Opinion
2020-345 S C
12-23-2021
Frecilannia MEDINA, Respondent, v. PERFECT BODY IMAGE, LLC, Appellant, Jemima Miranda, Sued Herein as Jemina Miranda, Defendant.
Doreen J. Shindel & Associates, P.C. (Doreen J. Shindel of counsel), for appellant. Frecilannia Medina, respondent pro se (no brief filed).
Doreen J. Shindel & Associates, P.C. (Doreen J. Shindel of counsel), for appellant.
Frecilannia Medina, respondent pro se (no brief filed).
PRESENT: TERRY JANE RUDERMAN, P.J., JERRY GARGUILO, HELEN VOUTSINAS, JJ
ORDERED that the judgment, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, without costs.
In this small claims action, plaintiff seeks to recover the principal sum of $5,000, based on defendant Perfect Body Image, LLC's (defendant's) alleged wrongful cancellation of a sales agreement. At a nonjury trial, it was established that, on April 8, 2017, plaintiff and her friend, Santa Pardilla, had gone to defendant's business establishment, where they each met with defendant Jemima Miranda, who discussed defendant's services with them. The same day, plaintiff signed a Spanish-language sales agreement on a form that had been drafted by defendant. Under the terms of the agreement, plaintiff agreed to purchase a single session of "Thermage CPT" treatment for a "promotional discounted package price" of $8,000 and a "fair market value" of $15,700. Defendant also agreed to provide plaintiff, at no cost, one additional Thermage treatment with a stated "fair market value" of $11,800 and seven "Velashape III" sessions with a stated "fair market value" of $15,750. Thus, the total stated market price was $43,200, and the discounted price, which was fully paid with a $0 balance, was $8,000. The sales agreement stated, among other things, that plaintiff's payment was nonrefundable; that, if plaintiff failed to complete all the services provided for in the sales agreement or adhere to its terms, plaintiff would be responsible for paying defendant the full "market value" of the services; and that defendant had the right to cancel the services listed in the sales agreement if plaintiff "failed to adhere" to the terms of the agreement. It was undisputed that plaintiff had paid defendant the full $8,000 price set forth in the sales agreement.
On April 8, 2017, plaintiff received her initial Thermage treatment. Plaintiff testified that she had always gone to defendant's establishment with Pardilla; that they had occasionally been refused treatments, because they had either consumed too little or too much water; and that she had received five additional treatments from defendant. On July 30, 2017, Pardilla was involved in a dispute with one of defendant's employees. Defendant thereafter refused to provide any further services to plaintiff.
Following the trial, the District Court dismissed the action against Jemima Miranda and awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $2,666.67 as against defendant upon a finding that defendant had cancelled its sales agreement with plaintiff without cause. Defendant appeals, arguing that plaintiff's payment was nonrefundable in its entirety and that, having provided the single service for which it had charged plaintiff, it had, in any event, satisfied its obligations under the sales agreement. Defendant thus claims that it had no contractual obligation to provide plaintiff with eight-ninths of the services listed in the sales agreement.
In a small claims action, our review is limited to a determination of whether "substantial justice has ... been done between the parties according to the rules and principles of substantive law" ( UDCA 1807 ; see UDCA 1804 ; Ross v Friedman , 269 AD2d 584 [2000] ; Williams v Roper , 269 AD2d 125, 126 [2000] ). Furthermore, the determination of a trier of fact as to issues of credibility is given substantial deference, as a trial court's opportunity to observe and evaluate the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses affords it a better perspective from which to assess their credibility (see Vizzari v State of New York , 184 AD2d 564 [1992] ; Kincade v Kincade , 178 AD2d 510, 511 [1991] ). This deference applies with greater force to judgments rendered in the Small Claims Part of the court (see Williams v Roper , 269 AD2d at 126 ).
We find no ground to disturb the District Court's determination, which was based on a credibility finding, that defendant breached the sales agreement by cancelling it without cause. In its decision, the court noted that the judgment it was awarding plaintiff constituted a sum that was proportionate to the number of treatments defendant had failed to provide. We reject defendant's interpretation of the agreement and, without determining whether the "nonrefundability" provision is enforceable upon a customer's breach—an issue we need not reach—conclude that it in any event cannot be enforced upon defendant's breach. Otherwise defendant, as vendor, could unilaterally breach the contract by choosing not to provide the customer with any or all of the services for which the customer had paid, without having to refund any sum.
As defendant has not challenged the amount awarded to plaintiff, and as plaintiff has not cross-appealed on the ground of inadequacy, we do not pass on the propriety of the amount awarded.
In view of the foregoing, we find that substantial justice (see UDCA 1804, 1807 ) does not require that the judgment, insofar as appealed from, be disturbed.
Accordingly, the judgment, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.
RUDERMAN, P.J., and VOUTSINAS, J., concur.