Opinion
No. M2007-00584-COA-R3-CV.
Assigned on Briefs December 5, 2007.
Filed March 24, 2008.
Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County, No. 07-79-IV, Richard Dinkins, Chancellor.
Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed.
Danny Ray Meeks, Only, Tennessee, pro se Appellant.
Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General; and Kellena Baker, Civil Rights and Claims Division, Nashville, Tennessee, for the Appellee, Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole.
Sharon G. Lee, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Herschel P. Franks, P.J., and Charles D. Susano, Jr., J., joined.
OPINION
Danny Ray Meeks, an incarcerated state inmate, was denied parole by the Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole. After losing his administrative appeal, he attempted to file a petition for writ of certiorari in chancery court, but the court clerk returned his petition pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-812 because he owed court costs from previous litigation. The court costs were later paid, and Mr. Meeks was allowed to file his petition. The petition was subsequently dismissed by the trial court because the petition was not filed within the 60 day filing period mandated by Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-102. After careful review, we find no error and affirm.
The record names the Appellee as "Tennessee Board of Paroles." However, the official name of the department is "Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole."
I. Background
In 1990, Danny Ray Meeks was tried and convicted by a Grundy County jury of aggravated kidnapping, especially aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and extortion. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of 48 years for the convictions. See Meeks v. State , No. M2005-00624-CCA-R3-HC, 2005 WL 3262934, at *1 (Tenn.Crim.App. 2005). Mr. Meeks is currently serving his sentence in the Turney Center Prison and Farm in Only, Tennessee.
At Mr. Meeks's second parole hearing on August 17, 2005, the Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole ("the Board") declined Mr. Meeks's parole and deferred the next review for six years. Mr. Meeks appealed this decision to the Board and on January 24, 2006, was informed that his administrative appeal was denied. On March 23, 2006, Mr. Meeks attempted to file a petition for writ of certiorari with the Davidson County Chancery Court. The petition was returned unfiled by the clerk based upon Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-812, which allows a court clerk to reject for filing another claim by the same inmate until prior fees, taxes, costs, and other expenses are paid in full. Mr. Meeks's court costs were later paid, and on January 11, 2007, Mr. Meeks refiled the petition for writ of certiorari and requested that the petition be filed nunc pro tunc.
The trial court dismissed the petition, holding that Mr. Meeks's petition was not filed within the 60 day time limit required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-102. Mr. Meeks has appealed.
II. Issues
The following issues are presented for our review by Mr. Meeks:
1) Whether the trial court erred in dismissing the petition for writ of certiorari because the petition was time-barred by the 60 day limitations period set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-102.
2) Whether Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-812 is unconstitutional.
3) Whether the trial court erred in assessing court costs to Mr. Meeks.
The issues raised by Mr. Meeks are questions of law which we review de novo with no presumption of correctness afforded to the conclusions of the trial court. Taylor v. Fezell , 158 S.W.3d 352, 357 (Tenn. 2005).
III. Analysis A. Statute of Limitations
The statute of limitations for the filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari is 60 days from the entry of the order appealed from, as set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-102:
Such party shall, within sixty (60) days from the entry of the order or judgment, file a petition of certiorari in the chancery court of any county in which any one (1) or more of the petitioners, or any one (1) or more of the material defendants reside, or have their principal office, stating briefly the issues involved in the cause, the substance of the order or judgment complained of, of the respects in which the petitioner claims the order or judgment is erroneous, and praying for an accordant review.
The 60 day limit in Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-102 is mandatory and jurisdictional. Hickman v. Tenn. Bd. of Paroles , 78 S.W.3d 285, 289 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2001). This provision promotes the timely resolution of disputes by establishing filing deadlines that will keep cases moving through the system. Hickman , 78 S.W.3d at 289; Levy v. Board of Zoning Appeals , No. M1999-00126-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 1141351, at *4-5 (Tenn.Ct.App. M.S., filed Sept. 27, 2001); State ex rel. Sizemore v. United Physicians Ins. Risk Retention Group , 56 S.W.3d 557, 565 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2001) (discussing the purpose of deadlines generally). It has been analogized to the deadline for filing a notice of appeal under Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a). Thandiwe v. Traughber , 909 S.W.2d 802, 804 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1994). Failure to timely file within the 60 day period results in a forfeiture of the right to seek judicial review and requires the court to decline to exercise its jurisdiction to grant the writ because the petition is time-barred. A'La v. Tennessee Dep't of Corr. , 914 S.W.2d 914, 916 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1995) (holding that a petition filed longer than sixty days after a final order is not timely filed); Brannon v. County of Shelby , 900 S.W.2d 30, 34 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1994) (holding that a petition not filed within sixty days is time-barred).
In the present case, Mr. Meeks sought to appeal from a final decision by the Board received by him on January 24, 2006. The clerk received his petition on March 23, 2006, but returned it to him pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-812 because he had outstanding court costs from a previous case. Tennessee Code Annotated § 41-21-812 allows a court clerk to refuse to file a claim from an inmate until costs from previous litigation is paid, as follows:
(a) Except as provided by subsection (b), on notice of assessment of any fees, taxes, costs and expenses under this part, a clerk of a court may not accept for filing another claim by the same inmate until such prior fees, taxes, costs and other expenses are paid in full.
(b) A court may allow an inmate who has not paid any costs or expenses assessed against the inmate to file a claim for injunctive relief seeking to enjoin an act or failure to act that creates a substantial threat of irreparable injury or serious physical harm to the inmate.
Tennessee Code Annotated § 41-21-812 applies to validly assessed unpaid costs from all prior cases, not only those found to be malicious or frivolous. See Sweatt v. Tennessee Board of Paroles , No. M1999-02265-COA-R3-CV, 2000 WL 1514071 (Tenn.Ct.App. Oct. 12, 2000). In the present case, Mr. Meeks does not contest that he still owed court costs from a previous case, nor does he claim his petition falls under section (b) of the statute. We find that Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-812 was correctly applied, and Mr. Meeks's petition was properly returned. When the petition was resubmitted and filed, the mandatory 60 day filing period had expired and the trial court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case.
However, Mr. Meeks argues that the 60-day statute of limitations under Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-102 was tolled when he submitted the complaint on March 23, 2006, until the clerk's office notified him that his prior court costs were paid in December 2006. Mr. Meeks cites no authority for this tolling provision; the statute makes no provision for it; and we are not aware of any such provision. In fact, such a provision would run counter to the clear wording and purpose of the mandatory and jurisdictional limitations period set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-102. It would serve to reward an inmate who is delinquent in paying court costs by allowing him or her to set a personal deadline for filing a petition for writ of certiorari by deciding when to pay outstanding court costs.
Further, "`[t]olling' refers to suspending or stopping the running of a statute of limitations; it is analogous to a clock stopping, then restarting. Tolling may either temporarily suspend the running of the limitations period or delay the start of the limitations period." 51 Am.Jur. 2d Limitation § 169 (2002). Mr. Meeks attempted to file the first petition on March 23, 2006, which was 58 days after he was notified that his administrative appeal had been denied. On January 11, 2007, Mr. Meeks refiled the petition for writ of certiorari. Even if the filing tolled the statute of limitations until Mr. Meeks was notified in December 2006 of prior court costs being satisfied, the statute began to run again on the date of his notification and was complete two days after he was notified by the clerk. Thus, even if Mr. Meeks was not notified until December 31, 2006, by the clerk, the statute of limitations ran no later than January 2, 2007.
The record does not indicate the exact date in December 2006 on which Mr. Meeks was notified that the clerk had ceased drafting for payment of prior court costs.
B. Constitutionality of Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-812
Mr. Meeks argues that Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-812 is unconstitutional. Specifically, Mr. Meeks argues that Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-812 violates Article I, section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution and the United States Constitution under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. These issues were not raised in the trial court, and issues raised for the first time on appeal are considered waived. See Black v. Blount , 938 S.W.2d 394, 403 (Tenn. 1996) ("Under Tennessee law, issues raised for the first time on appeal are waived."). This is true for issues regarding the constitutionality of a statute, unless the statute involved is so obviously unconstitutional on its face as to obviate the necessity for any discussion. In re Adoption of E.N.R. , 42 S.W.3d 26, 32-33 (Tenn. 2001). We do not find the statute in this case to be facially unconstitutional. Since Mr. Meeks did not raise the constitutionality of Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-812 at trial and it is not unconstitutional on its face, we will not entertain this issue on appeal.
C. Court Costs
Mr. Meeks asserts that the trial court erred in assessing court costs against him. As to the assessment of court costs, Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-12-119 provides:
(a) In all civil cases, whether tried by a jury or before the court without a jury, the presiding judge shall have a right to adjudge the cost.
(b) In doing so, he shall be authorized, in his discretion, to apportion the cost between the litigants, as in his opinion the equities of the case demand.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-12-119. Because the assessment of costs is a discretionary decision of the trial court, we review such a decision under an abuse of discretion standard. Lewis v. Bowers , 392 S.W.2d 819, 823 (Tenn. 1965).
Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 54.04 provides in pertinent part, "[c]osts included in the bill of costs prepared by the clerk shall be allowed to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs, but costs against the state, its officers, or its agencies shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law." Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.04(1). In determining the prevailing party, Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-12-110 provides that "[i]n cases of nonsuit, dismissal, abatement by death of plaintiff, or discontinuance, the defendant is the successful party, within the meaning of § 20-12-101." Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-12-110.
In the present case, the Board is the prevailing party. No extraordinary circumstances warranting review appear in the record before us, and the Supreme Court has held that "[m]erely because this cause was brought under the pauper's oath does not render this an extraordinary matter." Lewis v. Bowers , 392 S.W.2d 819, 823 (Tenn. 1965). Thus, Mr. Meeks has failed to show extraordinary circumstances to overcome the presumption in favor of the discretionary purview of the trial court in taxing the costs of the trial court. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by assessing court costs against Mr. Meeks.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs of appeal are assessed to the appellant, Danny Ray Meeks.