Opinion
No. 05-04-00268-CR
Opinion Filed January 4, 2005. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.
On Appeal from the 296th Judicial District Court, Collin County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 296-80056-93. Affirm.
Before Justices WRIGHT, FITZGERALD, and LANG-MIERS.
OPINION
A jury convicted Stephen Raynard McPherson of indecency with a child and assessed punishment at three years' confinement, probated for ten years, and a $5000 fine. Eight years later, the State moved to revoke appellant's community supervision, alleging appellant violated the terms of probation. After a hearing on appellant's plea of not true, the trial court found the allegations true, revoked appellant's community supervision, and assessed punishment at three years' confinement and a $5000 fine. In five points of error, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his community supervision. We affirm the trial court's judgment. Appellate review of a probation revocation is limited to a determination of whether the trial court abused its discretion. We examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's findings. See Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493-94 (Tex.Crim.App. 1984); Lee v. State, 952 S.W.2d 894, 897 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1997, no pet.) (en banc). The State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the probationer violated the terms and conditions of his probation. Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 874 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993); Lee, 952 S.W.2d at 901. In a revocation proceeding, the trial judge is the sole trier of the facts, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to be given the testimony. See Lee, 952 S.W.2d at 897. Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his community supervision based on mere technicalities at the end of a ten-year probationary period. Appellant argues there was insufficient evidence to show he knowingly and intentionally violated the terms of his community supervision. The State responds the trial court properly exercised its discretion in revoking appellant's community supervision because appellant violated the terms of his community supervision. We agree with the State. One of the allegations in the State's motion to revoke was that appellant failed to report monthly by mail. At the revocation hearing, Mercedes Sabal testified she provided indirect supervision of appellant's probation because appellant resided in Kentucky. According to probation records, appellant failed to report by mail in October and November of 2001 and from January 2002 through March 2003. Appellant admitted that he failed to report by mail in October and November 2001. Appellant testified he did not report by mail because he was in jail in Kentucky. Appellant presented no evidence that he was not permitted to write letters while in jail. We conclude the evidence is sufficient to show appellant violated the terms of his community supervision by failing to report by mail. Proof of one violation is sufficient to support revocation. See Lee, 952 S.W.2d at 900. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking appellant's probation. See Lee, 952 S.W.2d at 901. We overrule appellant's points of error. We affirm the trial court's judgment.