Opinion
No. CV 16-8292-FFM
07-21-2017
JUAN GILBERTO MEDRANO, Petitioner, v. SCOTT FRAUENHEIM, Respondent.
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
I. PROCEEDINGS
Petitioner, Juan Gilberto Medrano, a state prisoner in the custody of the California Department of Corrections, constructively filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on November 1, 2016. On February 9, 2017, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the Petition. On March 17, 2017, Petitioner filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss. On April 3, 2017, Respondent filed a reply. The parties have consented to have the undersigned conduct all proceedings in this case, including the resolution of all dispositive matters. The matter, thus, stands submitted and ready for decision. / / /
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A Los Angeles County Superior Court jury found Petitioner guilty of two counts of second degree murder and one count of assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (Cal. Penal Code §§ 187, 245). He was sentenced to thirty years to life, plus three years.
Petitioner then appealed his conviction. On August 21, 2014, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. Petitioner then filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court, which denied review on November 12, 2014.
Over one year later, on November 16, 2015, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Los Angeles Superior Court. While that petition was pending, Petitioner filed a federal habeas petition in this Court on November 18, 2015. (See Case No. 15-8970-DDP (FFM).) Therein, he asserted the same grounds for relief that he had asserted in the petition that he filed in the Los Angeles Superior Court. On December 18, 2015, this Court dismissed Petitioner's federal petition without prejudice because all of the claims were unexhausted and because they were pending before the Los Angeles Superior Court.
Subsequently, on April 28, 2016, the Los Angeles Superior Court denied Petitioner's state court habeas petition. In doing so, the Los Angeles Superior Court explained that, among other things, the petition was "untimely" and that "[P]etitioner ha[d] failed to explain and justify the significant delay in seeking habeas relief." (Lodged Doc. No. 12.)
Thereafter, on June 13, 2016, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Court of Appeal. On June 24, 2016, the California Court of Appeal denied the petition, noting that, among other things, "the issues [were] untimely raised without sufficient justification for delay. . . ." (Lodged Doc. No. 14.)
Petitioner then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court on August 22, 2016. On October 26, 2016, the California Supreme Court summarily denied the petition.
Petitioner then initiated this action.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Law
The current Petition was filed after the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") was signed into law and is, thus, subject to AEDPA's one-year limitation period, as set forth at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). See Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1286 (9th Cir. 1997). Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) provides the following:
Beeler was overruled on other grounds in Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 540 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc).
(1) A one-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of-
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court
and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
B. The Petition Was Not Filed Within the Limitation Period
As a general rule, the limitation period begins running on the date that the petitioner's direct review becomes final. Lopez v. Felker, 536 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1156 (C.D. Cal. 2008). Here, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition for review on November 12, 2014, and he did not file a petition of certiorari in the Supreme Court. Accordingly, Petitioner's conviction became final ninety days later, on February 10, 2015. See Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999). Therefore, Petitioner had until February 10, 2016 to file a timely federal petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Petitioner, however, constructively filed the instant Petition on November 1, 2016, over nine months later. Consequently, the present action is untimely, absent statutory or equitable tolling of the limitations period.
1. Statutory Tolling
Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) provides that "[t]he time during which a properly filed application for state post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection."
The statute of limitations is not tolled between the date on which a judgment becomes final and the date on which the petitioner filed his first state collateral challenge because there is no case "pending." Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999). Once an application for post-conviction review commences, it is "pending" until a petitioner "complete[s] a full round of [state] collateral review." Delhomme v. Ramirez, 340 F.3d 817, 819 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Biggs v. Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 2003)). "One full round" generally means that the statute of limitations is tolled while a petitioner is properly pursuing post-conviction relief, from the time a California prisoner files his first state habeas petition until the California Supreme Court rejects his final collateral challenge. Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 219-20, 122 S. Ct. 2134, 153 L. Ed. 2d 260 (2002); see also Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006; Delhomme, 340 F.3d at 819. The period tolled includes the time between a lower court decision and the filing of a new petition in a higher court, as long as the intervals between the filing of those petitions are "reasonable." Delhomme, 340 F.3d at 819 (citing Biggs, 339 F.3d at 1048 n.1).
Here, Petitioner is entitled to no statutory tolling. Although Petitioner filed a state habeas petition in the Los Angles Superior Court before the one-year limitations period expired, that petition did not statutorily toll the limitations period because the superior court found that the petition was untimely. Consequently, that petition was not properly filed. Moreover, that the superior court rejected Petitioner's state habeas petition for alternative reasons does not render his state petition timely. As the Ninth Circuit has explained, a state court's untimeliness determination renders a petition not "properly filed" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. section 2244(d)(2), even if the state court alternatively denies a petition the merits. Bonner v. Carey, 425 F.3d 1145, 1148-49 (9th Cir. 2005), amended by, 439 F.3d 993 (9th Cir.). Thus, because Petitioner failed to properly file a collateral state court challenge to his conviction within one year of the date on which that conviction became final, statutory tolling is inapplicable to Petitioner's instant Petition.
Further, the state habeas petitions that Petitioner filed after the limitations period expired did not toll the limitations period because, by that time, there was no longer a limitations period to toll. See Green v. White, 223 F.3d 1001, 1003 (9th Cir. 2000). Regardless, Petitioner's second state habeas petition was, likewise, denied by the California Court of Appeal because it was untimely. Although Petitioner's third state habeas petition was denied without comment, it is presumed to have been denied for the same reasons as set forth in the court of appeal's prior order denying Petitioner's second state habeas petition. In other words, it, too, was denied as untimely. Bonner, 425 F.3d at 1148 n.13 (explaining that reviewing courts look to last reasoned state court decision denying habeas relief to determine basis for silent denials of subsequent state habeas petitions). Although Petitioner may believe that the state courts' timeliness rulings were incorrect, this Court is bound by the state court's interpretation of state law. See Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76, 126 S. Ct. 602, 163 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2005) (per curiam) (stating that "a state court's interpretation of state law, including one announced on direct appeal of the challenged conviction, binds a federal court sitting in habeas corpus").
Moreover, Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling for any of the period during which his previously-filed federal habeas petition was pending. A pending federal habeas petition does not statutorily toll AEDPA's limitations period. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 180-81, 121 S. Ct. 2120, 150 L. Ed. 2d 251 (2001).
Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to any statutory tolling. Thus, absent equitable tolling, the petition is untimely.
2. Equitable Tolling
The AEDPA limitations period also may be subject to equitable tolling, if the petitioner shows that extraordinary circumstances beyond the petitioner's control prevented him from timely filing of a federal habeas petition and the petitioner has acted diligently in pursuing his rights. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 177 L. Ed. 2d 130 (2010); Jefferson v. Budge, 419 F.3d 1013, 1016 (9th Cir. 2005); Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003); Fail, 315 F.3d at 1061-62; Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002); Frye v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 2001). The petitioner bears the burden of showing that equitable tolling is appropriate. Miranda, 292 F.3d at 1065.
Here, Petitioner cites several reasons why, in his opinion, equitable tolling of the limitations period is warranted. First, he maintains that the state habeas petition form provided inadequate space to allow him to explain why he delayed the filing of his initial state habeas petition. Specifically, he complains that the state form provided only two lines for him to explain his delay in filing his state habeas petition. As a result, according to Petitioner, he was unable to set forth a comprehensive explanation. Presumably, Petitioner believes that the state superior court would have reached a different conclusion regarding the timeliness of his initial state court habeas petition if he had he been provided more space explain his delay in filing it.
Second, Petitioner asserts that his delay in filing his initial state court habeas petition was justifiable due to the voluminous trial record in his case. According to Petitioner, the trial record spanned approximately 3,200 pages, through which Petitioner had to carefully sift in order to identify the constitutional errors alleged in his initial state habeas petition. As a result, he was unable to file his first state habeas petition in a manner that would have been deemed timely by the state court.
Third, Petitioner maintains that the difficulty in identifying and presenting the alleged constitutional errors at trial was compounded by the fact that he had limited access to the prison law library. According to Petitioner, he was denied access to the law library altogether during his first four months of incarceration. Moreover, he claims that, once he was transferred to another prison, he had, at best, limited access to the law library for a period of nearly two years because the "yard" in which he was housed did not have a law library. Although he was able to use the law library in a different "yard" of the prison during this time, he was only able to do so when the prison was not in lockdown. And, even when he was able to access the law library, he was only able to do so for four hours at a time, two hours of which he had to spend in line waiting for legal materials. As explained below, Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling.
At bottom, Petitioner's arguments are not related to his ability to file a timely federal habeas petition; rather, they are directed at whether or not his state habeas petitions were timely filed (or whether any untimeliness in filing those petitions was excusable or justifiable). Indeed, one of Petitioner's equitable tolling arguments is directed at the adequacy of California's habeas petition form. In that argument, Petitioner claims that the state court could not properly determine if his initial state habeas petition was timely filed because the state habeas forms did not provide enough room to allow him to explain his delay in filing the petition. But that argument misses the mark. Put simply, his state habeas petitions were not properly filed under state law and, as such, they did not statutorily toll the AEDPA one-year limitations period. See Robinson v. Lewis, 795 F.3d 926, 929 (9th Cir. 2015).
The question of whether equitable tolling of the AEDPA limitations period is warranted presents a different question. In answering that question, this Court must determine whether an extraordinary circumstance beyond Petitioner's control prevented him from timely filing a federal habeas petition. Holland, 560 U.S. at 638. Whether or not Petitioner was able to timely file his state habeas petitions has little, if any, bearing on that question.
Moreover, the fact that Petitioner filed a state habeas petition, albeit an untimely one under state law, as well as the fact that he filed an unexhausted federal habeas petition within the one-year federal limitations period, strongly indicates -- if not conclusively demonstrates -- that no extraordinary circumstance prevented him from timely filing a federal habeas petition. See Gaston v. Bock, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034-35 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that district court did not err in denying petitioner equitable tolling based on alleged mental impairment where petitioner was able to file state habeas petitions during time period for which he sought equitable tolling). What is more, there was nothing to prevent Petitioner from filing his first state habeas petition in the California Supreme Court, as opposed to filing it in the Los Angeles Superior Court. Indeed, "[r]ather than requiring a petitioner whose habeas petition has been dismissed to appeal that decision to a higher court, California law provides that an original petition may be filed at each level of the California court system." Robinson, 795 F.3d at 929.
Regardless, none of the reasons cited by Petitioner warrants equitable tolling. First, Petitioner's assertion about the purported inadequacy of the state habeas petition form is meritless. Petitioner claims that he was precluded from providing a more fulsome explanation regarding the delay in filing his initial state habeas petition because the portion of the petition calling for explanations did not state that petitioners are permitted to attach additional pages to their petitions. On the first page of the state habeas petition form, however, the following language appears: "Answer all applicable questions in the proper spaces. If you need additional space, add an extra page and indicate that your answer is 'continued on additional page.'" (Lodged Doc. No. 12 (emphasis added).)
Petitioner also contends that equitable tolling is warranted because the state habeas petition form was confusing. At best, this contention amounts to a claim that Petitioner lacked the legal sophistication to timely file his state habeas petition. Aside from the fact that the timeliness of Petitioner's state habeas petitions is not relevant to the Court's equitable tolling analysis (see supra), petitioner's purported lack of legal sophistication does not warrant equitable tolling. See Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating that "a pro se petitioner's lack of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling"); Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1013 n.4 (9th Cir. 2009) ("[W]e have held that a pro se petitioner's confusion or ignorance of the law is not, itself, a circumstance warranting equitable tolling[.]") (citation omitted).
Second, there is no merit to Petitioner's allegations regarding the purportedly voluminous trial court record. Although Petitioner asserts that the record spanned 3,200 pages, it is, in truth, approximately half that size. (See Lodged Doc. Nos. 1-4). What is more, even if the record, in fact, were 3,200 pages, its length, alone, would not justify equitable tolling. See Whelan v. Harrington, 2012 WL 70600466, *5-6 (C.D. Cal. June 18, 2012) (length of petitioner's trial record, which spanned 4,963 pages, did not excuse 80-day delay between filings of state habeas petitions where claims in petition were discoverable from trial record and ultimately were rejected by state court without need for evidentiary hearing); compare with, Maxwell v. Roe, 628 F.3d 486, 496-97 (9th Cir. 2010) (statutory tolling appropriate despite prolonged delay between filings of state habeas petitions where record of "unique[ly] com[plex]" case involving ten counts of capital murder spanned 20,000 pages, gave rise to seven-year appeal process, generated order to show cause by state supreme court on issue raised in petition, and resulted in two-year evidentiary hearing regarding petitioner's state habeas petition). Although Petitioner cannot be faulted for carefully sifting through his trial record, there is no reason to believe that doing constituted an extraordinary circumstance. And, indeed, after his conviction, Petitioner had well-over two years to sift through the trial record before his conviction even became final.
Third, Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling with respect to his purported lack of access to the prison law library. As for the first four months of his incarceration, when he claims to have been denied all access to the prison law library, equitable tolling is not warranted because his purported lack of access to the law library could not have impacted his ability to file a timely federal habeas petition. Petitioner was convicted on September 26, 2012. His conviction did not become final until February 10, 2015 -- in other words, the statute of limitations had not even begun to run during Petitioner's first four months in prison. Thus, whether or not Petitioner had access to the prison law library during his first four months of incarceration had no impact on his ability to file a timely federal habeas petition.
Moreover, Petitioner's purported limited access to the prison law library for an undefined two-year period after being transferred was not an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling. In general, a petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling simply because he remained in administrative segregation and had limited access to law library. See Ramirez, 571 F.3d at 998; but see id. at 998 (noting that "a complete lack of access to a legal file may constitute an extraordinary circumstance").
Petitioner does not indicate when he was transferred from his original place of incarceration, other than noting that the transfer occurred sometime afer his first four months of incarceration. If Petitioner was transferred immediately after that four-month period ended, then he would not be entitled to equitable tolling for the reasons stated above. Indeed, under that scenario, Petitioner's access to the law library was limited only until sometime around March of 2015, which would have left him approximately eleven months to prepare his federal habeas petition. --------
Notwithstanding this general rule, the Ninth Circuit has held that equitable tolling may be appropriate where a petitioner held in administrative segregation is denied access to his legal materials, despite diligent efforts to obtain those materials. See Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1028 (9th Cir. 2005). Thus, in Espinoza-Matthews, the Ninth Circuit held that equitable tolling was warranted where the petitioner was repeatedly denied access to requested legal materials while confined in protective administrative segregation for eleven months. Id. In reaching this holding, the Ninth Circuit found significant that, once the petitioner's files were returned to him, he had only one month in which to file a timely petition.
Here, Petitioner does not even allege the dates during which his access to the law library was limited, other than to note that it was sometime after his first four months of incarceration. Based on that fact alone, Petitioner has failed to meet his burden to show that equitable tolling is warranted. And, although he contends that the prison was on lockdown during some of that time, he does not indicate when or for how long the prison purportedly was on lockdown. Putting that fact aside, Petitioner also has failed to provide any documentary proof showing that he sought legal materials from the prison library while he supposedly was denied access to it. Nor has he shown that the prison in which he is incarcerated lacked a system to deliver legal materials to prisoners who were unable to, or not permitted to, visit the prison library. Given this dearth of evidentiary support, any supposed lockdown cannot justify equitable tolling of the statute of limitations.
Moreover, unlike the petitioner in Espinoza-Matthews, who was confined in protective administrative segregation for eleven months and, therefore, had no access to the law library during that time, Petitioner concedes that he had some access to the law library throughout the undefined two-year period. Although he complains that he had to share the library with inmates from another "yard" and that he was required to wait in line to use the library, those circumstances are far from extraordinary. Thus, Petitioner's purported lack of access to (or limited access to) the law library does not warrant equitable tolling of the limitations period.
Petitioner failed to file his federal habeas petition within one year of the date on which the AEDPA's one-year limitations period began to run. Neither statutory nor equitable tolling brings the Petition within the limitations period. Accordingly, the Petition is time-barred.
IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Under Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, a court must grant or deny a certificate of appealability ("COA") when it denies a state habeas petition. See also 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c).
An appeal may not be taken from the denial by a district judge of a habeas petition in which the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a state court "unless a circuit justice or a circuit or district judge issues a certificate of appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)." Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). "A certificate of appealability may issue . . . only if . . . [there is] a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
Here, the Court has concluded that the Petition is time-barred. Thus, the Court's determination of whether a certificate of appealability ("COA") should issue is governed by the Supreme Court's decision in Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 120 S. Ct. 1595, 146 L. Ed. 2d 542 (2000). In Slack, the Supreme Court held that "[w]hen the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner's underlying constitutional claim, a COA should issue when . . . jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling." 529 U.S. at 484. As the Supreme Court further explained:
Section 2253 mandates that both showings be made before the court of appeals may entertain the appeal. Each component of the § 2253(c) showing is part of a threshold inquiry, and a court may find that it can dispose of the application in a fair and prompt manner if it proceeds first to resolve the issue whose answer is more apparent from the record and arguments.Id. at 485.
The Court finds that the requisite showing has not been made that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the Court is correct in ruling that the Petition is time-barred.
THEREFORE, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253, a certificate of appealability is denied.
V. ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, Respondent's motion to dismiss is granted. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Judgment be entered denying and dismissing the Petition with prejudice. A certificate of appealability is denied. DATED: July 21, 2017
/ s /FREDERICK F. MUMM
FREDERICK F. MUMM
United States Magistrate Judge