Thus, Guardado provides little help to the Court today. Guardado also went to great lengths to differentiate its holding from that of Medina v. United States, 92 F. Supp. 2d 545 (E.D. Va. 2000). In Medina, the Court was concerned that a broad reading of Section 1252(g) would preclude judicial review of a claim "even where there [was] blatantly lawless and unconstitutional conduct" taking place.

The only other circuit to have addressed the interaction of § 1252(g) and Bivens similarly stressed the importance of alternative remedies in precluding a damages action. See Humphries v. Various Federal USINS Employees, 164 F.3d 936, 945 (5th Cir. 1999) ("Aliens wishing to raise [constitutional] challenges in the future should do so either in a petition for review or for habeas corpus."); see also Khorrami v. Rolince, 493 F.Supp.2d 1061, 1068-69 (N.D.Ill. 2007) (following Humphries, while commenting that "I am not at all certain that this [Fourth Amendment cause of action] is the type of claim Congress sought to bar when it enacted § 1252(g)," and noting that "Dr. Khorrami had a remedy available to him: he could have raised his challenges in a petition for habeas corpus.").But see Medina v. United States, 92 F.Supp.2d 545, 554 (E.D.Va. 2000) (rejecting Humphries' reasoning). We recognize that Foster v. Townsley, 243 F.3d 210, 214-15 (5th Cir. 2001), in holding that § 1252(g) precluded jurisdiction over an alien's Bivens action, did not address Humphries' concern about the availability of some remedy other than a Bivens action.

(Resp. at 14.) The clause also obviates the concern raised in the single case Plaintiff cites in support of his argument, Medina v. United States, 92 F. Supp. 2d 545 (E.D. Va. 2000), vacated on other grounds, 259 F.3d 220 (4th Cir. 2001). There Judge Lee was concerned that a broad reading of § 1252 would preclude judicial review of a claim stemming from an arrest on a detention order "even where there [was] blatantly lawless and unconstitutional conduct by the INS agents," "creating grave constitutional issues."

Since I find that Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim (the arrest/detention portion) "arises from" the decision to commence removal proceedings, I find that § 1252(g) divests this Court of subject-matter jurisdiction to hear it. But see Medina v. United States, 92 F.Supp.2d 545, 554 (E.D.Va. 2000) ("§ 1252(g) does not indicate that Congress intended to divest the court of jurisdiction over Bivens actions arising out of the unconstitutional conduct of federal officers.").