Hudson argues that the only way to read § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) as mandating a five-year sentence for possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking on top of his ten-year sentence for the drug trafficking is to ignore § 924(c)(1)(A)'s exception for "any other provision of law." Hudson's appellate counsel concedes that Hudson faces an uphill battle in pursuing this argument: his brief acknowledges that we held in United States v. Easter, 553 F.3d 519, 524-27 (7th Cir. 2009) (per curiam), cert. denied sub nom., McKay v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 1281, ___ L.Ed.2d ___, and McSwain v. United States, No. 08-9560, ___ U.S. ___, ___ S.Ct. ___, ___ L.Ed.2d ___, 2010 WL 4811788 (Nov. 29, 2010), that § 924(c)(1)(A)'s language "any other provision of law" did not include underlying crimes such as Hudson's conviction for possession with intent to distribute. Easter rested on the published opinions from four other circuits, which all held that the "any other provision of law" clause did not refer to the underlying drug trafficking crime or crime of violence.