Summary
applying 90-day limitations period to Title VII claim brought in state court
Summary of this case from Jean-Louis v. Fountain HouseOpinion
85
January 31, 2002.
Order and judgment (one paper), Supreme Court, New York County (Louis York, J.), entered August 31, 2000, which granted defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint as time-barred, unanimously affirmed, without costs.
PRO SE, for plaintiff-appellant.
MARK J. GOLDBERG, for defendant-respondent.
Before: Tom, J.P., Sullivan, Rosenberger, Wallach, Buckley, JJ.
The complaint, alleging discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ( 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.) and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) ( 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.), was properly dismissed as time-barred, since plaintiff did not commence her action until more than 90 days after she was notified by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission of her right to sue (see, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5[f][1] and 42 U.S.C. § 12117[a]; see also, Johnson v. Al Tech Specialties Steel Corp., 731 F.2d 143, 146). While State courts have concurrent jurisdiction over Title VII and ADA claims (see, Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820), plaintiff's claims, interposed beyond the applicable 90-day limitation period set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5[f][1], were nonetheless time-barred; State law is irrelevant in determining whether a private individual has lost her right of action under Title VII through the passage of time (see, Draper v. U.S. Pipe Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515, 522).
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.