Opinion
NO. 4:04-cv-00087-DFH-WGH.
August 2, 2004
ENTRY ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
Plaintiff Angela Mead is a voter in Washington County, Indiana. She alleges that the defendants, the County Commissioners of Washington County, Indiana, have violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as well as Indiana law, by failing to adopt proper election districts for the commissioners themselves and for the county council. Mead alleges that Washington County's three county commissioner districts have a total deviation of 90.93 percent between the most and least populated districts. She alleges that Washington County's four single-member county council districts were also unequal with a total deviation of 50.30 percent. According to Mead, both sets of districts violate the "one person, one vote" principle outlined in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). She seeks to have both the county commissioner and county council districts declared unconstitutional and redrawn. She also alleges that the county commissioners failed to comply with state laws requiring periodic redistricting and districts of nearly equal populations.
Defendants have moved to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim. As explained below, the method of electing members to the two different bodies is different, however, and the difference is decisive, at least at the pleadings stage. Defendants' motion is granted as to the county commissioner districts and denied as to the county council districts.
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a court may dismiss a case "for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim "unless no relief could be granted `under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations.'" Nance v. Vieregge, 147 F.3d 589, 590 (7th Cir. 1998), quoting Hishon v. King Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). If it is possible to hypothesize any set of facts consistent with the complaint that would entitle the plaintiff to relief, dismissal for failure to state a claim is inappropriate. Veazey v. Communications Cable, Inc. 194 F.3d 850, 854 (7th Cir. 1999). Dismissal is proper only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle her to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
Washington County's government, like those of most Indiana counties, includes an executive consisting of three county commissioners and a legislative body made of seven county council members. In these counties, commissioners divide the entire county into three commissioner districts. Each of the three commissioners must reside in a different district, but each is elected by the voters of the entire county. Ind. Code § 36-2-2-5. The commissioners also divide the entire county into four single-member council districts. One council member comes from each of the four districts and is elected by the voters of that districts. The remaining three council seats are elected at-large by the entire county. Ind. Code § 36-2-3-4(a).
The Indiana counties of Marion, Lake, and St. Joseph have structures different from those in Washington and the remaining 88 Indiana counties. See Ind. Code § 36-2-2-1, § 36-2-2-4, § 36-2-3-1 and § 36-2-3-4. This case discusses the method for drawing districts and electing county government for Washington County and the majority of Indiana counties.
I. County Council Districts
Indiana law requires county council districts to follow four rules. Each district must:
(1) be compact, subject only to natural boundary lines (such as railroads, major highways, rivers, creeks, parks, and major industrial complexes);
(2) not cross precinct boundary lines;
(3) contain, as nearly as possible, equal population; and
(4) include whole townships, except when a division is clearly necessary to accomplish redistricting under this section.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution also demands that such legislative districts have as equal a population as possible. The Equal Protection Clause requires "substantial equality of population among the various districts, so that a vote of any citizen is approximately equal in weight to that of any other citizen. . . ." Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 579. This requirement applies to districts for local legislative bodies. Avery v. Midland County, Tex., 390 U.S. 474, 481-85 (1968). When drawing county council districts, therefore, a government entity must make "an honest and good-faith effort to construct its districts `as nearly of equal population as is practicable' but . . . absolute equality [is] a `practical impossibility.'" Vigo County Republican Central Committee v. Vigo County Com'rs, 834 F. Supp. 1080, 1084 (S.D. Ind. 1993), quoting Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 743 (1973).
One standard measure for equality of population among election districts is "total deviation," which is measured by determining the "ideal" population of each district if all districts were exactly equal. The difference between the ideal population and the population of the largest district is converted to a percentage of the ideal population. The difference between the ideal population and the population of the smallest district is also calculated in terms of a percentage of the ideal population. Then the two percentages are added together. See, e.g., Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 529 n. 1 (1969) (examining deviation of most populous and least populous districts from the ideal district population); Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, 547 app. (1969) (same). A district plan with a total deviation of more than 10 percent "creates a prima facie case of discrimination and therefore must be justified by the [body responsible for creating the districts]." Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 843 (1983) (affirming three-judge district court decision dismissing challenge to state legislature redistricting plan where plaintiff made prima facie case, but defendant provided legitimate state policy as justification).
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been applied to an Indiana county council district division before. In Vigo County Republican Central Committee, 834 F. Supp. 1080, Judge Tinder entered judgment in a dispute over the district boundaries for the Vigo County Council. Plaintiff argued that the county council districts were unconstitutional because they contained excessive population deviations. Prior to the lawsuit, Vigo County's council districts had a 37 percent total deviation as measured by the method described above. In response to plaintiffs' lawsuit, the Vigo County Commissioners redrew the district boundaries to achieve 3.8 percent total deviation. Plaintiffs' proposed plan had a deviation of 0.41 percent. The court found that despite the redrawn districts, the plaintiff had shown that the requisite threshold of 10 percent deviation was met originally and that defendant had not given proper justification for the redrawn districts. The court reasoned: "Commissioners may not simply draw up a revised plan with less than a 10% deviation and expect to be exempted from explaining why a plan with a lower deviation was not adopted." 834 F. Supp. at 1085. The court adopted plaintiff's plan.
Mead has alleged a prima facie case on her county council count for a violation of the Equal Protection Clause and Ind. Code § 36-2-3-4(d). In her complaint, Mead states that the total deviation of the Washington County Council districts is 50.30 percent, a number that exceeds the original total deviation in Vigo County and greatly exceeds the presumptive threshold of 10 percent for the Equal Protection Clause. Further, this court has supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 to hear state law claim because it forms part of the same case or controversy. The Washington County Commissioners may be able to show that Mead simply has her facts wrong, or they may be able justify the deviation in the county council districts' population. For now, however, Mead has alleged facts sufficient to move forward with this claim.
II. County Commissioner Districts
When drawing county commissioner districts, commissioners in counties like Washington must:
divide the county into three (3) districts that are composed of contiguous territory and are reasonably compact. The district boundaries drawn by the executive must not cross precinct boundary lines and must divide townships only when a division is clearly necessary to accomplish redistricting under this section.
Ind. Code § 36-2-2-4(a). Commissioners must reside in their respective districts, but there is a critical difference in the way commissioners are elected compared county council members. The voters of the entire county vote in all three commissioner district elections. Ind. Code § 36-2-2-5(d). Under Indiana law, there is no requirement that these commissioner districts have identical or even similar populations. In her complaint, plaintiff claims that the Washington County Commissioners were required to follow Ind. Code § 36-2-2-4(d), which demands commissioners draw districts with equal population. However, § 36-2-2-4(d) only applies to counties with populations like Lake and St. Joseph, which have single-member commissioner districts requiring similar populations. See Ind. Code § 36-2-2-4(b), § 36-2-2-4(c), and § 36-2-2-4(d).
Indiana Code § 36-2-2-4 provides in its entirety:
(a) This subsection does not apply to a county having a population of:
(1) more than four hundred thousand (400,000) but less than seven hundred thousand (700,000); or
(2) more than two hundred thousand (200,000) but less than three hundred thousand (300,000).
The executive shall divide the county into three (3) districts that are composed of contiguous territory and are reasonably compact. The district boundaries drawn by the executive must not cross precinct boundary lines and must divide townships only when a division is clearly necessary to accomplish redistricting under this section. If necessary, the county auditor shall call a special meeting of the executive to establish or revise districts.
(b) This subsection applies to a county having a population of more than four hundred thousand (400,000) but less than seven hundred thousand (700,000). A county redistricting commission shall divide the county into three (3) single-member districts that comply with subsection (d). The commission is composed of:
(1) the members of the Indiana election commission;
(2) two (2) members of the senate selected by the president pro tempore, one (1) from each political party; and
(3) two (2) members of the house of representatives selected by the speaker, one (1) from each political party.
The legislative members of the commission have no vote and may act only in an advisory capacity. A majority vote of the voting members is required for the commission to take action. The commission may meet as frequently as necessary to perform its duty under this subsection. The commission's members serve without additional compensation above that provided for them as members of the Indiana election commission, the senate, or the house of representatives.
(c) This subsection applies to a county having a population of more than two hundred thousand (200,000) but less than three hundred thousand (300,000). The executive shall divide the county into three (3) single-member districts that comply with subsection (d).
(d) single-member districts established under subsection (b) or (c) must:
(1) be compact, subject only to natural boundary lines (such as railroads, major highways, rivers, creeks, parks, and major industrial complexes);
(2) contain, as nearly as is possible, equal population; and
(3) not cross precinct lines.
Because the county commissioners are each elected by the voters of the entire county, the differences in district populations do not violate the Equal Protection Clause. See Dallas County v. Reese, 421 U.S. 477, 480 (1975) (reinstating district court decision upholding the constitutionality of unequal populations in county commissioner districts where entire county voted on commissioners). A commissioner in this election scheme represents the interests not just of the members of his or her residence district but of every person who elects him or her. Id at 479-80. This is not to say that every possible district map would be constitutional. The Supreme Court has cautioned in a similar case with residence districts where voting is by the larger jurisdiction:
As the plan becomes effective, if it then operates to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population, it will be time enough to consider whether the system still passes constitutional muster.Id. at 480, quoting Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S. 112, 117 (1967). To mount a successful challenge to this type of scheme, however, a plaintiff would need to allege and prove that the particular arrangement impermissibly dilutes the voting strength of an identifiable group. Dallas County, 421 U.S. at 480.
The Seventh Circuit has applied these principles to Indiana's county commissioner election scheme. In La Porte County Republican Committee v. Board of Com'rs, 43 F.3d 1126 (7th Cir. 1994). Plaintiffs in La Porte County alleged that the county commissioners drew the commissioner district lines for political purposes and sought relief under the theory recognized in Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986). Citing Dallas County, 421 U.S. at 480, the court noted that for residence districts, "a challenge to the borders requires proof that `a plan in fact operates impermissibly to dilute the voting strength of an identifiable element of the voting population.'" La Porte County Republican Committee, 43 F.3d at 1129. Because the entire county voted on commissioners, there was no frustration of "the will of a majority (or even a minority) of voters." Id. at 1128. Regardless of where the district lines were drawn, every voter in La Porte County had equal say in choosing all three commissioners.
The Seventh Circuit in La Porte County ultimately reversed the dismissal of the case. Although the court agreed that plaintiffs' complaint was insufficient to support a claim for "one person, one vote" or political gerrymandering, it held that the complaint supported a claim for denial of access to the ballot. The court found that allegations that the district lines had been drawn repeatedly to prohibit specific candidates from running were sufficient to state a claim under the Equal Protection Clause. 43 F.3d at 1129-30.
Mead's claim must fail under the reasoning of Dallas County and La Porte County. County commissioners districts in Washington County, like those in La Porte County, are residence districts that determine who may run in an election, not who may vote. Through her vote, Mead, like every voter in Washington County, has an equal say in selecting all three Washington County Commissioners though only one may live in her district.
Unlike plaintiffs in La Porte County, Mead has not alleged that the commissioner district lines were redrawn to exclude particular candidates. Neither has Mead alleged that any identifiable group has had its voting strength diluted by the Washington County Commissioner districts. She alleges only that the district lines have not been redrawn at all and that the districts have unequal populations. However, this practice does not violate the one person, one vote principle under the Equal Protection Clause.
This court has supplemental jurisdiction over Mead's state law challenge to the county commissioner districts. Her challenge is based on a simple misreading of the applicable statute. The requirement in Indiana Code § 36-2-2-4(d) that county commissioner districts "contain, as nearly as is possible, equal population," applies only to counties with populations of more than 200,000 and less than 300,000 or of more than 400,000 and less than 700,000. Because the state law claim is clearly without merit, the court can spare state courts the trouble of deciding the question by exercising supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, and dismissing the claim. See Van Harken v. Chicago, 103 F.3d 1346, 1354 (7th Cir. 1997).
For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion to dismiss the amended complaint is granted with respect to the challenges to the county commissioner districts and denied with respect to the challenges to the county council districts. Defendants' motion for a hearing on the motion is denied, for the parties' briefs have explained their positions sufficiently.
So ordered.