Opinion
15-73188
06-06-2022
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Argued and Submitted October 22, 2021 Pasadena, California
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Agency No. A094-957-863
Before: CALLAHAN and FORREST, Circuit Judges, and AMON, District Judge.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
MEMORANDUM
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denied Petitioner Donaciano Medellin-Delgado's application for cancellation of removal concluding that his California forgery conviction is a crime involving moral turpitude that disqualifies him for relief. Medellin-Delgado seeks review arguing that intent to defraud was not a required element of his forgery conviction, meaning that his conviction is not a categorical crime involving moral turpitude. Alternatively, he urges us to sua sponte call this case en banc to overturn Velasquez-Rios v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2021), which forecloses his argument that the 2015 retroactive amendment to California Penal Code § 18.5 makes his conviction punishable by less than one year for purposes of the application of 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C).
We review questions of law, including whether a crime involves moral turpitude, de novo, see Barbosa v. Barr, 926 F.3d 1053, 1057 (9th Cir. 2019), and we deny Medellin-Delgado's petition for review. We also decline his invitation to sua sponte call this case en banc.
1. Crime Involving Moral Turpitude.
An alien who has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude that is punishable by one year or more of imprisonment is ineligible for cancellation of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C). We apply the categorical approach to determine whether a crime involves moral turpitude by "identify[ing] the elements of the statute of conviction" and "compar[ing] [them] to the generic definition of a crime involving moral turpitude [to] decide whether the conviction meets that definition." Barbosa, 926 F.3d at 1057 (quotation marks and citation omitted) (third alteration in original); see also Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 257 (2013).
As we explained in our contemporaneous opinion in Vasquez-Borjas v. Garland, __F.4th__ (9th Cir. 2022), California law forecloses the argument that intent to defraud is not an element of a California Penal Code § 472 (Section 472) conviction based on possession. In People v. Castellanos, the California Court of Appeal held that Section 472 requires an intent to defraud and that possession of a forged document "affords an inference" that the possessor of the forged document intended to deceive someone. 110 Cal.App.4th 1489, 1493-94 (2003). The applicable California pattern jury instructions also direct that all convictions under Section 472 require proof of intent to defraud. CALJIC 15.00; CALCRIM No. 1926. Crimes "involving fraud" also involve moral turpitude, see Robles-Urrea v. Holder, 678 F.3d 702, 708 (9th Cir. 2012), and we have held that fraudulent intent is an element of the generic definition of forgery, Vizcarra-Ayala v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, the BIA was correct that Medellin-Delgado's forgery conviction was for a crime involving moral turpitude.
2. Velasquez-Rios v. Wilkinson.
Medellin-Delgado concedes that our decision in Velasquez-Rios forecloses his argument that his conviction no longer makes him ineligible for cancellation of removal because a retroactive change to California law made his conviction punishable by less than a year. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C). But he argues that we should sua sponte call this case en banc to overturn Velasquez-Rios. A petition for rehearing en banc was filed in Velasquez-Rios and circulated to the full court and "no judge . . . requested a vote on whether to rehear the matter." 988 F.3d at 1083. We, therefore, can infer that the court does not believe that en banc reconsideration of Velasquez-Rios is warranted, and we decline Medellin-Delgado's invitation to revisit the issue sua sponte.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
The Honorable Carol Bagley Amon, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.