. Schwiker, 717 F.2d 719 (2d Cir. 1983), and Singletary v. Sec'y of Health, Ed. & Welfare, 623 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1980). These cases are unpersuasive. "The lack of precedent in this circuit is not dispositive, but there is no requirement to give 'substantial credibility' to a disability claimant with a good work record." Loveless v. Colvin, No. 4:14-cv-36, 2015 WL 1608808 at *4 (N.D. Ind. April 10, 2015). Rather, a "'claimant's prior work record is just one factor that may be considered in evaluating his credibility.'" Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3); SSR 97-6p); see also Reed v. Colvin, No. 1:14-cv-080, 2015 WL 4921614 at *4 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 18, 2015) (same); McCartney v. Colvin, No. 1:14-cv-131, 2015 WL 1914802 at *4 (N.D. Ind. April 27, 2015) (same).
E. Conclusion
The Court AFFIRMS the Commissioners findings.
SO ORDERED on October 30, 2015.
S/ Joseph S. Van Bokkelen
JOSEPH S. VAN BOKKELEN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE