Martinez cites Meador v. Ivy, which held that a trial court cannot reform an unambiguous contract unless there are pleadings and proof of mutual mistake or there was a mistake on one side induced by fraud on the other. 390 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1965, no writ). However, Meador did not involve a settlement agreement.

Reformation asks the court to correct a written instrument which, due to mutual mistake or unilateral mistake accompanied by inequitable conduct or fraud, does not represent the true intent of the parties. See, e.g., First National Bank of Andrews v. Jones, 635 S.W.2d 950, 952-53 (Tex.App.-Eastland 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Stegall v. Fulwiler, 423 S.W.2d 182, 186 (Tex.Civ.App.-Amarillo 1967, no writ); Meador v. Ivy, 390 S.W.2d 391, 392 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1965, no writ). When, however, an action for damages based on fraud is sought, the party seeks merely to recover the damages occasioned by the fraud. Although a party may plead, present evidence, and obtain special issues on two or more inconsistent remedies arising from the same state of facts, prosecution of suit to final judgment and obtaining relief under one of the pleaded theories constitutes an election of remedies.

"In such cases," the court in Lawson said, "the courts will leave the parties as they find them, on the same principle that they refuse to enforce any other contract which by reason of its objects, or the nature of the consideration upon which it rests, is violative of law or against public policy." In accord, see: Meador v. Ivy, 390 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tex.Civ.App. San Antonio 1965, no writ). Appellant's attempt to recover half of the proceeds from sale of the seven-acre tract must fail also, for reasons additional to those applicable to the four-acre tract.