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noting that a plaintiff "may satisfy the subjective requirements of a deliberate indifference claim" where staff members had "mocked" plaintiff about his injuries after assault
Summary of this case from Sanchez v. Nassau Cnty.Opinion
9:08-CV-1037 (GLS/DEP).
September 30, 2010
Radcliffe Meeks, Pro Se, 06-A-2671, Clinton Correctional Facility, Dannemora, NY, Attorney for the Plaintiff.
ADRIENNE J. KERWIN, Assistant Attorney General, HON. ANDREW M. CUOMO, New York State Attorney General, Albany, NY, Attorneys for the Defendants.
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. Introduction
Pro se plaintiff Radcliffe Meeks, a Clinton Correctional Facility inmate, commenced this action against defendants Kartan and Sidicky, two physicians employed at the Central New York Psychiatric Center (CNYPC), alleging a civil rights violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ( See Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 7.) On March 9, 2009, Kartan and Sidicky moved for a partial dismissal of Meeks's complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Dkt. No. 13.) In a Report and Recommendation Order (R R) filed January 4, 2010, Magistrate Judge David E. Peebles recommended that defendants' motion be granted and that Meeks be given an opportunity to replead. (Dkt. No. 16.) Pending are Meeks's objections to the R R. (Dkt. No. 18.) For the reasons that follow, the R R is adopted in its entirety.
II. Background
In his amended complaint, Meeks alleges that while housed at CNYPC, staff members medicated him and drew blood against his will, despite his protestation that these medical procedures were against his religious beliefs as a Rastafarian Nazarite. ( See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 8-12, Dkt. No. 7.) Afterward, Meeks allegedly felt ill for five days — suffering chronic headaches, weakness in his joints, an inability to stand, and an inability to keep his eyes open and focused — and received no medical attention. ( Id. at ¶¶ 13-14.) Further, Meeks alleges that following the disruptive behavior of another inmate, staff members once again medicated him and drew blood against his will. ( Id. at ¶ 15.) According to Meeks, staff members then confined him in a room where he injured two fingers and received no medical attention. ( Id. at ¶ 16.) Meeks claims that Kartan and Sidicky violated the Eighth Amendment by their deliberate indifference to his medical needs and exercise of excessive force. ( See id. at ¶¶ 17-25.) Additionally, Meeks claims that they violated his First Amendment right to practice his religion. ( See id. at ¶¶ 26-27.) Based on these violations, Meeks seeks compensatory and punitive damages. ( See id. at 5.)
In Kartan and Sidicky's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, they argued that: (1) they were not personally involved in the alleged wrongdoings and cannot be found liable under the theory of respondeat superior; (2) the de minimis force used by staff members against Meeks did not constitute excessive force; (3) Meeks failed to allege that Kartan and Sidicky were deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need; and (4) New York State's sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment extends to state officers in their official capacities, and therefore the court must dismiss Meeks's claims against Kartan and Sidicky in their official capacities. ( See Defs. Mem. of Law at 3-7, Dkt. No. 13.)
Judge Peebles recommended that the court dismiss Meeks's excessive force claims, deliberate indifference claims, and claims for damages against Kartan and Sidicky in their official capacities, and grant Meeks the opportunity to replead. ( See R R, Dkt. No. 16.) Specifically, Judge Peebles found that: (1) Kartan and Sidicky could be held liable despite their claim that they were not personally involved in the alleged wrongdoings; (2) although de minimis force might suffice for an excessive force claim, Meeks's allegations did not evince sadistic or malicious application of force and were insufficient to support an Eighth Amendment claim; (3) Meeks's allegations did not include a medical need that was sufficiently serious to support a claim of deliberate medical indifference under the Eighth Amendment; and (4) the Eleventh Amendment provided absolute immunity to Kartan and Sidicky, as state officials, in their official capacities. ( See R R at 19, Dkt. No. 16.) In response, Meeks submitted objections to the R R, claiming that Kartan and Sidicky's use of force against him was excessive and that Kartan and Sidicky were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical condition. (Dkt. No. 18.)
III. Standard of Review
Before entering final judgment, this court routinely reviews all reportrecommendations in cases referred to a magistrate judge. If a party has objected to specific elements of the magistrate judge's findings and recommendations, this court reviews those findings and recommendations de novo. See Almonte v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, No. 04-cv-484, 2006 WL 149049, at *6-7 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2006). In those cases where no party has filed an objection, or only a vague or general objection has been filed, this court reviews the findings and recommendations of a magistrate judge for clear error. See id.
IV. Discussion
In his objections to the R R, Meeks specifically objects to Judge Peebles's findings regarding excessive force and deliberate indifference. ( See Objections at 2-3, Dkt. No 18.) In addition, Meeks specifically objects to the issue of Kartan and Sidicky's personal involvement. ( See id. at 5.) However, since Judge Peebles decided the issue of personal involvement in Meeks's favor, the court accepts the R R's recommendation to hold Kartan and Sidicky liable for their involvement in the alleged wrongdoings on the basis of their supervisory role.A. Deliberate Indifference
As to his allegations of deliberate indifference, Meeks argues that his two injured fingers constituted a serious medical condition and that the staff deliberately refused to provide medical attention. ( See id. at 3-4.) The standard for an Eighth Amendment claim on the basis of deliberate indifference includes both an objective and subjective prong. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991). To satisfy the objective prong, an alleged deprivation must be "sufficiently serious." See id. This means a condition of urgency that may lead to death, degeneration, or extreme pain. See Hathaway v. Coughlin, 37 F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 1994). Factors to consider include: (1) whether the condition significantly impairs a plaintiff's daily activities; (2) whether the condition has caused a plaintiff severe or chronic pain; (3) worsening of the condition due to lack of treatment; and (4) whether a reasonable doctor or patient would find the injury important and worthy of comment or treatment. See Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 701-02 (2d Cir. 1998).The subjective prong requires more than negligence by a defendant. See Hathaway, 37 F.3d at 66. Rather, a defendant must "know[] of and disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). For example, a prison official's conscious delay or failure to treat an inmate's serious medical condition "as punishment or for other invalid reasons" would satisfy the subjective prong. See Harrison v. Barkley, 219 F.3d 132, 138 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks, emphasis, and citations omitted).
As to the objective prong, courts have held that finger injuries are not sufficiently serious to support a claim of deliberate indifference. See Sonds v. St. Barnabas Hosp. Corr. Health Servs., 151 F. Supp. 2d 303, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). Indeed, a finger injury is unlikely to lead to death, degeneration, or extreme pain. See id. Moreover, Meeks has not alleged that his injuries resulted in extreme pain or significantly impaired his daily activities. See Chance, 143 F.3d at 703. Therefore, Meeks's amended complaint fails to satisfy the objective requirement of a deliberate indifference claim.
Regarding the subjective prong, Meeks alleges that Kartan and Sidicky "ignored and refused" his requests for medical attention. ( See Am. Compl. ¶ 19, Dkt. No. 7.) Meeks also alleges that two staff members "mocked" him and commented that he had broken his hand, which implies that staff members consciously disregarded a risk to Meeks's health. ( See id. at ¶¶ 15-16.) These acts may satisfy the subjective requirements of a deliberate indifference claim. Nonetheless, Meeks's medical condition, as pleaded, does not rise to the level of a serious medical condition. Therefore, Meeks's amended complaint fails to state an Eighth Amendment violation claim of deliberate indifference.
B. Excessive Force
Regarding the use of excessive force, Meeks argues that he never posed a threat to anyone. Therefore, he contends, Kartan and Sidicky's use of force was an unnecessary infliction of pain that constituted excessive force and dismissal of his claim would be improper. ( See Pl. Objections ¶¶ 7-10, Dkt. No. 18.) To determine whether a prison official exercised excessive force against an inmate, the principal inquiry is whether the defendant applied force in a good faith effort to maintain discipline or whether the defendant acted maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986). To determine whether a defendant used force maliciously and sadistically, a court will consider: (1) the need for application of force; (2) the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used; (3) the threat reasonably perceived by responsible officials; and (4) the extent of the injury inflicted. See id. at 321. Moreover, "[w]hat is necessary to show sufficient harm for purposes of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause depends upon the claim at issue." Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992). In situations involving institutional security, courts afford prison administrators extensive deference in their decisions regarding policies and practices necessary to preserve internal order and discipline. See id. at 6. However, when institutional security is not at stake, an official's license to use force is relatively limited. See id. at 13 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). In such cases, a plaintiff is not required to prove malicious and sadistic use of force by a defendant. See id. Rather, a plaintiff's allegations of "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" may suffice. See id.
Although rare, de minimis force can suffice for an Eighth Amendment violation if the use of force is "repugnant to the conscience of mankind." See id. at 9-10 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Indeed, a defendant's malicious or sadistic use of force, no matter how minimal, may violate both contemporary standards of decency and a plaintiff's Eighth Amendment rights. See id. at 13 (Stevens, J., concurring). Still, the plaintiff bears the burden of pleading facts from which a court can infer that a defendant exercised force in a malicious or sadistic manner. See Sims v. Artuz, 230 F.3d 14, 22 (2d Cir. 2000).
In the present case, the sole force exercised by staff members was their restraining of Meeks and injecting medication. A forcible inoculation, however, absent a showing of malicious intent, is insufficient to support a § 1983 claim. See Zaire v. Dalsheim, 698 F. Supp. 57, 59-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). Moreover, if a plaintiff has not alleged a motive for the defendant's use of de minimis force, the court will decline to infer a malicious intent. See Sonds, 151 F. Supp. 2d at 311. Meeks has failed to make any allegation that staff members maliciously or sadistically used force. Further, even if the court applies the lower threshold of wanton and unnecessary use of force, Meeks has failed to plead facts from which the court can infer that Kartan and Sidicky's use of force was either wanton or unnecessary. See Sims, 230 F.3d at 22. Accordingly, Kartan and Sidicky's alleged uses of force did not violate contemporary standards of decency and therefore cannot support an Eighth Amendment claim.
V. Conclusion
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that Magistrate Judge David E. Peebles's Report and Recommendation Order (Dkt. No. 16) is ADOPTED in its entirety and Kartan and Sidicky's motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 13) Meeks's claims is GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED that Meeks is granted leave to replead, in full compliance with the terms of this Order, within thirty (30) days from the date of the filing of this Order, after which defendants shall respond to the complaint as permitted under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and it is further
ORDERED that if Meeks fails to file a second amended complaint within thirty (30) days from the date of the filing of this Order, the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment dismissing this action without further order of the court; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk provide copies of this Memorandum-Decision and Order to the parties.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
September 30, 2010
Albany, New York
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Radcliffe Meeks, a New York State prison inmate who is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, has commenced this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against two physicians employed at the Central New York Psychiatric Center ("CNYPC"), alleging deprivation of his civil rights. In his complaint, as amended, Meeks asserts that while housed at the CNYPC he was medicated and blood was drawn against his will and through the use of excessive force, and in violation of his sincerely-held religious beliefs, and further that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs, including the adverse affects of being medicated and injuries to his fingers suffered while protesting defendants' actions. As relief, plaintiff's complaint seeks awards of compensatory and punitive damages.Currently pending before the court is a motion on behalf of the defendants seeking partial dismissal of plaintiff's complaint. In their motion, defendants assert that plaintiff's complaint does not state plausible claims for deliberate medical indifference or the use of excessive force and that plaintiff's claims against them in their official capacities must be dismissed under the Eleventh Amendment. For the reasons set forth below, I recommend that defendants' motion be granted.
I. BACKGROUND
In light of the procedural posture of this case, the following recitation is drawn principally from plaintiff's complaint, the contents of which have been accepted as true for purposes of the pending motion, see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007)); see also Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546, 546, 84 S.Ct. 1733, 1734 (1964).
Plaintiff is a New York State prison inmate entrusted to the care and custody of the New York State Department of Correctional Services ("DOCS"). While plaintiff is currently incarcerated in the Clinton Correctional Facility ("Clinton"), located in Dannemora, New York, the relevant events forming the basis for his claims occurred while he was temporarily housed at the CNYPC. See generally Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 7).
The claims set forth in plaintiff's complaint appear to be predicated upon two separate incidents. The first occurred in October of 2007 when Meeks was medicated and blood was drawn, apparently by employees at the CNYPC at the direction of defendant Dr. Rajieshwar Kartan, despite his protests that such actions would be violate his religious beliefs as a Rastafarian Nazanite. Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 7) ¶¶ 8-12. After being medicated against his will plaintiff reported feeling ill, being unable to stand, weakness in his joints, development of chronic headaches, and an inability to keep his eyes open and focused. Id. ¶¶ 13-14. Despite those reports, plaintiff was not provided with medical attention. Id.
On November 22, 2007, plaintiff was again medicated at the direction of defendant Dr. Sidicky, over Meeks' objection and despite his protest that his religious beliefs prohibited such medication. Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 7) ¶ 15. After being medicated and locked in a room, plaintiff banged on the door in protest, resulting in his ring finger and pinky finger of the right hand "slip[ing] out." Id. ¶ 16. Despite those injuries, plaintiff did not receive medical attention. Id.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff commenced this action on September 30, 2008 and, at the direction of the court, submitted a second amended complaint, which was approved by the court for filing on November 28, 2008. Dkt. Nos. 1, 4, 6 and 7. In his second amended complaint plaintiff names Dr. Rajieshwar Kartan and Dr. Sidicky as defendants, purporting to sue them in both their individual and official capacities, and sets forth three causes of action, alleging 1) deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs; 2) the unlawful use of excessive force; and 3) violation of his free religious exercise rights under the First Amendment. Id.
On March 9, 2009, in lieu of answering, defendants moved for dismissal of portions of plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Dkt. No. 13. In their motion, defendants argue that 1) since plaintiff does not allege that they were directly involved in the drawing of blood, medicating of the plaintiff, or the use of force, they cannot be held personally liable; 2) in any event, the force applied to plaintiff was de minimis, and therefore does not give rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment; 3) plaintiff failed to allege the existence of a serious medical condition, and therefore cannot pursue a claim of deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment; and 4) defendants are shielded from suit in their official capacities by the Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Id. Plaintiff has since submitted an affidavit, filed on March 30, 2009, in opposition to defendants' pending motion. Dkt. No. 15.
Defendants' motion, which is now ripe for determination, has been referred to me for the issuance of a report and recommendation, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Northern District of New York Local Rule 72.3(c). See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Dismissal Motion Standard
A motion to dismiss a complaint, brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, calls upon a court to gauge the facial sufficiency of that pleading, utilizing as a backdrop a pleading standard which, though unexacting in its requirements, "demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation" in order to withstand scrutiny. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007)). The relevant pleading requirements are set forth in Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires that a complaint contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Id. While modest in its mandates, that rule commands that a complaint contain more than mere legal conclusions; "[w]hile legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations." Ashcroft, 129 S.Ct. at 1950.
To withstand a motion to dismiss, a complaint must plead sufficient facts which, when accepted as true, state a claim which is plausible on its face. Ruotolo v. City of New York, 514 F.3d 184, 188 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. at 1974). As the Second Circuit has observed, "[w]hile Twombly does not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, it does require enough facts to 'nudge [plaintiffs'] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.'" In re Elevator Antitrust Litig., 502 F.3d 47, 50 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. at 1974).
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal motion, the court must accept the material facts alleged in the complaint as true, and draw all inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546, 546, 84 S.Ct. 1723, 1734 (1964); Miller v. Wolpoff Abramson, LLP, 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 823, 124 S.Ct. 153 (2003); Burke v. Gregory, 356 F. Supp.2d 179, 182 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (Kahn, J.). The burden undertaken by a party requesting dismissal of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) is substantial; the question presented by such a motion is not whether the plaintiff is likely ultimately to prevail, "'but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.'" Log On America, Inc. v. Promethean Asset Mgmt. L.L.C., 223 F. Supp.2d 435, 441 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (quoting Gant v. Wallingford Bd. of Educ., 69 F.3d 669, 673 (2d Cir. 1995)) (other quotations omitted).
When assessing the sufficiency of a complaint against this backdrop, particular deference should be afforded to a pro se litigant whose complaint merits a generous construction by the court when determining whether it states a cognizable cause of action. Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94, 127 S.Ct. at 2200 (2007) ("'[A] pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers'") (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 292 (1976) (internal quotations omitted)); Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 350 (2d Cir. 2003) (citation omitted); Donhauser v. Goord, 314 F. Supp.2d 119, 121 (N.D.N.Y. 2004) (Hurd, J.). In the event of a perceived deficiency in a pro se plaintiff's complaint, a court should not dismiss without granting leave to amend at least once if there is any indication that a valid claim might be stated. Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 704-05 (2d Cir. 1991); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a) (leave to amend "shall be freely given when justice so requires").
B. Personal Involvement
In their motion, defendants assert that they cannot be held liable for the constitutional violations alleged since they did not actually touch and apply force, draw blood from, or administer medication to the plaintiff. Defendants assert that because civil liability under section 1983 cannot be predicated upon a theory of respondeat superior, they have no personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation.
Undeniably, personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under section 1983. Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing Moffitt v. Town of Brookfield, 950 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1991) and McKinnon v. Patterson, 568 F.2d 930, 934 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1087, 98 S.Ct. 1282 (1978)). In order to prevail on a section 1983 cause of action against an individual, a plaintiff must show some tangible connection between the constitutional violation alleged and that particular defendant. Id.
In this instance it is true plaintiff's complaint does not allege that either of the defendants personally touched the plaintiff, applied force, drew blood, or administered medication against plaintiff's will. This fact, however, does not shield defendants from liability. Plaintiff's complaint alleges that those acts were performed at the direction of the defendants, a circumstance establishing their involvement in the constitutional deprivation. When a constitutional deprivation occurs based upon conduct of a subordinate acting in the direction of a supervisor, liability on the part of the supervisor can lie. Blyden v. Mancusi, 186 F.3d 252, 264 (2d Cir. 1999) ("[S]upervisor may be found personally involved in a deprivation . . . [if he or she] . . . directly participated in the infraction."); see also Collins v. Goord, 581 F. Supp.2d 563, 575 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (supervisor's motion for summary judgment denied where question of fact existed as to whether law library supervisor acted as a decision maker). I therefore recommend against dismissal of plaintiff's claims against the defendants on this basis.
C. Excessive Force
Defendants next argue that the force applied to the plaintiff during the course of drawing his blood and medicating him was de minimis, and thus does not rise to a level sufficient to support a cognizable claim of cruel and unusual punishment.
Plaintiff's excessive force claim arises under the Eighth Amendment. A plaintiff's constitutional right under that constitutional provision against cruel and unusual punishment is violated by an "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319, 106 S.Ct. 1076, 1084 (1986) (citations and quotations omitted); Griffen v. Crippen, 193 F.3d 89, 91 (2d Cir. 1999). The lynchpin inquiry in deciding claims of excessive force against prison officials is "whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm." Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7, 112 S.Ct. 995, 999 (1992) (applying Whitley to all excessive force claims); Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21, 106 S.Ct. at 1085 (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.) (Friendly, J.), cert. denied sub nom., John v. Johnson, 414 U.S. 1033, 94 S.Ct. 462 (1973)). Analysis of claims of cruel and unusual punishment requires both objective and subjective examinations. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8, 112 S.Ct. at 999; Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298-99, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 2324 (1991); Griffen, 193 F.3d at 91.
Although the record does not reveal the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff's commitment to CNYPC, it appears that plaintiff was still within the custody of the DOCS at the time. Information maintained on the DOCS inmate lookup web site indicates that, during the times relevant to his complaint, plaintiff was serving a prison terms of twenty-five years to life, with a parole eligibility date of March 22, 2030. http://nysdocslookup.docs.state.ny.us. Even though plaintiff was not physically located at a DOCS facility at the relevant time, because he was a prison inmate within the DOCS care and control the analysis of his excessive use of force claim is properly conducted within the framework of the Eighth Amendment, see, e.g., Cruz v. Ward, 558 F.2d 658 (2d Cir. 1977) (applying Eighth Amendment to claim of inmates involving the decision to transfer from psychiatric facility back to prison; Candelaria v. Erickson, No. 01 Civ. 8594, 2005 WL 1529566 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2005) (applying Eighth Amendment to inmate claim of medical indifference against hospital), and not the Fourteenth, which would apply in circumstances involving an involuntary civil commitment. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 312, 102 S. Ct. 2452, 2456 (1982).
The objective prong of the inquiry is contextual, and relies upon "contemporary standards of decency." Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8 (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103, 97 S.Ct. at 290). When addressing this component of an excessive force claim under the Eighth Amendment calculus, the court can consider the extent of the injury suffered by the inmate plaintiff. While the absence of significant injury is certainly relevant, it is not dispositive, as the defendants seemingly suggest. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7, 112 S.Ct. at 999. The extent of an inmate's injury is but one of the factors to be considered in determining a prison official's use of force was "unnecessary and wanton"; courts should also consider the need for force, whether the force was proportionate to the need, the threat reasonably perceived by the officials, and what, if anything, the officials did to limit their use of force. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321, 106 S.Ct. at 1085 (citing Johnson, 481 F.2d at 1033). Under Hudson, even if the injuries suffered by a plaintiff "'were not permanent or severe'", a plaintiff may still recover if "'the force used was unreasonable and excessive.'" Corselli v. Coughlin, 842 F.2d 23, 26 (2d Cir. 1988) (quoting Robinson v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 924 (2d Cir. 1987)).
Turning to the subjective element, as defendants argue, to prevail, plaintiff must establish that defendant acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Davidson v. Flynn, 32 F.3d 27, 30 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8, 112 S.Ct. at 999). That determination is informed by four factors, including 1) the need for application of force; 2) the relationship between that need and the amount of force used; 3) the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials; and 4) any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321, 106 S.Ct. at 1085. The principal focus of this inquiry "turns on 'whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.'" Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21, 106 S.Ct. at 1085 (quoting Johnson, 481 F.2d at 1033). When considering the subjective element of the governing Eighth Amendment test, a court must consider that the absence of serious injury, though relevant, does not necessarily negate a finding of wantonness since, as the Supreme Court has noted,
[w]hen prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of decency always are violated. . . . This is true whether or not significant injury is evident. Otherwise, the Eighth Amendment would permit any physical punishment, no matter how diabolic or inhuman, inflicting less than some arbitrary quantity of injury.Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9, 112 S.Ct. at 1000 (citations omitted); Velasquez v. O'Keefe, 899 F. Supp. 972, 973 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (McAvoy, C.J.) (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9, 112 S.Ct. at 1000); see Romaine v. Rewson, 140 F. Supp.2d 204, 211 (N.D.N.Y. 2001) (Kahn, J.). Even a de minimis use of physical force can constitute cruel and unusual punishment if it is "repugnant to the conscience of mankind." Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9-10, 112 S.Ct. 1000 (citations omitted).
It should be noted, however, that in practice a truly de minimis use of force will rarely suffice to state a constitutional claim. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9-10, 112 S.Ct. at 1000 ("[Not] every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action"); Griffen, 193 F.3d at 91 (citing Romano v. Howarth, 998 F.2d 101, 105 (2d Cir. 1993)); Johnson, 481 F.2d at 1033 ("Not every push or shove, even if it later may seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge's chambers, violates a prisoner's constitutional rights").
While the degree of force utilized to draw blood from the plaintiff and to medicate him against his will is not the subject of a great deal of elaboration in his complaint, it is clear that plaintiff does not allege more than a de minimis restraint, without any resulting physical injury. Moreover, plaintiff's complaint makes it clear that the use of force was exercised solely for the purpose of drawing blood and medicating him, over his religious objections, and was not applied maliciously and sadistically in order to cause harm or otherwise in a violation of contemporary standards of decency. Under these circumstances, even accepting as true the allegations set forth in plaintiff's complaint, they do not rise to a level sufficient to support a viable Eighth Amendment excessive force claim. Hasenmeier-McCarthy v. Rose, 986 F. Supp. 464, 470-71 (S.D. Ohio 1998). I therefore recommend dismissal of that portion of plaintiff's complaint which asserts an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against the defendant, though with leave to replead should plaintiff claim the use of force beyond mere reasonable restraint for the purpose of drawing blood and medicating the plaintiff.
D. Deliberate Medical Indifference
In their motion, defendants also attack plaintiff's second cause of action, which alleges deliberate indifference to plaintiff's serious medical needs, arguing that plaintiff's complaint fails to allege the existence of such a need.
Claims that prison officials have intentionally disregarded an inmate's medical needs are also encompassed within the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104, 97 S.Ct. at 291. In order to state a medical indifference claim under the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff must first allege a deprivation involving a medical need which is, in objective terms, "'sufficiently serious'". Hathaway v. Coughlin, 37 F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied sub nom., Foote v. Hathaway, 513 U.S. 1154, 115 S.Ct. 1108 (1995) (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298, 111 S.Ct. at 2324). A medical need is serious for constitutional purposes if it presents "'a condition of urgency' that may result in 'degeneration' or 'extreme pain'." Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 702 (2d Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). A serious medical need can also exist where "'failure to treat a prisoner's condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain'"; since medical conditions vary in severity, a decision to leave a condition untreated may or may not be unconstitutional, depending on the facts. Harrison v. Barkley, 219 F.3d 132, 136-37 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting, inter alia, Chance, 143 F.3d at 702). Relevant factors informing this determination include whether the plaintiff suffers from an injury that a "'reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment'", a condition that "'significantly affects'" a prisoner's daily activities, or "'the existence of chronic and substantial pain.'" Chance, 143 F.3d at 701 (citation omitted); Lafave v. Clinton County, No. CIV. 9:00CV774, 2002 WL 31309244, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2002) (Sharpe, M.J.) (citation omitted).
Copies of all unreported decisions cited in this document have been appended for the convenience of the pro se plaintiff.
The injuries which, plaintiff asserts, required medical attention that was denied to him by prison officials include unspecified injuries to two fingers, as well as the affects of medication including an inability to stand, weak joints, chronic headaches, and blurred eyes. Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 7) ¶ 13; see also Meeks Aff. (Dkt. No. 15) ¶ 4. Plaintiff's allegations fail to disclose the existence of a condition of urgency which could result in regeneration or extreme pain. Under the circumstances, I recommend that plaintiff's deliberate medical indifference claim be dismissed, with leave to replead. Shomo v. City of New York, 579 F.3d 176, 183 (2d Cir. 2009) ("'[A] pro se complaint is to be read liberally,' and 'should not [be] dismissed without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.'") (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam)).
E. Eleventh Amendment/Sovereign Immunity
Lastly, in support of their motion defendants assert that plaintiff's claims against them in their official capacities are barred by the immunity provided under the Eleventh Amendment.
The Eleventh Amendment protects a state against suits brought in federal court by citizens of that state, regardless of the nature of the relief sought. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782, 98 S.Ct. 3057, 3057-58 (1978). This absolute immunity which states enjoy under the Eleventh Amendment extends both to state agencies, and in favor of state officials sued for damages in their official capacities when the essence of the claim involved seeks recovery from the state as the real party in interest. Richards v. State of New York Appellate Division, Second Dep't, 597 F. Supp. 689, 691 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd 767 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1985) (citing Pugh and Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85, 89-91, 102 S.Ct. 2325, 2328-29 (1982)). To the extent that a state official is sued for damages in his or her official capacity, the official is entitled to invoke the Eleventh Amendment immunity belonging to the state. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166-67, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 3105 (1985); Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30-31, 112 S.Ct. 358, 361 (1991).
In a broader sense, this portion of defendants' motion implicates the sovereign immunity enjoyed by the State. As the Supreme Court has reaffirmed relatively recently, the sovereign immunity enjoyed by the states is deeply rooted, having been recognized in this country even prior to ratification of the Constitution, and is neither dependent upon nor defined by the Eleventh Amendment. Northern Ins. Co. of New York v. Chatham County, 547 U.S. 189,193, 126 S.Ct. 1689, 1693 (2006).
By contrast, the Eleventh Amendment does not establish a barrier against suits seeking to impose individual or personal liability on state officials under section 1983. See Hafer, 502 U.S. at 30-31, 112 S.Ct. at 364-65.
Since plaintiff's damage claims against the named defendants in their official capacities are in reality claims against the State of New York, thus exemplifying those against which the Eleventh Amendment protects, they are subject to dismissal. Daisernia v. State of New York, 582 F. Supp. 792, 79899 (N.D.N.Y. 1984) (McCurn, J.). I therefore recommend this portion of defendants' motion be granted, and that plaintiff's damage claim against the defendants in their capacity as state officials be dismissed.
IV. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATION
In their motion, while not challenging the sufficiency of plaintiff's free exercise claim under the First Amendment, defendants assert that Meeks' deliberate indifference and excessive force claims are not plausibly stated in his complaint, as amended. Having carefully reviewed plaintiff's complaint I am in agreement with defendants' position, and therefore recommend dismissal of those claims, though with leave to replead. Shomo v. City of New York, 579 F.3d at 183. I further find that defendants are entitled to dismissal of plaintiff's damage claims against them in their official capacities based upon the immunity afforded by the Eleventh Amendment. Accordingly, it is hereby respectfully
Although nowhere mentioned in this second amended complaint, plaintiff's motion response intimates the possibility of the First Amendment claim of retaliation. See Meeks Aff. (Dkt. No. 15) ¶ 5 ("The Defendant's [sic] Denial of Medical Attention to Plaintiff was a form of punishment to Plaintiff by the Defendants, because He Had threatened them with Civil Action"). If he chooses to amend his complaint yet again, the plaintiff may consider adding a claim of unlawful retaliation.
RECOMMENDED that defendants' dismissal motion (Dkt. No. 13) be GRANTED and that plaintiff's claims against the defendants' in their official capacities be DISMISSED, with prejudice, and that his excessive force and deliberate medical indifference causes of action DISMISSED, with leave to replead. Dkt. No. 13.
NOTICE: Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may lodge written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court within FOURTEEN days of service of this report. FAILURE TO SO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), 6(d), 72; Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993).
It is hereby ORDERED that the clerk of the court serve a copy of this Report and Recommendation upon the parties in accordance with this court's local rules.
Dated: January 4, 2010
Syracuse, NY