The record also evidenced Robert's drinking and physically abusive behavior toward Michelle on "many occasions." See, e.g., Mees v. Mees, 325 N.W.2d 207, 208-209 (N.D. 1982) (the conduct of the parties is one of the factors to be considered). Michelle has clearly established she has been disadvantaged by the divorce and is in need of rehabilitative support.

Sue questioned termination of her permanent support at age 65. Since she would need support even if employed, Sue claimed that it was incorrect to end it at age 65. She cited a long line of decisions approving spousal support for life when a disadvantaged spouse could not be satisfactorily rehabilitated to maintain a comparable standard of living. Nastrom v. Nastrom, 284 N.W.2d 576 (N.D. 1979); Gooselaw v. Gooselaw, 320 N.W.2d 490 (N.D. 1982); Mees v. Mees, 325 N.W.2d 207 (N.D. 1982); Briese v. Briese, 325 N.W.2d 245 (N.D. 1982); and Roen v. Roen, 438 N.W.2d 170 (N.D. 1989). Sue contended that it was wrong to schedule the ending of her "permanent" support at a time when she should ordinarily be able to retire and not have to work. Lynn argued that the trial court weighed Sue's needs at 65 with his ability to pay, suggesting that he would be less able to pay support after his own retirement.

See Rule 52, NDRCivP. See also Routledge v. Routledge, 377 N.W.2d 542 (N.D. 1985); Mees v. Mees, 325 N.W.2d 207 (N.D. 1982); Svetenko v. Svetenko, 306 N.W.2d 607 (N.D. 1981). However, when the record on appeal does not allow for a meaningful and intelligent review of the alleged error, we will decline to review the issues altogether.

While the conduct of the parties is a factor to be considered in ordering spousal support, it is but one factor and there is no requirement that the award be based on conduct alone. Mees v. Mees, 325 N.W.2d 207 (N.D. 1982). When an award of spousal support is rehabilitative, as it is here, its purpose is not to penalize but, rather, to provide the means by which a disadvantaged spouse may become self-supporting.

Allan contends that the divorce court's award of "alimony" was an award of spousal support because a major consideration of the divorce court was the disparate earning capacities of Allan and Ruth. This argument fails to recognize that consideration of the divorcing parties' earning abilities is one of the Ruff-Fischer guidelines [ Ruff v. Ruff, 78 N.D. 775, 52 N.W.2d 107 (1952); Fischer v. Fischer, 139 N.W.2d 845 (N.D. 1966)] which are utilized when considering either the equitable distribution of property or the award of spousal support. See, e.g., Volk v. Volk, 376 N.W.2d 16 (N.D. 1985) [utilizing the guidelines to analyze property distribution], and Mees v. Mees, 325 N.W.2d 207 (N.D. 1982) [utilizing the guidelines to analyze an award of spousal support]. Thus the divorce court's consideration of the parties' earning capacities does not indicate that the "alimony" award was intended to be spousal support.

The party challenging a finding of fact on appeal bears the burden of demonstrating that the finding is clearly erroneous. Routledge v. Routledge, supra, 377 N.W.2d at 546; Byron v. Gerring Industries, Inc., 328 N.W.2d 819, 821 (N.D. 1982); Mees v. Mees, 325 N.W.2d 207, 208 (N.D. 1982). Peter has not convinced us that he is unable to make the payments ordered by the court, or that in any other respect the court's division of property and award of spousal support are inequitable. We conclude that the trial court's determinations on property division and spousal support are not clearly erroneous.

The party challenging a finding of fact on appeal bears the burden of demonstrating that the finding is clearly erroneous. Byron v. Gerring Industries, Inc., 328 N.W.2d 819, 821 (N.D. 1982); Mees v. Mees, 325 N.W.2d 207, 208 (N.D. 1982). James, without even attempting to demonstrate his monthly income, has made only vague assertions about his inability to generate sufficient income to make the court-ordered payments to Donna. James has not convinced us that he is unable to make these payments, nor that an award of permanent alimony was improper under the facts of this case.

Factors to be considered when determining whether or not an award of spousal support is appropriate include the respective ages of the parties, their earning ability, the duration of the marriage and conduct of the parties during the marriage, their station in life, the circumstances and necessities of each, their health and physical condition, their financial circumstances as shown by the property owned at the time, its value at the time, its income-producing capacity, if any, whether accumulated before or after the marriage, and such other matters as may be material. Smith v. Smith, 326 N.W.2d 697 (N.D. 1982); Mees v. Mees, 325 N.W.2d 207 (N.D. 1982). We have recognized that one of the functions of spousal support is rehabilitation of the party who has been disadvantaged by the divorce. If rehabilitation is not possible, spousal support may be permanent to provide maintenance for the disadvantaged party.

We would have set aside the trial court's determination only if we were left with the firm conviction that a mistake had been made. See Mees v. Mees, 325 N.W.2d 207, 208-09 (N.D. 1982). Our disposition of this appeal makes it unnecessary for us to address the specific issue of whether or not the trial court's award of "spousal support" was clearly erroneous, but we note that under the facts presented on this record it would be difficult to conclude that the award adequately served a rehabilitative function.

A finding is clearly erroneous when we are left with a firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been made. Simply because we might have viewed the evidence differently, had it been presented to us initially as the trier of fact, does not entitle us to reverse the trial court. E.g., Mees v. Mees, 325 N.W.2d 207, 209 (N.D. 1982). Patricia testified concerning her work experience during the parties' marriage.