" McVey v. Pritt , 218 W. Va. 537, 540-41, 625 S.E.2d 299, 302-03 (2005).
"It is not the prerogative of this Court to arbitrarily disregard the plain meaning of clearly written statutes." McVey v. Pritt , 218 W. Va. 537, 540, 625 S.E.2d 299, 302 (2005). This Court has noted that the Legislature routinely uses terms like "shall" when it intends to give a mandatory direction.
"It is not the prerogative of this Court to arbitrarily disregard the plain meaning of clearly written statutes." McVey v. Pritt , 218 W. Va. 537, 540, 625 S.E.2d 299, 302 (2005). Instead, "the words of a statute are to be given their ordinary and familiar significance and meaning, and regard is to be had for their general and proper use."
We have held on a number of occasions that "[t]his court `cannot rewrite [a] statute so as to provide relief . . . nor can we interpret the statute in a manner inconsistent with the plain meaning of the words.'" McVey v. Pritt, 218 W. Va. 537, 540-41, 625 S.E.2d 299, 302-03 (2005) (quoting VanKirk v. Young, 180 W. Va. 18, 20, 375 S.E.2d 196, 198 (1988)). Accord Dunlap v. Friedman's, Inc., 213 W. Va. 394, 398, 582 S.E.2d 841, 845 (2003) ("[T]his Court cannot substitute its own judgment for that of the legislature and significantly rewrite the statute."